State, named John Birch, who was killed by the Communists over there about the time the war against Japan ended, and they were replete with references about the puppet troops, and I was waiting your appearance to clear up what puppet troops were.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I should like to pay tribute right now to John Birch, because that boy was a hero, an unsung hero. That chap was parachuted down behind the Japanese lines by myself during the war. That was done with lots of boys, but that chap was coming back to my headquartears to report what he had seen after the war was over, and he was set upon by a group of Communists. They were not puppet troops; they were Communist troops.

I had a long discussion with Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung about this matter and asked them to report to me what disciplinary action they took against the responsible individuals who killed Birch. Birch's action was very fine, and he was a credit to his State and to his country.

Chairman RUSSELL. Thank you, sir. I am sure his family will appreciate that.

General WEDEMEYER. But the puppet troops, sir

Chairman RUSSELL. And I do, as a representative of the State from whence he came.

THE PUPPET TROOPS

General WEDEMEYER. The puppet troops-whoever is alluding to puppet troops in China at this time may be referring to the Chinese Communist troops that were out in splinter troops in isolated places. You asked me what areas the Chinese Communists controlled at war's end, and I told you a limited area with its center at Yenan. But there were little groups of Chinese Communists all over China, little parties of them, even in the southeastern part, down in Kwangai Province near Canton. But most of their effort was directed toward the north and the northeast, and obviously with the ultimate objective. Manchuria-the control of Manchuria. And there must have been connivance, prior connivance, with the Soviet Communists because it was no time at all before the Chinese Communists were pouring into Manchuria and receiving the arms of the Japanese that had been turned over to the Soviet armies in that area.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, getting back for a moment to the puppet troops, I had assumed that perhaps they were Chinese or Manchurians who had been armed by the Japanese to uphold the fiction of government by some Chinaman.

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. In Manchuria or elsewhere.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes. There was a Chinese general, his name being Wang, who was a puppet leader for the Japanese. I understand now. I am sorry; I did not get it. I was stupid.

And there were puppet troops that operated particularly in the early stages of the war, Mr. Chairman, before I really got over there. They were not a significant group when I got there.

Wang had been liquidated. I do not know whether he was killed but at least he was out of the picture. The Japanese tried to maintain as many Chinese as they could. They armed, equipped, and tried to employ them, particularly, sir, in labor roles more than in military

roles because they did not have too much confidence in their fighting qualities.

Chairman RUSSELL. When did you return to the States after the Japanese surrender?

General WEDEMEYER. President Truman ordered me home in September, Mr. Chairman. In September he ordered the Ambassador home also, Ambassador Hurley. We discussed problems in China, French Indochina, and Manchuria.

Chairman RUSSELL. September of 1945?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman RUSSELL. And you returned to your command after that? General WEDEMEYER. I was home 1 week and flew right back and resumed command of the theater.

Chairman RUSSELL. When were you given another assignment? General WEDEMEYER. May of 1946, sir.

ESTIMATING COMMUNIST STRENGTH

Chairman RUSSELL. At the time you left China in May of 1946 what was the strength of the Communist movement in China as compared to the end of the war in 1945.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, now, of course, any figures that are given to you, sir, are going to be highly conjectural.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I did not mean down to the last man, General; but as to the extent of areas under their control, and whether it had increased in strength, and so on.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir. I think a conservative estimate would be about 3 million. I think that is a fair estimate of people who were supporting the Chinese Communist movement and were affiliated with the Chinese military.

Now, the Chinese Communist military would work in the fields and then would don a uniform and take a rifle and fight, and then the next day might be working in the fields again, in the rice paddies.

Chairman RUSSELL. Had they extended their control to any additional areas than those they held at the end of the war?

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, yes, sir. They had penetrated to Jehol Province in the vicinity of Peking and they had begun to pour into Manchuria and Kalgan, a very important western town west of Peking. The extent of their control, both territorially and by numbers, was increasing.

Chairman RUSSELL. Well, I am sorry, my time has expired.

Senator Connally?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Wiley?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator George.

CHINESE COOPERATION WITH WEDEMEYER

Senator GEORGE. General, were there any of the so-called Chinese war lords with any considerable numbers of troops at any point in China when you went over in 1944?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. Among the leaders of the Chinese Nationalist forces, Senator George, I received quite good cooperation.

I didn't sense that any former Chinese war lord would refuse to carry out my instructions.

Some of them were a little reluctant to accept my instructions at first. That was natural. I was a foreigner and new to them and they were not sure of my purposes. The Generalissimo I think was a little standoffish at first. He had had an unfortunate experience with my predecessor, but gradually confidence was restored and a fine relationship was created.

I received, therefore, I can state to you, friendly cooperation from these men and it increased; it was better as time went on.

At war's end I felt that we were beginning to put spirit, fighting spirit and determination into the Chinese military forces. I found them quite lethargic and apathetic when I went over there in September of 1944, quite discouraged.

Senator GEORGE. Do you mean by that the Chinese forces, the Nationalist forces?

General WEDEMEYER. I do, sir; yes, sir. I had very little contact with the Chinese Communist forces.

MARSHALL'S DIRECTIVE ON CHINESE MISSION

Senator GEORGE. Were you in China when General Marshall went over?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I was commanding the theater when he arrived in December of 1945, sir.

Senator GEORGE. December of 1945?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you talk with him, General?

General WEDEMEYER. Oh, I met him at the airport and gave him the usual military honors, sir. I took him to the Cathay Hotel and put him up in his rooms there, and then I discussed that evening his directive. He indicated his mission in China.

Senator GEORGE. Were you in continuous close touch with him while he was in China?

General WEDEMEYER. Up to the time of my departure, Senator George, I was in close contact with him either by radio or personal contact. About once a week I flew to Chungking to see him and to talk to the Generalissimo.

The bulk of my work, Senator, my greatest responsibility, was to repatriate these 3,000,000 Japanese subsequent to war's end, and therefore I had headquarters in Shanghai, but I moved up to Chungking where the Generalissimo was and where General Marshall was. moved up there--I would fly up there about once a week, sir, and I had frequent contacts with him and discussions concerning the developing situation.

Senator GEORGE. When did you leave China?

General WEDEMEYER. May of 1946, sir.

Senator GEORGE. In May of 1946?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. General Marshall was there during the entire year of 1946; is that right?

General WEDEMEYER. He came home, I believe, sir

Senator GEORGE. He came home in March or April.

General WEDEMEYER. March and April of 1946, but he went back.

Senator GEORGE. But he went back; that is correct.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Now how did General Marshall interpret to you his directive, General?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, I read it, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You read it?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And what was your interpretation of it?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, his directive substantially required him to broaden the base of the Government, as I recall the phraseologybroaden the base of the Government, and visualized the amalgamation of the Communist and Nationalist forces, and I had had a very wonderful relationship with General Marshall during the first 3 years of the war, sir, and then of course I was sent out in 1943 to be a part of the command there with Lord Louis Montbatten, as the chairman just indicated, and I wasn't as closely associated with the general from that time on, but because of that wonderful relationship that I had enjoyed earlier, I told him very frankly that in my judgment he could not accomplish that mission.

His mission was one that I thought was just like mixing oil and water, sir. I explained to him that from my observation there, the Nationalist forces, as the chairman has developed in his questioning, at war's end controlled the largest area and the most people in China. They had the most power, and they were determined not to relinquish any of that power.

My observations further indicated at that time that the Communists had a little power, and they were determined to have all of itall of it.

Senator GEORGE. But you regarded the amalgamation of the two forces as impossible?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I did, sir.

Senator GEORGE. And you discussed that frankly with General Marshall?

General WEDEMEYER. I did, sir.

COMMANDERS' ATTITUDE TOWARD FORMOSA

Senator GEORGE. Now, General, with regard to Formosa, was it your understanding that the naval and military commanders in China. regarded Formosa as vital to a defense of the western area of the Far East?

General WEDEMEYER. You mean the American

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir; the American leaders, military leaders, I am speaking of now.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

I don't want to be too semantic in my discussion with you, sir; but the word "vital" to means "mortal."

I am telling you that because when I accepted responsibility here in the Department, I found that we were in agreement with certain allies that a certain area was vital to our security, and I disagreed with that. It was important to our security, but "vital" meant "mortal," and that would mean that we would put all our resources into retaining that area, so I differentiated.

I think that Formosa was considered, among the people with whom I discussed Formosa, as very important to our security. It was an element, an important segment in a chain of bases right along off the coast that enabled us to neutralize any offensive action on the part of a potential enemy.

Senator GEORGE. Yes, sir.

You talked with General MacArthur

General WEDEMEYER. Many times, sir.

I would like to say, here, because I knew, I learned early that I was going to appear as a witness, and I haven't talked to a Senator, to General MacArthur, to Democrats or Republicans, or anyone, or any newspaper people, since I learned that I might come here.

I wanted to be able to express my personal views without any influence on one side or another.

Senator GEORGE. I am speaking of the time when you were in China.

General WEDEMEYER. Many times;. yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You saw him?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. You knew his views about Formosa?

General WEDEMEYER. I did, sir.

Senator GEORGE. There was never any question or doubt or equivocation about his views of the great importance of Formosa, was there?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; not in my judgment.

Senator GEORGE. In your judgment?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Did you discuss Formosa with General Marshall; did that ever become a subject of discussion?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. I don't recall ever discussing Formosa with General Marshall.

Senator GEORGE. You discussed General Marshall's directive, his mission there, and you had a very clear idea of that mission, as you have described it to us today. Is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Senator GEORGE. Thank you very much, General.
Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Bridges?

ANSWERING CONGRESSMAN MARTIN'S LETTER

Senator BRIDGES. General Wedemeyer, if you had been in General MacArthur's position, and received a letter from Congressman Joe Martin, what action would you have taken?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, Senator, I would like to preface what I am going to tell you by saying that, first, General MacArthur occupies a unique position, in my judgment, in this country.

He is a generation ahead of me in the military hierarchy.

He has had positions of great responsibility which involved not only military responsibility, but included diplomatic, political, and economic responsibilities; so, his actions in answering Representative Martin's letter, and the manner in which he did it, might be influenced by that unique position that he occupies.