4. Establishment of a procedure with SCAP, "MacArthur," that is, "for rate of reception and grouping of Japanese to provide for proper port of discharge in Japanesehomeland."

5. Possibility of utilizing either Chinese or Japanese crews to replace United States crews in toto or in part as conditions warrant.

6. Necessary berthing, servicing, and administrative arrangements for Liberties, including minimum arrangements necessary to make into personnel carriers for Japanese type of passenger.

7. Possibility of employing LST's now in western Pacific crewed by Japanese. The above factors suggest the need for immediate conference by addressees of this message.

Request comments of all action addressees to JCS.

And that, gentlemen, is what caused the conference in Tokyo, between MacArthur, Wedemeyer, and Spruance, and we had our subordinates with us, and we considered this proposition of repatriating three million Japanese, and moving the Chinese forces from the coast up to fill the vacua in Manchuria and

Chairman RUSSELL. Who signed that?

General WEDEMEYER. That was sent to all the addressees, COMGENCHINA, CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, Commander in Chief, Pacific, and MacArthur. Everyone got a copy, and it was sent by the War Chief of Staff, and Chief of Naval Operations.

REFERENCE TO UNIFIED CHINA IN TELEGRAM

Senator MCMAHON. Now, General, I quote from your reply, your joint reply, as given in your statement of today:

It is suggested that the United States assistance to China as outlined above be made available as a basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and to effect a compromise between the major opposing groups in order to promote a unified democratic China.

There was nothing in what you read us, General, about promoting a unified democratic China, was there, in that message that you have just read us?

General WEDEMEYER. I don't believe so, sir. May I interject there, sir? The thought was, though, implicit in that massage that we were continuing support of the Chinese Central Government, sir, the Chinese Central Government.

Senator MCMAHON. I think that is the theme that runs through it. General WEDEMEYER. That is right.

Senator MCMAHON. When you answered,

It is suggested that the United States assistance to China

you meant assistance to the Chinese National Government, headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

General WEDEMEYER. That is right.

Senator MCMAHON (reading):

As outlined above be made available as a basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and to effect a compromise between the major opposing groups—

now, who were they?

General WEDEMEYER. The major opposing groups were unquestionably the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

Senator MCMAHON. As you have said, I believe, earlier, in the assistance there was no assistance that was being made available to the Chinese Communists, no material was being furnished the Chinese Communists.

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir, not by the Americans. Senator MCMAHON. That is right.

General WEDEMEYER. There was assistance being made to the Chinese Communists from other sources.

Senator MCMAHON. But I am talking from the United States. General WEDEMEYER. Not by the Americans, sir; except that medical supply.

Senator MCMAHON. You advocated that our aid be so used, made available as a basis for negotiation by the American Ambassador to bring together and to effect a compromise between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist forces, because you said those are the major opposing groups.

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir.

Senator MCMAHON. And your objectives were to promote a unified democratic China.

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir.
Senator MCMAHON. That you agree.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

REASON FOR URGING UNIFICATION AT THAT TIME

Senator MCMAHON. NOW, General Marshall, of course, went to China with the ambition at least to accomplish the unification of the country and in order to promote a unified democratic China, did he not?

General WEDEMEYER. That is right.

Senator MCMAHON. And so to that extent, at least, as shown by this telegram, you agreed with the spirit of that mission.

General WEDEMEYER. There is no question about it, sir.

Senator MCMAHON. I see. You did not, however, have any very high hopes for its success.

General WEDEMEYER. Senator McMahon, I didn't feel that you could coalesce Communist forces and the Kuomintang.

As stated this morning, they were just antithetical in their approach and views.

Senator MCMAHON. That is what makes it difficult

General WEDEMEYER. May I say something there?

The Chinese Communist forces were strategically more favorably disposed in the north of China than were the Chinese Nationalist forces at war's end to reoccupy those vacua that were critical to the continued economy of the country; they were in northeast China, in Chahar, in Jehol, in those Provinces to the northeast, where the main line of communications and your cities were and your ports that were essential to the economy of China. The rice-producing area had been under the control of Japan.

Now, when these vacua occurred, my effort had been to put Chinese Nationalist forces in there so that you could begin to build up the economy of the Nationalist Government. If we did not move these forces up there quickly and did not move them up there without restraint, we would not accomplish that.

Actualy, when we began to move, either by air or by ship, Chinese Nationalist troops to this area-are you listening to me, sir? Senator MCMAHON. Sure.

General WEDEMEYER. All right, sir. When we began to move up there, obstacles were put in our way by the Chinese Communists. They began to shoot at the transport planes I was flying in there.

Now, if the American Ambassador could sit down with Mao Tsetung, the Communist leader, and with Chiang Kai-shek and tell him, "Here is what we propose to do, and we Americans are going definitely on continuing our support to the Nationalist Government, and this is the way we are doing it-we would prefer to have the Chinese Communist collaborate and cooperate to maintain peace down there"-I give you my word from the bottom of my heart that is what was in my mind then and I had no other idea, because I can state this, Senator, that I sent back to the Department radios indicating my view that the Communists were determined to get all the power-radio after radio, and I can personally confirm that, and you can see numerous radios from the Department of Defense indicating that while I was in that theater I was concerned about the Communists. But then when fighting the Japanese I did nothing about that. I stayed out of it and concentrated on the military-but after the war, I was thrown into it by the generalissimo's appeal to me for advice and help and also by my own Government's directive.

Senator MCMAHON. General, I believe you said General Chiang Kai-shek's government was unfortunately corrupt and inefficient. I believe you said that.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, I did, Senator MaMahon. But may I say, sir, I think it is dangerous to overemphasize that-and I believe I did. I believe I made a mistake in 1947 in emphasizing that, because we find corruption in our own Government-and it was inevitable with a government that was down and out economically.

Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator McMahon. Senator McMAHON. Thank you.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, a question of procedure. Chairman RUSSELL, Yes, sir.

Senator SALTONSTALL. I would like to ask unanimous consent that the telegram that General Wedemeyer read to Senator McMahon be put in the record as one without interruptions. I think it would be much easier and clearer to read.

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

TELEGRAM OF NOVEMBER 30, 1945, FROM JCS TO COMMANDER IN FAR EAST

(The document above referred to is as follows:)

Under consideration by the State Department is a restatement of United States policy, which if approved, will result in a new directive to commanding general, United States forces, China theater, along the following lines:

The commanding general, United States forces, China theater, after coordination with SCAP, will probably be responsible to make necessary arrangements with the Chinese authorities for repatriation of Japanese from the China theater. The United States will furnish assistance in the form of military supplies and advice to the Chinese authorities. The United States marines will probably remain in north China for the time being for the purpose of assisting in the repatriation of Japanese nationals, military and civil, from that area, the duration of such employment to be subect to future directives from the JCS. It is intended that they would be more or less confined in their employment to holding ports or beachheads.

To effect the above and also to assist the Chinese Central Government in reestablishing control of the liberated areas of North China and Manchuria, the United States will furnish transportation for additional Chinese troops. It is

emphasized that neither the policy nor the directive given above has yet been approved.

To assist you, 100 Liberty-type ships can be made available to COMGENCHINA at the rate of 50 ships per month. If needed, a greater number may be made available.

Your use of these ships depends upon following factors:

1. These Liberty ships are now awaiting discharge in AFPAC and their time of availability is contingent upon capability to discharge. This requires selection of ships based on cargo utilization or possible sale. Some of these ships are now loaded with supplies that might well be used by Chinese Army. Particularly pertinent in this connection is ammunition requirements of Chinese forces. Would you desire to have ammunition dumps or depots established at Chingwangtao, Tientisin, Tsingtao, or Shanghai by shipment from Philippines or Okinawa direct and thus avoid long air flights of munitions from Yunan?

2. Temporary accommodations for repatriated personnel to be installed by China theater at ports.

3. COMGENCHİNA would be responsible for making necessary arrangements with the Chinese for delivery of personnel to ships.

4. Establishment of a procedure with SCAP for rate of reception and grouping of Japanese to provide for proper port of discharge in Japanese homeland.

5. Possibility of utilizing either Chinese or Japanese crews to replace United States crews in toto or in part as conditions warrant.

6. Necessary berthing, servicing, and administrative arrangements for Liberties including minimum arrangements necessary to make into personnel carriers for Japanese type of passenger.

7. Possibility of employing LST's now in western Pacific crewed by Japanese. The above factors suggest the need for immediate conference by addressees of this message.

Requests comments of all action addressees to JCS.

End.

AGREEMENT ON LANGUAGE IN REPLY TELEGRAM, DECEMBER 1945 Chairman CONNALLY. Mr. Chairman, in that connection may I ask one question of the general?

Chairman RUSSELL. Is there objection? The Chair hears none. Chairman CONNALLY. Did you authorize this telegram purportedly sent by you and Admiral Spruance and General MacArthur?

General WEDEMEYER. The three of us did, sir. We concurred in that radiogram.

Chairman CONNALLY. That is what I wanted to know. I wanted to know if you agreed to that telegram.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.

Chairman CONNALLY. I heard some say that you did not agree to

that.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir, and I read in the newspaper-and this is a little unfair possibly to allude to it. I don't know. Spruance apparently has been asked by correspondents who initiated this idea, Senator Connally, who initiated this idea in the last paragraph here.

Actually an admiral named Barbey initiated the idea. My memory is absolutely clear on it. He initiated this thought here and I agreed to it.

Chairman CONNALLY. The agreement is the important thing.
General WEDEMEYER. I agreed to it, that is right.

Chairman CONNALLY. The initiation of it is not important. General WEDEMEYER. Only this, sir, that I never went along with any idea of a coalition government, Senator Connally. You have heard me talk before here.

Chairman CONNALLY. But you authorized this telegram.

General WEDEMEYER. I did, and if you interpret that as meaning a coalition government

Chairman CONNALLY. No, I haven't interpreted it at all. I just wanted to remove any doubt. I understood somebody said you had not authorized it.

sir.

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir, I authorized it.

Chairman CONNALLY. One of your subordinates signed it?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; General Wedemeyer authorized that,

Chairman RUSSELL. All right. Senator Kefauver? (No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Knowland.

Senator KNOWLAND. General, this morning in your testimony before I arrived back from California I noticed on page 6088 of the transcript a question had been asked you I believe by Senator Bridges as to what possibly you might have done had your advice been asked on this situation in Korea, and you gave an explanation based on the facts that you now have as to steps that you possibly would have taken.

SOVIET POLICY AT OUTBREAK OF KOREAN CONFLICT

In view of that testimony, I would like to ask whether or not you have given any thought to the situation that found the Soviet Union absent from the Security Council in June of last year.

Most of the testimony before this committee now rather clearly indicates that what the North Koreans did was done in conjunction and in cooperation with both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. Obviously the Soviet Union must have had advance notice that the North Korean Communists were going to move across the thirty-eighth parallel.

Now had they really wanted to prevent United Nations action, they would have probably had ample time to get Mr. Malik back to the Security Council so that he could veto any action. He wasn't present.

Have you given any thought to whether or not he might have been absent by design rather than by accident for the purpose of getting us deeply involved in Korea?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I have, and I have discussed that with friends out on the west coast but it was just an unofficial discussion in my home or in some friend's home.

I inclined to that belief and I don't think it is too conjectural because it is a pattern that they follow, a pattern of chicanery, Machiavellian maneuver, and that has been the policy of the Soviet diplomacy. It is not dependable. There is no stability and it is all operating to accomplish their objectives. Their objectives, not world peace.

Senator KNOWLAND. In other words, they would possibly have had two alternatives, either one of which would be highly satisfactory to them. By being away it was almost inevitable that the United Nations would act. Having acted, we would be involved.

If we were involved, they had an opportunity if successful of pushing us out of Korea, in which case they would gain great prestige and we would lose great prestige in the Far East.

If they were not successful in that alternative, if they could tie us down in a prolonged stalemate using our best troops where they were using their second or third team for a prolonged period of time, they would get some advantage out of that alternative as well, is that generally correct?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir.