A few days later I received a communication to the effect that that report would be top secret and would not be divulged, and I think the members of my mission did a fine job in keeping quiet about it. I think it was a well-kept secret for many years.

Senator CAIN. It was indeed, sir, and I think Members of the Congress who have been curious in recent years can testify to that.

The chief assignment before this committee, General Wedemeyer, as I understand it, is that we seek to study all of the facts related to the Far Eastern question.

STATE DEPARTMENT SUGGESTIONS ON WEDEMEYER REPORT

With that assignment in mind, I wonder if it would be possible for this committee to determine those portions of your report which Mr. Butterworth, as head of the Far Eastern Section of the State Department, thought might be embarrassing to this Government in order that we can study them and come to our own determination.

General WEDEMEYER. Well, as I recall it, sir, it was that part of my report—and I thought it was very important-pertaining to the establishment of a guardianship in Manchuria and a trusteeship in Korea.

My purpose was to create a buffer-to create a buffer-in those areas, where we would be able to preclude unilateral action on the part of Soviet-inspired or Soviet-controlled or Soviet-supported elements in the Far East.

That buffer would have denied the Soviets the opportunity to penetrate effectively to the south. That idea had been recommended earlier, as I tell you. Right after the war I made that recommendation to Chiang Kai-shek, because I didn't think he had the capability of carrying on in Manchuria; although his sovereignty had been recognized, he didn't have the resources to exercise that sovereignty in Manchuria immediately after the war. My purpose, of course, was to establish a guardianship. I didn't use the word "trusteeship" because I thought guardianship, the connotation of that would not be quite so objectionable to the Chinese.

Now, that in my judgment was the most important element of my report, both for Korea and for Manchuria. I think if the United States had implemented that idea, it would have been a changed picture today in the Far East, the whole situation, in my judgment, would have been different.

Senator CAIN. General-I beg your pardon. Had you completed your answer?

General WEDEMEYER. Not quite, sir.

The State Department, I believe, objected to that, because they said that Russia was a member of the guardianship. Well, the only way I could get Russia out of the guardianship was to fight a war, and I was trying to avoid a war.

I had to accept the fait accompli and include them in the guardianship, but at least I was denying them an opportunity to exploit their position in unilaterally evolving this guardianship in Manchuria and the trusteeship in Korea.

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, some of us occasionally suffer from a lack of patience and would like to conclude our hearings. All of us want to conclude these hearings as soon as we are convinced that all the information and facts are available to us.

But I point out what to me is most provocative, that after almost 6 weeks of hearings, you are now telling us that a portion of your report, which in your opinion you considered to be among its most important facets and recommendations, the State Department or one of its officials sought to delete and remove from being considered by this committee and by the Nation as a whole.

General WEDEMEYER. Now, sir, I say that with a great deal of humility. It is just my judgment. I recognized at that time and still do that there were a lot of problems that were confronting the State Department about which I had no knowledge.

Another thing that I recommended was that these actions should be implemented through the United Nations organization, and I did that because we had just recently been criticized for avoiding or evading the United Nations organization in what we did in Greece and Turkey.

If you recall, we were severely criticized by the Soviet in the United Nations for sidetracking the United Nations and taking unilateral action in Greece and Turkey.

So I don't want my Government to be criticized again for similar action, and I recommended that all of this be implemented through that organization under the ageis, you might say, of the United Nations Organization; and it is in consonance with the Charter of the United Nations, this formation of a trusteeship.

Senator CAIN. You were not only qualified as a witness in your own right, in my judgment, General Wedemeyer, but you have been qualified by references made to you by other witnesses before this

committee.

I think that everything you care to say and have to say is of real importance and I am particularly impressed by your recent references to Manchuria and by the solution you sought to impose in that area of the world.

OBJECTIVES IN KOREA

General Wedemeyer, it seems to me at least, this is my chief concern, which has developed during these hearings that since Red China entered the war the United Nations have largely given over the power of decision and the choice of area to our enemies.

On repeated instances the United States, acting as the agent or the Unified Command for the United Nations, has advised Russia, Red China, and the world that we are going to continue a limited operation in Korea.

It seems to me that the limitation to which General MacArthur so forthrightly addressed himself is the best evidence anyone needs to have that it is not now nor is it likely to become the determination of the United Nations to defeat our present enemy, Red China, in a military way.

To what extent, General Wedemeyer, would you agree in that matter, sir?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, the only time that what you might call a holding attack is justified, either tactically or strategically, is to improve your position vis-à-vis the enemy.

ent

This morning, Senator Cain, I don't know whether you were presSenator CAIN. I was, sir.

General WEDEMEYER. But I prefaced my remarks with the statement that I have been away from the Pentagon and all of the inner councils for 2 years.

I don't perhaps unquestionably-don't have the information that your Joint Chiefs of Staff and their respective staffs have upon which to base judgments, and I indicated that I never questioned their. loyalty to country or to principles.

They have made statements to the effect, according to the testimony, that we are buying time.

Therefore I do not feel competent, Senator Cain, to differ with men who, as I stated earlier, I respect, whose judgment I have sometimes differed with, but I don't question their purposes at all.

Now they say we are buying time, and I think that this committee ought to heed what they say very carefully. They are all very fine, competent men.

Senator CAIN. General Wedemeyer, I understood you, sir, this morning to say that in your opinion that once a theater commander has been given a mission, he necessarily ought to be given the authority to carry that mission out.

General WEDEMEYER. Unrestricted.

Senator CAIN. Did I understand you right?
General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir.

Senator CAIN. On the 10th day of October 1950, the President said to the country that the mission of General MacArthur was that of repelling aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area as called for by the United Nations. Is that your impression of what the allied nations are doing in Korea, General Wedemeyer, to repel aggression and restore peace to all of Korea? General WEDEMEYER. Well, of course, at present, Senator Cain, they are the United Nations forces which are attempting to repel the aggression that occurred on and its initiation June 25, 1950.

They are attempting to repel that aggression, and the battle surges back and forth, losses being sustained on both sides, but nothing definitive resulting from these actions, nothing definitive in a military sense. In a psychological sense, the longer this draws out, in my judgment, the more we lose psychologically in the world. Senator CAIN. I thank you, General.

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Tobey?

(No response.)

Chairman RUSSELL. Senator Sparkman?

WEDEMEYER MEMORANDUM TO STATE DEPARTMENT ON FORMOSA, AUGUST 1949

Senator SPARKMAN. General Wedemeyer, first I want to ask you with reference to this memorandum or whatever it was, that the State Department put out on December 23, 1949, I believe it was-General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; that is the date; yes, sir.

to?

Senator SPARKMAN. You know what it was that I have reference

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; that is the memorandum. Senator SPARKMAN. Now, as you said in the beginning of your statement this morning, Secretary Acheson, I believe it was, stated that that was put out following a suggestion from you.

I believe, later, in answer to a question put to him by the Chairman of this Joint Committee, Senator Russell, he stated that that suggestion from you was in writing, but I do not believe it has been produced yet.

Do you have a copy of it or, if not, I will ask the chairman to obtain

one for us.

General WEDEMEYER. Now, sir, I have a copy here; I don't know whether I am authorized at this time to put it in.

Senator SPARKMAN. You do not know whether it has been declassified or not?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir; I don't. I didn't know whether you were going to ask me for it, but it is true that I signed a memorandum to the Secretary-Assistant Secretary of State for Public Information, or Public-what do they call it?

Senator SPARKMAN. Public Affairs, wasn't it?

General WEDEMEYER. Public Affairs. It is true that I signed it, sir.

Senator SPARKMAN. That was to Mr. George V. Allen, was it not, who was then Assistant Secretary of State?

General WEDEMEYER. That was his name, that is correct, sir. Senator SPARKMAN. As I recall, the Secretary of State testified to that effect.

General WEDEMEYER. That was August 26, 1949, just before I was relieved of my assignment in the Department.

Senator SPARKMAN. I do not want, Mr. Chairman, to ask for something that is improper, but I wonder if, subject to our security restrictions that the committee has, that could not be read into the record at this point?

Chairman RUSSELL. In the opinion of the Chair it can be, unless General Wedemeyer has a desire to raise some issue with respect to it. General WEDEMEYER. I have no objection.

Senator SPARKMAN. As I understood it, his only reluctance was whether or not it was declassified, and I suggested we would leave it up to the censor, anyhow.

Chairman RUSSELL. We have a procedure to protect the classification of it and, as a matter of fact, the committee declassified the document in question, so

Senator SPARKMAN. We declassified the memorandum; we have not had this letter yet.

Chairman RUSSELL. I understand. Unless General Wedemeyer has some objection to reading it

General WEDEMEYER. I have no objection.

Senator KNOWLAND. There is no cryptographic communication involved in this?

General WEDEMEYER. No, sir. My assistant, Colonel Gilchrist, states that I can read it, and that he will attempt to take care of the declassification with Admiral Davis, so that you can have it as part of your record. Is that all right?

Senator SPARKMAN. I should think that would certainly protect everything.

Chairman RUSSELL. You may proceed.

General WEDEMEYER. This is a memorandum for George V. Allen, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. The date is August 26, 1949. [Reading:]

Subject: Current position of the United States with respect to Formosa. In a memorandum for the executive secretary of the National Security Council the Secretary of State on August 4, 1949, stated that under present circumstances the passage of Formosa under Communist control by external or internal action appears probable—

You remember, gentlemen, earlier this morning that I told you that many communications that I had read in the Department had that statement in it, that the fall of Formosa appears probable.

This is just one reference to it. [Reading:]

since there appears no certain assurance that Formosa can be denied to Communist control by political and economic measures alone

and those are the only measures that were authorized, the political and economic.

Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on August 16 reaffirmed their previous views that overt United States military action to deny Communist domination of Formosa would not be justified. However, I also note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the probabilities of the Formosa situation make it more than ever necessary that every effort be made to forestall any weakening of the over-all United States position with respect to the Philippines, the Ryukyus, and Japan. In Department of the Army consideration of this matter, it appears to be particularly desirable that, should Formosa be lost, this event should have a minimum of ill effects on the governments and peoples of western-oriented nations and particularly those of the Far East. Accordingly, it occurs to me that, if not already instituted, you may desire to consider information measures designed to accomplish this end.

The above suggestion is supplementary to those made from time to time by the Army member of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Staff established in accordance with NSC 4, who has been furnished a copy of this memorandum. I trust you will consider it appropriate for me to bring to your attention such points which may arise in connection with our consideration of matters of the above nature.

A. C. WEDEMEYER,
Lieutenant General,
General Staff Corps.

STATE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION PAPER OF DECEMBER 23, 1949

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. Now, General Wedemeyer, if I recall, the Secretary of State in his testimony relating to this stated that he had informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he did not believe that economic and political measures alone would make it possible to save Formosa from falling; and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed him that no military resources would be available-and I gather that is what you mean there, when you say no overt military aidGeneral WEDEMEYER. I think that it exactly

Senator SPARKMAN. That is a reasonable interpretation, is it not?
General WEDEMEYER. I think so; yes.

Senator SPARKMAN. And it was following that exchange of information that that suggestion was put out?

General WEDEMEYER. That is right, sir, to soften the blow once it fell.

Senator SPARKMAN. Yes. In other words-I have forgotten the language that was used, but it was to slant the news coverage in such