Actually T. V. Soong told me he would not sign such an agreement, and he didn't. Wang Shih-chieh, I believe, did. I believe he was Foreign Minister or Deputy Foreign Minister, who signed the SinoSoviet Pact. I believe I am correct about that, but I am not absolutely certain.

Senator BREWSTER. I think you are right.

General WEDEMEYER. But T. V. Soong stated he would not sign any paper ceding territory whose sovereignty had been recognized. Senator BREWSTER. Then there is no question in your mind that not only the generalissimo but his advisers in the Government all recognized the tragic consequence of the cession of this territory in Manchuria?

General WEDEMEYER. I couldn't use the term "all," sir, because those are the only personalities that I know about right thereChiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong. And I know-I am quite confident that Wang Shih-chieh signed the agreement.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Although T. V. Soong was sent as China's representative, and normally one would expect the senior man to sign the agreement. He refused to do so.

Senator BREWSTER. Although he did participate in the negotiations? General WEDEMEYER. That is hearsay on my part, but I believe he did.

Senator BREWSTER. Would you think then that any attempt to say that the Chinese Nationalist Government embraced the agreement for the cessions in Manchuria with any enthusiasm was quite erroneous? General WEDEMEYER. Well, that is just the antithesis of my own experience with Chinese officials of the highest rank.

Senator BREWSTER. You know of no evidence to indicate that any Chinese officials welcomed this cession of Manchurian territory, is that correct?

General WEDEMEYER. No; that is correct. I can say categorically that is correct.

Senator BREWSTER. As far as your knowledge is concerned they bitterly resented and regretted it?

General WEDEMEYER. As far as I know, that is correct.

JAPANESE SURRENDER OVERTURES DURING WAR

Senator BREWSTER. Did there come to your attention in your activities in the Chinese theater any indications as to the Japanese attitude toward surrender after, let us say, the middle of 1944? There were various rumors

General WEDEMEYER. I personally saw overtures proffered by the Japanese for surrender submitted to the Chinese Government. The generalissimo showed them to me. I saw two on two different occasions, and the terms of the surrender were very favorable to the Chinese Nationalist Government; and the Generalissimo stated to me that he was going to fight alongside his traditional friends, the Americans, to the end. That is all he said. He didn't comment any further, and he didn't ask me for any comment.

Senator BREWSTER. About what period were those, as far as you can recall?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, the first one, sir, was shortly after I took command of the theater, right after New Year's.

Senator BREWSTER. 1944?

General WEDEMEYER. It was the winter of 1944-45, sir; and we were getting pushed around very badly, and I was really worried as to whether or not I was going to be able to stay in China.

The Japanese were pushing us around very badly, and I even evacuated women from Chungking because I learned that there was going to be a parachute drop in the capital by the Japanese, and I knew it would be a very bad situation, so I evacuated all my nurses, and I had a few Wacs there, to Kunming, from which area I could more easily evacuate them. Everything had to be done by air.

It was right after that that I saw the note. The generalissimo showed me a note, and then about June or May, maybe, a few months later, I saw a note.

INTEGRITY OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK

Now, when you say to me-I would just say, frankly, it is possible these notes may have been planted to impress me; I accept that, knowing the oriental philosophy and cunning. But, honestly, in my contacts with this man for 2 years, he found me to be right on top of the desk and he seemed to be responsive to that kind of treatment. I was never discourteous, but I was often very firm with him, and I don't believe that he was guilty of chicanery. It may have been. I don't believe that he was.

Senator BREWSTER. Is his reputation not to the contrary even among many of his most severe critics that Chiang, Generalissimo Chiang, is himself an honest man?

General WEDEMEYER. Well, he is a better Christian than a lot of Americans that I know. He worships every day, every morning. He has a period of silence, and he goes and reads the Bible.

He has had it translated into Chinese; he does not speak English or read English.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, you had very intimate and constant contact with him over a considerable period so that you

General WEDEMEYER. Perhaps, more than any other occidental in the world for 2 years.

Senator BREWSTER (continuing). Had as good an opportunity as any American certainly ever had to form an impression of his character as well as his capacity; and you had no question, as I understand it, as to his integrity of purpose in all of your experience?

General WEDEMEYER. That is correct, sir. I trusted him, and I feel that he was sincere in his desire to really help his people.

There was a period 1927-37-those dates are important, 1927-37known in China as the golden decade, and it was that period that Chiang Kai-shek was in control; and the same group of men whose unscrupulousness and maladministration that Wedemeyer and others have emphasized subsequently-it was during that period that China enjoyed improved communications, a stabilized economy, and even objective foreigners, Americans who lived there for years, will tell you that Chiang Kai-shek was building schools and helping his people during that period.

Now, you recall the Marco Polo incident. The Japanese are supposed to have attacked the Chinese because they saw that China would be unified and consolidated, and that a nationalist feeling was growing, being generated by, or under Chiang Kai-shek's leadership, and that is the reason they precipitated their attack because they were afraid China would become too integrated and too strong and it would disrupt their idea of an Asia coprosperity plan for the Japanese, that they had always wanted to accomplish, and a strong China would have denied that opportunity to them.

Senator BREWSTER. Are you familiar with the book that he has written on the future of China, as he envisages it?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; I have read that, and many others on that subject.

I have just read an excellent book written by Freda Utley, called the China Story, which is excellent, in my judgment, a very objective résumé of the situation out there, and I would commend it to any of the Senators to read.

Senator BREWSTER. Do you consider that a fair and accurate portrayal of the problem?

General WEDEMEYER. In my limited knowledge of all the data she has got there, I don't retain figures in my mind, Senator Brewster, but I think she has given us a very good portrayal of the situation out there now.

CONSEQUENCES OF UNITED STATES EMBARGO, AUGUST 1946 TO MAY 1947

Senator BREWSTER. Now, one of the matters which was developed in that book was developed elsewhere, is this question of the aid to China, and the consequences of the embargo from August 1946 to May 1947; and then the subsequent difficulties in the supply of ammunition. Were the shortages of ammunition one of the very critical problems for the National Government?

General WEDEMEYER. They were, sir; but I never would fail to emphasize, in making a statement, or a reply, that it is the moral rather than the material aid that is important to an army, the spirit of the

army.

Senator BREWSTER. I think that is very interesting; and you have, I think, in all of your reports and everything, emphasized that-that it was the failure of our moral support of what proved to be the only side that we could use to do business with, that greatly weakened them.

SUPPLIES FLOWING TO CHINESE COMMUNISTS

But, there was a material aspect, also; during the 10 months that we embargoed, under General Marshall's direction, the shipment of arms and ammunition to China-did the Communists also pursue a similar embargo of arms and ammunition to the Chinese Communists?

General WEDEMEYER. Any reply that I would give you would be hearsay, sir.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, I realize that.

General WEDEMEYER. I have heard that supplies were continuously flowing into the area from the Russians-from the Soviet. I would like to stop using the term "Russians" because I think the Russian people would be friends to us.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. From the Soviet is what I mean.
Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General WEDEMEYER. Many of the plants-the machine tools and the arsenal equipment in Mukden and in Manchuria-many of those were dismantled and removed, I presume to the maritime provinces of the Soviet. If you read the report, that would be strongly confirmed. And then they continued to manufacture Japanese equipment; that is, with the Japanese dies, and send it back, and one would say, "Well, but the Soviet did not supply those arms; that is Japanese equipment that was taken from the Japanese prisoners."

And considering how quickly equipment wears out in combat and particularly considering the maintenance that the Chinese give, from my experience-well, I am confident that many of the Japanesemarked arms that we captured or had evidence of, were pouring back into there from the maritime provinces.

Senator BREWSTER. Well, were not there very vast stores of Japanese equipment already in Manchuria?

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir, reputedly so. I did not see it with my own eyes. I saw thousands of rifles when I was in Harbin and Mukden and those areas. But when you say "vast stores," I do not know how vast you mean. Now, sir, I am not qualified to state that there were; but it is reasonable to assume there were. And there was a large army of Japanese there prepared to fight and oppose the entrance of the Soviet in the war.

Senator BREWSTER. So it is almost inevitable to conclude that the Japanese would have had very considerable provision against such eventuality.

General WEDEMEYER. Yes, sir; it is reasonable to assume that.

Senator BREWSTER. And also it is reasonable to assume that the Russians or rather the Soviet took that over when they accepted the surrender. Now, as far as you know, to your knowledge, there was no attempt to embargo or restrain the transfer of those to the Chinese Communist forces during the 10 months' period when you were unable to deliver

General WEDEMEYER. The first order published by SCAP, that is the Supreme Allied Command-General MacArthur-the very first order, No. 1, was that all arms and equipment taken from the defeated enemy would be turned over to the Chinese Nationalist Government, and the Soviet representatives in Manchuria received a similar order because SCAP was designated to settle these arrangements, the arrangements in the surrender terms.

I did, so far as I could-the equipment I took away from the Japanese prisoners I turned over to the Chinese Nationalist Government. Chairman RUSSELL. Your time has expired, Senator.

Senator Flanders?

Senator FLANDERS. General, I had to be away yesterday-
Chairman RUSSELL. Senator, pardon me for one statement.

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION, OCTOBER 7, 1950

Examination of Lieutenant Smith's brief discloses that this resolution of the General Assembly of October 7, 1950, has been discussed several times in the course of the hearings but has not been printed

in the record. It is rather short, so we will have it printed in the record at this point.

(The document referred to is as follows:)

UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

October 7, 1950.

Fifth session, agenda item 24.

THE PROBLEM OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF Korea

Resolution adopted by the General Assembly at its Two hundred and ninetyfourth plenary meeting on October 7, 1950 (adopted on the report of the First Committee (A/1422))

The General Assembly, having regard to its resolutions of November 14, 1947 (112 (II)), of December 12, 1948 (195 (III)), and of October 21, 1949 (293 (IV)),

Having received and considered the report of the United Nations Commission on Korea,

Mindful of the fact that the objectives set forth in the resolutions referred to above have not been fully accomplished and, in particular, that the unification of Korea has not yet been achieved, and that an attempt has been by an armed attack from North Korea to extinguish by force the Government of the Republic of Korea,

Recalling the General Assembly declaration of December 12, 1948, that there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea,

Having in mind that United Nations armed forces are at present operating in Korea in accordance with the recommendations of the Security Council of June 27, 1950, subsequent to its resolution of June 25, 1950, that members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions of the General Assembly referred to above was the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government of Korea,

1. Recommends that

(a) All appropriate steps be taken to insure conditions of stability throughout Korea;

(b) All constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea;

(c) All sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, South and North, be invited to cooperate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections, and in the establishment of a unified government;

(d) United Nations forces should not remain in any part of Korea otherwise than so far as necessary for achieving the objectives specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) above;

(e) All necessary measures be taken to accomplish the economic rehabilitation of Korea;

2. Resolves that

(a) A Commission consisting of Australia, Chile, Netherlands, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey, to be known as the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, be established to (i) assume the functions hitherto exercised by the present United Nations Commission in Korea; (ii) represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea; (iii) exercise such responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation in Korea as may be determined by the General Assembly after receiving the recommendations of the Economic and Social Council. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea should proceed to Korea and begin to carry out its functions as soon as possible;