can appreciate the value of first reviewing the analyses of others-and whether or not one agrees with them is immaterial. Certainly China watchers in the West have not had the benefit of seeing more than a smattering of Soviet estimates. The Soviets, on the other hand, not only obtain all the relevant foreign publications through normal subscriptions and purchases, but in nations where significant work is done on China, Soviet embassies maintain a China specialist whose primary responsibility is to collect unpublished reports and papers, attend conferences, and in general keep up with the activities of scholars and officials working on China. Since the English language has apparently become a prerequisite for the younger generation of China scholars, U.S. research is carefully studied and frequently cited-albeit usually selecting critical evaluations which seem to support and perhaps add authority to their own judgments. With no intent of reprobation, it is safe to say that the new estimates of China's economic performance by Molodtsova have been greatly influenced by Western scholarship. Surely the Soviets would have no problem in writing a report on "U.S. Perceptions of China's Economic Development"-if only there was more uniformity in these perceptions. There are, however, inherent weaknesses and important handicaps faced by Soviet sinologists in their analysis of Chinese developments. We have no way of knowing the number of people in the Soviet Union who are working on contemporary China, but it is small in comparison to the United States. An obvious reason, but one that is not generally appreciated, is the problem of language. In the United States the overwhelming majority of university scholars and government researchers working on the People's Republic of China rely on the hundreds of pages per week of translated texts-newspapers, journals, radio broadcasts, and other materials-which are available to individuals interested in the day-to-day developments, in China. Even many scholars of Chinese extraction find it more practical to use translations and only occasionally supplement or cross-check this information by consulting the original texts. In other words, the knowledge of the Chinese language, while highly desirable, is not a prerequisite to the study of contemporary China in the United States. While the Soviet Union does apparently publish Chinese radio broadcasts in Russian and probably translates other selected materials from Chinese, the overall effort does not compare to the extensive translation services available in the United States. This means that every person working on China must have a good grasp of the Chinese language. As admirable as this may be, the obstacle of language limits tremendously the number of people who, in addition to getting a higher degree in, for example, economics, would be willing to devote years of additional study to attain a reading fluency of Chinese. In addition to postponing their career for several years, the necessity of analyzing materials in the Chinese language inevitably slows down the rate of progress of any research." Related to the question of language, the Soviet Union does not have the tremendous resource represented by 11 Although there does not seem to be a subscription record in Washington, I was told that the Institute of the Far East receives one copy of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: "People's Republic of China" and perhaps some other American or British translations. There is a great demand for this document among Soviet China specialists and it takes weeks to route it within the China branch of the Institute. Since all reproductions in the Soviet Union are vigilantly controlled ("must have the signature of the head of the department"?), scholars spend hours transcribing in long-hand passages from these publications. Since there are no restrictions on subscriptions for translations distributed by the National Technical Information Service, would it not be practical for the Soviets to subscribe and teach their Sinologists English-as, it seems, they already do? the many hundreds of American scholars and translators of Chinese extraction, who not only have a native language fluency, but also can provide valuable perspective on many of Peking's policies and programs. Another serious handicap faced by Soviet sinologists relates to the availability of Chinese sources. Every Soviet scholar visiting the United States is overwhelmed by the materials on China available in our academic and governmental institutions and by the elaborate retrieval technology. While Soviet centers have impressive Chinese collections in their own right, and have numerous titles not available in the United States, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the amazement of visitors with American collections and facilities. When queried about reasons for this discrepancy, the answers are more or less the same. In the fifties, when the U.S.S.R. and the P.R.C. were friendly, the Soviets obtained much material from China, but apparently there was no directed intensive and systematic collection effort; certainly nothing comparable to the U.S. effort. There seemed to be no reason at that time for anything more than a casual ment of Chinese publications. They apparently did use some of the Hong Kong booksellers to obtain publications from the Chinese mainland after the 1960 schism, but the U.S.S.R. did not seem to establish a wide-ranging procurement system comparable to that of the United States. Why not? One can only speculate; maybe they could not absorb and process more than they already received; morelikely, the Soviets did not believe until the late sixties, that the break between them and Peking was anything but temporary. procure Finally, in addition to the already discussed intrusion of politicsinto research on China, there is a weakness in Soviet sinology which stems from the rigidity of the system under which such research is performed. Highly planned, regulated, and coordinated research may not be appropriate in dealing with contemporary China, or, for that matter, with any other area with inadequate data. In this stifling atmosphere there is little imagination in the work on China, and Soviet researchers find it difficult to go beyond the data-an imperative when working with limited information. Duplicative research may seem wasteful and inefficient, but it is exactly this individuality and "freewheelingness" of American research on China, which eventually produces growth in understanding and sometimes even a modicum of consensus. Neither the Soviet political milieu, nor the Soviet highly structured and orthodox educational system encourages the use of creativity, and even occasional flights of fancy, in a field which has such far-reaching political and international ramifications. Although the Soviets themselves recongize and even publicly admit. some of the problems and weaknesses in their research on the People's Republic of China, they will understandably find much to fault in the above evaluation by an outsider and a foreigner. But it would be misleading to end this discourse on a negative note. It is very important not to loose sight of the great improvement that has taken. place in Soviet research on the PRC since the beginning of this. decade. Whether this trend is accellerated or retarded will depend entirely on the level of political constraints imposed by the leadership on the academics. Unincumbered by political demands for conformity, free to pursue their research and arrive at independent conclusions, Soviet sinologists should be able to move to the forefront of studies on modern China. If this day every comes, it will behoove Western China-watchers to pay much closer attention to what their Soviet counterparts may start saying and writing about China. ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION IN POST-MAO CHINA: POLICIES, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS BY NAI-RUENN CHEN CONTENTS I. Introduction__. II. A three-stage development program. 1. The background 2. Stage I: 1978–80_. 3. Stage II: 1981-85_ 4. Stage III: 1986-2000__ 5. Implications for policy formulation. III. Economic planning and management- 1. Material incentives__ IV. Human resource development_ 1. Shifts in science and educational policy. V. Technology imports---. 1. The role of foreign technology and equipment_ 3. The policy of "yang wei chung yung”. 4. Financing technology and equipment imports_ VI. Prospects for the future... 1. Constraints influencing economic modernization. I. INTRODUCTION Page 165 166 166 169 171 172 173 174 174 177 179 181 183 185 186 188 190 192 192 194 195 196 200 200 202 The major task facing Chinese leaders in the post-Mao era is to realize China's long-held goal of transforming the country into a "powerful modern socialist state" in the shortest possible time. This goal, however, encompasses two, often competitive, components: economic modernity and socialist transformation. The past 28 years have witnessed recurrent ideological conflicts and policy disputes within the Chinese leadership over the relative weight attached to these two components. The "moderate" group assigns greater priority to economic growth while viewing the attainment of socialist values as a long-range objective. The "radical" faction, on the other hand, advocates the simultaneous achievement of economic development and socialist revolution, and opposes programs and methods that may (165) speed industrialization and modernization but undermine socialism.1 The debate resumed in the early 1970's, and intensified in late 1975 and the first nine months of 1976, culminating in the downfall of the "gang of four" and the rise of the "moderate" group to the dominant leadership position. The current leadership under Hua Kuo-feng is committed to accelerating economic growth. The "speed of development" is viewed as not purely an economic question, but a political question of greatest importance. At the National Industrial Conference in May 1977 Hua declared: "In the next 23 years the development of the Chinese economy should and will be faster and better than in the past 28 years." The same theme was repeated in other leaders' speeches, articles, and editorials throughout 1977. This theme constituted the framework of the report Hua delivered on February 26, 1978 to the Fifth National People's Congress (NPC), a report which has become the most important and detailed economic policy document emanating from China in recent years." An attempt is made in this paper to outline the development program which the current leadership has adopted for achieving accelerated economic growth and to discuss its long- and mediumrange goals and their implications for policy formulation. A major portion of the paper is devoted to an analysis of the major economic issues occasioned or accentuated by the newly adopted development program, and discusses policy measures advanced for resolving these issues. To provide insights into these issues and better understand the rationale of new policies, references are frequently made to the debate over the past few years. The main emphasis, however, is on an analysis of the pragmatic perceptions of the post-Mao leadership from the vantage point of 1977 and early 1978. The final section is devoted to an assessment of the constraints on China's development program and to a projection to the end of the century of China's probable economic position relative to major industrial powers. II. A THREE-STAGE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 1. The Background To achieve accelerated economic growth, the post-Mao leadership has revitalized the two-stage development program previously enuncíated by the late Chou En-lai and has reformulated it into a threestage program. In his report to the fourth NPC in January 1975, Chou outlined a two-stage modernization scheme: In this paper the term "moderate" is used interchangeably with "pragmatist", and "radical", with "dogmatist" or the "gang of four". The two groupings represent clearly identifiable political factions in China, formed between the end of the Cultural Revolution and the arrest of the "gang of four" in October 1976. These factions advocated distinctive economic platforms embracing, in addition to the basic issue of economic growth versus socialism, a wide range of other issues to be brought out in the following sections. It may be noted here that while Chinese writers, both radical and moderate, like to depict policy options as diametrical opposites, some of the policy differences are differences in degree or emphasis, not contradictory alternatives. In our discussion of the radical and moderate viewpoints, the present tense is frequently used because although the radical group has largely fallen silent its perception remains germane to the policy debate in China. Commentator, "The question of Speed Is a Political Question," People's Daily, October 26, 1977, p. 1. "Comrade Hua Kuo-feng's Speech at the National Conference on Industry Learning from Teaching (May 9, 1977)," People's Daily, May 13, 1977, pp. 1-3; quotation on p. 3. See, e.g., Yu Chiu-li, "The Conditions of China's National Economic Development," People's Daily, October 25, 1977. Hua Kuo-feng's Report on the Work of the Government Delivered at the First Session of the Fifth National People's Congress (February 26, 1978), in People's Daily, March 9, 1978, pp. 1-5; hereafter referred to as "Hua's Report to the Fifth NPC." The first stage is to build an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system *** before 1980; the second stage is to accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology before the end of the century, so that our national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world." The visualization of a two-stage development was not new; it was first mentioned, also by Chou, in his work report to the third NPC in December 1964. At that time, the Chinese economy had largely recovered from the 3-year depression following the Great Leap. Chou was hopeful that after further improvements in 1965, the economy should be ready for a long-term drive toward modernization beginning from 1966, the first year of the third five-year plan. But the modernization program was rarely mentioned again in the Chinese press. It seems that the Chinese leadership was divided on this issue. The differences probably did not revolve so much around the ultimate goal of economic modernization as around the methods by which it might be achieved. The main opposition could have come from the late Mao Tse-tung. At the time of the third NPC, the governmental and party apparatuses were firmly in the hands of Liu Shoa-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, later labeled as the first and second "capitalist roaders," respectively, during the Cultural Revolution. Mao was seriously concerned that the policy measures formulated under the Liu-Teng sponsorship to implement the modernization program would very well lead China to "revisionism." In any case, the modernization program was shelved during the Cultural Revolution. After a lapse of 10 years, Chou once again presented it to the Fourth NPC for at least two reasons. The Chinese economy, recovering from the tumultuous years of the Cultural Revolution, had made good headway in the early 1970's, and Chou apparently thought that the time was ripe for China to make another attempt to embark upon the modernization drive. Further, suffering from terminal cancer, he wanted to lay down the groundwork for the drive befor his death. Teng Hsiao-ping was entrusted with the responsibility for drawing up plans to implement the modernization program.9 During the summer of 1975, a draft uotline of a 10-year economic plan (1976-85) was prepared. The outline was discussed and approved by the Politburo.10 At the same time, three policy documents were drafted under Teng's direction: 1. "Certain Problems in Accelerating Peking Review, No. 4, Jan. 24, 1975, p. 23. Ibid. In the published version of Chou's 1964 report only a brief reference was made to the desirability of modernizing agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology "within a not too long historical period." No mention was made of the two-stage development scheme, nor was the end-of-thecentury objective specified. See a summary of Chou En-lai's report on the work of the Government to the Third National People's Congress in Red Flag, No. 1, 1965. In his 1975 report, Chou En-lai pointed out that the visualization of a two-stage development was made "on Chairman Mao's instructions." Indeed, in the 1950's, Mao already frequently envisaged in his writings a modernized China within a few decades. For example, in his famous 1957 speech on constradiction, Mao spoke of building China into" a socialist country with modern industry, agriculture, and science and culture." (Mao Tse-tung's Selected Works," vol. V, 1977 (Chinese edition), p. 366). Earlier, he talked about overtaking the United States in 50 to 60 years. At the same time, however, Mao was deeply committed to his ideological goals of socialist revolution. In his view, economic growth and modernization should not be attained at the expense of socialist values. The view became stronger in the 1960's than in the 1950's. Among the reasons why Chou chose Teng as his successor probably were not only Teng's strong administrative ability and pragmatic economic philosophy but also the same commitment which Teng shared with Chou toward China's economic modernization. Soon after the conclusion of the Fourth National People's Congress, Teng began to take steps to formulate concrete measures for the two-stage development program. See Kung Hsiao-wen, Teng Hsiao-ping and the 20 Articles," Study and Criticism (Hsueh-hsi yu p'l i-p'an), No. 6, June 14, 1976. 10 Hua's report to the Fifth NPC. 27-427 - 79-13 |