Population estimates and projections prepared by FDAD in 1976..

Previous provincial figures.--

Other indications of the current national total.

1. Total population figures, alternate models, selected years: 1953–2000_. 2. Vital rates, alternate models, selected years: 1953-2000_.

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3. Population by 5-year age groups and sex, alternate models, for selected years: 1953–2000.

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4. Population in functional age groups, alternate models, for selected years: 1953-2000___.

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Most estimates of China's population prepared by foreign scholars during the early to middle 1970's were strongly influenced by the reported success of the current birth control and health campaigns and by the often repeated population total of 800 million. They showed sharply declining birth, death, and natural increase rates and in some cases abandoned the 1953 census and the yearend 1957 registration figures in favor of a much lower base total presumed to be the result of the 1964 investigation. By implication these estimates accepted the Chinese goal of an accelerated demographic transition as an accomplished fact.

In the spring of 1976, the Foreign Demographic Analysis Division (FDAD), Bureau of the Census, prepared three sets of estimates and projections for the People's Republic of China (PRC) which, while still based on the 1953 census population total, showed relatively slow and irregular declines in intrinsic fertility and mortality until the

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1970's, followed by rapid declines in fertility into the 1980's and steady declines in mortality to the end of the century. The intermediate model reached a total of just over 950 million as of midyear 1976, and the low and high models ranged from about 900 million to 1 billion. These three estimates were the highest of all those prepared outside of China during the middle 1970's.

Since 1976 two things have happened that have changed the general perception of demographic levels and trends in the PRC. Following the death of Mao in August 1976 and the accession to power of Hua Kuo-feng in September, PRC sources charged that Hua's rivals in the successional struggle, now called the "gang of four," had opposed birth control and late marriage and had dealt serious setbacks to family planning and public health efforts for several years prior to their defeat. Beginning in September 1976 and continuing to the present, new provincial population figures have been appearing in news dispatches from the PRC that are larger than previously available figures; the new figures currently add to just under 920 million. Unless one is prepared to argue that the setbacks blamed on the "gang" are political fictions without any substantive basis, population estimates for China cannot continue to show uninterrupted progress in the reduction of fertility and mortality throughout the middle 1970's. Unless one is also prepared to argue that PRC provincial data exaggerate the size of the population, the 1976 FDAD low series and all other estimates that do not substantially exceed a national total of 900 million by midyear 1976 are too low.

The purpose of this chapter is to assess the significance of the current demographic developments in the PRC in the perspective of China's demographic history and to present the assumptions, methods, and results of a new set of population estimates and projections.

RECENT TRENDS IN FAMILY PLANNING

Policy and Commitment

Almost 30 years have elapsed since Mao Tse-tung declared that China's large population was "a good thing" and that it could multiply "many times" without posing any difficulties for national development. Now birth control has been written into the constitution of the PRC, and Hua Kuo-feng has called for a reduction of the national population growth rate to less than 1 percent within 3 years.2

The change did not come overnight. In the intervening years, Mao and his colleagues twice launched a birth control campaign and let it subside before coming to what appears to be an irrevocable commitment in the current birth control campaign. The first signs of a renewal of birth control efforts after the cultural revolution appeared in 1968, but the drive did not really gather momentum until 1972 or 1973.

The Bankruptcy of the Idealist Conception of History," September 19, 1949; Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. IV, Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1961, pp. 453-454.

2 "The Constitution of the People's Republic of China," adopted on Mar. 5, 1978, by the Fifth National People's Congress of the PRC, first session, New China News Agency (NCNA), Peking, Mar. 7, 1978; Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), No. 52 (Supplement), Mar. 16, 1978, p. 69; Hua Kuo-feng, "Unite and Strive to Build a Modern, Powerful Socialist Country," NCNA, Peking, Mar. 6, 1978; FBIS, No. 52 (supplement), Mar. 16, 1978, p. 27. Article 53 of the Constitution merely says that "the state advocates and encourages family planning."

For an analysis of the vicissitudes of the first two birth control campaigns, see John S. Aird, "Population Policy and Demographic Prospects in the People's Republic of China," in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, People's Republic of China; An Economic Assessment, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, May 18, 1972, pp. 220-311.

"7

Since 1973, however, the official endorsement of birth control has been more open and more forceful than at any time since the first campaign got under way in 1954. Lest anyone suppose that the new commitment might waver, like others taken in the past, authoritative spokesmen now insist that planned population growth is "an established policy of the Chinese government, ," the purpose of which is to insure that population growth "corresponds to the development of the socialist planned economy." Both domestic and foreign propaganda endorse the principle that "anarchy" in human reproduction is intolerable and that "man should control himself as well as nature." Birth control is now identified with the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party to a greater degree than ever before. It is "an essential task which Chairman Mao personally advocated for many years." The goal of a 1 percent growth rate is said to have been "the long cherished behest of esteemed and beloved Premier Chou." Hua Kuo-feng reportedly "acted as a leader of the birth control leadership group of the State Council," "personally worked out the annual plans for birth control work," attended report meetings, listened and made notes, and provided theoretical guidance for the work.10 It is also disclosed, somewhat belatedly, that Hua gave an address at the National Conference on Family Planning and Birth Control Work in September 1974 in which he pointed out that birth control is "closely related" to the health and prosperity of the people and to the "speed of development of socialist revolution and socialist construction." " Recent dispatches from the PRC include local pledges to observe the "instructions" about birth control given by Mao, Chou En-lai, and Hua. What those instructions were is not disclosed, but the statements are obviously intended to convey the idea that the policy bears the personal endorsement of China's most respected leaders. Perhaps equally important, opposition to the policy is identified with Liu Shao-ch'i, Lin Piao, the "gang of four," and various unnamed "class enemies," 12 so that those who dare to resist may understand the political risks.

Once again, as in the first two birth control campaigns, the priority attached to birth control efforts seems to be related to official concern about the pace of economic development in general and of agricultural development in particular. Chinese officials have stated that the PRC made no significant economic advancement in the 10 years prior to the overthrow of the "gang of four" in the fall of 1976.13 In May 1977, Yeh Chien-ying, vice chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party reminded the National Conference on Learning from Taching in Industry that agriculture was the "foundation of the national economy" and that "in a big country such as

NCNA (English), Peking, August 23, 1974; FBIS No. 166, Aug. 26, 1974, p. E3. The phrase has since been repeated in domestic birth control propaganda.

NCNA (English), Peking, Mar. 5, 1953; British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), Mar. 14, 1973, FE/W715/Á/1.

"17th Session of U.N. Population Commission Concludes in Geneva," NCNA (English), Geneva, Nov. 9, 1973; American Consulate General, Hong Kong, Current Background (CB), No. 74-14, July 8, 1974, p. 64.

7 Wuhan radio, Hupeh Provincial Service, Dec. 20, 1977; FBIS, No. 246, Dec. 22, 1977, p. H2. Nanking radio, Kiangsu Provincial Service, Apr. 10, 1978; FBIS. No. 72, Apr. 13, 1978, p. G5.

• Canton radio, Kwangtung Provincial Service, Dec. 12, 1976, FBIS, No. 242, Dec. 15, 1976, p. H16.

10 Hangchow radio, Chekiang Provincial Service, Jan. 16, 1977: FBIS, No. 14, Jan. 21, 1977, p. G4.

11"Family Planning and Birth Control Work Considered To Be One of the Important Aspects of the Agriculture-Learning-From Ta-chai Movement," Jen-min jih-pao (JMJP), Peking, Mar. 2, 1977; Joint Publications Research Service (JPRS) No. 69,038, May 3, 1977, p. 18.

12 Ibid., p. 19.

1 Harrison E. Salisbury, "China's Leaders View Last 10 Years as 'Lost," New York Times, Nov. 5, 1977, p. C3.

ours, only when agriculture is run well can the problem of feeding our 800 million people be solved and economic development be feasible." "A cold winter was followed by drought in the spring and early summer of 1977 and some flooding later in the summer. There were substantial purchases of foreign wheat during 1977, and Chinese reports of agricultural production at the end of the year were unusually vague and devoid of numbers, normally a sign that the news is not good. Early indications are that Chinese imports of wheat could be heavy again this year, perhaps exceeding the record import of 7.6 million metric tons in 1974.15 The marked intensification of the birth control campaign since August surely signifies that the central authorities see control of population growth as more urgent than ever.

Campaign Tactics

Current promotional tactics also reflect the new resolve. Centrally determined planned population growth rates establish the overall objectives within which provincial growth rate targets are set, and these serve as the basis for the target rates for counties, which prescribe those for lower level units. At the lowest levels, a quota of births is allocated among the eligible married couples on a priority basis. The priorities seem to be related to age at marriage, the number of years married, whether or not the couple already has one child, and how long a time interval has elapsed since the birth of the first child. There are indications that the limit has now been set at two children per family. Several provinces have pledged that they will strive to get their population growth rates down to 8 per 1,000 by 1980 or 1985.16 Other provinces, without disclosing their own target figures, have undertaken to develop their birth control work so that they can insure fulfillment of the "population plan" that is part of the fifth Five-Year Plan (1976-80)."

With the mounting pressures on local cadres to meet mandatory population growth targets handed down from above, there will be increasing temptation to resort to coercive measures when no other option is available. News dispatches that seem to refer to forms of coercion have been coming out of the PRC since the early 1970's. A Shantung commune reported using "mass criticism and repudiation" in order to "smash reactionary fallacies and shatter feudal' concepts" relating to marriage and childbearing. 18 In another commune in the same area where there were 21 women in one production brigade "who should have controlled their childbearing but did not, the cadres "strengthened solidarity among them, eradicated their old fashioned notions***, and thus promoted a sense of planned parenthood among them." 19 Other dispatches proclaim the "violent struggle

14 Excerpts from his speech given by NCNA, Peking, May 12, 1977; FBIS, No. 93, May 13, 1977, p. E3. 15 Gene Meyer, "China May Become No. 1 Importer Of Wheat This Year, Analysts Say," Wall Street Journal, Feb. 9, 1978, p. 30.

16 Hupeh is to reach 8 per 1,000 by 1980 and Anhwei to get below 8 per 1,000 by 1985. See Wuhan, Hupeh Provincial Service, Dec. 20, 1977; JPRS, No. 70,533, Jan. 24, 1978, p. 87, and Hofei radio, Anhwei Provincial Service, Jan. 18, 1978; FBIS, No. 16, Jan. 24, 1978, p. G10.

17 Foochow radio, Fukien Provincial Service, Jan. 24, 1978; FBIS, No. 18, Jan. 26, 1978, p. G4, and Canton radio, Kwangtung Provincial Service, Apr. 10, 1978; FBIS, No. 71, Apr. 12, 1978, p. H16.

18 Birth Control Office, Wentung County, Shantung Province, "Penetratingly Develop Birth Control Work, Contribute More to the Revolution," Ch'ih-chžeh i-sheng tsa-chih (Barefoot Doctor Journal), No. 1,. 1973.

19 Ibid.