leads to centralization much of the information needed for decisionmaking can readily be transferred using modern telecommunications. However, the qualitatively important parts will still require individuals to travel and meet, the consequence of which is that very high levels of interaction is found in a few dominant places within a country. This clearly points to centralization which is a consequence of the need for key individuals to minimize the time needed for travel and external contacts.

The development of the industrial enterprises in rural areas-in particular the collectively owned ones which have proliferated within communes and brigades in recent years pose a number of problems with regard to equality. The wages paid to the workers in such industries are with few exceptions higher than what the agricultural laborers receive in the area surrounding the industrial units. In a news item publicizing the experience of a brigade in Kwangtung it was stressed that "payment from brigade-run enterprises for each person transferred from a production team should be given to the individual's production team".29 It is then being incorporated with the team's work points to be distributed among all the commune members, including those who work in the brigade-run industries. Whether this policy will be upheld nationwide or not will not be discussed here. However, there is a compelling logic in view of the low level of mechanization and the rapid development of brigade and commune-run industries. The most important asset of the production team is its labor force and the indicated policy assures that the renumeration to the team. If activity is outside the production team benefits are to the members of the team and not to the separate individuals.

However, there is also another problem with regard to the smallscale industries in rural areas. The labor productivity is much lower in the collectively owned enterprises than in the State-owned rural industries which in turn is considerably lower than in the large-scale State-owned enterprises, mainly located in the urban areas. In terms of average productivity the ratio is 4 to 1 in favor the large Stateowned enterprises, according to estimates made by the author. The lower labor productivity is a reflection of quality of management, amount of capital and the technology utilized. As capital and technological resources are allocated on a priority basis to the large Stateowned enterprises the inevitable consequences will be that the relative productivity of the smaller, rural, enterprises will remain low. This may not be an explicit objective in the present policy of strengthening of management and central initiative. However, in discussing technical innovations at a national conference Yuan Pao-hua, viceminister of the State Planning Commission, had the following to say: 30

In the system of industrial management, there must be planned reform to effect specilized production. It is not right for us to build large or small factories that engage in all kinds of specialties. New technologies are recommended only for large-scale, specialized mass production.

Similar views, which might be detrimental to the local industrial development were also voiced when discussing policies for the mechanization of agriculture in the beginning of 1978, already referred to earlier.

B11/12.

"Production Team as Basic Unit in Three-Level Ownership," NCNA, Feb. 13, 1978, BBC FE/5743/ Vice Minister Yuan's speech at Technical Innovations Conference, NCNA, Feb. 3, 1978, BBC FE/ 5739/B11/9.

Finally, of special note are some issues which have been hotly debated during the past couple of years, on the role of basic, theoretical, and long-term research. As long as China had an untapped potential for applied knowledge and resources for economic development the priority to basic, long-term research may not have been an important question. But foreign observers and the Chinese themselves clearly see that this is no longer the case and the gap between basic research in China and advanced countries may be widening rapidly in a number of sectors. Long-term basic scientific research basically requires additional resources. But this matter of priority there has been a clash with the proponents of alternative views propagated by "the gang of four". The proponents were arguing that the research institutes should carry out open-door research in order to meet immediate needs in the production without revised priorities.

The radicals views on research is, of course, related to their attitudes toward researchers and other intellectuals. In the opinion of "the gang of four" the researchers must not be treated differently from ordinary people. Laymen and researchers should be equal. On that ground it was unacceptable that researchers could withdraw from the demands for manual labor, political work, et cetera, that other groups in the Chinese society were requested to fulfill. It has now been clearly pointed out such a situation hindered the research and technological development that China needed for the future. As a result of the acceptance of this view the students trained at the universities during and since the Cultural Revolution were insufficient in numbers and quality.

The more fundamental differences between "the gang of four" and the new Chinese leadership relate to egalitarianism and professionalism. The Cultural Revolution emphasized strong egalitarian forces in the Chinese Communist society. These were of broad appeal to the young people who in China, like many other developing countries, constitute 45 percent of the age groups under 20 years. However, the demand for a more equal and just society were only partially articulated into programs which had any chance of implementation. The juster Maoist society of which many had a vision should not accept any priviliged groups. This criticism turned against the established institutions like universities and research institutes, aside from the bureaucracy and the class struggle, was one of the instruments to achieve changes. But the class struggle as a political instrument also led to an antagonistic view of the intellectuals. They were seen more or less as potential and permanent enemies and therefore the class struggle within universities and research institutes had to be institutionalized, according to the view of "the gang of four". The resulting political struggle, in the institutes, and the general demands for open door research, no doubt, contributed to lowered efficiency and quality.

The new party leadership has now resolved the issues and clearly stated that the radical views were mistaken and would hinder the socialist transformation of the Chinese society because it obstructed the development of the material base. The present view is that science and technology is a productive force-that is to say an instrument. Consequently, science and technology-and the scientists and engineers as well-should not be seen as part of the superstructure and no longer constitutes a conflict with the economic base. Thus, the scien

tists and engineers should not be opposed but supported. Another important consequence is that the organizational problems should be solved differently. If science and technology is a productive force, that is, an instrument of the State, the sector should be organized as efficiently as possible to make as early and significant a contribution as possible to the planned socialist transformation. Therefore, the scientists in the research institutes who were previously considered as politically unreliable need no longer be controlled within the groups to which they belong. The external political control on how resources are utilized does not, of course, disappear. But, the professional resources within science and technology are seen as a key instruments toward achieving long-term goals in China.

When we try to assess the changes in China it may always be useful to maintain a historical perspective as all changes may not be permanent and we can expect that China will experience political struggles between opposing views on the role of science and technology and how the sector should be controlled and organized. Is there any risk that China will eventually move toward political changes such as have taken place in the Soviet Union and which the Chinese term revisionism? No doubt, the heavy emphasis on economic growth and the use of the intellectual and technological expertise in the country may make it difficult to strike a stable balance.

The new technology and science policy now emerging in China may be an element which is at least partly antagonistic to the objective of reaching the socialist society conceived by Mao and the reasons for this are several: First, to meet the technology requirements of the modern industry the emphasis must be on large systems with a high degree of vertical division of labor with apparent nonegalitarian consequences for management in production enterprises as well as in the related R. & D. institutions. Second, trend toward further professionalism and inequality encouraged importation of technology where technological and management solutions developed in capitalist countries must be adjusted to suit Chinese conditions. If this were desired, the integration and coordination of large scale technological projects and the subsequent applications in manufacturing will require professional expertise which must be highly trained and competent. All such people will spend much of their time in central agencies, ministries or offices in the bigger cities with little or at least less time than previously to move into manual labor. Fourth, a large scale approach to industrialization also requires improved transportation and communications and new management systems which all lend some credibility to the argument that new forms of social control might develop which are detrimental to the egalitarian interests of the masses of the Chinese population.

In all fairness, it must be pointed out that the policy statements, so far available to us, clearly indicate that the leadership is bent on maintaining a balance of technological development between the various sectors of the society, this implies the continuation of a two-leg policy. However, in carrying out such a policy it is always noted, indeed underlined, that the professionals are to form the backbone in any new undertakings where the masses are involved. This may gradually lead to a situation where indigenous technological development is downplayed thereby favoring an increased emphasis on the importation of technology. More ambiguous effects could be

found in a situation where the present momentum to reinstate the professionals, technicians, engineers, researchers, and other intelfectuals cannot be stopped.

The result might then be that these people establish themselves as new privileged class with the blessing of the party and military bureaucracy. Such a possibility cannot be ruled out because, for example, if the food supply problem is resolved, there is no urgent need, in the short run, to divert large R. & D. and investment resources into agriculture as this would only aggravate the issue of unemployment and labor allocation. For the time being in China, as in many other developing countries has no other choice than to use agriculture as a residual employer. Consequently, development resources such as engineering manpower, R. & D. resources, et cetera, are likely to mainly flow into the modern industrial sector. This might then add additional support to the hypothetical possibility that certain key groups in the urban-based modern economy establish themselves as privileged groups to the detriment of the majority of the population residing in rural areas thereby changing the broad economywide emphasis or scientific and technological change.

So, it might be appropriate to pose the following question. The emphasis is on urban technological change-will it be possible for the Chinese leadership to maintain a fair balance between urban industry and rural agriculture? Herein we can find three different type problems with regard to changes in technology and science policy. First, will the leadership be able to maintain the delicate but necessary balance in meeting the modernization objectives while reflecting the legitimate interests of the various groups in the Chinese society? Second, as the potentially privileged groups will make use of the new situation to further their own interests, in ways detrimental to the majority of the population in the rural areas will this nonprivileged majority create a counterforce in order to redress the balance? Should this be the case the present change in technology policy would create an unstable situation. Third, will the changes create a situation where privileged groups become established as a stable new class to the detriment of the overall, long-term development of China?

It must also be emphasized that the current situation in China is rapidly changing and the structure for encouraging innovations and change in technology and science policy has not been fully worked out. The current debate on science and technology, as reflected in the news media over the past couple of years, can thus only shed limited light on the future development of science and technology in China.

CHINESE EMPLOYMENT POLICY IN 1949-78 WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON WOMEN IN RURAL PRODUCTION

BY MARINA THORBORG

CONTENTS

Introduction___.

Policy on rural employment

Organizational changes in Chinese agriculture--

Equal work, equal pay...

Women and overwork in agriculture...

Number of women engaged in agricultural production..

Workdays of women in agriculture_-_

Child care for village women..

TABLES

Page

536

536

538

540

555

567

587

596

1. Change of name and size of production units in Chinese agriculture, 1952-74

2. Total number of women, 15 to 59 years old in the agricultural population of China 1929-33, 1949–78__

3. Proportion of women working in agriculture of all women of working age in the agricultural population in China, by type of area, and during the busy season, 1929-33, 1948-60-

4. Proportion of women working in agriculture of all women of working age of the agricultural population, by province or region of China, 1949-60--

539

568

570

576

5. Proportion of women working in agriculture of all women of working age in the agricultural population, 1963-76----

583

6. Estimated total number of women of working age working in Chinese agriculture, 1929-33 and 1949–78-

585

7. Proportion of women and men working in Chinese agriculture in North, Northeast, and South China in 1929–33 and 1957--

585

8. Women working in agriculture as a proportion of the agricultural labor force, 1960-73.

586

9. Number of workdays performed by women and men in 228 APC's in 1957----.

590

10. Proportion of workdays in production performed by women and men in the main geographical areas of China in 1957.

591

11. Workdays per year by women and men of working age of the agricultural population, 1954-72..

592

12. Number of children in childcare stations in five Chinese provinces and in all of China in 1958_.--.

602

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDWF-All-China Democratic Women's Federation

ACWF-All-China Women's Federation

APC Agricultural Producers Cooperative

CB-Current Background

CCD Communist China Digest

CCP-Chinese Communist Party

CFJP-Chieh-fang jih-pao (Liberation Daily)

CKFN-Chung-kuo fu-nü (Women of China)

FBIS-Foreign Broadcast Information Service

HCKFN-Hsin chung-kuo fu-nü (Women of New China)

24-427 O-79-36