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MILITARY ACHIEVEMENTS TO DATE

If you look at what has been accomplished, without attempting to transfer myself into a military expert, but taking what they have said, I think it is about this: That when NATO began there was no obstacle whatever in the way of a quick punch attack by the Communist forces which are already in Europe. There was just nothing to stop them at all, and at any moment when they were out on maneuvers, they could just have kept on, and there was not anything to stop them at all.

I think we have now gotten to the position where the Communist forces in Europe cannot overrun Europe and, therefore, if there was to be any physical military aggression it would have to be preceded by a very considerable mobilization and obvious prelude to aggression. That is an important thing. I think it has given a great sense of security that this thing does not happen overnight.

It is given an added sense of security that mobilization is an ominous thing, and very many things can happen if that is once started in these other countries, and all of that is to the good; and this buildup will continue more slowly than we had hoped, but it will continue, until the situation is going to be one which would make any sort of an aggression most unwise.

THE LISBON TIMETABLE

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Secretary, might I interrupt you for just a minute there? Did you find that you had to change the timetable that was set at Lisbon for the development of the forces? Did we have to stretch it out?

Secretary ACHESON. The answer is both yes and no, Senator.

At Lisbon, and at all of these annual reviews, you do two things: You take the year about to open and the countries, and each one of them says what it will do in that year, and that is a firm operation.

Then, for planning purposes, since you have to place orders in advance, you have to make arrangements for drafting people, and all of that, they have a planning goal for the next year following the one that is about to open, and a still more indefinite planning goal for the third year ahead.

We have pretty well-not completely, but pretty well-accomplished what was hoped to be done in 1952.

Where we have fallen short in that is in the effectiveness of the units.

The number of divisions proposed was raised, the divisions are not as good as the Lisbon specifications said they should be, they have not got the equipment that they are supposed to have, and in training and one thing or another, they have not come up to the Lisbon standards, but they have come within measurable distance of it.

It has turned out to be clear that what in the beginning of 1952 we hoped could be done in 1953, will not be done in the quantity we hoped, and similarly, what we then hoped to be done in 1954 will not be done in 1954 in that quantity.

Instead of attempting to reach those quantities planned ahead at Lisbon, they are concentrating on the quality, with a smaller advance in quantity, but a greater attainment of quality.

The CHAIRMAN. That was 96 divisions and 9,000 aircraft, was it not?

Secretary ACHESON. I do not remember the figures. The actual figures of 1952 were very much shorter than that.

The CHAIRMAN. In 1954?

Secretary ACHESON. It was probably the goal that you mentioned was the more distant one ahead, but what has been accomplished is important and worthy of consideration.

CONFIDENCE IN GENERAL RIDGWAY

We also, at this meeting in Paris, had General Ridgway there, and I think that was important. It was the first time that General Ridg way had appeared before the whole Council, which is made up of three or four ministers from each country.

General Ridgway made a very great impression, and he made an impression because he was forthright and very clear indeed, and he was also understanding of the civilian governments' problems. He stated quite frankly that everybody should understand that his mission, as written out in instructions to him, could not be accomplished with the forces now at his disposal. He understood that; he wanted to be sure that we understood it, everybody understood it, and it does not mean that he was discouraged or giving up, but that we had to keep going longer in order to get to the point where once we had hoped to get in a much shorter time.

He said he understood fully the political and economic problems which the various governments had, and discussed those in a way which led the governments to realize he did understand them very well, and he got a good hearing, and there was a great feeling of confidence in General Ridgway.

Then, after the Mediterranean Command question was settled, the two commanders in the Mediterranean came in, Carney and Mountbatten, came in; they were introduced, and made very brief speeches to us, and then went on their way, so we had the command business, and we had the Mediterranean, and we had this problem of working out the forces for 1953, one settled, the second one put well on its way to settlement in April.

DEFENSE INFRASTRUCTURE

We then got onto another matter, which is a very important thing, and a most troublesome one. That was the logistical support for the European forces, that is, the whole network of communications, the roads, the railways, the harbor facilities, and all of that, which suffers by the horrible name "Infrastructure." I suppose that means the underlying support structure.

This is something which is not created for the forces of any one country. It is for the whole combined force and, therefore, it has been worked out as a scheme by which the country where the facility is

going to be will contribute the land and certain things which it, and it only, can do. It is not a charge on the united group.

Then the construction work is parceled out, and then the hat is passed to get enough funds to carry on the work for a year.

That is a very poor way of doing it, because what has happened so far is that none of the countries have put anything for this in their budget when they make it up because this operation does not take place until after the budget is made up.

Therefore, they all sit around and say, "I am sorry, we can't do anything."

Well, after several years of that-and Bob Lovett has borne the burden with us-it was decided this year to stop that kind of thing altogther and have the countries put into their budgets the best guess that they can make, and the biggest effort that they can make so that, after all, after you sit down together, you are negotiating from something that you have got, and not from something that you have not got.

We have had what is called four slices. A slice is roughly a year's program dealing with some actual part of this construction, which can be done, and usually, in the year ahead.

We are now in what is called the fourth slice. The meeting in December was able to raise only half the money which was called for, and we had two projects presented to us by General Ridgway. One was what they thought it was necessary to do in the year ahead, specifying the items, and the cost of that was roughly $400 million, somewhere in that neighborhood.

Then he gave us another list which was the things you had to start right away if you were going to do any of this the next year, and the cost of that was about $200 million.

Now, the second one was financed, that was done, and he was told to go ahead on that basis.

At the meeting in April they will have to take up the last part of it, and work that out, and I think that should be done.

These underlying support facilities are very important indeed. All the harbor installations, the truck and road arrangements going to the various fronts, the communication systems set up under various contingencies so that they will operate whatever the form of attack, and airfields, are another very important part of it.

But progress was made on that, and I think progress was made so that in the future it will be less difficult.

THE FRENCH AND INDOCHINA

There was also a discussion of several important political problems. The French are periodically in great depression about their position in Indochina, which is an extremely difficult one, with a very grave drain, both financially and in manpower on the French military forces. Sometimes they get discouraged because they do not see much light ahead; and then we all go to work on it, and give them some help, and then they feel much better about it. They are up and down. on this great problem.

1 Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense.

72-194-77-vol. V-2

We went into it quite a lot at the NATO meeting. The French like to be encouraged by having everybody say that this is not merely a little French venture all by itself; it is part of a whole struggle against Communist aggression. We said that in a resolution, and we said everyone who was helping them should continue to do so, and they felt much more encouraged about the whole thing after that.

They have been working pretty well-not as well as it should be done on the raising and training of large native forces. They are particularly the forces of Vietnam; the other two kingdoms cannot contribute very much by way of forces, maybe 10,000 men each, but Vietnam very large forces.

The difficulties have chiefly been in the training field. We are anxious to help them more than they appreciate the necessity for. Our Army has developed ways of training people who have not got great educational background. For instance, this worked out in connection with the South Koreans.

So if you concentrate on certain aspects of the training of a man, and train only on that, you can, in an extraordinarily short time, get a man who is very efficient and competent in a limited field, and that is all he needs to be. He does not need to know twenty things; if he knows two things well, that is all that is necessary.

So we have tried to get the French to send instructors out to Korea and see how this is done, and we have offered to help them in every way we can.

We have been helping them financially very much in the past year, and I am sure that we will all want to continue that because their position is essential in Southeast Asia.

THE EDC AND GERMAN TREATIES

We discussed the European Defense Community [EDC], this treaty with Germany, and the treaty of the six powers creating a European

army.

We examined the difficulties which had arisen in the way of ratification of those treaties. It seemed to us that they were substantial, that they were difficult, but they were not overwhelming, and one should not get depressed about it. I had some talks, both with the French and the Germans, who encouraged me very much to believe that this thing will be worked out and can be worked out.

The difficulties, as I say, look formidable, but I think that they can be surmounted; they have just got to be because that is such a very important aspect of the whole increase in military strength in Europe. The CHAIRMAN. Do recent developments still leave you that optimistic?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, I think so, Senator. I have a firm conviction that the Germans will be able to get this thing moving along; certainly, by the end of February they ought to have it finished.

I think that the French Government is determined to go ahead with it; they want to have some talks with the Germans on some separate protocols which will deal with certain aspects of the matter which, I think, can be dealt with.

For instance, the French want to be sure that there is a way if they

need forces for Indochina they can get those forces. They do not want their manpower completely frozen into this European army setup. Well, that is a reasonable request, but I think that can be done.

Senator FERGUSON. You mean get forces from their own forces rather than

Secretary ACHESON. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON [continuing]. From our forces?
Secretary ACHESON. From their own.

You see, when you now put troops into the European army you can only withdraw them on certain conditions specified in the treaty. One is internal difficulties, and what they want to be sure about is if they need to get a brigade or whatever it is, in Indochina, it will not take them six months to argue with European army people to get that brigade out. They can usually relieve a brigade from Indochina, and put another brigade in.

They have some problems dealing with the French officer corps which I think they can work out.

There is a strong desire for some sort of British association in the European army, which I think is not impossible, and can be worked out, too.

All of these are tricky; they are all difficult. Any one of them can blow up at any time, but I think everyone appreciates the vast necessity of going forward with this thing, so they will not blow it up. I think the thing will be worked out.

THE FALL OF SCHUMAN

Senator SPARKMAN. Mr. Secretary, is the dropping of Schuman 1 particularly significant or will it have any particular effect upon the program?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I think it is too bad-it is a sad thing. Schuman has done a tremendous thing in Europe, He is the one who has had the real vision for the unification of Western Europe, of course, and he has been in a leading position. He has either been Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, or Foreign Minister since the formation of the French Government in 1946.

That is a pretty wearing process in French politics. This is the 18th government that he has been in since the end of the war.

Also he has been very greatly criticized on account of the North African troubles. The control over North Africa falls under the Foreign Office, and when there have been difficulties there the criticism is and has been centered on Schuman, so he has had to lead in a rather difficult field in Europe. He has had to bear responsibilities in a rather difficult external field, and it just kind of wore him down politically.

It may be that if he goes out now for a while, he can come back in again.

Bidault is experienced; he has been Foreign Minister before, and he belongs to the same political party as Schuman.

I should hope that it will mean no great difference between Schu

1 Robert Schuman was replaced by Georges Bidault as Foreign Minister in the new French Government formed by Rene Mayer in January.

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