General BRADLEY. Unless you are at war with England, then your lockade would not apply to Hong Kong; unless you are at war with ortugal, it would not apply to Macao, according to the legal inrpretations that have been placed on blockades in the past. Of ourse Hong Kong and Macao are two places where there is lots of ipping going in, lots of ship going in, so that would certainly have ome bearing on the effectiveness of the blockade; if you had to exlude Hong Kong and Macao, we think it could include Port Arthur nd Dairen in such a blockade, because they belong in sovereign ight to China and are being used by Russia, by treaty.

That agreement was supposed to have expired, but it has been reewed, and we suspect that in the meeting that took place in Moscow ast October, for about a month, that this was probably one of the hings that they reached some further agreement on, but we think it ould apply to those two ports.

How much trouble it would get you into, if Russia tried to escort he vessels, we don't know, but it would apply, as we said, to those wo, but you could not apply it to Hong Kong and Macao if it were United States action.

The CIA intelligence estimate

THE BRITISH EXAMPLE

Senator TAFT. General, that raises the question of the British, for instance. When they blockaded Germany, they cut off Belgium and Holland, they blockaded them just the same as they were blockading Germany.

General BRADLEY. I believe at that time they were occupied by the Germans, so it was really aimed at the enemy.

Senator TAFT. They went much further than that, Switzerland, I understand, they didn't stop with any neutrals at all, but included them all, as I remember. During the First World War, those countries were not all occupied, and it is my recollection that the British claimed the right to blockade all of them.

Senator SPARKMAN. Didn't they leave a neutral zone to get through to the unoccupied countries?

Senator TAFT. They let some things go through the blockade and didn't let other things go through.

Senator SPARKMAN. I recall, if you were going into one country, you had to go through a very definite zone.

Senator TAFT. If you had any guns or anything like that for the Germans, they took them off.

Senator KNOWLAND. That came down to the search and seizure proposition.

General BRADLEY. That comes down to economic sanctions, then. You could get, for example, in Hong Kong, you could put on this blockade, you could probably, still under your economic sanctions, stop guns from going into Hong Kong, but that would not apply to food, clothing and such things as that.

Senator TAFT. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Didn't Britain refuse to allow food to go into Germany?

General BRADLEY. I am sorry, sir, I cannot answer that.

Senator SPARKMAN. Into Germany, but not the neutral countries General BRADLEY. We could stop food going into China, but the question is, would you want to stop food going into Hong Kong. which legally would not be included in the blockade?

Senator FERGUSON. But, the stuff goes directly from Hong Kong into Red China. I understand.

Senator TAFT. In the First World War, whether occupied or not. the British went into all those countries, they went into Holland. and Holland wasn't able to do much about it, they were not a strong nation, but the British certainly claimed the right to blockade them at that time.

General BRADLEY. All I am repeating is the opinion I got from the Naval Judge Advocate, who made quite a study on blockades, and that is the substance of what I've been telling you here.

TRADE THROUGH HONG KONG

The same thing would apply here. Senator Taft, you could stop guns and such items from going into Hong Kong under the sanctions. but to stop everything from going into Hong Kong, according to this opinion, would be an act of war against the United Kingdon... and so forth.

Senator FERGUSON. You, mean, if United Nations did it, isn't the United Kingdom

General BRADLEY. I am talking about the United States. I said if you got the United Nations, then you have an entirely different story. Senator FERGUSON. Do you have any evidence it would be treated like that, if you were to attempt to stop goods going into Hong Kong! General BRADLEY. I am citing the opinion of the Naval Judge Advocate. If you applied a blockade to belligerent people with whom you are at war, since you are not at war with the United Kingdom. your blockade could not be legally applied against Hong Kong in a blockade of China.

Senator FERGUSON. It is hard to understand why Britain doesn't enter into a voluntary blackade to keep things out of Red China. General BRADLEY. Well, they have, on strategic materials.

Senator FERGUSON. But they are supplying them with a lot of things that aid China.

General BRADLEY. I was merely pointing out the legalistic side of this, as I understand it from the people who have studied blockades for years, naval people.

Some other things might be mentioned about blockades. It has a lot of different aspects.

ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF A BLOCKADE

I started to say that the CIA, Central Intelligence Agency's estimate is that a blockade, a complete blockade would have very little short term effect. It would eventually have a cumulative effect on China's ability to carry on, and it certainly would affect their economy. How much it would affect the materials that they are getting to fight with in Korea is another matter.

Of course you could certainly stop the raw rubber, and tires from ing in there. However, you have got to weigh that as against how uch it will affect the whole economy and trade relations with Southst Asia, because the people in Ceylon are selling the rubber and e getting absolutely essential rice for it. Now, whether or not we uld replace that rice, if we shut off the rubber going into China another thing. There are a lot of angles.

I am not trying to advocate for or against it, merely trying to int out the things that are involved in a blockade, things that we ust consider very carefully before we decide to put on a blockade.. has some very far-reaching effects, and I would not say that you ould not do it, I do not say you should do it, I am just pointing it the things that must be considered before our Government rives at a decision to a blockade.

A U.N. BLOCKADE WOULD FACE FEWER PROBLEMS

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. To do it alone.
General BRADLEY. Yes.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. You would have no problem if the
N. would do it.

General BRADLEY. If the U.N. would do it, in furtherance of their etion in declaring the Communists in North Korea the aggressors, en it would be much simplified, you don't have so many problems. ou still have the problem of its effect on the trade of Southeast sia, how it will affect some of your friends, but you certainly would ave it greatly simplified if you could get it through the United ations; get the United Nations to take that action.

That is a rather hurried runthrough, Mr. Chairman. I know there re going to be lots of things I have not commented on, which I will e glad to try to explain.

THE SITUATION INSIDE CHINA

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us whether, in relation to the sitution inside China, what your information is as to whether there is in indication of restlessness, or any extensive guerrilla activity in Communist China?

General BRADLEY. May I ask how much of this record is off of the ecord?

The CHAIRMAN. Whatever you want goes off the record.

General BRADLEY. I would like to have this part off of the record. The CHAIRMAN. The rest of what you have said will be treated is executive and not for publication, and anything that you say is to be off the record, will be treated as such.

[There was discussion off the record.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, there has been a great deal of discussion in the papers and elsewhere about the material that has not been furnished, and what we are going to furnish.

Can you tell us something on that score?

General BRADLEY. Yes, sir, I can look up those figures.
Please leave this off the record.

[There was discussion off the record.]

BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE FAR EAST

The CHAIRMAN. General, I think the fear that has prevailed some what is based upon the conclusion, which may or may not be correct, that is implied in my question now.

What forces, including submarines, airplanes-what striking force have the Soviets got in that eastern vicinity so that if a general explosion followed, what position are we in, with our fleet, in Japan and in Korea? What have we got in relation to air defense, naval defense and what-not?

General BRADLEY. I knew these figures yesterday, but I will have to check on them again at this time.

[There followed discussion off the record.]

SOVIET PRODUCTION CAPABILITIES

The CHAIRMAN. In relation to this overall ability to attack, what information have we got on the volume of production that the Russians now have? They have been sending a lot of their stuff to the Viet Minh forces, into Korea and wherever material is needed to make trouble, they send it.

What is their capacity?

Have they been able to create a backlog, or what do you have on that?

General BRADLEY. Well, sir, as you know they kept up production of war materials after the last war was over to a much greater extent than we did, and they show a tremendous amount of their budget, as much as they hide their budget, they show a tremendous amount of their budget went into war materials. They continued to manufacture them.

We think that right now we can manufacture jets as fast as they are manufacturing jets, the MIG 15's.

TRUCKS

They are having to manufacture a lot of trucks, as you say, and our records show that during 1952 we destroyed a thousand trucks in Korea, and we think that is a rather conservative figure because they only are given credit if the pictures show they are knocked out and caught fire. That is a little drain on their capacity, in addition to those that are worn out; but we averaged, during 1952, destroying a night of the trucks.

Right now, in the last few months we have been sighting tre mendous numbers. In fact I guess it was Sunday night we over a thousand.

sighted

-well.

The CHAIRMAN. What trucks? General BRADLEY. I thousand trucks. We can only attack about percent of those, of course, so any we cannot attacksometimes, on some nights we cannot attack any of them because of bad weather, and we are not too sure.

The traffic shows an upgrade in the dark of the moon. We know that because we see more of them in the dark of the moon because

1 Numbers not given in the transcript.

hey are taking advantage of the dark of the moon to run, but the
hart of the year shows a steady up and down, with an increased
umber spotted during the dark-of-the-moon nights.
Senator TAFT. Where do they come from?

General BRADLEY. They come down three principal routes.
Senator TAFT. Where, originally-from Russia?

General BRADLEY. We think the Russians furnish most of the

source.

Senator TAFT. And they run them, themselves, on across on their own power, across Siberia?

General BRADLEY. Undoubtedly.

You might put up that map of Korea, the one that shows the

routes.

Senator GREEN. On what do you base your supposition that they are mostly Russian trucks?

General BRADLEY. We just do not think that China is getting enough raw materials to make them. It might be that they are getting it shipped in, but we don't know.

Senator GREEN. You don't know?

General BRADLEY. No, we think most of them are Russian-made. They come down in three ways, they come down through An-Tung, through that area, then there is one that comes down to the right of that, coming almost south [indicating on map].

Some of them also come down these two routes and then through here, and there is another main supply route through here and another one down the coast.

This railroad comes down out of Russia, and comes down the coast and we are able to interdict that, so they cannot use the railroad too much, but they are able to keep their bridges repaired enough to run the trucks down, and also to repair their tunnels and bridges and run a lot of material through on trains.

Those are the three principal routes.

These ones through here, both of these are being used, this one and this.

EFFECTS OF A NAVAL BLOCKADE

Senator HUMPHREY. General, what would be the effect of a naval blockade, let us say, according to your first alternative, both intercoastal and also a complete sea blockade, what would be its effect in view of the many land routes within the land mass of China? General BRADLEY. I don't know whether you could all hear the question or not. The question was: What effect on this would a blockade have?

1

We figure a thousand tons a day goes into China by water.

Only two railroads come down through here and this a thousand tons is more than is presently handled on those two railroads. If you don't cut off the coastal blockade, lots of this could come down here to Port Arthur and Dairen and then by small boats get down the coast, so I am afraid it would not have too much effect, it would have some effect of course, but it would affect all this stuff coming in here. They could control and handle most of it by road and by coastal shipping. That would probably result in handling all of Numbers not given in the transcript.

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