there are some Greek-owned ships under the Panamanian flag, and whether or not any of those Greeks we are talking about are American citizens on the side, I don't know, but a lot of those are running in there under the Panamanian flag. Senator MANSFIELD. Is there any way that the United Nations, as such, could bear down on Panama, Greece, or Monaco, or any other country belonging to the United Nations, I don't necessarily mean Monaco? General BRADLEY. Those are the ones whose flags they run under, that is the truth. However off the record. The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further? AN INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL VAN FLEET Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have included in the record the interview of General Van Fleet that appeared in this evening's Star. The CHAIRMAN. So ordered. The CHAIRMAN. If there are no further questions, the meeting will stand adjourned. We thank you, General. With the thoughts we got this morning and the information we have gotten this afternoon, we know that we have a responsible job ahead of us and hope the Good Lord will give us the judgment to make the right moves. [Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 72-194-77-vol. V-10 REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE (DULLES) (Staff Memorandum)1 FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1953 UNITED STATES SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C. Present: Senators Smith (N.J.), Chairman, Knowland, George, and Sparkman. Not members of subcommittee but attended because of special interest in Secretary Dulles' report: Senators Taft, Langer, and Fulbright. Secretary of State [John Foster] Dulles; Assistant Secretary for the Far East [John Moore] Allison; Senate Liaison Officer Horace Smith. Messrs. Wilcox, Kalijarvi, and Holt, Foreign Relations Committee staff members. In response to Secretary Dulles' question concerning press reports of consultative subcommittee meetings, Senator Smith expressed the opinion that such meetings should be entirely off the record. The Secretary went on to say that he wanted to be clear on that, for what he discussed with the subcommittee would, in large part, be governed by whether or not his comments were given to the press. Senator Sparkman felt that it was bad psychology to leak information to the press because of the chain of public opinion set off in that manner. Senator Knowland's view was that no announcement of scheduled meetings of this kind should be given to the press and thus arouse speculation as to the subject matter. Senator Smith read aloud a short prepared statement, noncommittal in comment, which was acceptable to all for release to the press. Senator Smith opened the meeting by stating that President Eisenhower's reference to the Far East in his state of the Union address had raised a number of questions in the minds of a good many people about our policy in Asia, and for that reason he felt it desirable to meet with the Secretary and other members of the subcommittee to discuss in a general way what the administration has in mind. The Secretary began by saying that the basic purpose of the administration is to try and end the fighting in Asia, not only in Korea but in Indo-China as well. He stated that the situation in Indo-China is even more dangerous in its global aspects than is the fighting in 1 In general, verbatim transcripts are not kept of meetings of the consultative subcommittees. Korea, for a collapse in Indo-China would have immediate grave reactions in other areas of Asia, especially the rice bowl lands. He stressed the possible serious effect on India and Japan, which get a large portion of their rice from that region. The greatest single obstacle to getting the European Defense Community going is the fear on the part of France that Germany will again be in a position to wage aggressive warfare on her neighbors. This fear is manifested in French reluctance to strip her European forces by sending sufficient troops to Indo-China to bring the hos tilities there to an end. Our intelligence, however, points to evidence that given a sufficiently large striking force in Indo-China, the French could successfully hait the war, provided that training of Vietnamese troops could be stepped up appreciably. High ranking Vietnamese officers have been invited to Korea to inspect United Nations equipment and methods, but the French are so proud of their own military techniques, they may be unwilling to accept much guidance and counsel from U.N. military leaders. Also, the language barrier might pose difficulties. Part of this overall problem is whether or not we have sufficient productive capacity to carry on the program of training and equipping the South Koreans, the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa and Vietnamese forces in Indo-China. There has been a very great failure to meet our commitments both in Asia and in Europe. Efforts here have been seriously retarded because of the lack of elementary weapons and ammunition. Our troops in Korea have had to be rationed to five rounds of 105 mm a day, for example. That situation, however, is beginning to pick up. The failure of U.S. production to meet anticipated levels has had a serious effect upon what we have been able to do to make our policies effective. The judgment, however, of our best military people is that a good deal could probably be done to change the situation in Asia to our advantage if we could work out a program in which we were able to treat Asia as a single front. As part of that, we would need to intensify the training of South Koreans and Vietnamese troops so that within 12 months their own forces woud be able to hold the line and the Communists could not funnel down into Indo-China as they have done in Korea. It is estimated that there are approximately 200,000 troops (Chinese Communist) in place on that border ready to move, and we certainly do not want a big influx of additional Chinese volunteer forces to spill over the border into Indo-China. There must be some means, therefore, of pinning down such forces so that they cannot march. The aim of the Kremlin, of course, is to perpetuate the fighting because, by the use of satellite second-teams they are able to tie up the first-team of the Western world. Already we are committed, so far as our land forces in Korea are concerned, to a very considerable extent; the French are committed in Indo-China; and it is, therefore very difficult to develop the strength we need in Europe. From this it is apparent that we need to find a way to disengage our forces by doing what we can to enable our allies to hold the line against the Soviet satellites. If that can be done, it is hoped that the Kremlin will cease to find the fighting advantageous to them, and will react accordingly. When Senator Taft raised the question of U.S. recognition of Comunist China in the event hostilities cease, the Secretary replied that e did not anticipate it, certainly not in the foreseeable future or nder present circumstances. The Secretary stated that a good deal of thought has been given to he use of Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea, and, while that posibility has not been ruled out, Chiang himself does not desire it. Furthermore, there is evidence that Rhee is strongly opposed to the dea of using Korea as a possible battleground for civil war between Vationalist and Communist Chinese forces. Although using Naionalist troops in Korea would pose a training and equipping probem for us, on the other hand, it would give the Nationalists combat Experience which they very much need. Such combat experience could e gained also under a rotation system for troops on islands off the nainland engaged in raids against the Communists on the mainland. A number of these islands are in the hands of Nationalist sympahizers. Senator Knowland commented that in his opinion we should press for greater assistance from our allies than the present 10 percent they are contributing. He went on to say that the American public is growing tired of having to bear 90 percent of the manpower burden. To this Senator Taft added that our hands are more or less tied because the action in Korea is termed a U.N. one. Mr. Allison pointed out that the powers with the most forces to contribute are already heavily committed in the Far East-the British in Malaya and the French in Indo-China. He acknowledged, however, that we will have to ask them for more help. The Secretary stated that in all honesty and fairness it must be remembered that at the time the U.S. intervened in Korea it was not a U.N. enterprise, that our allies were not overly anxious to come into the picture, and that they felt that having thrown the mantle of the U.N. around the operation, they had discharged the bulk of their responsibility. Senator Knowland remarked that if that was their attitude, it did not bode well for the future. He added that he felt we ould not establish a precedent for the U.N. action by carrying a 90 percent burden of participation. Mr. Dulles went on to say that the sense of urgency on the part of our allies has lessened, partly because of ammunition and other equipment shortages that tend to drag out the war. Also, the fact that the Congress has established a short term basis for the Korean operation has been a hindrance, he said. It was his view that our whole psychology of getting the war over quickly is bad, for it only emphasizes our natural moral repugnance to war, a repugnance our enemy does not share. The Secretary stated that at the present a reevaluation of the Korean problem is going on, and the administration is exploring the possibility of a blockade. It is, of course, apparent that on the pretext of negotiations for an armistice, the Communists have built up their strength and have dug in for a tenacious holding operation. Another critical area at this time is the Middle East. Because of British and French commitments in the Far East, the Suez area is left very much exposed. Almost certainly there is a tie-in between antisemitic activity on the part of the Soviet Union and wooing of |