The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary ACHESON. I think it would have very serious effects, Senator, very serious effects.

THE THREAT OF WAR HAS LESSENED

The CHAIRMAN. When Churchill was over here he said something about the threat of war had lessened, you will remember. I understand that is your viewpoint, too?

Secretary ACHESON. I should think it is fair to say that. It requires a lot of qualifications. It has certainly lessened insofar as its arising in Europe is concerned.

I should think also the increased strength in Europe makes it much less desirable for them to take steps elsewhere which might bring on a general conflagration. I should say this is a fair statement if one takes it cautiously.

NO SOVIET TIMETABLE OF AGGRESSIONS

The CHAIRMAN. With your vast experience in Government, and in your dealings with the Kremlin and the people in Europe, is it your idea that the Kremlin has an overall plan, has a timetable, which was partially upset, probably for a long time upset, in Korea. But the Kremlin is convinced, that it was chosen to take over the world, and its steps indicate that it has been pretty successful in doing so so far, and that it is going to carry on? Do you think that is the general outline of what we can expect that maybe the timetable has been postponed?

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, I do not think there is any timetable. I think that is one of the great differences between the danger which comes to us from the Soviet Union and the danger which came from Hitler.

I think Hitler had a timetable, and the thing that really pulled him down was his rigid adherence to that timetable, and his taking steps at certain times which just got him into trouble when he did.

I think with the Russians they are much more willing to leave this thing quite indefinite as far as time is concerned. I think that their ultimate ambitions and ultimate desires are very much as you have described them.

I think one has to have in mind always that at the center of all Russian thinking is the security of the regime; that is the thing which is right in their minds. Therefore, they will not do the kind of thing which Hitler did, which was to take a step which threatened the whole business right at the start, because if he lost he lost everything.

Therefore, they will proceed in a way in which, so far as possible, they would not take a step which would endanger the regime.

THE DANGER OF KREMLIN ERROR

That does not mean that they never would endanger it, because there is the possibility of error and the possibility of error in the Kremlin is a very disturbing one, and it comes from two sources.

One is the error which they have put into the minds of all their people so that they are reporting from the outside world in a manner which is highly colored with what the reporter thinks the people at home want to hear and, therefore, they are quite apt to get erroneous reports as to what we or other people would do in a situation.

They also have another grave problem, and that is that they have on their eyes, even when they look at facts which are reported correctly, they have spectacles which are ground according to Communist dogma and, therefore, what they see is not what happened, but what happened reflected through these spectacles, and certain things have just got to happen; in other words, from their point of view the whole capitalistic system has to take a certain course, it just has to; it is inevitable, just the way the Earth revolves or the seasons change.

This idea that the capitalist world is going to distintegrate is inevitable. Also, the capitalist world is going to get itself into wars; they changed their doctrine quite a bit as to who it is the capitalist world is going to fight. A long time the idea was held that it was going to fight them in one last desperate struggle before it collapsed. Now they say it is not going to happen at all. It is going to be a war within the capitalist world first, and we will probably destroy ourselves, so we will not have to fight them.

But the possibility of error in their seeing things abroad is increased by the fact that they see it through these distorted lenses. Now, with those cautions and qualifications, I think that what they propose to do is to proceed in any place where they can push in without this grave risk, and if they thought that they could do something because we were incompetent or unable to stop them, I think they would do it.

I do not think that they would do it if they thought this was going to bring an attack right smack back on them; I do not think that they would. But, for instance, if one makes an assumption that certain retaliatory operations on our part were possible, it is quite possible that the stepping up of dangers in Europe will be very much increased, because it is this looking out for their situation at home which is very important, and that again is one reason why you have to have the alternative protection; you have to have your retaliatory striking power, and you have your defense on the ground so you may not be given the chance of not using your own striking power, because if you use it it will be used back on you, and a great deal of damage will happen.

A SEPARATE AUSTRIAN SETTLEMENT UNLIKELY

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I would just like to conclude by asking a few general questions in relation to the overall perimeter. What do you say about Austria. Is there any chance of our getting that treaty that was contemplated, that the Russians agreed they would

Secretary ACHESON. I should not think there was any chance of getting settlement in Austria before some kind of a settlement is reached in Europe.

THE SITUATION IN JAPAN

The CHAIRMAN, What is the general situation in Japan? Would you say it was pretty healthy?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir; I should think that it is extraordinarily healthy considering the facts of the world as they are today. The Japanese are faced with very serious economic problems. I do not quite see their way through all of those problems at the present time; that is one difficulty.

They have also a considerable difficulty ahead of them in playing their part in the defense of the Pacific as there is a strong resistance to any kind of armament in Japan. They have been through this thing, they do not like their own military class, they do not like anything about it.

They know they have got to do it, and I think they will do it. I think they will have to do it slowly. If we get too impatient, if we crowd them too fast, we will get a bad reaction out of them.

I think we are going to have in the future another problem, which is the behavior of considerable military forces of the United States in Japan. They want the forces there, we want them there, but the mere presence of troops of another nation within your own country is always a problem.

That will have to be handled with a great deal of tact and understanding on both sides to keep it on the track, but I think, on the whole, it is in pretty good shape.

NO PLAN TO COUNTER TUDEH PARTY TAKEOVER

The CHAIRMAN. If the Tudeh Party were to take over in Iran, have any plans been made or in conjunction with our allies, as to what should or should not be done?

Secretary ACHESON. No, sir; I think there are no operational plans for that.

I think that the general idea would be that if it took over, and if the Government of Iran continued in some way, either in the country or out of the country, and wanted us to help them, we would do whatever we could to help them. But I do not think there are any plans as to how to do it or when.

THE SITUATION IN NORTH AFRICA

The CHAIRMAN. How is the French-Arab situation in North Africa getting along, the two countries there that France was interested in?

Secretary ACHESON. It is a very disturbed one; it is not in very good shape. We are hoping that now that this thing is over in the United Nations, the French will get on with their program of reform and improvement in North Africa, and that the Bey and the Sultan will cooperate with them, and this thing will quiet down; but there has got to be more movement than there has been in the past to keep it stable.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to comment on the situation that relates to the Israeli and the Arab situation?

THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE

Secretary ACHESON. That is just one of the grave current almost insoluable problems of the world.

In some way or other, in order to get stability or any sort of strength in the Middle East, which you have got to have if you are going to be secure at all, there has got to be a way found of bringing those hostilities to an end; reassuring the Arabs that there is not going to be Israeli expansion by population that is bursting_out of that little country; there has got to be an assurance to the Israelis that there is not going to be Arab aggression against them, and they have all got to work on some plan, yet undevised, so that they cooperate in a defense of this area, which is one of the richest and one of the most exposed.

PAKISTAN AND INDIA

The CHAIRMAN. What about Pakistan and India?

Secretary ACHESON. That again is one of the very great deal of troubles in that area. No one has been able to make a degree of progress which we once hoped could be made in solving the Kashmir question, which is the great problem there.

Dr. Frank Graham has seemed at times to be pretty close to a solution, and then something happens, and they drift apart again. It is pretty discouraging.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the situation in India in relation to the Communists increasing the strength of their forces? There is a lot of talk to the effect that unless there is something done within a very few years that they will be able to take over India by virtue of their pentration, taking over political parties, and so forth.

I wondered what you have to say about that, because to me that is one of the things we have to face up to.

Secretary ACHESON. I think the situation there is better than it was a year ago. The last election showed a really startling growth of Communist voters in South India, and that will lead to a great acceleration in the internal development plans of the Indian Government, and I think Nehru has worked out a schedule by which he will have doubled or trebled the food-producing capacity of South India before the next elections come up, which will be 5 years after they came up before.

If that is done, I think that the outlook is good. If it is not done, I think the outlook is bad.

It is a problem of dealing with people; there is great pressure of the population on what is at the present time an inadequate and exhausted source of food supply, but which can be made a very good

one.

Now we are working with the Indian Government. Tremendous steps are being taken. It is a race against the pressure of hunger, despair, and progress. I think we can win it.

1 Appointed U.N. Security Council mediator in 1951.

72-194-77-vol. V-3

Secretary ACHESON. I do not remember exactly the words which I used to describe General Ridgway's mission, but roughly, and subject to getting the thing straight from the paper itself, it is about what we have always said is what we wished to attain, that is, to have a force in being or soon to be in being, which would accomplish two purposes: One would be to prevent war, to deter war, to prevent any attack, and the other would be if the worst happened, if we were attacked, to conduct this successful offense and ultimately to win the war.

Now, he cannot accomplish the mission stated that way now because he has not got sufficient force.

Senator FERGUSON. That is, either one of those missions?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, either one of those missions completely.

SOVIETS COULD NOT OVERRUN EUROPE WITHOUT MOBILIZATION

But what I was saying earlier, Senator, before you came in I think, is that what we have now got is a force which is sufficient to make it impossible for the existing Communist forces in Europe to take off and overrun Europe.

Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that Communist forces in Europe means in Poland, in East Germany?

Secretary ACHESON. What it really means is in East Germany.
Senator FERGUSON. East Germany?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes; and it means that for the reason that I will go on to state

Senator FERGUSON. Not in Austria?

Secretary ACHESON. Well, I had not thought about Austria. I do not know the military answer to that, but not very strong forces in Austria exist on either side.

What I went on to say is that the reason that that achievement is an important achievement is that it would require some considerable degree of mobilization to augment the forces in East Germany to make it a successful attack, and that is something which is observable, and something of which we will have cognizance.

Senator GILLETTE. That is my question.

Secretary ACHESON. That is why we are happy that we have been able to do that much, and as we can do more, everybody ought to be happier still.

Senator GILLETTE. That is all that I wanted to ask him, Mr. Chair

man.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I regret that I have to go to a meeting of my New Jersey people. I want to thank the Secretary for coming this morning and for his statement here, and to express again my appreciation of the many meetings we have had together, and our personal relationship, and I hope that will always

obtain.

Secretary ACHESON. Thank you; it is very gracious of you.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Sparkman?

Senator SPARKMAN. No questions.

Senator FERGUSON. I have two questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I beg your pardon, Senator.