ut then we would very quickly reach areas like the Arab countries, here many things might happen with small stakes for the Soviets, o put in there, and that is why for the last 8 years we have clung to ndochina, convinced that it was one of the doors to the Southern belt f Asia, and that if that door was being opened, let open, to the Comnunists, very probably the country would be through in a short numer of years.

Senator MANSFIELD. In other words, there would be a chain reaction o the countries in the East which eventually would go beyond the Suez, into Africa, and in addition to that the wealth of the Indies would be open, that is, the rubber and oil and the tin in Malaya, all hose things which are so important, plus the rice granary in Indohina, Thailand, and Burma, which could be used by lots of people; so what you have there is in a lot of respects probably the most important position in Asia.

INDOCHINA MORE IMPORTANT THAN KOREA

Mr. PLEVEN. We believe this part of Asia is strategically much more important than Korea, I mean strategy

Senator MANSFIELD. That is right.

Mr. PLEVEN. [continuing]. And I believe that people who have been recently in those areas, you see, have told me that it is amazing the importance and the interest which people in Indonesia, for instance, are taking with respect to the struggle in Indochina because they fully realize that it is a key position, and I think it is the only explanation also why the Chinese are constantly helping and pushing,

you see.

At the moment, you see, we feel that the movements of troops which make us believe there will be shortly an offensive, are directed towards Laos, and from Laos to Siam.

Senator MANSFIELD. If that happens, what happens to Burma and Thailand?

Mr. PLEVEN. That is right; I call Siam Thailand. It is certainly one of the strategy components of the world.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is right.

Mr. PLEVEN. And I believe also that the loss of prestige for the Western World will have great effects throughout Africa. Senator MANSFIELD. That is my question, Mr. Chairman.

PUBLICATION OF THE RECORD

The CHAIRMAN. Monsieur Pleven, I should say, as I have listened. to these questions and answers, it sems to me that there would be little or nothing that should not get out to the public of much that has been said, and in back of it would be the strength of your own conviction. We would like to make this matter into a Senate document. I might say that Adenauer was here, and he agreed to the same thing. We agreed that someone from his Embassy could look over and make any corrections they wished of the record, but it seems to me that we that we have here a second precedent that has occurred recently where we have had the benefit of distinguished statesmen from abroad to counsel with this group, and I am sure anything you have said is

not in the slightest in disagreement with what we feel and what we have said ourselves, but it is a confirmation more or less of an international opinion that I think I would be very glad if you would agree that we could print it.

Mr. PLEVEN. I will tell you, I would like to consult our Ambassador

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. PLEVEN. [continuing]. Because, you see, the difference is that Mr. Adenauer was here on an official trip to America.

Here I am a friend, passing through Washington, and going to get a degree, and when Adenauer was speaking, he was speaking for the German Government, and I was not speaking here for my government.

The CHAIRMAN. No, you were not.

Mr. PLEVEN. I was just on my own.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what makes it all the more valuable.
We will abide by your wishes in the matter.

Mr. PLEVEN. I will speak to Henri Bonnet about it, and try to find out what he thinks.

The CHAIRMAN. We will do more than that. We will have it transcribed, and if he wants to come down and look it over there can be an agreement effectuated between him and Mr. Wilcox of the committee here, then, as to what should be done.

Senator GREEN. Negotiated is the word.

The CHAIRMAN. Anyway, I want to again express to you our appreciation for this very friendly and very profitable visit that you have paid to this committee, this group. You can see how interested they are. We hope ere long to get back to Paris and visit with you

over there.

Mr. PLEVEN. Well, it is my hope, you see, I hope you Senators will come, and I will be glad to have a chance to repay this visit. Senator TOBEY. Vive la France!

Mr. PLEVEN. Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:05 o'clock, the committee adjourned.]

"

1

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE1

FRIDAY, APRIL 17, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:25 a.m., in the Foreign Relations Committee room, U.S. Capitol, Senator H. Alexander Smith, presiding.

Present: Senators Smith, Hickenlooper, Taft, Langer, Ferguson, Knowland, George, Green, Gillette, and Mansfield.

Also present: Dr. Wilcox, Dr. Kalijarvi, Mr. O'Day, Mr. Cahn, and Mr. Holt, of the committee staff.

Senator SMITH. Gentlemen, will the meeting please come to order. At the request of the chairman, who has to be absent today, the second-in-command on the Republican side is presiding, I hope, with the indulgence of his colleagues.

MEETING OF THE NATO COUNCIL IN PARIS

We have Secretary Dulles with us, who is about to go to a meeting in Paris of NATO, as I understand it, and there are things that he wants to discuss with the committee. So, Secretary Dulles, we will give you the floor for whatever you may want to say to us. We welcome you here, as ever, of course, and we are delighted to see you again.

Secretary DULLES. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. And we hope you shot some ducks, or whatever you were doing last week.

[Discussion off the record.]

Senator SMITH. All right, Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES,

SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary DULLES. Mr. Chairman, I asked for the opportunity to meet with your committee before going over to the meeting of the NATO Council, which will be held in Paris next week.

There will be, in addition to myself, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Humphrey, and the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wilson, and Mr. Stassen, Director of Mutual Security.

It will be the first time that the new administration has had to deal with these NATO problems, which are extremely complicated, difficult, and as to which I still have a great deal to learn.

1 See note, p. 289.

THE SUBJECT WILL BE FORCE GOALS

Broadly speaking, the purpose of the meeting is to check up on the progress that has been made toward the military goals that were agreed upon at Lisbon in 1952, and then to try to decide what the goals should be for 1953, and perhaps 1954.

I am told that the force goals agreed upon at Lisbon have been substantially achieved through the creation of 50 ground force divisions, approximately 4,000 aircraft, and 1,600 ships, which was the goal for the end of 1952.

The problem then will be before us of working out programs for the current year, 1953. That would have been done last December. I understand, but because of the change of administration that impended, it was not dealt with at that time, and was postponed until the present time.

Our general feeling is as we go to this meeting that the programs in the past have been somewhat too spasmodic in an effort to meet certain target dates, and that they are not the type of effort which can be sustained over a long period of years, without exhausting economically and financially the member countries.

They themselves seem to have come to that conclusion, and in the last few weeks we have had, in our talks with the representatives of the British, French, Belgian, and governments with whom we have met, there has been a feeling from them that they cannot carry on at the present pace unless they can get very substantially increased financial help from the United States which, from our own standpoint, we deem to be doubtful because our own fiscal condition is not as good as it might be.

A SUSTAINED PACE WITHOUT EXHAUSTION

We believe that while the effort should be sustained, it should be sustained at a pace which can be kept up without, as I say, fiscal and economic exhaustion, and with a presumable tapering off of the economic help which they get from the United States.

In the past there has been an atmosphere of a good deal of emer gency and certain hysteria and panic about this effort. There have been dates picked as the probable date of greatest danger. You will recall when I was here in Washington in 1948 I was told that the date of greatest danger would probably be 1950; then it was 1952, and now it is 1954, and then it was to be 1956.

Well, events have shown, I think, that we are not smart enough to predict the date of greatest danger, and that to meet a danger which probably will exist for a long period of time, we must have policies ourselves which can be sustained consistently with economic health over a long period of time, and we intend to approach the problems of the NATO Council in an effort to try to find programs which will involve the use of economic strength to create military force in being to the degree, but only to the degree, that is compatible with economic health.

The French position is particularly precarious. The budget is way out of balance and currency is weakening again, and they, as well as the other countries I mentioned, have indicated that they do not feel that they can go on progressively without greater help from us

which, in turn, I do not think we want to recommend to the Congress o give.

I prepared here for use in an address which I am going to make before the Editors Association tomorrow night, a little statement, which would be the first public statement as to our general attitude, and I would like, if I might, to read this to the committee, so that it can see whether you think it, in general, reflects the sound point of view to ake over there. May I read that?

Senator SMITH. We will be glad to hear that, Mr. Secretary.

EDC HAS BEEN REVIVED

Secretary DULLES. I first talk a little bit about the European Defense Community [EDC], and concluding that, I say, referring to the visit which I made the trip Mr. Stassen and I took to Europe, and return visits here, the result of our visit and return visits to Washington of several European leaders-this project has now been revived.

It cannot yet be confidently predicted that it will be realized, but at least it can be realized far more likely than seemed possible last January.

Senator SMITH. You are referring to the EDC in that?

Secretary DULLES. That refers to EDC, the European Defense Community.

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. It is sufficiently likely so that I feel we are now justified in making the provisional assumption that there will be a solid core of continental unity, including Germany.

A SPASMODIC APPROACH HAS BEEN EXHAUSTING

Then I go on to NATO and I say that we never expected that the European Defense Community, when created, would alone carry the burden in making Europe secure. The European Defense Community of six nations would stand within the framework of NATO, a partnership of 14. This partnership, however, presented us with urgent problems, for the program for NATO now seems to most of the member nations not to represent the best use of economic and fiscal strength.

The United States and its NATO partners have until now been operating on the assumption that the moment of greatest danger was some early predictable date. Therefore, it was reasoned that extraordinary efforts should be made to meet that date, leaving subsequent years for recuperation. It has, however, proved necessary regularly to postpone the date of peril, to prolong correspondingly the extraordinary exertion and to defer the period of stabilization. This spasmodic approach has been exhausting to all concerned. Several of our allies have now told us that they cannot hold to the present pace without greatly increased help from the United States.

PROGRAMS FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD

The situation obviously calls for a fresh approach. Because we do not believe a setting of a date of peak danger can be reliably forecast,