by certain expenditures of money, you can get the maximum security and protection for the United States.

You can get at much less cost other people who will hold the outposts, the outpost positions, and that should not be treated as a matter wholly unrelated to the security of the United States itself.

HAS THE SECRETARY BACKED DOWN?

Senator LANGER. Mr. Secretary, rightfully or wrongfully, the people out there have got the impression that you and Mr. Stassen wen' over there to Europe about a month ago or 5 weeks ago

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator LANGER [continuing]. And they approved of the attitu you took, and that of Stassen. They said, "By God, this fellow Dulles sure told them that they have got to help themselves over there on they are not going to get it."

Now, that impression is general out there, and lately they har gotten the impression that you are retreating from that position. In stead of carrying it through, as you said you were going to do at tha time, that you are backing away from it which, of course, tends to make you more unpopular with the rank and file out there, if means anything to you.

Secretary DULLES. Well, of course, it does mean something to me But I have got to give the President and you people my honest ad vice. When you have a machine that is running in a certain direction you can try to stop it abruptly, in which case you generally get an accident, or you can make a sharp angle, in which case you generally have an accident, or you can swing it through a curve, in which case you can conserve a good bit of what you have got.

Now, what we are trying to do is to swing this thing to a curve. and that is not nearly as spectacular as though you are trying to stop it all at once, or trying to turn at right angles.

I say, if you do any of these things it is spectacular, all right, b you get a lot of pieces flying all around, and everybody knows yo have done something. If you try to swing around a curve it takes people a little while to get them to realize that you have actual changed your course. I am trying to do it by a curved method, be cause if we do it the other way we are going to lose tremendors elements of value.

Here you have got a very considerable force which is built up in Europe where you have got the men waiting for end items. The e items are all ordered, they are in the pipeline, about to come out fr that purpose.

We do not want them ourselves, and you can cut that whole thing off, in which case a huge investment that you have made goes virt ally for nothing, and your whole organization that you have built up for 4 or 5 years, 50 divisions here now, will entirely collapse.

As I say, it would be spectacular to do it that way, but I do n really believe that is in the best interests of the United States to de that way. I think, as I say, swinging through a curve which will tape this thing out gradually, is better than the shock method.

Senator LANGER. Yes. But what they are particularly criticizing a radio speech you gave, you know, during the campaign, and I " telling you what the impression is out there.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

THE CHANCES OF RATIFICATION ARE IMPROVED

Senator LANGER. The impression is through the campaign there vas the belief that Mr. Eisenhower spent months over there organizng these various countries, and he had done a great job-that was he campaign literature; he had got all those countries united, and you get on the radio, and you give a speech, and the effect of your speech was that not a single country had ratified anything that had been done, and they said, "Well, have we got any soldiers over there at all or what did Mr. Eisenhower do," and the impression now is out there that very little was done and that, as a matter of fact, when you went over there you were the first fellow who said, "Do something. You have got to ratify this thing or there won't be more aid," and they liked it. The people liked your attitude.

Secretary DULLES. And the result of that attitude is that it is at least likely now that there will be ratification. Out of that ratification will come a substantial German force which will be the greatest shield that we could get, and that with that in creation we can gradually cut down our own aid.

Now, the question is do you want to take action on what may be the eve of that thing or wreck it all or do you want to see it go through. I think the thing to do is to try to see it through, at least for-we do not know yet. Of course, I would not want to be put in a position of promising that this EDC will get ratified, but I could go over with you the status of it in the different parliaments, and I think you would feel, at least, it was a good gamble.

Senator LANGER. No more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator SMITH. Senator Gillette?

Senator GILLETTE. No question, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Senator Ferguson?

MORE ON THE FORMOSA STORY

Senator FERGUSON. I do not care whether you put this on the record or not. Was your conversation with the news people, with the press, off the record or for background purposes or was it not?

Secretary DULLES. It was entirely for background purposes.
Senator FERGUSON. That is all.

Secretary DULLES. We were sitting around and talking just as we would-it was a social affair to which they had invited me, and we sat around and chatted after dinner, just as a group of men would do

Senator FERGUSON. After an ordinary dinner?

Secretary DULLES [continuing]. After an ordinary dinner, a social dinner.

Senator SMITH. Senator Mansfield?

Secretary DULLES. Let me make clear that no person at that dinner wrote anything to which I take exception.

Senator FERGUSON. It was the New York Times that wrote the story.

Secretary DULLES. But the fellow who wrote the story was not at the dinner.

Senator FERGUSON. That is what I mean.

Secretary DULLES. And somewhere in between this thing get planted. Now, who did it or just how and how it was pulled off, I do

not know. But as far as I know it must have been a deliberate plant done by somebody for some ulterior purpose; but they are disturbed about it as much as anybody else.

Senator FERGUSON. Is the man who wrote it a White House correspondent?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. He is permanently there?

Secretary DULLES. He is assigned to them. He is not assigned to the State Department. It never occurred to me that the story had any origin at the State Department. You called me up, Bill.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. And it never entered my mind that it had any
relationship to me. I was the most amazed person in the world when
I found out they were pinning the story on me.
Senator FERGUSON. Was Waggoner at the party?
Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. He is at the State Department?
Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. So the man who wrote it was assigned to the White House?

Secretary DULLES. Yes; and apparently there is more to it, because. as I say, I was told last night that they had been told that the subject had been discussed at Cabinet meetings, which is utterly fantastic, so somebody has been spreading something for ulterior purposes. Senator SMITH. Senator Mansfield.

Senator MANSFIELD. No questions.
Senator SMITH. Senator Knowland?

Senator KNOWLAND. Just one short question.

Senator SMITH. What time do you have to go?

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand he has to be away at 12:30 or be there at 12:30, so I would just like to ask this one question that you could answer either on or off the record.

Secretary DULLES. This is all an executive session.

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

DISCUSSIONS ON KOREA

What steps can be taken to prevent the discussions which we may get into on this Korean situation from being a super Panmunjom. which I understand it, if the ceasefire comes then the possibilities of a buildup are there, although I understand under the Indian proposal there is not supposed to be a buildup; so that they will not use this time to actually strengthen their position, and then at some point in their own choosing turn the spigot the other way, and start getting tough again, and by that time having the airfields, the ammunition dumps and the troop concentrations to maybe strike us a fatal blow in Korea.

Can there be some time element or is this just an open-end situation that they talk as long as they have the desire to build up their strength?

Secretary DULLES. I am afraid that they can talk as long as they want to and as long as we are prepared to sit there and listen to them. We are obligated to carry on. We can put a time limit on it, but we

ave not got all the pressures under this armistice that have so far een negotiated that I would like to see there. I say that frankly. You see, what we inherited here was an armistice agreement that ad been negotiated by us, the United States, that is, and to some exent under the United Nations participation, not at the United Nations tself, but through the representatives of the other governments who Lave forces in there.

Everything was agreed to except in one article, with the exchange of the prisoners of war.

Now, some of those things that were a great deal not precisely the way I would like to see them, but we were so far involved in this as a United Nations partner that it did not seem practical or wise to atempt to at that stage, at least, reopen the entire armistice negotiaions.

I think myself that very serious consideration should be given to putting a time limit on the present talks and stating that if we do not get some satisfactory action quickly then we will not merely break up the talks but, perhaps, call off everything that has been agreed to so far because today we are being held to things that we agreed to on the assumption they would be all, and I do not think we should be indefinitely bound to some of those things that were agreed to.

Now, there is an understanding which I think is of some value. [Discussion off the record.]

Senator FERGUSON. Are we, in effect, starting where they left off now in their negotiations?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And recognizing all that has been said and done?

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. And are we going to continue the policy that we go into these talks and we are to stay there and will not leave, nothwithstanding anything that happens?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator FERGUSON. I understand that was the agreement before. The men were instructed, "You go in there and sit in these talks"Secretary DULLES. That is nothing to which we are bound. Senator FERGUSON. We are not bound by such a policy?

A SHARP TIME LIMIT FAVORED

Secretary DULLES. I would not favor that at all, no. I would favor putting a very sharp time limit on this thing, and although I have not discussed this with the President, and it is a matter in which his view would carry great weight not only because he is President but because of his military experience, I would be inclined to review all these previously agreed to articles, and if they are not pretty satisfactory, then, some of them do not seem to me to be satisfactory, I would say: "If you do not get agreement very quickly everything is off, and the next time you start from scratch."

in

Senator FERGUSON. Yes; that would be a great handicap if we went

Secretary DULLES. Well, it is.

Senator FERGUSON. [continuing]. With an idea we were to continue these talks on into the future

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator FERGUSON [continuing]. And we would sit there and listen to anything that they had to say no matter how absurd it was or how bitter it was against the United Nations.

Secretary DULLES. I think you can be sure that policy will not be followed.

Senator KNOWLAND. It seems to me we are entitled to have a demonstration of good faith on their part. If they are merely going to use it as a super Panmunjom and a propaganda background for stalling and maybe making troop dispositions, then it seems to me we should not be in a position of letting time work in their favor, as it definitely has done in the Panmunjom talks.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

ARE THEY BRINGING DOWN MUNITIONS WITH THE SICK AND WOUNDED?

Senator FERGUSON. Was there anything to this information that they were bringing down munitions with the sick and wounded?

Secretary DULLES. I do not know. I inquired about that of our intelligence officer this morning, and he could not confirm it. He said that the information that he had about their troop dispositions was that they were moving more onto a defensive position than to an offensive position, and apparently were making some redeployment of their forces as against the possibility of amphibious landings on their flanks, but I will have to look into that further.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, certainly a thing like that, if it would happen, that would affect the whole peace negotiations.

Secretary DULLES. It would certainly raise grave doubt right away as to the good faith of their maneuver.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator SMITH. Senator Taft, do you have any questions?
Senator TAFT. I am sorry that I had to leave.

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH WAS AMBIGUOUS ON KOREA

The President's speech yesterday was ambiguous to me as to just what was proposed to be done in Korea. He said:

The first great step along this way must be the conclusion of an honorable armistice in Korea.

This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a United Korea. It should mean no less importantly-an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of Indo China and Malaya. For any armistice in Korea that merely released aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud.

I do not understand whether that meant that the President was willing to undertake preliminary and immediate cessation of hostilities and wait on everything else or whether this was going to be part of the condition of an armistice.

Secretary DULLES. No. I was saying while you were out of the room, Senator Taft

Senator TAFT. Yes.

Secretary DULLES [continuing]. That the present negotiations involve a continuance of the cast in negotiations which resulted in an armistice agreement which was complete in every respect but one, that is, about the exchange of prisoners of war.