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Now that we did not think was practical to disturb because it was not entirely within the authority of the United States to do it. It vas a United Nations document, to some extent, and to disturb it would have caused very serious repercussions and difficulties with some of our allies; but we are carrying on and accepting the past negotiated provisions of the armistice. That armistice agreement itself provides that after the conclusion of the armistice, then in 30 days political talks will be initiated. I think that is what the President had in mind.

Senator TAFT. So we do just what we have been doing for the last year; we, in effect, cease hostilities and take chance on whether we

ever get anything else.

Secretary DULLES. That is correct.

AN ARMISTICE WITHOUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WOULD BE A MISTAKE

Senator TAFT. Is that not just what we did at Yalta and everywhere else where we have negotiated with the Russians, given them what they want first, and then go on? Has not the very condition of an armistice been that there should be some settlement in Korea, and must we not settle it all at once?

Secretary DULLES. Well an armistice generally precedes a political settlement. I do not know that-

Senator TAFT. That may be, but that is when you have got somebody beaten. The only effect of an armistice here is a greater buildup of the Soviet military machine so that they are able to save ammunítion and save airplanes and build up airplanes, build up their forces, and generally put themselves in a position where they are less likely to agree to these political agreements.

You feel that we are absolutely bound to go through if they come in and say, "We will agree to your prisoner thing," that we are bound to sign up the armistice as is?

Secretary DULLES. That is the feeling, yes.

Senator TAFT. I think it is a great mistake, I may say, for myself. Senator SMITH. Are you in accord with those pressures as to that or is it because we think it is the right thing to do? It seems to me that is the reason why you have got to have a very close time limit on it or it will rise to another 6 months, and there will be another buildup, and they will be talking politics in Korea indefinitely.

Secretary DULLES. The pressure for an end to this fighting in Korea is, of course, very great not only among our allies, but also here at home. It, of course, is a very large budgetary item.

Now, it was the President's feeling that we should not cancel out all of the armistice agreement which had been made. You see, theoretically, the negotiations are still going on. For us to move in and cancel out what has been done will create a very great disturbance in our relations with our allies.

A REASONABLE TIME LIMIT ON THESE DISCUSSIONS

Senator KNOWLAND. It does seem to me that if we have not already done so, there ought to be a clear understanding with our associates, if not with the full U.N. membership, and because of the complexion of the U.N. that may not be feasible but certainly with the nations that are associated with us, that there should be some reasonable time'

limit on these discussions, because while I find, of course, everybody has a deep desire for peace, and I have had any number of letters from men in Korea as well as the members of their families at home I was just out in California, and I found a considerable amount of sentiment that unless this thing could be settled right. they do not want to be forced into a situation of fighting again under maybe far worse conditions than we are now engaged in, and I would hope that the administration and our U.N. associates realize the grave dangers of having this in an open-ended, superduper Panmunjom operation.

THE INDIAN PROPOSAL

Secretary FERGUSON. Are we bound by the Indian proposal that has been approved, if they offer to accept that at the U.N.? 1 Secretary DULLES. We voted for it.

Senator FERGUSON. I mean, but is it the idea of the new administration to accept that as a settlement?

Secretary DULLES. The President, in the course of the campaign, said that we would make an armistice on the basis of the Indian proposal.

THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT GIVES A FALSE PICTURE

Senator TAFT. Mr. Secretary, this is what bothers me. "This means the immediate cessation of hostilities and the prompt initiation of political discussions leading to the holding of free elections in a united Korea."

It seems to me that gives a completely false picture. Once the armistice is concluded, what on Earth-what chance is there in a thousand that they will ever agree to free elections in Korea any more than they have in Germany? You are presenting a picture which is going to happen, which is not going to happen if it is preceded by a complete armistice, and then we are through. Nobody is going to resume another aggressive war all of a sudden because they will not agree to these free elections, and it seems to me, unless it means that these things are part of the making of the truce, I think it is a misrepresentation to the American people to say that this means the prompt initiation of political discussions, and hold out the hope of free elections in Korea, and hold out the ceasing of attacks in Indo China. We throw away the only weapon we have got to enforce those things, and once we make that armistice those things are just

so much hot air.

There is no chance of obtaining them. Why should they agree to them any more than they are agreeing to them in Germany? That is the thing that bothers me.

It seems to me that if that is what it means, then it seems to me the passage is a complete misrepresentation to the people of what we may hope for, because it holds out hopes that are completely foreign, if the armistice is to be made first. Unless we make those a condition of the armistice, I think we might just as well tear up the paper on which the speech was written.

1 A resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 3, 1952, containing detalled proposals to the Chinese and North Korean Governments for resolution of the prisoner exchange issue.

Secretary DULLES. Well, there are a good many problems that you would get into when you take over a situation which is as far adanced as this one was when we took it over.

Senator TAFT. Yes, I know.

Secretary DULLES. One possible course of action was to say that we would renegotiate the entire armistice agreement. That would isolate es very much, whatever that means, from our allies, not merely-the lliance is important to us not merely in Korea, which is a less imortant part than in a good many areas in the world. Europe and the Year East, and in general it affects the whole question of whether or ot we can have a cohesive working alliance between the Western European powers. We just cannot do that if we act wholly on our own rishes, and we have got to respect the fact that in practice there is a ifferent continuity in government, and even if you have a change in dministration you cannot, to your best interests, wholly destroy verything that has taken place before.

I think that there is a serious question which I have raised, myself, s to whether or not the armistice should not be more closely tied in with the political discussions than is the present timetable, and I hink we may find ways to do that.

Senator TAFT. That is what I would hope.

Secretary DULLES. I am using whatever ingenuity I have, trying to ind a way for moving in that direction, so that we can still maintain pressure. We lose, certainly, a great deal of the available pressure if ve make the kind of perpetual armistice here and that, in turn, leads o perpetual political discussions, particularly because the present rmistice line is not acceptable to the South Koreans, a very acceptable osition, and you may, if we do not look out-you are going to get into situation where the South Koreans are going to say, "Well, boys, if his is the line you want us to hold, you hold it, and we will quit," and hen we will really be in the soup. I do not think that is likely to hapen, but there is a good deal of unrest in South Korea.

Senator TAFT. I do not want to stop any other senators. Have the ther senators finished?

Senator SMITH. We have been around.

NATO READINESS DOUBTED

Senator TAFT. I have only one other question. I have, of course, as ou probably know, complete skepticism about NATO, at least until he Germans are a full part of it.

Secretary DULLES. Yes.

Senator TAFT. You spoke of the goal of 50 divisions having been eached. I do not think a commander in Europe could muster 25 diviions if the Russians attacked. I do not know where they are, whose hey are; there are not any, so far as I know of, more than 25, and I do ot think we ought to hold out any false pictures, when we do this hing, of what it is.

I have been very anxious that-I suppose you will be advised by he present Joint Chiefs of Staff when you go over, who got up the resent program, and I have been urging for a long time that they be ismissed, not so much because of themselves, but because it seems to he we ought to have a new look from the military end of this proposi

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tion. I am no military expert, but I have felt very strongly that we ought to take a completely new look at what the program is going to be in Europe if the Russians ever do attack, and find out whether our six divisions are going to be wiped off the map, and whether the ports of Europe are going to be destroyed before they could possibly get out, by atomic bombs. Certainly if the Russians can bomb this country, as we seem to fear, they certainly could destroy every port in Europe to which these armies are looking for supplies.

I just think the whole thing-and I may be completely wrong, but I do think we are entitled to a completely new look at it, and it seems to me it is very important that it be done before we commit ourselves to any, at least, long-term program now. That, of course, will take time, but I have been urging that they are going to appoint new Joint Chiefs of Staff in August when the present terms expire. Why not appoint them informally now and let them go into this whole business and spend the time between now and August criticizing and going over the program that we are spending so much, $50 billion, on today, not only the European but our own program, and what we are going to do in case of war.

Secretary DULLES. I will communicate that to the President.
Senator TAFT. I just throw out those ideas.

Secretary DULLES. I will communicate those ideas to the President and Secretary of Defense.

Can I be excused, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. I may say that we are meeting at two o'clock this afternoon with the American Legion. Senator Knowland, can you be here this afternoon?

Senator KNOWLAND. Yes.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, APRIL 17, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.O.

The committee met in executive session at 2 p.m. in the committee

room.

Present: Senators Smith (presiding), Ferguson, Knowland, Green, and Gillette.

The purpose of the meeting was a discussion desired with the committee by the Foreign Relations Commission of the American Legion. No stenographic report of the meeting was kept.

The committee adjourned at 3:30 p.m.

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