Mr. STASSEN. All right, sir. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions? ARE THE BRITISH SHIPPING JET ENGINES TO RUSSIA? Senator HICKENLOOPER. Governor, are the British shipping jet ngines such as those others to the Russians now or electronic echanisms or strategic materials of that kind, to your knowledge? Mr. STASSEN. They are not. Senator HICKENLOOPER. There was a time when they were shipping et engines of course to the Russians. Mr. STASSEN. That was quite a long time ago. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I know, but I just wondered if they might e continuing that practice, if there had been any change. Mr. STASSEN. No, they are not. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Or, any other strategic, fabricated mateial, let us say, things such as electronics, all materials like that? Mr. STASSEN. No, they are not. Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is all. The CHAIRMAN. I understand there will be a vote on the Douglas mendment. If there are no further questions, the committee will stand adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the committee stood in recess until 10:30 a.m., the following morning Wedneday, April 29, 1953.] MINUTES TUESDAY, APRIL 28, 1953 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee on overseas information met at 10:30 a.m. in the Foreign Relations Committee Room, to hold an executive session. Present: Chairman Hickenlooper, Senators Wiley, Knowland. Mundt, Green, and Fulbright. For record of proceedings, see official transcript. (368) 1 REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE1 WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29, 1953 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:30 a.m., in the Foreign Relations Committee Room, U.S. Capitol, Senator Alexander Wiley (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Wiley (chairman), Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Taft, Langer, Ferguson, Knowland, George, Green, Fulbright, Sparkman, and Gillette. Also present: Dr. Wilcox, Dr. Kalijarvi, Mr. O'Day, Mr. Cahn, Mr. Marcy, and Mr. Holt, of the committee staff. NOMINATION OF M'FALL The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order. Gentlemen, may I have your attention. They have set up the nomination of Jack M. McFall, Foreign Service Officer, class 1, to be Minister to Finland. He is over there now and we are informed by Mr. Wilcox that we have the FBI report, and he is all right. Do you want anything further on that? Senator GREEN. I think he is a pretty good man. Senator KNOWLAND. I think he is an excellent man, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Then you move to suspend the rule, and report him favorably? Senator KNOWLAND. I so move. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so moved. NOMINATION OF WADSWORTH Next is the nomination of George Wadsworth of New York. Some of you know him. I know him. Senator FULBRIGHT. He is in Czechoslovakia, is he not? Senator SMITH. I thought he was in Turkey. Senator FULBRIGHT. He was but now he is in Czechoslovakia. What is he up for? The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Senator FULBRIGHT. That is all right with me. The CHAIRMAN. I understand the FBI cleared him. Mr. WILCOX. Yes. 1 See note, p. 289. The CHAIRMAN. Everything being all right, is there the usual motion to suspend, and recommend him to the calendar? Senator SMITH. I so move. The CHAIRMAN. Is there any objection? [No response.] The CHAIRMAN. It is so ordered. Mr. Secretary, we are very happy to have you here with us today. I I understand that there are one or two matters you want to discuss with us, as relating to the recent NATO meeting in Paris, and also that, I understand, you care to discuss the Austrian Treaty situation. Now, sir, carry on in your own way. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE. ACCOMPANIED BY DOUGLAS MacARTHUR, II, COUNSELOR, STATE DEPARTMENT WESTERN INITIATIVE ON THE AUSTRIAN TREATY Secretary DULLES. Let me first, if I may, talk about the Austrian Treaty, if that is agreeable. You will recall that in the President's message, or speech, of a week ago Thursday,' he outlined a series of steps which might be taken by Soviet leaders to demonstrate whether or not they had a real and good faith to ease the tension, and he mentioned Asia, the end of the fighting in Korea, and also mentioned Indochina. In Europe, he gave first mention to Austria. The question of Austrian peace has been discussed at great length. It was first dealt with by the deputies in London in 1946; it came up before the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow, which I attended with Secretary Marshall in the spring of 1947, and has since then been kicked around. We believe that it is advisable for an initiative to be taken by the United States or by the United Kingdom, which is also interested in the matter, to revive the Austrian Treaty. One reason why we want to do that is to try to act first before the Soviet may propose a four-power conference in relation to Germany, which would be quite embarrassing at this time to Adenauer, and with relation to EDC things, which is already in hot water in Germany; and if you add to that present trouble a prospective fourpower conference about the unification and neutralization of Germany, it might make Adenauer's problems almost insoluble. There is a very strong feeling on the part of the Germans. French, and British that we should try to get the Austrian Treaty in the foreground, ahead of the German matter, so that if the Soviet propose a conference on Germany, we can say, "Well, the first thing to do is to act on this question of Austria. Until you have shown your good faith in Austria we will wait and then we can talk." That will force action in that direction before taking up any proposal about Germany. On that general policy there is complete agreement between the three Western powers. 1 April 16. THE 1946 DRAFT NOT THE KIND OF TREATY WE WANT TODAY Now, when we come down to apply that concretely you face somewhat of a problem because the long form treaty for Austria, which was largely drafted by the deputies in 1946, and which was refined somewhat in some of the paragraphs, and was redrawn, that treaty is not today the kind of treaty which we would like to see made for Austria.1 It throws upon Austria certain burdens which I think are quite undesirable. It requires Austria to pay the sum of $150 million in order to buy out the Soviets from the control of certain industries which they have in the East Austrian area, payable over a 6-year term. It leaves the Soviet in control of certain oil projects and certain Danube shipping facilities in Vienna. The United States proposed about a year ago a short-form treaty, which is a very simple document of just a couple of pages, a copy of which I have here, and which just restores the freedom and independence of Austria and provides for the withdrawal of Allied forces. The Soviet have indicated that they would not consider even this short-form treaty but would be prepared to consider the long-form treaty. They have indicated that to the Austrians. The Austrians have themselves announced publicly, I think it was in the paper this morning, that they would accept the long-form treaty. They think they can live with it. The British and French are extremely insistent that we should go back to the long-form treaty which has been substantially agreed upon, and we face the problem of renewing these negotiations under conditions which, in all probability, we will either break with Austria, with the British and French, or else accept this long form treaty. JOINT CHIEFS HAVE OPPOSED A TREATY In line with the policy of the administration to try to talk these things over at a rather early stage with this committee I wanted to tell you that the problem is up very actively at the present time. Tomorrow morning I am having a meeting with the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who have been somewhat opposed in the past to the long-form treaty-in fact, to any treaty with Austria, because they would prefer, I think, to stay in occupation of Austria rather than to have a mutual withdrawal. However, that has not been the general policy of the past administration, and I think it is not the present policy, although In December 1946, the Council of Foreign Ministers agreed to appoint special deputies to begin preliminary work on an Austrian treaty in London in January 1947. Discussions began on January 14 and by April 24 a draft treaty of a preamble and 53 articles-the "long form" treaty referred to by Secretary Dulles had been worked out. Formal agreement had been reached on only 33 of these articles, however, and from there the negotiatons were to drag on into 1950 with some progress on particular articles but no definitive result. On December 15, 1950, the State Department announced that discussion of the treaty draft by the deputies had been suspended. An attempt to revive the talks in January 1952 was stymied when the Soviet Union refused to participate. In response, the Western powers, on March 13, took a new tack, offering an "abbreviated" treaty draft of eight articles the "short-form" treaty referred to by Dulles-but this too was rejected by the Kremlin. Nor did the initiatives discussed here by Secretary Dulles bear immediate fruit: not until 1955 would it become possible to reach an agreement on Austria acceptable to all the powers involved. |