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QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD

Senator GILLETTE. With the Chairman's permission, I shall read the questions, and also with his permission, will give the Secretary time to answer them, so that they may be included in the record:

One: Does the Administration intend to go forward with development of NATO, building greater strength and greater security, and exercising leadership in that direction-or does it intend to slacken, stretch out and relax the efforts that the previous Administration made to build Atlantic defenses, shift the emphasis in foreign policy away from NATO to some other part of the world, and allow leadership in the Western community to slip into the hands of some other nation or group of nations? Does this Administration still believe in the North Atlantic Treaty?

Two: With respect to the idea that the whole NATO system of collective defense depends on swift establishment of a European Army through ratificstion of the EDC treaty, are we not in the position of having placed all our Atlantic eggs in the one European Army basket? Do we have any alternatives ! ready in case the European parliaments devide they don't wish to ratify the EDC treaty?

Three: If the European nations do finally ratify the EDC treaty and thereby permit raising a substantial German force within the framework of a European Army, will the Administration then consider its main objective in Europe has been achieved, and will it then abandon further active leadership in building the Western community? Is German rearmament your principal objective or only a step toward some larger goal?

Four: Now, if for some reason or combination of reasons, the EDC treaty is not ratified, what will the Administration do? Are you planning a fundamental revision of U.S. policy in the Atlantic area, and, if so, what revision do you have in mind?

Five: Do you intend to recommend that Congress make drastic cuts in the military aid program in reprisal for failure of the European parliaments to carry out your demand for quick action on the EDC treaty? In view of the obstacles in both Germany and France, and the unlikelihood of early ratification, do you still intend to carry out the implied threat to cut down the aid program? If so, do you believe it is in the national self-interest of the United States to lower our defenses against the Soviet challenge in this manner?

Six: Would you agree that the condition which you placed on continuation of the U.S. military assistance program is a reasonable one, or do you feel there is justification for the suspicion that by demanding something that may be unobtainable the Administration may be perparing a convenient excuse for abrupt cessation or reduction of the aid program? In other words, is blame for a decision here to cut the program to be laid at the doors of our Allies? I would submit those questions and ask the Secretary, at a later time

Secretary DULLES. I will answer them now, if you want me to. The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

ADMINISTRATION INTENDS TO GO FORWARD WITH NATO

Secretary DULLES. The administration intends to go forward with the development of NATO, building greater strength and greater security.

I have indicated that our emphasis will be on quality for the time being, rather than on quantity, because only the kind of increase that can come through quality, rather than quantity, is compatible with the economic health of the countries concerned.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. How does that change our target from the Lisbon program?

Secretary DULLES. The Lisbon targets have already been met. Senator SMITH of New Jersey. Met quantitatively, but not qualitatively.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, largely on a paper basis.

Of the 50 divisions or so in Europe, which theoretically exist, there are only partially-they are only partially in a state of combat readiness and it seemed much more important to develop a combat readiness in the divisions you have, instead of going to the very extensive and expensive operation of putting more people theoretically in uniform, but who actually would look good on paper, but would not effectively add to the combat effectiveness of the entire operation.

We do not think, Senator Gillette, that to force these people to make an effort which is going to ruin their currency, which is going to lead to the overthrow of friendly governments and the installation of unfriendly governments, is a very effective way to exercise leadership. That type of leadership we do not intend to exercise.

As far as belief in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is concerned, I do not know how anyone can doubt that after the tremendous investment of time and effort, enthusiasm and inspiration which President Eisenhower has himself put into that, nobody can talk to him without realizing that he has the greatest belief and faith in NATO, but he wants to have it developed in a way which will keep it strong and not have it run into a collapse because it tries to do too much.

Your second question, you asked what the alternative is to the EDC.

NOT AWARE OF ANY ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE TO EDC

I am not aware of any adequate alternative. Of course if there is no EDC, we will have to do something else. No one has yet thought of a way of really making Europe secure without having German contingents in it, and nobody has thought of a way to bring German contingents into a European army except through such a method as is represented by the EDC.

You can conceive of just going ahead and arguing about giving equipment to the German Nationals, to create a German Nationalist Army, but that would be a violation of the surrender and would create a tragic situation at the very beginning in the relationships between the Anglo-French, who have already met with them in two world wars, and if it starts again, it could well create a third. Senator HICKENLOOPER. You said Anglo-French, but you meanSecretary DULLES. I mean Anglo-German.

I can say that I do not believe that there is a head of any one of the European governments concerned who feels any less strong than we do about the importance of getting the EDC ratified. The French are in a panic today, the French Government, lest EDC fail, whether through their own primary difficulties or the German primary difficulties, they don't see any alternative, and it is very largely their problem, and if they cannot think of any alternative, it is difficult for us to do so.

As I say, if it fails we will have to in some way adjust ourselves to that failure, but we have not thought of any substitute method for accomplishing the indispensable goal of getting the German forces into a European Army.

You say if EDC is ratified and the German potential is brought within the framework of a European army, will we then consider

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our main objective has been accomplished, and will the adminis tration then abandon further active leadership in building the Western community?

THE GOAL IS A EUROPE THAT STANDS ON ITS OWN TWO FEET

I would say if a European Community is established, and I think now not only in terms of the military community but in terms of a political and economic community, because that phase of the matter is also going ahead very rapidly, that we will think that our efforts have in large part achieved their purpose, because a united Europe, embodying nearly 200 million people, does not need to be supported by the United States any more. That kind of a Europe would stand on its own feet. That is what we want it to do. We want a Europe not dependent upon the United States, which is not in fear of the Soviet Union.

If we create that, we will have created enough, so that we can expect that those people can be the masters of their own future, which they ought to be.

NO REPRISALS FOR FAILURE ON EDC

You say if the EDC is not ratified, are we planning a fundamental revision of U.S. policy in the Atlantic area.

I think there would certainly have to be some changes in the United States policy if it were not ratified, because, as I say, our present assumption is that there will be unity in Europe, political, economic, and military, and if we are compelled reluctantly to abandon that, it would basically alter the premise of our present policy.

You ask whether we would intend to make drastic cuts in the military aid program in reprisal for failure of the European parlisments to carry out the demand, and so forth.

We do not intend to ask for cuts as a reprisal for failure. There would be some things that we would not think it was useful going on spending money on, if this thing is not going to develop. We might find it more advantageous to spend it somewhere else. It is not a question of reprisal; it is a question of spending the money where we are going to get the best results for it.

You asked whether we believed it was in the national self-interest to lower defenses against the Soviet challenge.

NO LOWERING OF OUR DEFENSES

Certainly we have no intention of lowering our defenses against the Soviet challenge in any respect.

Would you agree that the condition which you placed on continuation of the U.S. military assistance program is a reasonable one, or do you feel there is justification for the suspicion that by demanding something that may be unobtainable the administration may be preparing a convenient excuse for abrupt cessation or reduction of the aid programs?

There is not the slightest thought in our minds of attaching an unfulfillable condition as an excuse for getting out of the NATO situation. As I say, the faith of the President in NATO, and his own

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vestment in it should be sufficient warranty against a devious aproach of this sort.

Senator GILLETTE. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I just want to say that I have been handed by Mr. Wilcox a sugested schedule for MSA hearings commencing May 5.

Apparently there will be a joint session with the House on May 5. fter that the two committees will have separate sessions.

Will you please bear that in mind, May 5, 6, and 7, and I hope y that time to wind it up.

Secretary DULLES. This has been an executive session. I would refer not to have anything said about my answers to the hypothetcal questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

And thank you, gentlemen.

[Whereupon at 12:15 p.m., the committee stood in recess, subject o call of the Chair.]

MINUTES

FRIDAY, MAY 1, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSEAS INFORMATION PROGRAMS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS. Washington, D.C. The subcommittee on overseas information programs met at 10 a.m. in executive session in the Foreign Relations Committee Room. Present: Chairman Hickenlooper, Senators Wiley, Green and Fulbright.

Also present were public affairs officers, information officers from various countries.

For record of proceedings, see official transcript.

The subcommittee adjourned at 12:05 p.m.

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