MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 19531

[Editor's note: In January 1953, President Truman recommended to Congress $7.6 billion program for mutual security in fiscal year 1954. After lengthy tudy of the matter, President Eisenhower recommended on May 5 that the rogram be reduced to about $5.8 billion. This reduction was effected largely y further major cuts in nondefense items in the program and by the "stretch ut" of military deliveries, the aim being to gear the mutual security effort to he "long haul"-to a pace that could be maintained for some years without isrupting the economies of the free nations, including that of the United tates. An exception was made for the Far East, however, funds requested for at part of the world being increased by $1 billion over the preceding year. he Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on the program in open and losed session from May 5 until May 29. The markup began on June 5 and an riginal bill, S. 2128, in the form of amendments to the Mutual Security Act f 1951, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, the Economic Cooperation ct of 1948, and the Act for International Development, was reported to the enate on June 13. On June 15, the Senate referred the bill to the Armed Serves Committee, which reported it back on June 18 with several amendments. he Senate passed the bill on July 1, substituting the text of its bill for the louse version, H.R. 5710, passed on June 19. The conference report was filed on uly 10 and passed the House and Senate on July 13. The bill was signed into w as P.L. 118 on July 16. One other matter bears mention: On June 1 the resident sent to Congress his Reorganization Plan No. 7, which abolished the [utual Security Agency (MSA), created the Foreign Operations Administration FOA) in its stead, and transferred the Technical Cooperation Administration TCA) from the State Department to the new agency. The plan was referred > the Committee on Government Operations and went into effect 60 days after ransmittal when Congress took no action to disapprove it.]

TUESDAY, MAY 19, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a. m., in the caucus oom, Senate Office Building, Senator Alexander Wiley (chairman) residing.

Present: Senators Wiley (chairman), Smith of New Jersey, Hickenlooper, Taft, Ferguson, Knowland, George, Green, Fulbright, parkman, Gillette, Humphrey, and Mansfield."

Also present: Dr. Wilcox, Dr. Kalijarvi, Mr. O'Day, Mr. Marcy, nd Mr. Holt, of the committee staff.

Maj. Gen. George C. Stewart, Director, Office of Military Assistnce; and Brig. Gen. J. J. O'Hara, Deputy Director of Military ssistance Division.

[The committee met at 10:30 to hear General Ridgway in open ssion. The hearing room was cleared at 11:30 and the meeting sumed in closed session at 11:35.]

The CHAIRMAN. All right. The meeting will come to order.
All right, General, carry on.

1 See appendix D.

STATEMENT OF GEN. MATTHEW B. RIDGWAY, SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER EUROPE

General RIDGWAY. Thank you, sir. My intention now, sir, is to present further information and evaluation which may guide your thinking on our vast problems of defense, and I am speaking again in the same role as before, both as the international and U.S. commander in Europe.

What I have to say does not alter my premises nor my conclusions of the morning session, but it will give you a great deal more classified documentation and background, and the reasons behind my major observation.

THE SOVIET THREAT

First of all, the Soviet threat: You will recall I mentioned this morning that the U.S.S.R. itself has some 175 to 180 army divisions, in their army, and some 20,000 aircraft. Of these, 134 army divisions and approximately 15,000 aircraft or 75 percent of each, are disposed i in areas facing the allied command Europe. By facing my command, I mean these forces are located in the occupied countries of Eastern Europe, and in the western and southern areas of Russia.

The Navy has more than 350 submarines, including an estimated 125 ocean-going submarines in the European fleet.

While the number of divisions in the Soviet Army has remained the same since the end of the war, their combat effectiveness has been considerably improved; the troops are well-fed, well-trained and disciplined.

Soviet equipment is considered adequate both qualitatively and quantitatively. In some respects present Soviet weapons, such as their armored vehicles, heavy mortars and artillery possess excellent combat characteristics. In the air, the Soviets have made significant progress in reequipping their forces with high performance jet aircraft, and in increasing overall combat efficiency. The Mig-15 is-a jet fighter-a good airplane and, as an interceptor, is generally the equal of our F86F, although the F86D, which is now in production, is considered to be superior to the Mig-15 in practically all respects. The airfield construction program in east Europe, which began in 1948, has advanced well beyond the needs of air units currently deployed in that area. There are over 100 major air fields with runways 6,000 feet or longer completed or under construction in Eastern Europe.

In addition, there are well over 200 second-class airfields, a great many of which are either fully operable or maintained on a standby basis.

The Soviet Navy continues to increase its strength in ships and submarines, and to improve the quality of its naval aviation, with emphasis going to the submarines. Soviet forces are considered combat-ready to undertake large-scale offensive operations, and with their adequate logistical support of the armed forces of their captive nations not as yet fully prepared.

SATELLITE MILITARY POWER

Nonetheless, the most ominous situation in Europe today is the ontinued growth of satellite military power. At the end of 1950 here were 59 divisions; there are 75 today. The air forces of these aptive nations now possess some Soviet-made jet aircraft. Their rmed forces have grown far beyond the needs of the task of mainaining Communist power in each country.

While possibly only a third of their divisions could participate in n aggressive campaign, the other divisions which would constitute reserve at the present time, are gradually acquiring combat capailities.

These divisions are organized, trained, and equipped, Mr. Chairan and members of the committee, along Soviet lines, and even ome of their commanding officers are Russian.

The U.S.S.R. has furnished the armed forces of these captive ations large amounts of equipment and materiel, including some of he best the Soviets have to offer.

To insure the trusted leadership to conduct the military activities f these forces, the officer cadres have all been purged of doubtful ersonnel. As a further safeguard, Soviet military advisers have een sent to organize, to train, and to direct the political indoctrinaion.

It seems reasonable to assume that the Soviets have knowingly aken a calculated risk in re-equipping these forces, and, therefore, ust consider them worthy in any future war of the expense they are curring.

At the present time, the industrial and military mobilization caacity of the U.S.S.R. is such that the present 175 to 180 Soviet army ivisions could be increased to 320, 30 days after mobilization.

NATO REQUIREMENTS

There is the threat which I and my principal commanders must e prepared to meet. It is an essential element in the development of ur plans, both our availabilities plan and our requirements plan. The requirements plan is the source of the determination of the equirements in terms of divisions, ships, aircraft, and supplies. As I indicated earlier today, the military estimate of the minimum equirements to meet the threat are under constant review.

In reappraising the military situation, the NATO Military Comittee agreed at its April 18 meeting in Paris on the following minium requirements up to D plus 30: 1401% divisions; 3,347 vessels, nd 12,314 aircraft for the defense of the NATO area, less North merica, against the initial Soviet threat.

Of these totals, the requirements for the Allied Command Europe s this: 100 percent of the divisions, 25 percent of the vessels, and 80 ercent of the aircraft.

PROGRESS SINCE 1950

I should like now to discuss with the committee, the progress which llied Command Europe is making toward meeting these require

72-194-77-vol. V-27

ments. In doing this, I shall first discuss the progress that has actually been achieved since 1950, and then discuss the planned buildup in 1953 and 1954.

This chart, gentlemen, shows the forces buildup and the total requirements, for all of NATO, except North America.

The first three bars from the left indicate the status of forces, army, navy, and air force as of the end of 1950, 1951, and 1952.

The fourth and fifth bars similarly depict the force goals for 1953 and 1954, and the sixth bar represents the military requirements of 14013, D plus 30 divisions; 3,347, D plus 30 vessels; as well as 4,689, D plus 180 vessels; and 12,314 D-Day aircraft.

There is a relatively large increase, as you will note, in the number of forces available at the end of 1952 over those of 1951. This is in large measure due to the inclusion for the first time of the forces of Greece and Turkey, as these valiant peoples only entered NATO in

1952.

ARMY UNITS

Referring now to the army, the D-Day forces shown in solid green increased from 14 divisions in 1950 to 2013 in 1951, and 481/3 in 1952. Of these 48% divisions, 2313 are Greek and Turkish. The expansion of D plus 30 forces in 1952, which is shown in green stripes, reflects comparable increases.

In referring to the total number of divisions on this chart, I have, for the purposes of simplicity, considered three separate regiments to be a division equivalent. For example, of the 140% divisions shown on the chart, our requirement is actually for 132 divisions, and 25 separate regiments. You divide the 25 by 3, and you get 81%, and add that to 132, and that is where we get the 14013.

The dotted lines drawn across the bar indicate combat effective divisions available by D plus 30, increasing from 2113 in 1950 to 68 in 1952.

Two points should be made here, neither shown on the chart. First, although the Lisbon goal of 502% divisions for 1952 was met numerically, I rated only 402% as combat effective.

Secondly, at the end of 1952, there were 24 out of a total of 912 divisions which, it was estimated, would not be fully combat effective by D plus 30.

The principal reasons these D plus 30 divisions could not be combat effective were shortages of regular specialists and active duty personnel, inadequate service and training, and lack of equipment and ammunition.

The fourth and fifth bars reflect D plus 30 goals of 971/3 divisions, and 102 for 1953 and 1954, respectively.

NAVAL FORCES

Turning now to the naval forces, I should like to point out that for simplicity in presentation I have used the term "vessels" which include all combatant types. As an operational commander, I am primarily concerned with carriers and escorts, minesweepers, and maritime aircraft. The latter category includes principally long- and short range antisubmarine aircraft.

The rate of buildup of total vessels indicated on this chart arallels almost exactly the rate of escorts, minesweepers, and mariime aircraft, whereas combat carriers remain at 14 from 1951 hrough 1954. Less than 10 of these would be available to the operaional commander on D-Day.

Referring to the naval bar for 1950, on the extreme left, we see hat there were 543 vessels available in the NATO area in active ommission, presumably ready on D-Day, and a cumulative total of ,173, including those in reserve.

The bars for 1951 and 1952 show an increase both in the NATO aval forces available and in the number of forces effective on D >lus 30.

Included in the 1952 bar are some 75 effective Greek and Turkish vessels.

I think it would be of interest to know that NATO, as a whole, net and slightly exceeded the naval goals set at Lisbon; and as for the goals for 1953 and 1954, you will observe a gradual increase in vessels planned to be available.

THE AIR SITUATION

Our air situation has undergone a similar change. At the end of 1950, there were less than 2,000 aircraft available for the defense of the NATO area. The great majority of those were seriously deficient in the combat capability required in modern warfare. Our end of 1951 status shows considerable improvement quantitatively.

However, the NATO air forces were still, for the greater part, equipped with obsolescent planes. Although the Lisbon 1952 goal was not met, the end of 1952 status presents a picture which is nonetheless encouraging. The effect of our past efforts is beginning to be evident here for the first time.

Please note that we realized numerical increases from a little under 3,000 to almost 3,800, including, however, some obsolescent types.

While it is true that about half of these increases results from additional Greek and Turkish forces, there was still a gain of some significance in the other countries. The fact that there was any gain at all is particularly important in relation to the striking fact that in 1952 we nearly doubled our jet aircraft availability.

The task of converting units equipped with conventional type aircraft to jet aircraft is an undertaking of major proportions involving very substantial effort in training, maintenance and supply operations, and this is certainly a very encouraging picture.

However, I do not want to leave you with a too optimistic evaluation of the air forces available. Of the 3,800 aircraft available only about 2,900 are assigned to Allied Command Europe. The remainder are retained under national control, primarily in France and in the United Kingdom, where air defense and certain other functions are national responsibilities. These forces are not evaluated by my headquarters.

Of the 2,900 aircraft in squadrons of Allied Command Europe, my headquarters' evaluation is that at most 2,400 would be consid