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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 a.m. in the Foron Relations Committee room, U.S. Capitol, Senator Alexander iley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Wiley (chairman), Smith of New Jersey, ickenlooper, Tobey, Langer, Knowland, George, Green, Fulbright, parkman, Humphrey, and Mansfield.

Also present: Dr. Wilcox, Dr. Kalijarvi, Mr. O'Day, Mr. Marcy, r. Holt, of the committee staff.

[The committee first took up certain routine nominations. It then rned to a report from Secretary Dulles on his trip through the iddle East.]

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, Secretary Dulles has arrived.

Mr. Secretary, we are glad to have you here with us. You have aveled around the world and have come back looking fresher and unger than ever before.

It must be that you have had no problems.

ATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY HENRY A. BYROADE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE NEAR, MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

Secretary DULLES. I felt what problems there were I could just ing back maybe for you gentlemen, so I would not need to worry out them.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you carry on in your own way and tell us at you think we ought to know, about what you found out. Secretary DULLES. I would take up these countries, not necessarily the order I visited them, but as they present either distinctive or oup problems.

LIBYA

Libya, in the middle of the Mediterranean area, is a new state ich is very considerably influenced by the United Kingdom, and have a very considerable influence, we have a very important se in Libya, and the British are trying to again enlarge its bases Libya.

Our base arrangement is in pretty good shape, although subject renegotiation, and in many of these cases we have a sort of side reement with the country that in return for a base which they ve us for nothing, we give a certain amount of economic aid.

We came back with less hope in that respect than we had when we went over, primarily because of the intensity of the dispute between Egypt and the British with respect to the Suez business That is a very critical situation, indeed, and at the time we got there the conversations between the two governments had been broken off

The CHAIRMAN. How about the pistol, was it a good pistol?

Secretary DULLES. And, there was no prospect of resumption, and the British and Egyptians were recruiting-well, the Egyptians were recruiting forces to operate a guerilla force against the base, and the British were making plans in turn which might even have led to a reoccupation of Cairo and Alexandria, which would in turn set the whole Arab world aflame.

Senator SPARKMAN. A few days after you left, Mr. Secretary after you left Egypt the newspapers carried a story that seemed to carry a little hope on that settlement over there.

I would like to have your comments on that. I am sorry I don't remember the details now, but it seemed that Egypt had expressed a willingness to cooperate with England in the removal of the British forces from the Suez area, and to agree to some kind of an international setup and control of the canal.

Do you know what I am referring to?

Secretary DULLES. I think I know what you are referring to but it has no substance.

Senator SPARKMAN. No substance?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you mean it is without fact?

BRITISH BASES

Secretary DULLES. The story has no basis in fact, except to this extent: I talked for 2 or 3 days with Naguib and with a little group of revolutionary leaders who were the real power in Egypt, several colonels and majors, who were the power behind Naguib, and tried to explain to them the fact that that base had a great international importance and could not be looked upon purely as an Egyptian asset, but I didn't get very far.

I flew over the base area, which extends all the way along the Suez Canal area, to a considerable width. There are a series of air strips, big depots of ammunition, vehicles of one kind and another. and there are supposed to be about a billion dollars of military equipment in one or another of these depots, and from them they route that equipment from those bases, the British fly them to their positions in Jordan where they have an Arab League army, and their position in Cyprus, and from which, if there was a general war, in the advanced position along the frontier with Soviet Russia, they would be supplied from there.

Also there is one field which our air people attach much importance to, a base for a strategic operation against Russia. It has been agreed that the British troops will go out. You can't take them out at one time, there are $1,000 of them, or were when I was there, and there are probably more than that now.

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rnal source of funds. The only thing they have to sell in the orld is this strategic position.

The CHAIRMAN. How long ago was that agreement made?
Secretary DULLES. A year and a half ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a memorandum of it?

Secretary DULLES. Is there a memorandum of it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Secretary DULLES. Yes, there is a formal written agreement.

TERMS HAVE NOT BEEN SETTLED

Mr. BYROADE. The agreement has not been ratified yet. Secretary DULLES. It has not been ratified by the Libyan Governent, and there is some question about the provisions, and they ink they should get more for it, they think they should get $2 illion a year. As a matter of fact, I think the military people are uite prepared to evaluate it at 2 million, or quite a bit more because is an extremely valuable position.

Senator MANSFIELD. Why is that not a military problem. It looks ike the military should take care of it.

Secretary DULLES. We discussed it at the National Security Counil meeting earlier, and I think they have the money and can clean he situation up, and will clean it up. It is one of these things that rets down into the bureauracy and everybody thinks the reason for hot doing anything is somebody else, but it is creating considerable 11 will there, and a feeling that we are not living up to our promses that we extended as a condition for them to grant us these facilities.

GREECE

I pass on next to Greece, because it is in the same general area. The relationship with Greece is extremely good. They have an excellent government now with [Premier Alexander] Papagos, and a cleaner government than they have had for a long time. Papagos is very loyal to the United States. He is willing, if the Korean war goes on, to send more troops to Korea, and also to give us bases and facilities, there, as we desire.

They do expect some economic aid, particularly to help them develop some water power projects which they have there, and I believe that the military will feel it worth while to do so.

Senator HUMPHREY. Is that in the Mutual Security budget? Secretary DULLES. Yes. It is not earmarked there, but the funds for that are available on the budget as submitted. Then, if you go on, you get next to the Arab world.

EGYPT

I might mention first, Egypt. We have gone over there, or have gone with the hope and expectation that quite a little could be built around the foundation of Egypt. The new government of General [Muhammad] Naguib seems to offer considerable promise and maintains a certain prestige in the Arab world.

1

1 Egyptian Premier and titular head of the 1952 revolution against the monarchy.

We came back with less hope in that respect than we had when we went over, primarily because of the intensity of the disput between Egypt and the British with respect to the Suez business. That is a very critical situation, indeed, and at the time we got there! the conversations between the two governments had been broker off—

The CHAIRMAN. How about the pistol, was it a good pistol?

Secretary DULLES. And, there was no prospect of resumption, and the British and Egyptians were recruiting-well, the Egyptians were recruiting forces to operate a guerilla force against the base. and the British were making plans in turn which might even have led to a reoccupation of Cairo and Alexandria, which would in turn! set the whole Arab world aflame.

Senator SPARKMAN. A few days after you left, Mr. Secretary. after you left Egypt the newspapers carried a story that seemed to carry a little hope on that settlement over there.

I would like to have your comments on that. I am sorry I don't remember the details now, but it seemed that Egypt had expressed a willingness to cooperate with England in the removal of the British forces from the Suez area, and to agree to some kind of an international setup and control of the canal.

Do you know what I am referring to?

Secretary DULLES. I think I know what you are referring to but it has no substance.

Senator SPARKMAN. No substance?

Secretary DULLES. No.

Senator SPARKMAN. Do you mean it is without fact?

BRITISH BASES

Secretary DULLES. The story has no basis in fact, except to this extent: I talked for 2 or 3 days with Naguib and with a little group of revolutionary leaders who were the real power in Egypt, several colonels and majors, who were the power behind Naguib, and tried to explain to them the fact that that base had a great international importance and could not be looked upon purely as an Egyptian asset, but I didn't get very far.

I flew over the base area, which extends all the way along the Suez Canal area, to a considerable width. There are a series of air strips, big depots of ammunition, vehicles of one kind and another. and there are supposed to be about a billion dollars of military equipment in one or another of these depots, and from them they route that equipment from those bases, the British fly them to their positions in Jordan where they have an Arab League army, and their position in Cyprus, and from which, if there was a general war, in the advanced position along the frontier with Soviet Russia. they would be supplied from there.

Also there is one field which our air people attach much importance to, a base for a strategic operation against Russia. It has been agreed that the British troops will go out. You can't take them out at one time, there are 81,000 of them, or were when I was there, and there are probably more than that now.

Then the question of who is going to operate and manage and upervise the base, and maintain it in a state of readiness in the vent of war, that question enters into the matter, and that relates

not only the Suez area, by any means, but to the entire Eastern Lediterranean and the Middle East area, and that requires compecent people who know what the stuff is, and how to use it, and who an handle and route spare parts and things that come in, and the Egyptians are not able to take that phase of it over. They think they are, but they are not, and I think everybody will agree to that.

OUTLOOK FOR A SETTLEMENT

The problem of giving this base some kind of an international status is an extremely difficult one. I think probably it can be done. I worked out a formula while I was there which might be mutually acceptable, and I got General Naguib and his followers to agree that they would not start any guerilla operations against the British forces in the Suez until I had gotten back home and had a further exchange with the British to see if we could get the talks going again.

That is one of the urgent matters still to be dealt with, and they are working on that urgently at the Department now. It is tremendously important to find a solution for that.

Churchill has taken a pretty stiff position in relation to it, and his negotiators in Cairo are under very strong instructions not to make any concessions. Churchill is leaning on the theory, maybe rightly or wrongly, that the best way to deal with these people is to be tough, and if they say, "Take your troops out," he sends more in.

Pending a final agreement, they are concentrating quite a lot of their strength in that area at the present time.

We found in Libya they sent a large part of their airborne troops, and some advance air warning groups, and so forth, which recently had been transported from Libya into the Suez base, and General Roberts, who was there, thinks if things go on this way, it will inean war. We may not call it war, but that is what it will be.

Naguib and his followers are intensely nationalistic and do not have any understanding of the international implications of the Suez base. They are so narrow-minded that we are doubtful as to whether they would ever take a very broad view of these international problems, and also the problem of the British bases is such that even if you find a formula for solution, it would take 2 or 3 years to operate.

There is a strong feeling in that area, and agitation upon us not to give the British anything, not to give any help to the British. They want what we can supply, but do not want us to supply anything to the British, and of course the British feel exactly the reverse about that, they do not want us to give anything to the Egyptians.

I do not think that can be solved in a clean-cut way at the present time by bringing up Egypt in an economic and military way, as we had hoped, and we thought they might be a cornerstone of some kind of a Middle East defense organization.

72-194-77-vol. V-29

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