overall picture in a systematic fashion, and then we will ask questions of him, but if he proceeds in the way I think he can, without interruption, he will give us an overall picture that will be truly what we want, and I think will really clear away a great many things that we have been looking to have cleared away.

Let me say, too, that it is not my intention in making this study to accuse anybody or, on the other hand, receive self-serving statements, but rather simply to get at the facts on this overall problem.

I had originally envisioned that we would not hold this meeting for a while, but in view of the Lincoln birthday week and in view of the fact that some of our colleagues are already having to leave town, I felt that we had to advance the meeting.

I might say to you gentlemen who came in late, I asked Mr. Humelsine, Deputy Under Secretary of State, to come to us in relation to the various categories that I have set forth, and I think I was reading them when you came into the room.

I felt, as I said, that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee would benefit from securing a comprehensive picture of this problem. Certainly there is no committee, as I said, which has a more basic jurisdiction than ours, for the effective functioning of the State Department.

Now, Mr. Humelsine, you told me that the testimony you wanted to give, you wanted to be sworn.

Mr. HUMELSINE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you shall give this committee in relation to matters now under consideration will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HUMELSINE. So help me God.

TESTIMONY OF CARLISLE H. HUMELSINE, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, ACCOMPANIED BY SAM BOYKIN, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SECURITY IN CONSULAR AFFAIRS

The CHAIRMAN. Just tell the committee who you are, your age, your background, and then go into the categories.

BACKGROUND OF THE WITNESS

Mr. HUMELSINE. I will be 38 years of age this coming March. My background is: I am native of the State of Maryland; I was raised there, born in Hagerstown, went to the public schools, went to the University of Maryland, graduated from there in 1937; in 1937 to 1941, I worked as assistant to the President, University of Maryland, Dr. H. C. Byrd; in 1941, I went in the U.S. Army as a second lieutenant of infantry.

I was in there until 1945, when I left the Army I had the rank of colonel.

I was hired into the Department of State when Mr. Russell, who was the law partner of Mr. Jimmy Byrnes, was there.

I worked in the Department successively from that time until the present time; and at the moment, I hold the position of Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a copy of that letter that sets forth these categories.

Would you kindly go on, in your own way.

Mr. HUMELSINE. I will say, at the outset, this is a rather comprehensive problem to cope with, and the committee must realize that I have only had since 6:30 last night to prepare my testimony, although I have been working in this field, which has been one of the fields of responsibility that have been under my general supervision and department, as Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. So, if I miss any point, I will be glad to take it, or them, afterward.

As the Chairman suggested, I would very much appreciate it if I would be allowed to make my complete presentation and then I will answer any questions that I possibly can.

IS THIS WITNESS FREE TO TELL THE TRUTH?

Senator FERGUSON. At the very outset, before going further, I would like to ask you a question.

It appeared from the testimony of a witness that, for instance-a certain agency, that people are forbidden to tell the facts, even though they take an oath to tell the facts.

I think you are familiar with the agency.

Mr. HUMELSINE. Yes, sir, I am familiar with that.

Senator FERGUSON. There is nothing in the State Department's rules or regulations which you feel in any way would keep you from giving on this record the truth or the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

Mr. HUMELSINE. If I took an oath to tell the truth, I will tell you the truth.

Senator FERGUSON. Under that agency, I think they take an oath also.

Mr. HUMELSINE. I have never had any such instruction since I have been in the U.S. Government.

Senator FERGUSON. I just wanted to make the record clear on that point.

Mr. HUMELSINE. I have never taken an oath to any other agency not to tell the truth.

Senator FERGUSON. I appreciate that.
The CHAIRMAN. Go on, sir.

A WORKING ASSUMPTION

Mr. HUMELSINE. I want to make two points, at the outset, if I

may:

First I want to offer an assumption. This assumption is that you are licked in handling this problem unless you proceed from the working assumption-and I want to underline the working assumption that the Department and the Foreign Service have been penetrated by subversive elements.

Second: I want to say that you must have a loyal, secure group of employees. I believe that no less should be tolerated.

TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION

I am going to talk about the following topics. All of these are connected with the problems of physical and personnel security of the Department of State, and the Foreign Service.

These include physical pentration, homosexuals as security risks, loyalty-security dismissals, and technical pentrations.

Later on, you may want to touch on these other aspects such as the problem of alien diplomatic persons in the United States.

One reason I limit that last one is because I want to talk a little about it, and when you bring that up, about the fact that Mr. J. Edgar Hoover is the primary official in that particular field, I want to be very careful that I do not step on the toes of any other agencies in my presentation.

PHYSICAL PENETRATION

The first thing I want to start with is: I want to talk about physical penetration, I want to say that this is a most important problem that we have to deal with today, inasmuch as we are in this situation vis-a-vis the Russian state.

Within the last few weeks we have had incidents of breaking and entering our missions in Rotterdam and Sydney. Fortunately, the latest types of developments that we have perfected have kept that penetration from being successful.

I could talk about other attempts of penetration in Caracas, Baghdad, Damascus, Bolivia, Turkey, and so forth. It is worldwide in

scope.

For instance, I want to tell you about a situation down in Caracas, Venezuela. The Soviets purchased a building down there, leased a building to use as a culture institute. They happen to have purchased it right next door to our Embassy. We are convinced that they purchased that for the purpose of penetration.

I have a picture here, picture No. 1, which shows the location of these two buildings right together. The meeting room of the Soviet cultural institute is on the top floor, right next to the roof of our Embassy.

I might add that our code room is right under there [indicating on photograph]. We are certain that that was deliberate, that they took that step in order to penetrate us, to be close to the code room and so forth.

Here is the picture, and it shows where the code vault is, where the Embassy's telephone lines come in, where the Embassy's file room is, right here; and the culture institute of the Soviets is right here. Well, we took action on that. We tightened our security guard right away, and within a period of 6 months we moved out of that particular building and got ourselves another building where we could have more security than we had right there.

I would like to talk to you now from picture No. 2.

SECURITY MEASURES OVERSEAS

Picture No. 2 [exhibiting the photograph] is a picture of General Gerow's office in Moscow. I show you this picture to show what

we have tried to do to make things secure for some of the personnel that are working overseas.

Here are some of the steps we take, or took, to make General Gerow's offices secure.

You will see a combination type of arrangement on the door, so that you can only get in by knowing the combination.

The windows are barred, have bars over them. We have got special type tape arrangements to keep people from entering.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Who is that you are talking about?
Mr. HUMELSINE. Gerow.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Not Grove.

Senator FERGUSON. No, remember the man who lost his diary?

Mr. HUMELSINE. With all that, I show that to point up the fact that with all the precautions, and money and so forth we spend on this particular thing, a fellow goes out and is careless with a document that is prepared in a room such as this, and the spending of this money isn't worth tinker's damn.

That is an actual picture of what we have done there, and what we have attempted to do to make things secure.

Incidentally, in that diary, well it compromises certain of the very security operations that we carried on, and referred to the fact that our security officers were coming into Moscow to brief our people, and referred to two of them by name. That doesn't help us to do our job one bit.

I could go on, ad nauseum, and tell about this particular problem, but there just isn't time, if I want to get this whole thing before the committee.

Senator SMITII of New Jersey. That was in Moscow ?

Mr. HUMELSINE. That is General Gerow's office, and it shows the steps we have taken trying to protect it and make it secure. That is the office now used by the present military attaché.

HOMOSEXUALS AS SECURITY RISKS

Next, I want to talk about a homosexual as a security risk.

This has been a problem, as you all know, that has plagued the Department of State and Foreign Service, and I might say at this point the matter has not only plagued the Department of State and Foreign Service. I think if someone would look into it in a proper exhaustive way, you would find that it plagues a lot of other departments and institutions, but in the public mind, it seems to be a psychological illness or sickness generally associated with the Foreign Service and the Department of State.

We are interested in these people because they are security risks. I feel sorry for them. We have sympathy for them, but there is no doubt in my mind that they are security risks.

The other day I was talking to a Congressman and he said, I can't see that they are any different from the problem of the fellow who has a mistress. One is just as subject to blackmail as the other.

I said, "Mr. Congressman, I differ with you because it is not a question of the one being subject to blackmail and the other not being subject to blackmail. Sure, both of those people are subject to black

고

mail, but it is quite clear to me that these homosexuals are sick people, and they just don't know what they are doing, they do some of the most foolish things, which lead to the compromising of our particular type of work and we cannot tolerate it, and we have to

get rid of them and we have a program to do that."

I will give you some examples to prove what I state, that these people are security risks.

SOME EXAMPLES

We picked up, not long ago, a State Department officer who went to York, Pennsylvania, for a weekend with a Soviet attaché here, with a member of the U.S.S.R. mission here. Needless to say, that man is off our rolls.

Mr. Hoover gave us a tip on that particular problem.

Not so long ago, in the last year, in Yugoslavia, there was a young Foreign Service staff officer who was left in charge of the Bled office, that is the summer office where the Yugoslav Government is located during the summer.

This officer was a homosexual. We found out, as the result of investigation, that he was a homosexual. He carried on an affair with two Yugoslav nationals, we know, 2 nights, clear through the night, and they had access to the office, our summer office there. Because that fellow lost all track of what he was doing, he just forgot he was a government employee of this particular government, and the place was wide open to these two men.

A third is the case that I want to talk about. I can refer to that by name, because we took action in the Department of State, with the Justice Department, and that particular man is now in the penitentiary down in North Carolina.

He probably accepted bribes. We know at least up to $20,000, and it could be as high as $50,000, or above. He was of good family, a good background, an excellent record all the way through.

He went out to Hong Kong and was working in a visa section there. He took up with a Chinese male, and they lived together. We found that out in the course of our investigation. The fact that he was a homosexual they used against him, and they bribed him. They bribed him to give citizenship certificates to Chinese to come into this country. It was not until we interrogated him through our security officers that he even realized that he might possibly have been used as a tool of Communists through that particular device.

When we had that, of course we turned that over, as I say, through the Department of Justice. We furnished our reports. He had a trial and he is in prison, I think, for a 6-year term.

Senator SMITH of New Jersey. When was that, exactly?

Mr. HUMELSINE. This was about a year ago.

Mr. BOYKIN. Over a year ago.

Mr. HUMELSINE. Now, as the results of that, we picked up six other homosexuals after picking this one up, which gives you an example of how this thing works. In the interrogation we carried out of him, we got the names of other individuals he had had relations with, and it resulted in six employees of the State Department and Foreign Service being discharged.