MINUTES

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 3, 1953

UNITED STATES SENATE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C. The subcommittee considering the St. Lawrence Seaway legislation met at 2:30 p.m. in executive session in the committee room. Present: Chairman Wiley, Senators Green, Sparkman, and Humphrey.

The subcommittee considered some suggested changes in the committee print of S. 589. A motion was approved by those present to vote to report the bill to the full committee. In addition to those present the chairman had the proxies of Senators Tobey and Taft. For record of proceedings, see official transcript. The subcommittee adjourned at 3:30 p.m.

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sheikdoms, with the British backing their claims that their authority really runs way back into the interior-Ibn Saud says that is not so at all, and there have been some local fracases there and the British sent some troops in to cut certain Arabian lines of communications, and apparently we wrote a letter, President Truman i wrote a letter to Ibn Saud about the time these oil deals and so forth were made, saying that we would always be ready to protect Saudi-Arabia against any aggression from any power.

Of course, I guess we were only thinking then about the Soviet Union, but Ibn Saud says, 'Here is aggression by the British. What are you going to do about it?"

He said, "I am your friend, you are my friend. What are you going to do?" and says, "If you don't respond here, I will have to make my friends somewhere else."

We have got these tremendously important oil rights and have a very important base there, and we do not want to see those things go down the drain if we can help it. I am trying to mediate a little in the dispute, and make it get into some form of fruition.

I am going to come back to this area later, but I will pass on to India now, and Pakistan.

Senator LANGER. It occurs to me, we ought to send Truman over there to mediate.

CONVERSATIONS WITH NEHRU

Secretary DULLES. The principal values of my trip to India. I think was the fact that I had several long conversations with Mr. Nehru. The two of us were together and we talked in complete intimacy for several hours a day each of the 3 days and covered the waterfront pretty considerably. We did not come to an agree ment about anything. I don't mean to say we disagreed about everything. We didn't try to come to an agreement, except to exchange views and understand each other better.

I think he got a much clearer picture of our intentions and our position with reference to Korea, for example, than he had before. He seemed to think that the position we were taking in reference to repatriation of prisoners either was taken merely as a pretext and excuse to prevent an armistice, and that if we had paid any attention at all to Syngman Rhee and the Republic of Korea, that was another way of trying to break up the armistice.

I think I satisfied him as to the integrity of our position in both of these respects. He seems to be quite naive about a number of matters, and not to be fully grounded as to facts, and I think he is told by various advisers that we are doing these things without

any purpose.

1

One illustration, he has said, "Why don't you stick closer to the Indian resolution in the United Nations Assembly? That resolution provides, among other things, that the ultimate disposition of these PW's who don't want to be repatriated shall be referred back to the United Nations."

I said that we had not put it that way, that they should be released because we knew perfectly well that the Communists would

1 A resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 3, 1952, containing detailed proposals to the Chinese and North Korean Governments for resolution of the prisoner exchange issue.

olently object to any reference back to the United Nations because ey claim the United Nations, without Communist China in it, illegal, and any reference to it as such is just waving a red flag efore a bull, that is why it was left out.

It was put back in at last and the proposal brought up with the sult which I had anticipated. They didn't waste 5 minutes to low that through the roof.

Nehru felt that we were trying to avoid an armistice by not eceding to the Indian suggestion because we were not in favor of n armistice.

Senator LANGER. Did he talk English clearly?

Secretary DULLES. Perfect English, better than I do. He had a eautiful command of languages.

Well, out of our talks I am pretty sure did come the fact that the ndians announced they stood behind our later armistice proposal. I don't know whether that is good or bad, but they did take that osition.

We talked to them a lot about the settlement of the Pakistan and Kashmir dispute, and generally the threat to India and South>ast Asia from the Communist neighbors. They are taking a pretty strong position with reference to any possible movement down from the north, and Nehru made a statement that the mountain range there is the boundary and nobody can come across it, and that is the strongest position he has taken.

They don't seem to be worried much about the threat from the Indo-China and Burma side. Of course, they can take Burma, but he feels they couldn't get very well from Burma to India, relying upon the difficulty of the terrain, which probably is more imaginary than real.

Senator KNOWLAND. Didn't the British rely on the difficulty of the terrain in defending Singapore and the Japs came right on through the rice fields?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. It is interesting that he is taking quite a definite position here. Of course, it is more academic than anything else, about their getting across the Himalayas, and they did make a pretty strong statement there.

THE INDIAN ARMY

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are they building up a good army, or do they have one?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, they have a pretty good army. It is mostly tied down by the Kashmir dispute, and until that is disposed of

Senator FULBRIGHT. How many men do they have?

Mr. BYROADE. I think about 350,000 to 400,000.

Secretary DULLES. I think so. They have a little more than Pakistan. Pakistan has about 350,000, and India about 400,000, and that relatively is small in proportion to their population. Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it pretty well equipped?

Secretay DULLES. It is pretty well equipped, not modern stuff, but largely the stuff the British equipped them with during the Second World War.

sheikdoms, with the British backing their claims that their authority really runs way back into the interior-Ibn Saud says that is not so at all, and there have been some local fracases there and the British sent some troops in to cut certain Arabian lines of communications, and apparently we wrote a letter, President Truman wrote a letter to Ibn Saud about the time these oil deals and so forth were made, saying that we would always be ready to protect Saudi-Arabia against any aggression from any power.

Of course, I guess we were only thinking then about the Soviet Union, but Ibn Saud says, 'Here is aggression by the British. What are you going to do about it?"

He said, "I am your friend, you are my friend. What are you going to do?" and says, "If you don't respond here, I will have to make my friends somewhere else."

We have got these tremendously important oil rights and have a very important base there, and we do not want to see those things go down the drain if we can help it. I am trying to mediate a little!) in the dispute, and make it get into some form of fruition.

I am going to come back to this area later, but I will pass on to India now, and Pakistan.

Senator LANGER. It occurs to me, we ought to send Truman over there to mediate.

CONVERSATIONS WITH NEHRU

Secretary DULLES. The principal values of my trip to India. I think was the fact that I had several long conversations with Mr. Nehru. The two of us were together and we talked in complete intimacy for several hours a day each of the 3 days and covered the waterfront pretty considerably. We did not come to an agreement about anything. I don't mean to say we disagreed about everything. We didn't try to come to an agreement, except to exchange views and understand each other better.

I think he got a much clearer picture of our intentions and our position with reference to Korea, for example, than he had before. He seemed to think that the position we were taking in reference to repatriation of prisoners either was taken merely as a pretext and excuse to prevent an armistice, and that if we had paid any attention at all to Syngman Rhee and the Republic of Korea, that was another way of trying to break up the armistice.

I think I satisfied him as to the integrity of our position in both of these respects. He seems to be quite naive about a number of matters, and not to be fully grounded as to facts, and I think he is told by various advisers that we are doing these things without any purpose.

1

One illustration, he has said, "Why don't you stick closer to the Indian resolution in the United Nations Assembly? That resolution provides, among other things, that the ultimate disposition of these PW's who don't want to be repatriated shall be referred back to the United Nations."

I said that we had not put it that way, that they should be released because we knew perfectly well that the Communists would

1 A resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 3, 1952, containing detailed proposals to the Chinese and North Korean Governments for resolution of the prisoner exchange issue.

olently object to any reference back to the United Nations because ey claim the United Nations, without Communist China in it, illegal, and any reference to it as such is just waving a red flag fore a bull, that is why it was left out.

It was put back in at last and the proposal brought up with the sult which I had anticipated. They didn't waste 5 minutes to low that through the roof.

Nehru felt that we were trying to avoid an armistice by not eceding to the Indian suggestion because we were not in favor of n armistice.

Senator LANGER. Did he talk English clearly?

Secretary DULLES. Perfect English, better than I do. He had a eautiful command of languages.

Well, out of our talks I am pretty sure did come the fact that the ndians announced they stood behind our later armistice proposal. don't know whether that is good or bad, but they did take that >osition.

We talked to them a lot about the settlement of the Pakistan ind Kashmir dispute, and generally the threat to India and Southast Asia from the Communist neighbors. They are taking a pretty strong position with reference to any possible movement down from he north, and Nehru made a statement that the mountain range there is the boundary and nobody can come across it, and that is the strongest position he has taken.

They don't seem to be worried much about the threat from the Indo-China and Burma side. Of course, they can take Burma, but he feels they couldn't get very well from Burma to India, relying upon the difficulty of the terrain, which probably is more imaginary than real.

Senator KNOWLAND. Didn't the British rely on the difficulty of the terrain in defending Singapore and the Japs came right on through the rice fields?

Secretary DULLES. Yes. It is interesting that he is taking quite a definite position here. Of course, it is more academic than anything else, about their getting across the Himalayas, and they did make a pretty strong statement there.

THE INDIAN ARMY

Senator FULBRIGHT. Are they building up a good army, or do they have one?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, they have a pretty good army. It is mostly tied down by the Kashmir dispute, and until that is disposed of

Senator FULBRIGHT. How many men do they have?

Mr. BYROADE. I think about 350,000 to 400,000.

Secretary DULLES. I think so. They have a little more than Pakistan. Pakistan has about 350,000, and India about 400,000, and that relatively is small in proportion to their population. Senator FULBRIGHT. Is it pretty well equipped?

Secretay DULLES. It is pretty well equipped, not modern stuff, but largely the stuff the British equipped them with during the Second World War.