the bottoms rust out of Chiang Kai-shek's small navy? How long will it be before his guns, tanks, and planes are completely outmoded? How long will it be before the Chinese Reds have perfected their defenses to such an extent as to make a second front impossible? No; time is not on our side. If we permit the State Department's bankrupt policies to prevail, time will have run out completely. While more thousands of American boys die on foreign soil. The people of Greece will never forget that the shipment of 50 of our Navy's Helldiver bombers was their salvation back in 1946. Those 50 planes, together with only 3 American military men to train Greek fliers, and a mere handful of mechanics to teach the Greeks to service the planes, turned the tide against the Communist forces in Greece. Certainly, if we could afford to gamble in Greece and achieve such wonderful results, we can afford to take a chance on Formosa. A little can go a long way if it is effectively applied. Successful policies are not measured in billions of dollars, millions of foot soldiers, and thousands of planes. The true measure is how effectively those dollars, those men, and those planes are employed. Nor is the measure of good government its multitude of controls and edicts, or the scarcities and hardships it imposes, or the lavishness of its spending and the harshness of its taxes. Don't you think it is about time Washington learned that? Yes, in this crisis, we need leadership and sound policies as we have never needed them before. As Americans, everyone of us must act in the full meaning of good citizenship. We must look to the year of 1952 for deliverance. It is up to every American to help obtain this leadership by promoting widespread discussion of the issues and the most careful selection of political candidates in both parties. Each of us can help; each of us should participate to the utmost. As we near the end of this day of tribute to Abraham Lincoln, let us borrow from his wisdom, his simple principles, and his frugality. Let us remember that it was the clear, high-principled thinking of Lincoln that saved the Union, and let us realize that without clarity of thought, without actions based on fundamental principles, without the moral values that he embraced, we cannot save the world we live in. We have more than an opportunity. We have a duty. God grant us the wisdom and the strength to perform it. APPENDIX D (Referred to on p. 457) PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ORDER RECALLING GENERAL MACARTHUR AND Message relieving General MacArthur of command, April 10, 1951 I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as President and Commander in Chief of the United States military forces to replace you as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Far East; and Commanding General, United States Army, Far East. You will turn over your commands, effective at once, to Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway. You are authorized to have issued such orders as are necessary to complete desired travel to such place as you select. My reasons for your replacement will be made public concurrently with the delivery to you of the foregoing order, and are contained in the next following message. Statement of the President relative to the relief of General MacArthur, April 10, 1951 With deep regret I have concluded that General of the Army Douglas MacArthur is unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and of the United Nations in matters pertaining to his official duties. In view of the specific responsibilities imposed upon me by the Constitution of the United States and the added responsibility which has been entrusted to me by the United Nations, I have decided that I must make a change of command in the Far East. I have, therefore, relieved General MacArthur of 83797-51-pt. 5-4 his commands and have designated Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway as his successor. Full and vigorous debate on matters of national policy is a vital element in the constitutional system of our free democracy. It is fundamental, however, that military commanders must be governed by the policies and directives issued to them in the manner provided by our laws and Constitution. In time of crisis, this consideration is particularly compelling. General MacArthur's place in history as one of our greatest commanders is fully established. The Nation owes him a debt of gratitude for the distinguished and exceptional service which he has rendered his country in posts of great responsibility. For that reason I repeat my regret at the necessity for the action I feel compelled to take in his case. Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur December 6, 1950 [From New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951] From Joint Chiefs of Staff to Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan (and other commanders) : "1. The President, as of 5 December, forwarded a memo to all Cabinet members and to the Chairman, N. S. R. B.; Administrator, E. C. A.; Director, C. I. A.; Administrator, E. S. A.; and Director, Selective Service, which reads as follows: "In the light of the present critical international situation, and until further written notice from me, I wish that each one of you would take immediate steps to reduce the number of public speeches pertaining to foreign or military policy made by officials of the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch. This applies to officials in the field as well as those in Washington. "No speech, press release, or other public statement concerning foreign policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of State. "No speech, press release, or other statement concerning military policy should be released until it has received clearance from the Department of Defense. "In addition to the copies submitted to the Departments of State or Defense for clearance, advance copies of speeches and press releases concerning foreign policy or military policy should be submitted to the White House for information. ""The purpose of this memorandum is not to curtail the flow of information to the American people, but rather to insure that the information made public is accurate and fully in accord with the policies of the United States Government.' "2. He also forwarded the following to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense: "In addition to the policy expressed in my memorandum of this date to the heads of departments, concerning the clearance of speeches and statements, I wish the following steps to be taken: "Officials overseas, including military commanders and diplomatic representatives, should be ordered to exercise extreme caution in public statements, to clear all but routine statements with their departments, and to refrain from direct communication on military or foreign policy with newspapers, magazines or other publicity media in the United States.' "3. The above is transmitted to you for guidance and appropriate action." Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, March 20, 1951 [From New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951] To: Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan. 20 MARCH, 1951. State planning Presidential announcement shortly that, with clearing of bulk of South Korea of aggression, United Nations now prepared to discuss conditions of settlement in Korea. Strong UN feeling persists that further diplomatic effort toward settlement should be made before any advance with major forces north of 38th Parallel. Time will be required to determine diplomatic reactions and permit new negotiations that may develop. Recognizing that parallel has no military significance, State has asked JCS what authority you should have to permit sufficient freedom of action for next few weeks to provide security for U. N. forces and maintain contact with enemy. Your recommendations desired. Statement of General MacArthur, March 24, 1951 [From New York Times, March 24, 1951. Note. As reprinted in New York Times, April 12, 1951, this statement is dated at Tokyo "25 March 1951." See also Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 39401 Operations continue according to schedule and plan. We have now substantially cleared South Korea of organized Communist forces. It is becoming increasingly evident that the heavy destruction along the enemy's lines of supply caused by our 'round-the-clock massive air and naval bombardment, has left his troops in the forward battle area deficient in requirements to sustain his operations. This weakness is being brilliantly exploited by our ground forces. The enemy's human wave tactics definitely failed him as our own forces become seasoned to this form of warfare; his tactics of infiltration are but contributing to his piecemeal losses, and he is showing less stamina than our own troops under rigors of climate, terrain, and battle. Of even greater significance than our tactical success has been the clear revelation that this new enemy, Red China, of such exaggerated and vaunted military power, lacks the industrial capacity to provide adequately many critical items essential to the conduct of modern war. He lacks manufacturing bases and those raw materials needed to produce, maintain, and operate even moderate air and naval power, and he cannot provide the essentials for successful ground operations, such as tanks, heavy artillery, and other refinements science has introduced into the conduct of military campaigns. Formerly his great numerical potential might well have filled this gap, but with the development of existing methods of mass destruction, numbers alone do not offset vulnerability inherent in such deficiencies. Control of the sea and air, which in turn means control over supplies, communications, and transportation are no less essential and decisive now than in the past. When this control exists, as in our case, and is coupled with the inferiority of ground firepower, as in the enemy's case, the resulting disparity is such that it cannot be overcome by bravery, however fanatical, or the most gross indifference to human loss. These military weaknesses have been clearly and definitely revealed since Red China entered upon its undeclared war in Korea. Even under inhibitions which now restrict activity of the United Nations forces and the corresponding military advantages which accrue to Red China, it has been shown its complete inability to accomplish by force of arms the conquest of Korea. The enemy therefore must by now be painfully aware that a decision of the United Nations to depart from its tolerant effort to contain the war to the area of Korea through expansion of our military operations to his coastal areas and interior bases would doom Red China to the risk of imminent military collapse. These basic facts being established, there should be no insuperable difficulty arriving at decisions on the Korean problem if the issues are resolved on their own merits without being burdened by extraneous matters not directly related to Korea, such as Formosa and China's seat in the United Nations. The Korean nation and people which have been so cruelly ravaged must not be sacrificed. That is the paramount concern. Apart from the military area of the problem where the issues are resolved in the course of combat, the fundamental questions continue to be political in nature and must find their answer in the diplomatic sphere. Within the area of my authority as military commander, however, it should be needless to say I stand ready at any time to confer in the field with the commander in chief of the enemy forces in an earnest effort to find any military means whereby the realization of the political objectives of the United Nations in Korea, to which no nation may justly take exceptions, might be accomplished without further bloodshed. Message from Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, March 24, 1951 [From the New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1951] To: Commander in Chief, Far East, Tokyo, Japan. MARCH 24, 1951. The President has directed that your attention be called to his order as transmitted 6 December 1950. In view of the information given you 20 March 1951 any further statements by you must be coordinated as prescribed in the order of 6 December. The President has also directed that in the event Communist military leaders request an armistice in the field, you immediately report that fact to the JCS for instructions. Letters exchanged by Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., and General MacArthur, March 1951 (1) Letter from Hon. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., to General MacArthur, March 8, 1951: [From Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3938] HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D. C., March 8, 1951. General of the Army DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, Commander in Chief, Far Eastern Command. MY DEAR GENERAL: In the current discussions of foreign policy and over-all strategy many of us have been distressed that, although the European aspects have been heavily emphasized, we have been without the views of yourself as Commander in Chief of the Far Eastern Command. I think it is imperative to the security of our Nation and for the safety of the world that policies of the United States embrace the broadest possible strategy and that in our earnest desire to protect Europe we not weaken our position in Asia. Enclosed is a copy of an address I delivered in Brooklyn, N. Y., February 12, stressing this vital point and suggesting that the forces of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa might be employed in the opening of a second Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our forces in Korea. I have since repeated the essence of this thesis in other speeches, and intend to do so again on March 21, when I will be on a radio hook-up. I would deem it a great help if I could have your views on this point, either on a confidential basis or otherwise. Your admirers are legion, and the respect you command is enormous. May success be yours in the gigantic undertaking which you direct Sincerely yours, JOSEPH W. MARTIN, Jr. (2) Reply thereto by General MacArthur, March 20, 1951: [From Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, p. 3938. See also Daily Congressional Record, April 5, 1951, p. 3482] Hon. JOSEPH W. MARTIN, Jr., GENERAL HADQUARTERS, Tokyo, Japan, March 20, 1951. House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. DEAR CONGRESSMAN MARTIN: I am most grateful for your note of the 8th forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12. The latter I have read with much interest, and find that with the passage of years you have certainly lost none of your old-time punch. My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China's entry into war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counterforce, as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition. It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe's war with arms while the diplomatic there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory. With renewed thanks and expressions of most cordial regard, I am Faithfully yours, DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, Comment upon relief of General MacArthur by Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, April 12, 1951 [From Daily Congressional Record, April 13, 1951, pp. 3940-3941] In clarification of news dispatches from the United States making reference to the President's directive of December 6 enjoining against the issuance of public statements on foreign policy without reference to the State Department for clearance, Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, of General MacArthur's staff, today pointed out the following: 1. The directive of December 6 was not directed to General MacArthur personally but was directed to all executive agencies of the Government. 2. Immediately after its receipt General MacArthur submitted a proposed communique to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who informed him, among other things, that it was not necessary to submit communiques referencing military operations. 3. The President, in a press conference in January, appeared to this headquarters to speciacally define General MacArthur's authority, but denied that there was any curb on his authority "to speak freely on the Korean War." 4. Furthermore, the directive of December 6, by its terms and spirit, was interpreted at this headquarters as applying solely to formal public statements and not to communiqués, correspondence, or personal conversations with others. 5. The general feels that he has complied meticulously with all directives he has received, not only recently, but throughout his entire military service. 6. The general has interpreted both his statement of March 24 and his letter to Congressman Joseph Martin, dispatched from here 4 days prior thereto, as dealing exclusively with the military situation and within the area of his uncontested authority to speak. The one bore no slightest relationship to the other. 7. The reference to arms for reserve elements of the Republic of Korea was taken from a top-secret message of early January while the Army's retrograde movement from Seoul was in progress and conditions indicated the possibility of evacuation. Subsequently, when our initiative had been reassumed, General MacArthur, within his capability to arm, authorized a 25-percent increase in each Republic of Korea division, the increase to be in infantry riflemen. It was obviously quite beyond the capability of this theatre to arm and equip 500,000 more Koreans. Their utilization, therefore, became a matter of political policy under the global military-assistance program. APPENDIX E (Referred to on p. 458) [Excerpt from "United States Relations With China" (pp. 605, 606, 607) Annexes to Chapter V: "The Mission of General George C. Marshall, 1945-47 (61)," President Truman to the Special Representative of the President to China (Marshall)] ANNEXES TO CHAPTER V: THE MISSION OF GENeral George C. MARSHALL, 1945-47 President Truman to the Special Representative of the President to China (Marshall) WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 15, 1945. MY DEAR GENERAL MARSHALL: On the eve of your departure for China I want to repeat to you my appreciation of your willingness to undertake this difficult mission. I have the utmost confidence in your ability to handle the task before you but, to guide you insofar as you may find it helpful, I will give you some of the thoughts, ideas, and objectives which Secretary Byrnes and I have in mind with regard to your mission. I attach several documents which I desire should be considered as part of this letter. One is a statement of United States policy toward China which was, I understand, prepared after consultation with you and with officials of the Department. The second is a memorandum from the Secretary of State to the War Department in regard to China. And the third is a copy of my press release on policy in China. I understand that these documents have been shown to you and received your approval. |