gressively better use of defense dollars through elimination of nonessential expenditures, and through improved management, in order to release funds for increasing combat effectiveness, and to provide opportunities to curtail over-all costs."

The expanded program which the President submitted to Congress yesterday makes it all the more necessary that we obtain the maximum return for every dollar that we are investing in our national defense. This gives added point to a matter I mentioned here on April 26, when I said: "Our mobilization in time of emergency depends for its success upon the soundness of the forces in being which constitute our mobilization base."

The forces in being which make up our Army, Navy, and Air Force constitute a sound base. To that base, we recommend that you now add a total active duty strength in the neighborhood of 600,000 men-making a total of some 2,100,000 men.

Earlier this year this committee considered requests for a program covering all activities of the Department of Defense, approximating $13,300,000,000. Yesterday the President submitted a supplemental estimate in the amount of $10,500,000,000. The recommended revised budget, in the aggregate amount of $23,800,000,000, would accomplish the purpose of financing the costs of the Korean campaign, as well as providing for the early expansion of the military forces to cope with the present international situation.

The supplemental estimate includes $3,063,000,000 for the Army, $2,649,000,000 for the Navy, $4,535,000,000 for the Air Force, and $240,000,000 for establishmentwide activities of the Defense Department.

About 59 percent of the supplemental request, or $6.2 billion, has been included for guns, tanks, ships, aircraft, ammunition, and other major procurement items. (Of this total about $3,344,000,000 is for aircraft-$40 million for the Army, $620 million for the Navy, $2,684,000,000 for the Air Force and $185 million is for shipbuilding.)

About 24 percent, or $2.5 billion, would go for the operation and maintenance of the facilities and equipment for the regular operations of the Armed Forces, including the sharply increased demands for consumption-type matériel in the Korean campaign. (About one-half of the $2.5 billion would go for consumptiontype matériel.)

About 13 percent, or $1.35 billion, would go for the pay and allowances of military personnel, including their food, subsistence, and travel.

Of the balance, $174 million is for military construction-$4 million for the Army and $170 million for the Air Force.

Exclusive of costs for guardsmen and reserves on active duty, $33 million has been provided for the National Guard, Officers Reserve Corps, and the ROTC program of the Army.

One hundred and twenty million dollars has been included for research and development, $70 million for industrial mobilization, and $50 million has been allocated for contingencies.

As the President stated in his message transmitting the supplemental request, certain program changes will undoubtedly be necessary in order properly to prosecute the campaign in Korea. For this reason authority is being requested to adjust by 10 percent any single appropriation by transfer from other appropriations. This would permit the necessary adjustments either in the Korean support or in the build-up phase contemplated by these estimates. I have instructed Assistant Secretary McNeil to keep this committee currently informed of all such actions which we find necessary.

I want to emphasize that this is not a call for full mobilization. It is a call to increase our strength in being, in order to enable us to support the United Nations' action in Korea and to build up our strength elsewhere to meet the threat to world peace.

The supplemental request before you rests on two principal factors: First, the requirements for land, naval, and air forces needed by General MacArthur successfully to prosecute the campaign in Korea; and second, the need to build up the strength of our forces over and above those committed to the Korean campaign.

The plans covering the build-up of our forces are based upon studies which began immediately after the President's announcement of the Soviet atomic explosion last September. You will recall that I discussed these studies when I testified here on April 26.

Because of the events in Korea the minimum desired forces which these studies showed to be required-normally a matter that would have been provided for in next year's budget-are being requested at this time.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are in complete agreement and fully support the forces planned for the build-up in our strength, and are also in complete agreement as to the forces to be provided in support of the Korean campaign.

The action in Korea is a battle of supply and the distances involved are great. As a result, we must expect difficult problems and slow progress. The Military Establishment which we are asking you to expand, however, is a sounder mobilization hase than the United States has ever had before. By reason of the ground work laid by my predecessor and the efforts of officers and civilians in all the agencies of the Department of Defense -the spirit of teamwork within the Department has grown tremendously. We have today a closely knit team of land, naval, and air forces. The swift decisions during the past 4 weeks to coordinate the combat efforts of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the Far East are striking examples of the benefits of unification in an emergency.

Our Military Establishment has been geared to provide a sound mobilization base and a swift striking force in case of a third world war. In addition, we have had to be prepared to meet, to the extent that we could, the first shock of an act of calculated local aggression. The latter test has been met with unprecedented speed in Korea. We are now in the process of backing our shock troops with the necessary reinforcements. We are asking you to supply the men and equipment to replace those being used in the Far East and additional strength to prepare for the possibility of future emergencies. I am sure that all of us will meet the challenge of the aggressor with the same undaunted spirit as that shown by our fighting men in Korea.

The witnesses who follow me will give the details of the program we recommend. It is a program designed to bring the action in Korea to a successful conclusion; it is also a program designed to promote world peace by deterring further aggression. It is the sort of program to which I referred on April 12 this year when I gave the founder's day speech at my alma mater, the University of Virginia.

Speaking in Charlottesville that day, I said:

"I have every confidence in our ultimate success. We shall face facts as they are and shall fit our defense plans and our manpower and munitions requirements to meet them. Our defense plans, however, are not rigid. They are not the laws of Medes and Persians. They are flexible and adaptable to changing conditions. They are under constant study and review. If we become convinced that our present means are insufficient to meet the exigencies of the day and the probable threats of tomorrow, we shall not be too humble to ask for more; and if we find them more than adequate we shall not be too proud to ask for less. We shall always seek for truth and we shall take fitting means to meet the truth."

Gentlemen, I shall be glad to attempt to answer any questions you may

have.

APPENDIX BB

(Referred to on p. 2941)

A FEW COMMENTS ABOUT ONE THOUSAND PAGES OF WHITE PAPER

[For release for Sunday papers and radio, August 7, 1949]

By Patrick J. Hurley

I have just received and hurriedly read the more than 1,000-page State Department white paper. The paper is a smooth alibi for the pro-Communists in the State Department who have engineered the overthrow of our ally, the National Government of the Republic of China, and aided in the Communist conquest of China.

The white paper seems to indicate that the State Department has recovered the five or six suitcases full of State Department documents that were given or sold to the pro-Communist Amerasia magazine. The white paper certainly is now quoting aforesaid documents that were not available to me when I testified in December 1945 before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. The American people have had an opportunity to read most of the Chambers-Hiss documents. Why can't the public have an opportunity to see the Amerasia papers pertaining to China, and have an explanation of the reasons why the officials

arrested by the FBI in the Amerasia case were released and whitewashed by the State Department?

My directive from President Roosevelt in keeping with the American policy in China, was to prevent the collapse of the National Government of the Republic of China; keep the Chinese Army in the field, and to unify all anti-Japanese armed forces and bring them under the control of the National Government. There were, of course, numerous other directives but the foregoing are sufficient for the purpose of showing the failure of the white paper to really tell what happened in China. Most of the quotations attributed to me occurred during the war when Russia was our ally and we were attempting to unify all the military forces in China to defeat Japan. I was, of course, attempting to get the Communists to agree to the policy of my Government.

Beginning on page 87 and ending on page 92, under the title of "American Chargés Recommendations," the State Department does disfigure the recommendation made by American Chargé at Chungking, Mr. George Atcheson. The recommendations were made in my absence and were intended to destroy the National Government of the Republic of China, by arming the Chinese Communist Party whose purpose it was to overthrow the Government which I was directed to uphold. Fortunately, when the pro-Communists of the State Department called me on the carpet all primed to make me accept the Atcheson proposal, I was furnished a copy of the Atcheson cable which I now have before me. I quote from the Atcheson report:

.6* * * The President should inform the generalissimo in definite terms that the military necessity requires that we supply and cooperate with the Communists * *

Atcheson definitely recommended the arming of the Communists whose purpose it was to overthrow our ally, the National Government of the Republic of China. Now the question arises who were the pro-Communists in the Embassy at Chungking?—and I am quoting again from George Atcheson's message:

"This telegram has been drafted with the assistance and agreement of all the political officers of the staff of this Embassy.”

According to Atcheson, every official in the American Embassy in China was in favor of arming the Chinese Communists whose purpose it was to overthrow our ally, the Government of China, which I was directed to uphold. At the close of the Atcheson report, the State Department very kindly adds:

"General Hurley strongly opposed the course of action recommended above. (by Chargé Atcheson) and it remained the policy of the United States to supply military matériel and financial support only to the recognized Chinese National Government."

What the white paper does not show is that I was called on the carpet with a full array of the pro-Communists of the State Department. as my judges and questioners, to defend the American policy in China against "every official of the American Embassy in China." I won over all of their criticism for one reason only. President Roosevelt sustained my position and said it was in keeping with the traditional American policy in China. Nearly all the officials relieved by me in China because they were pro-Communist are now in the State Department-presumably writing alibi white papers.

Let me for a moment discuss a more deep-seated disagreement which I have with the present American foreign policy. It is truly stated in the white paper that I nearly always agreed with the announced policy of the President and the various Secretaries of State. I criticized the wide discrepancy between the policy stated by the highest officials and the policy made effective throughout the world by the State Department. The policy of the highest officials and the State Department are not alike. They are very different policies. Let us look at the record:

On November 26, 1941, Secretary of State Cordell Hull demanded an agreement by Japan that:

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support-militarily, politically, economically-any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking."

Secretary Hull's policy was in keeping with the traditional American policy in China. My disagreement was not with the policy stated by President Roosevelt or President Truman or Secretary Hull. It was with the policy made effective all over the world by the State Department. For instance, the Atlantic Charter adopted before we entered the war provides that:

The nations: “Seek no aggrandizement, territorial, or other.” And again,

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"which"

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which they will live."

tions: "Respect the right of all people to choose the form of government

were other provisions of the Charter, but these two are enough for the am making. Britain and Russia, the United States and China, and 45 nations, adopted the Atlantic Charter as a statement of the objectives for we were fighting. That was Roosevelt's policy and I was for it. Later, Britain and Russia attempted to secede from the principles they had agreed to in the Atlantic Charter. At President Roosevelt's direction, I prepared at Teheran what is known as the Iran Declaration. The Iran Declaration, over the signatures of Churchill for the United Kingdom, Stalin for Soviet Russia, and Roosevelt for the United States, under date of December 1, 1943, reaffirmed the principles of the Atlantic Charter as the objectives for which the United Nations were fighting.

Then came the Yalta Conference. President Roosevelt was a sick man at Yalta. The State Department officials took over. The secret agreements at Yalta surrendered every principle of the Atlantic Charter and the Iran Declaration. My controversy concerning Yalta began when I said ours is a Government by the people, and the people cannot form correct conclusions if they are not given all the facts. I demanded the publication of the secret Yalta Agreements.

Now let us find what the secret Yalta Agreements did to China. I was not present at Yalta. China was not represented at Yalta. A secret agreement was signed by Churchill, Stalin, and Roosevelt giving Russia a preeminent right in the Chinese-Manchurian Railways. The Yalta secret agreement gave Russia a preeminent right in the port of Dairen in China. The Yalta secret agreement gave Russia the naval base of Port Arthur in China. All of these concessions to Russia were in violation of America's traditional policy in China and in violation of China's right to territorial integrity and political independence.

The Yalta secret agreement is the blueprint for Communist conquest of China. The import of the white paper to the effect that we were compelled to meet these demands of Russia because we were afraid of what Russia would do about our war with Japan, is not a satisfactory reason for our entering into the secret agreements of Yalta. At that time the United States had on the land, on the seas, and in the air, the greatest military power ever assembled on this earth. America's military power at the time of Yalta was invincible. The United States did not need Russia. Russia dared not oppose the United States. Japan was already defeated before Russia reached the Japanese front. The surrender of all of these rights to Russia in China was legally and morally unjustified, and no white paper will ever be able to change the history of America's diplomatic failure in China.

The white paper does not attempt to define for the American people the present American policy in China.

Senate Office Building, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR KNOWLAND: I wish to thank most heartily for introducing so promptly and fairly into the hearings my wire to you of June 5, 1951. In the New York Times of June 8 appears a copy of the transcript of hearings including my wire. Apparently Western Union made some mistakes in transmittal and I am therefore sending you herewith the correct copy and expressing the wish that the clerk of the committee may use the correct wire instead of the somewhat mangled version in which there are some obvious mistakes:

"In the June 5 issue of the New York Times is a report of conversation between you and Secretary Acheson regarding my trip to China in 1944. You quote from John Carter Vincent's report on my conversation with Chiang to the effect that I said the American Communists were taking a patriotic attitude in the United States in 1944. What I actually said was that the American Communists were

going all out to support the war effect in the United States against Japan and Germany and I could not see why Chinese Communists should not be as eager to defeat the Japanese as the American Communists. It seemed to me common sense to assume that the attitude of Communists in all countries would be the same with regard to defeating Germany and Japan. For your information I may say that neither Roosevelt nor I had the slightest illusion as to what the American Communists stood for from August 1939 till June 22, 1941. Both of us stood for help to Finland during that period. I talked with the President of the Farm Bureau and the Master of the Grange about organizing food shipments to Finland while she was fighting Russia. You and I know the American Communists in 1944 were going all out to support the war effort against Germany and Japan, Their reason for doing so is something else.

Super

"Either John Carter Vincent's report of my conversation with Chiang conveys a false impression or my original language was not sufficiently clear. ficially the American Communists were acting in 1944 as patriotic Americans in supporting the common war effort as approved by the United States Senate against Germany and Japan. Of course everybody knows American Communists were probably doing it for Russia's sake not our sake. Secretary Acheson and Secretary Marshall know this as well as you and I but apparently Secretary Acheson must have been momentarily confused by your question or he could not have replied as he did that my views was at variance with that of the State and War Departments. In your cross questioning of both Marshall and Acheson you have endeavored to make it a part of the record that we tried to bring about a coalition government in 1944. That is not true. What Roosevelt tried to do was to bring about unity of effort to defeat the Japanese. I made it repeatedly clear to Chiang in 1944 that the United States Government was not interested in the Chinese Communists but in the prosecution of the war against the Japanese. We were interested in Chiang making sufficient changes in the postwar peried to avoid such a catastrophic upset as eventually took place. I outlined my views on this subject in a report to Roosevelt which was printed in full in the January 19, 1950, issue of the New York Times. For your information and for the record— pursuant to a request by Chiang for a liaison between himself and Roosevelt I wired Roosevelt on June 28, 1944, suggesting that he consider General Wedemyer in this capacity. I trust you may find it possible to make this wire a part of the hearings.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As a means of supplementing testimony given by General Marshall on the subject of United States casualties in Korea, and pursuant to his agreement to furnish various additional figures and information on this subject, I am forwarding the following:

1. A complete set of cumulative weekly reports on battle casualties, by services, for the period August 25, 1950 (covering the period since June 25) to May 11, 1951.