Zealand, Canada, and the Netherlands have dispatched vessels to support the United Nations' effort to cut off supplies for the invading hordes from north of the 38th parallel. In carrying out this work, shore bombardments have been conducted where and as necessary to interdict the supply of Communist troops which have moved into that portion of Korea governed by the Republic of Korea under the aegis of the United Nations. Valuable service has also been rendered by a British naval unit in the rescue from the water of airmen who had been compelled to abandon their airplane. The Coast Guard of the Republic of Korea has been rendering invaluable service in providing for the security of the shorelines. Naval air provided by the United Kingdom has contributed in a major way in the support of landing operations at P'ohang-dong.

Upon the request by the Security Council of the United Nations for assistance to defend the Republic of Korea against the North Korean aggressors, the only forces in the area immediately available were those United States and British Commonwealth occupation forces under the command of General MacArthur in the occupation of the Japanese Islands. The size and nature of these forces were sufficient only to perform the occupation duties in Japan.

Before committing the forces, in response to the Security Council resolutions, they had to be regrouped and re-equipped from standards for peacetime occupation of Japan to standards suitable for combat in Korea. This also involved moving these troops, with their equipment and supplies, from their various occupation occupation stations in Japan, by combinations of motor, rail, water and air transportation, to Korea. Even so, all the materials for sustained combat were not immediately available to General MacArthur and therefore had to be rushed to Korea from the United States-a distance of onethird of the way around the globe. Future assistance for the defense of the Republic of Korea, both men and materials, must be transported over corresponding distances from the Member nations of the United Nations rendering such assistance. The well-planned attack by the North Korean regime, the size of their force, their logistical support and their ability to continue to press the attack, account for the degree of initiative enjoyed by the aggressor. The defenders of the Republic of Korea have been forced to submit to the time and place selected by the aggressor, and now must depend upon assistance from nations peacefully disposed and lying not merely hundreds, but thousands of miles away.

Extensive Resources of Aggressors

From the continuing appearance on the battlefield of large numbers of enemy personnel and equipment, it is now apparent that the North Korean aggressors have available to them resources far in excess of their internal capabilities. This, with the initial advantage of the aggressor, combines to give the enemy a strength that cannot be overcome until the United Nations forces achieve the effect of superiority in weapons and manpower. The task is not a small one when viewed in comparison with the potential resources of the aggressor force. Until forces of the Unified Command are increased further in strength, the rapidity with which success will be achieved cannot be predicted. However, with the combined efforts of the United Nations, the full effect of the contribution from each member nation. 83797-51-pt. 5- -17

will be felt in the ultimate defeat of the aggressors from north of the 38 degree parallel.

Commanding General's Prediction of Victory

In conclusion, it is believed appropriate to quote the Unified Commander's latest estimate of the Korean operations.

"With the development in Korea of major elements of the Eighth Army now accomplished the first phase of the campaign has ended and with it the chance for victory by the North Korean Forces. The enemy's plan and great opportunity depended upon the speed with which he could overrun South Korea once he had breached the Han River line and with overwhelming numbers and superior weapons temporarily shattered South Korean resistance. This chance he has now lost through the extraordinary speed with which the Eighth Army has been deployed from Japan to stem his rush. When he crashed the Han Line the way seemed entirely open and victory was within his grasp. The desperate decision to throw in piecemeal American elements as they arrived by every available means of transport from Japan was the only hope to save the situation. The skill and valor thereafter displayed in successive holding actions by the ground forces in accordance with this concept, brilliantly supported in complete coordination by air and naval elements, forced the enemy into continued deployments, costly frontal attacks and confused logistics which so slowed his advance and blunted his drive that we have bought the precious time necessary to build a secure base.

"I do not repeat not believe that history records a comparable oper ation which excelled the speed and precision with which the Eighth Army, the Far East Air Force and the Seventh Fleet have been deployed to a distant land for immediate commitment to major operations. It merits highest commendation for the commanders, staffs and units concerned and attests to their superior training and high state of readiness to meet any eventuality. This finds added emphasis in the fact that the Far East Command, until the President's great pronouncement to support the epochal action of the United Nations, had no repeat no slightest responsibility for the defense of the Free Republic of Korea. With the President's decision it assumed a completely new and added mission.

"It is, of course, impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy future incidents of a military campaign. Over a broad front involving continuous local struggles, there are bound to be ups and downs, losses as well as successes. Our final stabilization line will unquestionably be rectified and tactical improvement will involve planned withdrawals as well as local advances. But the issue of battle is now fully joined and will proceed along lines of action in which we will not repeat not be without choice. Our hold upon the southern part of Korea represents a secure base. Our casualties despite overwhelming odds have been relatively light. Our strength will continually increase while that of the enemy will relatively decrease. His supply line is insecure. He has had his great chance but failed to exploit it. We are now in Korea in force, and with God's help we are there to stay until the constitutional authority of the Republic is fully restored. MacArthur."

APPENDIX

Resolution Adopted by the Security Council, July 7, 1950

The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, Having recommended that Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

1. Welcomes the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its Resolutions of 25 and 27 June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

2. Notes that Members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea; 3. Recommends that all Members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

4. Requests the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

5. Authorizes the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of operations against North Korean forces concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating;

6. Requests the United States to provide the Security Council with reports as appropriate on the course of action taken under the uni

B. Second Report, August 16, 1950

I herewith submit a report of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for the period 20 to 31 July, inclusive. Details of these operations are in press communiqués numbers 98 to 126, inclusive, and Korean press releases numbers 127 to 177, inclusive. A general description of the operations for the period is as follows:

By 20 July main enemy columns, each of approximately division strength, reinforced by tanks, were contacted and identified at the following points: 4th North Korean Division, northwest of Taejon; 2nd North Korean Division, southeast of Chongju; 15th North Korean Division, 15 miles southeast of Chongju; 5th North Korean Division, north of Yongju; and there were unidentified elements north of Yongdok. The enemy 1st, 3rd and 6th Divisions, also identified by this date, were either in reserve, regrouping or en route to other battle areas. The battle-front was not a continuous line, but rather, it consisted of a series of columns of battalion and regimental size probing main roads and mountain trails in an effort to penetrate United Nations positions. The greatest concentration was massed for the drive toward Taejon, with decreasing strength toward the east. The enemy forces on the East Coast were separated from those to the West by rugged mountains. However, in the mountainous area,

from Youngyang south to Yongchon, there were an estimated 1,500 guerrillas. The guerrillas, often intermingled with refugees, became one of the major security problems of the campaign.

In the Taejon sector the enemy employed two and possibly three divisions with tank support. The delaying force in this area was the United States 24th Division and elements of the United States 25th Division. This delaying force executed a planned withdrawal to Yongdong on 21 July. The position at Yongdong was held for four days, showing an increased United Nations strength. Nevertheless, the enemy was able to muster such superior forces that he penetrated our flanks and forced the withdrawal of the delaving force to Hwanggan on 26 July, and to Kumchon on 30 July. Meanwhile, the 6th North Korean Division, which had garrisoned Seoul, was reported on 23 July to have moved south in the direction of Chonju. With the 6th Division echeloned to the rear, the 4th North Korean Division initiated a major strategic envelopment to the south against weak militarized police forces of the Republic of Korea. Driving virtually unopposed toward the western and south ports the enemy seized Mokpo, Kwangju, Amwon [Namwon], and Chinan on 24 July. The enveloping force then shifted direction of movement to the east toward the vital ports of Masan and Pusan. Yosu and Hadong were taken on 27 July, and, by 28 July, enemy forces reached eastward to Kochang, and, to the north, extended the line to Muju. This major envelopment was possible to an enemy who employed at least nine divisions against a United Nations ensemble of only three United States divisions and four of the Republic of Korea divisions, all understrength.

East of Taejon, in the sector opposing the forces of the Republic of Korea, enemy progress was less rapid. The 15th North Korean Division, driving down the Chungju-Hamchang axis, was reinforced on 28 July by the 1st North Korean Division. These enemy forces continued making local advances until they reached the outskirts of Hamchang. East of the Hamchang area, enemy forces believed to be from the 5th North Korean Division finally occupied Yongju by 24 July and thereafter made no appreciable progress during this period. On the east coast, the action was initially fluid with alternating withdrawals and advances in the vicinity of Yongdok. By 26 July the 5th North Korean Division was positively identified in the east coast area, and by the 29th, Yongdok was in enemy hands. Infiltration and guerrilla operations in rear areas which initially constituted some annoyance were materially reduced by the close of the period.

On 31 July there were eleven enemy divisions identified on the line of contact, with the possibility of two or three additional formations. The enemy dispositions formed a discontinuous line from Chinju in the south, northward through Kochang, Hwanggan, and Hamchang, and eastward through Yongju to Yongdok with the greatest concentration of divisions in the central part of this line. However, the wide envelopment in the south and southwest continued as the enemy action of major significance. The general pattern of enemy strategy, predicated on superiority of forces and armament, is a double envelopment, in the north via Hamchang, in the southwest via Kochang-Chinju, while maintaining pressure in the center to prevent displacement of United Nations Forces.

As yet no army forces of Member nations other than the United' States have arrived in Korea. The Republic of Korea forces have been reorganized into two corps and have been resupplied with United States equipment. They have progressed admirably. In addition, the Republic of Korea forces have demonstrated by limited attacks and determined defensive operations that they are doing and will continue to do their utmost in defense of their country. Their withdrawals have been more to preserve continuity of the battle front than because of enemy pressure. United States and Republic of Korea army forces with their increased artillery and larger caliber rockets have proven that they can meet and destroy the North Korean tanks. Member Nations Contribute Forces

Naval forces were considerably augmented during this period by the addition of several United States and British units and a few units from other nations. Eight nations are now represented by naval forces and assistance: Australia, Canada, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. To date the bulk of shipping necessary to the conduct of the Korea war has been provided by the United States. Naval forces have maintained a continuous and effective patrol of North Korean ports and coastlines. Carrier air strikes of increasing frequency have ranged from strategic targets in the north to battlefield targets in close support of the ground movement. A patrol on both coasts, directed primarily toward interception of enemy shipping to the south, has effectively stopped all coastal water movement of enemy troops and supplies. Shore bombardments as requested by infantry units on the east coast have proved to be very effective in destroying military targets, harassing the enemy at night, and disrupting coastal land communications. When returning to our bases for logistic support, patrol ships have performed additional tasks of convoying and escorting shipping to and from Pusan. Naval units have participated in the evacuation of the sick and wounded from Korea to locations of security and better care in Japan. The accomplishment of these continuing tasks has, to date, resulted in relatively minor interference or resistance by the enemy in the form of aerial strafing or bombardment by shore-based artillery. There has been no naval interference by the enemy.

United States light bombers and United States, Australian and Republic of Korea fighters continually attacked targets in close support of ground troops, including attacks on tanks, trucks, artillery pieces and bridges. United States medium bombers attacked and destroyed the Chosen explosives manufacturing plant at Konan. Several marshalling yards were disrupted and many railroad and highway bridges were cut, thereby reducing and delaying the flow of supplies to North Korean forces. Due to the heavy air attacks on rail and highway traffic during daylight, the North Korean forces resorted to moving practically all traffic at night. This was countered by increased night attacks on concentrations of traffic. A considerable number of United States fighter aircraft were brought to Japan by the United States Navy carrier Boxer to augment the fighters previously available. Canadian troop carrier aircraft joined the United States Military Air Transport Service operations in carrying men, supplies and materials to the Far East. Although a few