10. The failure to adequately train and supply equipment to the South Koreans made them tempting targets of aggression.

The testimony of the Secretary of State, General Marshall, and General Bradley constitutes a flat admission that the United States Government did not adequately arm and equip the South Korean forces.

Secretary of State Acheson admits that the South Koreans were not furnished with heavy arms, artillery, tanks, or aircraft. The excuse is that the United States in the years of 1948 and 1949 did not have such equipment available." This is astonishing. Billions spent ; no arms available.

59

The Secretary further testifies that the South Korean troops were not as well trained as the North Koreans despite the fact that before the June attack Congress was informed by William C. Foster, then Deputy Administrator of the ECA, that the South Koreans were capable of resisting any aggression from the north."

60

In continuing his testimony, the Secretary of State testified that, had we kept our troops in Korea, our very presence might have prevented the aggression which has cost so many American lives."1

61

This statement of Secretary Acheson's is difficult to understand in the light of the positive evidence submitted to the committee that the Executive had warning prior to June 25, 1950, of the strong possibility of Communist aggression."7

11. The publication of the Wedemeyer report on Korea might have alerted the Government and the people of the United States

General Wedemeyer, one of the best-informed Americans on problems of the Far East and a military planner of experience and authority, was sent to China and Korea in the summer of 1947 "for the purpose of making an appraisal of the political, economic, psychological, and military situations—current and projected." He submitted a report. Secretary Marshall suppressed the report and accepted full responsibility for the suppression.**

9 63

We are not impressed by the ambiguous reasons given the committee for the suppression of the report. Its timely publication might have proven of immense advantage to the United States. The Secretary of State conceded that publication of the report, particularly that section dealing with Korea, might have served to alert the American people to the dangers of aggression at the thirtyeighth parallel.

65

Wedemeyer's 1947 report on Korea, made public by this committee for the first time in April 1951, was a remarkably accurate prediction of events that subsequently occurred in Korea. It showed clearly that North Korea possessed an army with aggressive capabilities, thoroughly trained and armed by Soviet Russia.

It stated that the defensive constabulary set up in South Korea by the United States and the United Nations would be completely unable to cope with the North Korean Army.

It was a tragic error to suppress the Wedemeyer report-particularly that section dealing with Korea. We were shocked to find a copy of this report was never furnished to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.c

One portion of the Wedemeyer report contained a recommendation for the establishment of a United Nations guardianship for Manchuria and a trusteeship in Korea, which, if adopted, would have in the general's opinion changed the picture today in the Far East.67

As the General so forcefully testified: "My purpose was to create a buffer

* * *

in those areas, where we would be able to preclude unilateral action on the part of Soviet-inspired, or Sovietcontrolled, or Soviet-supported elements in the Far East."

58 Hearing. p. 2010.

59 Ibid., p. 2010.

60 Ibid., p. 2009.

61 Ibid.. p. 2010.

68

62 It is noted, that of the funds provided by Congress for additional military assistance to the Republic of Korea, only a few hundred dollars' worth of excess signal equipment had been shipped prior to June 25, 1950.

63 White paper, p. 255.

64 Hearings. p. 372.

65 Ibid., p. 1987.

66 Ibid., p. 1989.

67 It is significant that Walton Butterworth, of the State Department, asked General Wedemeyer to make changes in this section of the report, and the General refused on the grounds of principle. Hearings, p. 2365.

68 Ibid., p. 2367.

12. The involvement of the United States Armed Forces in the Korean conflict is without precedent in American history

The unusual nature of this conflict is tersely described in a report of the House of Representatives dated February 20, 1951, entitled "Background Information on the Use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries." It reads: "Since June 1950, United States military forces have been in action in Korea. The military engagement has been variously described as "police action," "war," "hostilities," and "defense against aggression." No declaration of war has been made by the Congress. The President has not proclaimed a state of war, nor have the North Koreans or Chinese Communist authorities. Nevertheless, the figure of 47,388 American battle casualties leaves no doubt that the United States is engaged in large-scale hostilities. What has happened in Korea can happen elsewhere in the world." **

As this exposition of the use of our Armed Forces explains:

"The action of the United States in Korea is in one sense unprecedented. For the first time the United States has committed large military forces in a foreign country in response to the action of an international organization." 09 The fundamental issues raised by our intervention in Korea concern first the extent of the executive power to commit the United States to a military action, and, second, war-making powers of the National Legislature.

It is clear that in the resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950, insofar as they involved military support for the Republic of Korea, the Security Council of the United Nations under article 39 of the Charter made recommendations with respect to assistance in Korea and not decisions. As the House report pointed out, only "decisions" of the Security Council are legally binding.

With respect to the President's power as Commander in Chief which has been exercised independently of the Congress on over 100 occasions since the founding of our Government, it must be pointed out that in every instance, except that of Korea, the use of this power has been "primarily for the protection of American lives or property or in defense against direct aggression and usually involved only small forces." 70

The reference therefore to these previous involvements of United States Armed Forces provides no precedent either legal or factual for the United States intervention in Korea. It is likewise true that collective action by an international organization is without precedent in modern history.

13. The command function delegated to the United States by the UN has been subjected to veto by a minority of participating nations

By resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations on July 7, 1950, the military command functions in Korea were delegated to the United States." The extent to which this command authority is absolute has never been defined clearly. It would appear that the allied commander, formerly General MacArthur and now General Ridgway, would have, subject to the approval of the Joint Chiefs and the Commander in Chief, sufficient authority to take whatever measures might appear desirable to successfully carry out the military mission in Korea.

This theory of command function, however, has not worked out in practice. It appears that the United States has been unduly apprehensive of the opinions of our allies in carrying out its command authority. This is true in spite of the fact that the United States contributed nearly 95 percent of the manpower and material resources used to assist the Republic of Korea.

The timidity with which the United States exercised command is illustrated by the failure to apply the doctrine of "hot pursuit." This is a doctrine of criminal law which enables a peace officer to pursue a fleeing felon outside the area of his jurisdiction when he is close behind the culprit. The privileged sanctuary of Manchuria is comparable to the area outside the policeman's jurisdiction. Testimony indicates that in January 1951 the allied commander, the Joint Chiefs, the President, and even the State Department unanimously agreed that the doctrine of hot pursuit should be invoked against enemy aircraft which attacked our Air Force south of the Yalu River. The Secretary of Defense accordingly asked the Secretary of State to inform our allies that we were contemplating such "hot pursuit.' However, instead the Secretary of State took it upon himself to instruct our diplomatic representatives to obtain the views

69 H. Rept. No. 127, dated February 20, 1951, p. 1. It must be remembered that since the publication of this report our total casualties have exceeded 175,000.

70 Ibid., p. 36.

1 Compilation, p. 14.

of only 6 of our 13 allies in Korea. All six, according to the Secretary of State, felt the application of the doctrine of "hot pursuit" was not wise. As a consequence, the decision of the United States military was disregarded.

The action of American officials in connection with the "hot pursuit" question is most difficult to understand. Witnesses agree that the Defense Establishment, after the decision to invoke "hot pursuit" had been approved by all responsible agencies of the American Government, requested the State Department to notify our allies in Korea of our intention to apply this doctrine.

Of course the command function delegated to the United States did not require us to notify our allies.

Testimony indicates that our diplomatic representatives were requested to contact the governments of 6 of our 13 allies in Korea in order to "get the attitude." 72 It will be noted that this instruction was at variance with the request made by the Defense Department in that (1) Defense requested that our allies be notified and (2) Defense requested all allies be notified.

Secretary of State Acheson testified that our diplomatic representatives were not instructed to urge our allies to concur in acceptance of the "hot pursuit" doctrine.

In spite of numerous questions directed to this point, the committee never did publicly obtain the names of the six nations contacted nor the reason for the failure to contact other participating nations.

The consequence of this informal veto of our command authority is apparent. Enemy aircraft can fly from their Manchurian sanctuary in ever-increasing numbers to attack, not only our Air Forces, but also our Ground Forces in Korea. Failure to apply the "hot pursuit" technique places a life-and-death handicap on our airmen and has cost planes and personnel. While engaged in combat, in high-speed jet planes, our men have the additional obligation of keeping one eye on the Yalu River boundary.

14. The parallel has no military significance

The division of Korea was accepted as a devise to effect Japanese surrender." The Soviets, under this arrangement, accepted the surrender of all Japanese troops located north of the thirty-eighth parallel, while the United States forces accepted the surrender of Japanese military units south of the parallel.

Although this division was originally accepted as a matter of temporary convenience, it was soon discovered that the Soviet Union regarded it as a definite boundary.

Failing in all efforts to gain Soviet cooperation in the consolidation of Korea, the United States presented the problem to the United Nations.

In November 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations called for an election in Korea under the observation of a United Nations commission so that the people of Korea could choose a representative national assembly, draft a constitution, and establish a national government.

Soviet-controlled North Korea refused to allow the United Nations commission north of the parallel. As a result the free elections were confined to South Korea and the Republic was established on August 15, 1948.

A month later the Soviets announced the creation of a Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, claiming jurisdiction over the entire country.

On June 25, 1950, the Communist forces of North Korea began crossing the thirty-eighth parallel in force in a full-scale assault on the Republic of Korea. The lightly armed South Korean constabulary fell back under the weight of the initial thrust.

The President of the United States, with concurrence from his advisers, authorized the use of naval and air units to bolster the defense of South Korea. After an on-the-spot survey, General MacArthur, supreme commander, Allied Powers, advised the President that the situation required the use of ground troops. The President accepted the advice of General MacArthur and ordered the use of United States military units on duty in Japan.

Since that time Korea has become a seesaw battleground. Seoul, the capital, has changed hands four times. UN troops reached the Yalu River last fall and the conflict in Korea seemed near a close. Then the Chinese Communists entered the conflict with four field armies. This enormously expanded the scope of the war.

72 Hearings, p. 2078.

73 See Acheson's address before the American Newspaper Guild, Washington, D. C., June 29, 1950.

The thirty-eighth parallel has been crossed and recrossed as the armies fought up and down the narrow Korean peninsula. Several times the allied forces lost the initiative while waiting for a UN decision as to whether or not the thirtyeighth parallel could be crossed.

The problem of the parallel came up for discussion during the committee hearings. Witnesses appearing before the committee agree that the parallel has no military significance. General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave his views on the matter as follows:

"From a military point of view, as I have said, the thirty-eighth parallel means nothing, but we must realize politically it may have a lot of significance and that is why we would have liked to have some guidance along that area, which has not been given to us as yet by the United Nations."

99 74

15. The political significance of the thirty-eighth parallel has never been satisfactorily explained

* *

It would be expected, of all the witnesses, that Secretary of State Acheson could best explain the political significance of the thirty-eighth parallel. Nevertheless no clear exposition was forthcoming. He did say that "I think there was understanding about the policy, but * some of the nations associated with us did not think that there should be military decisions to advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel until the policy decision to do so had been taken by the United Nations, particularly by the nations contributing forces." " On the same subject Secretary of Defense Marshall said:

"We regarded that there was no, you might say, legal prohibition against passing the thirty-eighth parallel; for that purpose, he would go ahead and do it; but a major advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel at this particular time when the situation had been restored was not to be undertaken without the approval, specific approval, of the Government."

99 76

16. Limited war is impossible to define

The committee has heard much about "limited war." This is a new concept in warfare. Efforts to define limited war, to discover what the phrase means, have met with evasion.

Some historical examples of limited war were cited but it turned out that in each case the limitation was imposed by the inability of the commander to bring maximum power to bear. No illustration was given of a commander conducting a limited war when he had the opportunity for offensive effort and the resources to back it up.

The enemy in Korea fought with no holds barred. They had no Navy or they would have used it. They had a small air force, which was steadily expanded as the war went on and the full strength of this air force was thrown into battle.

We did have inescapable handicaps; witnesses testified to our limitations. But the idea of not exploiting the resources available in the face of an enemy exerting all his power is to us indefensible.

17. The identity of our real enemy has been established

Some witnesses-but not all-showed hesitation in identifying the real enemy with whom we have been engaged. That the outbreak in Korea was no local operation was manifest from the start. Subsequently, as the Chinese Communists poured in and planes and weapons of Russian manufacture appeared upon the scene, we had a practical demonstration of what Americans had already surmised that the Korean aggression was an international Communist action. General MacArthur 77 so identified it as did Secretary Acheson, indirectly when he said that there was "Russian dominance in that (Chinese) regime." 18. The Russian domination of Communist China was already known The fact that Russia had an overwhelming influence in Communist China has been long known. For instance, Army Intelligence in 1945 drew up a documented report which demonstrated this influence and domination. A persistent and disturbing factor has been the reluctance of some State Department officials to

4 Op. cit., p. 1072.

75 Ibid., p. 2031. 76 Ibid., p. 340.

Ibid., p. 142.

78 Ibid., p. 2109.

99 78

accept this authoritative evidence. For instance, at the very time (1945) that Army Intelligence drafted its report, a trusted Foreign Service officer of the State Department, upon his return from an extended trip into the Red-controlled portions of China, told an American journalist that "the so-called Communists are agrarian reformers of a mild, democratic stripe more than anything else." During these hearings Secretary Marshall himself, reflecting on his exneriences in China in 1947, said:

7 79

"When I got out to China and looked the ground over, from the very start, and there was no doubt that the leadership of this group were Marxist Communists, and so stated in my presence, and insisted, in my presence, that they were.

"And, when I visited Yenan, in that mountain fastness of theirs, in their little theater building which they used for all sorts of purposes, and they had some kind of entertainment prepared for me-over the proscenium arch, was a large picture of Stalin; and I recall Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist Prime Minister, came to me protestign, in Chungking, in the late winter or early spring of 1946, against the dragging of Stalin's portrait through the streets, in the mud.

"I have heard him assert not once but a number of times that he was a Marxist Communist. His story always was that they would approach the desired end, which was a Communist form of government, through, first the democratic processes, as they called them, until there was enough stability and industrial strength and development to permit them to go the whole way to a Marxist Communist state.

"The only phase of the agrarian belief would have been, I should suppose, the fact that most of the members of the party were of the agrarian type, as there were almost no industries within the Communist bounds in the early days of China.

"There was never any doubt in my mind, and never any though there was any misunderstanding about it."

9980

19. There has been a lack of adequate military support from United Nations allies The Korean War was supposed to be a United Nations action. Forty-seven members of the international organization formally supported the operation but few contributed much practical assistance. (Turkey, considering her resources, was a notable exception.) The plain truth is that the United States has footed most of the bill in money and has furnished most of the men and equipment. Ninety percent of the casualties were American. Contributions of our UN allies total:

1 The 10,000 listed as manning ships from United Kingdom include personnel aboard ships of British Commonwealth countries.

Exact number of New Zealanders unavailable.

NOTE. In addition to the forces listed above, which are actually in the Korean area, a few other small contingents have been promised.

Source: Hanson Baldwin, the New York Times, July 9, 1951.

We are unable to comprehend why the administration persisted in its attitude of refusing the offer of 33,000 fighting men advanced by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. At first administration spokesmen stated that any acceptance would result in an open invitation to extend the war to Red China. After the Chinese

Congressional Record, June 5, 1951, p. 6298 (Raymond Ludden, Foreign Service officer). 80 Hearing, p. 377.