the people of China are represented. He expressed his opinion that the Communist Party of China professes to be democratic only for the purpose of endeavoring to achieve control of the administration of the National Government; that in fact it is not a democratic party. The word "communism" does not mean "democracy," Chiang pointed out and he further stated that if the Communists claim to be democratic why do they continue to call themselves Communists. In order to shorten the period of transition and gain control of the Communist forces I indicated to Chiang that political concessions should be made, As the first, step toward China's major objections of unification of all military forces to defeat Japan and unification of China to prevent outside forces from keeping China divided against herself and further objectives of preventing a civil war in China and obtaining a democratic China under a democratic constitution adopted by a convention of the Chinese people I impressed on Chiang that his most important objective at the moment was unifying the armed forces of China. Chou En Lai had in the meantime devoted all of this time in the conferences toward advocating a friendly consultative meeting in Chungking of representatives of other parties as well as the Communist party and the Kuomintang. It was suggested by him that some nonpartisan persons be invited to attend this meeting. It was my idea that a bipartisan group be set up which would devise the plan for unification serving as a procedural steering guide to conduct all parties during the transitory period of the government from a one-man government into a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Chou En-Lai suggested also that some nonpartisan person be invited to attend this meeting. Dr. T. V. Soong during each debate ably described the objectives, position, and success of the Kuomintang in conducting the government up to the present. Chou En-Lai presented the Communist Party objectives. The Nationalists' position, as ably set forth by T. V. Soong was that the Kuomintang is the party of Sun Yat Sen and the party of reformation in China; and further that it is the party of liberalism. Dr. Soong contended that historically it is now responsible for the government of China; that it has been steadfast in upholding its ideals through the reformation and during the war against the Japanese; that there will be chaos in China without the Kuomintang; and that, since he had become Acting President of the executive Yuan, he keenly felt his personal responsibility for preventing a chaos which would result from a collapse of the Chinese Nationalist Government. The above points were presented in an eloquent and a vigorous manner. With the exception of the argument that now the time had come when, in accordance with the will of Dr. Sun Yat Sen, and the desire of the Chinese people, the government should be turned back to the people, Chou En-Lai agreed with Dr. Soong's arguments. Chou En-Lai insisted that the leaders of the major parties of China must trust each other and form a coalition in order to sustain the government through the transitory period. The Nationalist Government replied, via Dr. Soong, that it was not in favor of surrendering authority in the midst of a war against the Japanese because the resulting weakness during the transitory period might cause the collapse of the government. Chou En-Lai assured them that the National Government would have the unlimited support of the Communists if the proper concessions were made. Chou made it known that it was necessary that China be united, for otherwise imperialistic nations economically interested in China would keep her divided against herself and thus would keep her from economic development depriving her of her rightful place among the nations of the world. General Chou and Dr. Wang were appointed as a committee to draw up a document which would pave the way for action. Just prior to the assignment of the committee, Dr. Wang Shih Chieh told me that he felt I favored the position taken by Chou En-Lai. I was not in full agreement with the position taken by Chou, and I frankly told him so; but I also added that the fundamental issues involved had been debated by everyone so many times that we were now merely repeating what had been said before. I reminded them that they had been negotiating with the Communists for over five years, and I ended up by saying that everyone had made too many speeches; that there had been too much negotiating and no action. Dr. Wang, on February 3, presented a draft to me (this draft is included in another document). That very afternoon Chou informed me that he was sending the draft to Yenan and he stated that for the first time he had a feeling that 83797-51-pt. 5-36 we were reaching a basis upon which cooperation would result. The following day, during a meeting between myself, T. V. Soong, and Chiang, the Generalissimo said he had consented to the plans stated in the foregoing proposal but that he felt that the Communists obtained what they had been endeavoring to obtain all along. I frankly replied that the only previous instrument with which we could have worked was the Communist Five-Point Proposal; that if he had revised the proposal at the time it was offered, that the Communists, in my opinion, would have been reasonable in their acceptance of any revision. I further stated that it was the only document in which there is a signed agreement by the Communists to submit control of their armed forces to the National Government. The chances for successful conclusion are restricted by the fact that the conclusions of the suggested political consultant committee must be unimous before the National Government will be bound to act. The further restretion is the fact that the unification of the armed forces is still predicated en political action to be taken by the Kuomintang in the future. The document drawn up by Wang and Chou, agreed to by Chiang, had been transmitted to Yenan. He said that all the arguments and all the documents submitted should indicate to you that the Chinese Communist Party is not democratic; that its purpose is to destroy the control of the government by the Kuomintang before here has been an opportunity to adopt a constitution or to return the control of the government to the people on a democratic basis. The government representatives, including the Generalissimo, claim that the support of democratic principles given by the Communists is merely a ruse which they are using in an effort to obtain control of the government under the Communist one-party rule. The representatives of the National Government state that the real purpose of the Chinese Communist Party is to overthrow control by the Kuomintang Party and obtain a one-party rule of China by the Chinese Communist Party and in the evolution of the one-party rule by the Kuomintang. The Kuomintang's purpose is to have a democratic constitution adopted and to return the government to the people. It is contended by the National Government that whether by design or by accident the Kuomintang has had the responsibility of leading China over a long period of trying time. The National Government will appoint a bipartisan War Cabinet with policy-making powers. Until control is returned to the people of China under a democratic constitution, the Kuomintang will not relinquish control of the government. Kuomintang will not give up its authority in these troublesome times to a so-called coalition government. They claim that the surrendering of power of government to partisan organizations would not be returning the power to the people. Chiang wanted the Communist Party to agree to the Good Faith Offer of the National Government. Chiang stated that the National Government had given every possible guarantee to the Chinese Communist Party that their armed forces would not be discriminated against or destroyed. The Generalissimo stated that if the Chinese Communist party is really supporting the program for the unification of a democratic China, they should stop reciting falsehoods. He labeled the charges of the Chinese Communist party that the Chinese National Government had made an agreement with or was negotiating an agreement with the Japanese as ridiculous. Chiang alleges that this lie was perpetrated by the Communists for the purpose of breaking the faith of the United States in the integrity of the Chinese National Government. He said that some Americans who were well-meaning but misled had accepted and reported this falsehood as if it were true. He also stated that the claims made by the Communist party concerning their military strength are untrue, having been made only for the purpose of trying to convince the rest of the world that China is divided. Chiang stated that the fact was that the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people are supporting the National Government and that they support the program of returning the control of the government to the people and the adoption of a democratic constitution. Chiang said that the purpose of the Communists, while retaining the principles of the Communist party, but publicly stating that they are a leading democratic party in China, is to effect a coup by which they could take control of the National Government and convert it into a one-party Communist government similar to that in Russia. Chiang stated further that the Communists believe that if Russia enters the war in Asia, it will support the Communists against the National Government. Notwithstanding all of this, Chiang stated the National Government had decided to undertake this bold measure of returning to the people, in the midst of a war, the control of their government; and that, therefore, now the government invites the Communists and their party representatives to meet on an equal status for the purpose of a united and intensified effort against the enemy and also to strengthen the national unity and to provide a program for guiding the country through the transitory period which would end in a democratic, constitutional government. The Generalissimo stated that if the Communists really want a democratic, constitutional government, this give them ample opportunity to take part in its inauguration. Before General Chou En-Lai left for Yenan on February 16, he had indicated to me that he would agree to the political consultant meeting provided for in the document quoted above. It was his opinion that the one-party Kuomintang rule should end immediately and that a coalition administration should be formed to help China in her effort to draw up a democratic constitution to be adopted by a people's convention and thus form a democratic government. I pointed out that all of this sounded very nice, but that it did not accomplish the immediate unification of the armed forces of China. The position of China will suffer in the forthcoming San Francisco conference if she cannot show a greater degree of unity than that indicated, and I pointed this out to him. In the opinion of General Wedemeyer, who has been kept fully informed of the negotiations' progress, this report is a logical and excellent presentation of the facts. The decision to support the leadership of Chiang Kie Chiek and to support the National Government, I am convinced, was a proper one for our Government to make. On many occasions I have advised the Generalissimo and Soong that China must make her own decisions, be responsible for her own international and domestic policies, and furnish her own leadership. At no time have I submitted any principle or method that in my opinion would weaken the leadership of Chang or the National Government. End of part four. That New subject: I had prepared a reply to your message which I did not send. In your message you appear to have reduced my role in these negotiations to the position of merely making a suggestion without implementing the suggestion. That is the method followed by Ambassador Gauss when he transmitted the President's and the Secretary of State's message on September 9th last. message, as you now know, obtained no results whatever because it lacked vigorous implementation. I decided, however, not to send the telegram as I hope to see you and discuss the situation more fully. It is my earnest desire to be amenable to every suggestion from State Department even when I believe our position is weakened and accomplishment postponed by lack of vigorous implementation of suggestions. Perhaps this respite in negotiations and my visit with the State Department will clarify my mind on the distance I will be able to go in promoton of the war effort by inducing or compelling the unification of Chinese armed forces and a coordination of effort to assist us in the defeat of Japan. APPENDIX WW Conversion tables showing stenographic transcript page numbers with printed hearing page numbers Conversion table (to accompany pt. I of printed hearings) Conversion table (to accompany pt. II of printed hearings) Conversion table (to accompany pt. III of printed hearings) Conversion table (to accompany pt. IV of printed hearings) INDEX Acheson, Dean, testimony. Allies (see also United Nations contributions in Korea) Page 1667-2291, 3308-3575 3576-3590 42, 87, 104, 110, 168, 296, 417, 574, 615, 621, 635, 672, 742, 745, 749, 755, 950, 1223, 1243, Army Talk-Orientation Fact Sheet No. 66, Our Ally China. Atlantic Charter--- Atomic bomb.. 3616-3624 501, 2865 55, 77, 83, 187, 220, 260, 562, 609, 1381, 2390, 2894, 2895, 2898, 3074, 3104, 3116, 3132 Testimony. Bender, George__ Bipartisan foreign policy. Birch, John M... Blockade: Economic Naval 2947-3053 1900, 2110, 2234, 3211, 3327 544, 2301, 2526, 2546 169, 179, 197, 281, 328, 354, 386, 424, 598, 623, 636, 946, 999, 1515, 1521, 1522, 1615, 1652, 1654, 1724, 11. 178, 261, 355, 482, 598, 1188, 1327, Books on China_. Bradley, Gen. Omar, testimony. Brewster, Senator Owen. 3221-3228 997-1005, 1646-1649, 1654-1658, 1815-1826, 1947-1957, 2103-2112, 2431-2435, 2476-2480, 2509-2514, Bridges, Senator Styles--- 26-28, 371-393, 686-690, 745-754, 1098-1102, 1191-1195, 1382-1386, 1429-1432, |