CHAPTER V.

THE CAMPAIGN OF 1829 IN EUROPE.

Situation at commencement of year -Resources of Russians-Diebitsch -Resources of Turks-Commencement of hostilities-Capture of Sizeboli-Naval exploit of Turks-Siege of Silistria-Diebitsch's march on Schumla and subsequent operations-Battle of Kulewtscha-March across the Balkans-Capture of Adrianople-Position of Russian army at peace of Adrianople - Signature of peace.

THE political and military situations at the commencement of the year 1829 are equally interesting and deserving of attention. In the first place there was every reason why Turkey should be left to continue the contest single-handed. The English and French ambassadors had both withdrawn from Constantinople to Corfu, in consequence of the refusal of the Sultan Mahmoud to sign the treaty of July 6th, 1827. So long as the Sultan held out on this point, and he continued obdurate almost to the last, there was no reason to expect help from England, and even had the Cabinet of St. James, overcome by jealousy of Russia, waived the important matter of the treaty and despatched its fleet to aid the Turks in the Black Sea, as pointed out by Count Moltke, in conse

quence of the small force then possessed by Great Britain, 'notwithstanding the acknowledged superiority of the English navy,' it is more than doubtful, in face of the large Muscovite fleet in those waters, whether any reinforcement that could have reached the Ottomans from Malta would have sufficed to give them the command of the Euxine. France was bound, if not to hostility, at least to a hostile neutrality. General Schneider's brigade was then in the Morea for the protection of the Greeks, and the Algerian expedition was being fitted out; hence, as this was sufficient to occupy the attention of the French public, so serious a thing as a European war, which assistance to the Turks would have entailed, was not to be thought of. Lastly, Austria was in firm pursuit of her traditional policy—that of allowing other people to do disagreeable work, while she reaped any benefit to herself that might accrue from it. Had the Russians been very successful in the previous year, and had it appeared that the safety of Constantinople was seriously jeopardised, then possibly the Court of Vienna might have assumed a warlike attitude and have adopted a definite line of policy; but as this was not the case, as in fact both combatants were much exhausted, the Russians more especially having suffered enormous losses, and having achieved only a doubtful success, there was apparently no occasion for immediate or decided action; on the contrary, it was better to wait and act as mediator, possibly also exacting some favourable conditions for the performance of that

office. Prussia alone, according to Count Moltke, acted in a manner to be commended, and was mainly responsible for the fact that the war was localised, although, of course, under no circumstances would her interests have necessitated her taking part in it. On the whole, therefore, it was evident that the two combatants would have to fight it out by themselves. Let us now consider how far they were respectively prepared for the encounter.

First, as regards Russia, we have seen that at the close of 1828 she occupied Varna, had reduced all the fortresses in the Dobrudscha, but had failed to capture either Silistria or Schumla. The Russians had also command of the sea-an all-important advantage. Count Moltke gives their naval strength as follows: in the Black Sea, eleven ships of the line, two of which were three-deckers; eight frigates, two of which carried sixty guns; and twelve corvettes and brigs of war; the squadron altogether had 1,800 guns and had Sebastopol to fall back upon. In addition to this force there was the squadron of Admiral Heyden, which blockaded the Dardanelles and consisted of eight ships of the line, seven frigates, and twenty smaller vessels, carrying altogether about 1,500 guns. To oppose this formidable force the Turks had only eight ships of the line, three of which were three-deckers, frigates, five corvettes, and three brigs, altogether about 1,000 guns. During the entire winter of 1828-1829-a very severe one, as so often happens when there is a war-the Muscovites made every effort to repair the losses of the pre

vious year. Marshal Wittgenstein was replaced by the chief of his staff, Diebitsch, who started in his command with special advantages, inasmuch as he was not hampered by the presence of the Emperor Nicholas on his diplomatic following. He was alike general and negotiator, he was not forced to make military considerations subservient to those of politics, and, as there was no telegraph in those days to St. Petersburg, he had the entire fate of the campaign in his hands—a great responsibility, but one that principally contributed to his eventual success. The new commander-in-chief joined his army on February 24th, 1829, and Count Moltke gives the following account, derived probably from personal observation, of the measures taken to improve the Russian forces:—

'General Diebitsch immediately devoted the greatest attention to the reorganisation of his army. The treatment of the soldier was much improved, the intolerable restraint and the unnatural stiff carriage somewhat abated. Nevertheless, much still remained to be done; for instance, skirmishers were always forced to keep step and rank; for this reason they were only of use on level ground. The men's dress and accoutrements were changed for others better suited to the climate. The commissariat, a most important matter for the coming campaign, was put on a different footing; an immense baggage-train was unavoidable over uncultivated or wasted provinces. Long columns were composed of thousands of waggons drawn by oxen, which served a double purpose-for draught and

for food. The parties covering the columns were armed, and had two guns, so as to be able to defend themselves if necessary; but as these waggons could not be used on the other side of the Balkan, thousands of camels had been bought on the steppes of Asia for the use of the army. This useful, patient, and strong animal, which can carry a heavy burden even through snow and on the smallest amount of food, is especially fitted to follow the movements of an army. In spite, however, of all the measures taken, provisions were scant. pound of meat and a glass of brandy three times a week, besides twelve biscuits and some oatmeal daily.

Each soldier received one

'The cavalry made a splendid appearance at starting— they were entirely remounted. The front rank of the hussar regiments was provided with lances, so as to keep out of the reach of the Spahis' sabres, and the number of Cossacks was much increased. The infantry bore traces of the hardships they had undergone in their bad winter quarters. According to the testimony of an eye-witness the men's faces wore an expression of sadness and pain. After all that they had suffered in the former campaign, they looked upon themselves as martyrs to their religion and their emperor. Nowhere in the Russian quarters were to be seen or heard the jokes that never fail among German soldiers when in tolerable plight. Singing was the only expression of joy that was heard, but the songs had the melancholy character peculiar to the Sclavonian

race.

The soldiers were much given to religious cere