CHAPTER XII.

THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE EASTERN QUESTION.

Importance of Austria in a Russo-Turkish War-The Slaves-Policy of Austria-How the action of Austria might be neutralized, externally and internally-Slavonic question-Danger to AustriaLimits of Bulgaria-Interests of England-Traditional policy of Russia--Essentially aggressive in its character-Various lines of policy open to England-Which it is her interest to adopt-Unfortunate natural antagonism between Russia and England—Advantages of the policy suggested.

In the foregoing chapter, and in those that preceded it, no account whatever has been taken of the position of Austria or of the attitude which the Slavonic and Greek population of Turkey might assume in the event of any complication and subsequent war with Russia. A glance at the map will show that in a strategic point of view Austria holds the key of the situation; no Russian army could possibly reach Constantinople from the Danubian frontier, if Austria were to forbid. This fact has been dilated on at considerable length and with great clearness by the Russian General Fadéeff,1 who thereupon argues that the real enemy of Russia is not Turkey but Austria, since the latter power may prevent any designs of aggression being carried out on the former.

■ Vide Appendix.

This author, however, apparently overshoots the mark: while taking it for granted that Turkey, if unassisted, would prove an easy prey to a Muscovite attack, and that an invading army would only require six weeks to march from the Danube to Constantinople, he considers that not more than 60,000 men could be sent by the maritime powers to assist the Porte. This evidently is an underestimate. France, perhaps, need not be taken into account, as since the '70 campaign her great object has been to establish a Russian alliance; but were either Italy or England to enter into the contest both powers could alone place in the field a far larger force. Considering the enormous amount of shipping at the disposal of England, two corps could be despatched from their shores at a week's notice, and an equal number from India in scarcely a longer time, and could certainly arrive at the Bosphorus before the Russians could get there from the Danube. is, however, extremely improbable, having in view the present temper of the English people, and the present financial difficulties of the Italian Government, that either one power or the other would, at all events in the first instance, take any part in the quarrel. Hence Turkey would stand alone, having in her favour the possible intervention of Austria, and having against her the probability of an extensive rising on the part of the Slave population.

It

Let us first turn to Austria. The past political history of this country exhibits a strange mixture of weakness, indecision, temporary boldness, and chronic fear. No

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country has less reason to desire a Russian occupation of Constantinople, or has greater cause to wish the Danube to remain free and neutralised; nevertheless of all the interested powers, there is not one that has lent herself with greater readiness to Russian designs. We have seen that twice in the last century she allied herself against Turkey, and in only one of the eight wars in which during the last 170 years Russia and Turkey have been engaged has Austria assumed in any way a hostile attitude to the Muscovite armies. That once-in the Crimean War-she took no active part in the contest, although, as clearly shown by Kinglake, she led the Western Powers on the ice, distinctly assuring them that she would support their ultimatum to the Emperor Nicholas, and drawing back at the last moment. In 1829, according to Von Moltke, she encouraged the Turks to continue the contest, hoping from the apparent exhaustion of the combatants that she might eventually step in as an umpire and dictate terms to both. In 1870, when Russia issued her celebrated note, announcing that she could no longer be bound by the treaty of Paris as to the Black Sea, Austria pursued her accustomed and traditional policy of masterly inactivity. It is true at the time she was not supported. The English ministry of the day failed to appreciate the importance of the clauses involved; the Sultan Abdul Aziz was too busy with his palaces and his harems to take much account of the doings of infidels. France and Germany were engaged in mortal strife; Italy had only just

got to Rome and hoped to stay there; Austria alone could have said 'No,' and this 'No' would probably have been decisive, but she failed to say it. Thus one of the great safeguards against Russian aggression was swept away by the stroke of a pen; what had cost thousands of lives and millions of pounds to effect was abandoned without a blow or a struggle.

At the present juncture, who can doubt that a simple concentration of Austrian troops on the Transylvanian frontier would make war an impossibility? There would be no more panics on all the bourses in Europe; no more failures from the prostration of trade; but faithful to her ancient policy Austria remains still. War rumours continue, and if peace intervenes we shall owe but few thanks to the Cabinet of Vienna. It cannot be said that Austria

is to blame for the policy which she thus consistently pursues; she is perfectly right to allow others to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for her; but it must always be remembered by those who look to Austria to check Russian aggression that, if they trust to her, they trust to a broken reed; not only from habitual policy, but also from external circumstances, she cannot be regarded in any way as a dependable element connected with the Eastern question.

For let us consider how her action might be neutralised, however willing she might be to act. Of course first comes Germany. An understanding between Prince Gortchakoff and Prince Bismarck, and a simple warning issued by the latter, would prevent a single

Austrian soldier moving a foot forwards towards the Principalities; and the bribe that could be offered for this passive assistance might be a tempting one, say Holland, the German-speaking Baltic provinces, or Bohemia, with Austrian Germany. Then, again, there is Italy; lately there were rumours of a Russo-Italian alliance: it is said that wherever there is smoke there is also fire. The action of Italy would much paralyse Austria, and would neutralise a large portion of her troops-the bribe there would not be so tempting, and it could not so certainly be administered; it would be the Trentino, or perhaps the eastern shores of the Adriatic. It thus may be seen that complications may easily occur, which would render Austria by no means a free agent. It is fortunate for Europe that the statesmen both of Germany and Italy of the present day are notoriously honest and high-minded, otherwise the possibilities here suggested might become realities.

Then again, there is the Slavonic question-so much talked of now, but which has only recently come into prominence. It is somewhat difficult to disentangle the actual truth from the web of falsehood and random assertion with which it is involved. It would appear, however, from the writings of those who are both friendly and hostile to Russia, that for years past a most complicated and deep-seated intrigue has been proceeding—instituted and carried out by secret societies according to some fostered, and certainly regarded by no means with

1 Vide Appendix, Lord Palmerston's opinions.