incompatible with the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire; she has given evidence of her own moderation, whether sincere or feigned it is unnecessary to inquire; and last, but not least, she has succeeded in isolating her traditional antagonist from exterior alliance and support.

APPENDIX.

6

Extract from Opinion on the Eastern Question,' by General Rotislar Fadéeff, of the Russian Army. Translated by T. Mitchell, C.B., late Secretary to Her Majesty's Embassy, and Consul at St. Petersburg.

It is generally considered in Russia that France and England are the principal obstacles to an armed intervention in Turkish affairs; but, in reality, however much they might desire it, France and England are not in a position to defend European Turkey against Russia, provided the hands of Russia are untied on the western frontier. It is a matter of impossibility to struggle, by landing forces, against a power of equal strength which has open access overland into the disputed country. Such a struggle is impossible, both in respect to time and to numbers. Of what avail would be the means of maritime transport against an army of 200,000 men acting continuously? In 1854 the allies employed a part of the winter and the whole of the spring in transporting 60,000 soldiers to Turkey; they then required a considerable time for the organisation of their waggon-train; until June they were chained to the sea-coast, and they had not acquired mobility even by the end of that month. Their forces in the Crimea grew to the dimensions of a numerous army only by the gradual transport of fresh troops during the course of a

whole year. Meanwhile the Russian army requires only six • weeks, and even less, to march from the Danube to Constantinople, provided, of course, it be sufficiently numerous for the blockade of fortresses in the rear, during a forward movement, that shall also be as far as possible uninterrupted. In dealing with the Turks, a war may be pushed on as rapidly as the transport train can be made to advance. It is to be presumed that the war will support itself on the Balkan peninsula, provided the rapidity of the campaign does not permit the enemy to devastate methodically the country which, under such circumstances, would of course not submit to him without opposition. Hitherto, following old traditions, Russia has fought in European Turkey step by step, besieging fortresses to the astonishment of Europe, and without the justification of an unavoidable military necessity. In 1829, however, there was a political reason for such a plan of campaign; it was necessary to secure, as far as possible, the rear of the Russian army against any sudden hostile attack on the part of Austria.

In order to settle the fate of European Turkey, in spite of the maritime powers, it will be sufficient for 150,000 troops to reach the Bosphorus, i.e., that 250,000 men, on the broadest calculation, should reach the Danube. There can be no difficulty in supplying these numbers, even with our present military organisation, allowing also for a sufficient and satisfactory occupation of the shores of the Baltic and Black Seas, and for the employment of 50,000 active troops on the side of the Caucasus. Russia can always forestal the land forces of her Western opponents, not only in the Balkans, but even at Constantinople. Even if they should succeed, after considerable difficulty, in meeting the Russian army in front of that capital with a force like that which, after the lapse of many months, they got together in 1854 at Varna, 60,000 Europeans, sup

ported by any number of Turks, would not be able to defeat a Russian army of 150,000 men. Moreover, there would be no regular Turkish troops in existence at such a time: they would have been dispersed earlier in Europe and in Asia. The Straits would fall into the hands of the captors of Constantinople; their fortifications could not hold out against a land force; and the entrances into the Sea of Marmora, once occupied and properly defended, any serious attempt from seaward to dispute the possession of Turkey would become almost impossible. The largest force that has ever yet been landed was the army of the Crimea, which consisted of 60,000 troops, without cavalry or waggontrain, and with but a small proportion of artillery. The landing was crowned with success in consequence of two special reasons, namely, the shortness of the voyage (only thirty-six hours), and the numerical inferiority—to the extent of one-half—of our troops on shore. But a landing in the face of superior numbers, or of an enemy of equal strength abundantly supplied with warlike resources, would lead to destruction. The army of Wellington, transported in ships supplied from sea, and having a strong place of refuge at the mouth of the Tagus, maintained its footing in Spain against the superior, although divided, forces of the French, only because the country was for that army; but imagine the opposite position. Could a French army, between 1807 and 1812, surrounded by a national insurrection, have held its ground in Spain against superior English forces? And such would be exactly the position of the European allies in Turkey if Russia acted with decision. Indeed, were Russia to act with promptitude and decision, those allies would not, in all probability, be found in Turkey at all. Were the maritime powers to resolve on defending Turkey without having the co-operation of Austria, they would defend it only with their naval forces, and only with such a number of land troops as they could carry on

board their fleet without inconvenience; but they would never risk their army. Many are led into error by the fact that the allies of 1854 were able to carry the war into Russia and to maintain themselves there. But how were they able to effect this? Simply by taking up a strong position on the coast, which they succeeded in fortifying before a sufficient force could be collected against them. There are many similar positions on the Turkish coast, but it would be impossible to save the Turkish dominions by encamping a small force on a sea-shore. In reality France and England can as little protect European Turkey against Russia with their land forces as they can protect Canada or Mexico against the Americans.

The difficulty is this, that it is impossible for Russia to carry on a war on the Balkan peninsula without the permission of Austria, and that permission she can under no circumstances obtain. Look at the map. Russia can reach European Turkey only by one road through the gate formed by the south-east angle of the Carpathians and the mouth of the Danube: the key of that gate is in the hands of Austria. By crossing the Danube or even the Pruth, a Russian army would expose her rear to Austria. In this awkward position the first threatening demonstration on the part of Russia's good neighbour would compel the army to beat a hasty retreat as in 1854. The Lower Danube is accessible only with an Austrian passport. In relation to Russia, the geographical position of European Turkey may be compared to a strong chest, of which Austria forms the lid; without lifting that lid, it is impossible to get anything out of the chest. Russia has had sufficient experience of that.

It was rumoured in 1854 that Prince Paskewitch strongly represented to the late Emperor that, once resolved on a war with Turkey, it was necessary, above all, to prepare for a war with Austria. He affirmed that the Eastern question could be