solved only at Vienna, not in Turkey. Events have proved the correctness of the views of that celebrated warrior.

While Russia held possession of the Black Sea, an attempt might have been made to break open the chest from the other side, i.e., to knock out the bottom of it by a landing in the Bosphorus. The result would have been a rising of the entire Christian population, the paralysing of Turkey during the following months, and probably her final dissolution; but in whose favour? The siege of Constantinople and the straits would not settle that question. It would have to be settled by a war on land against a coalition of which Austria would be the soul. During the continuance of such a war the Christian population of the Balkan peninsula would be in a chaotic condition. It would fight the Mussulman inhabitants of the towns, but it would not be able to give Russia any assistance beyond its own territory. In order to occupy the straits and the entire peninsula, it would be necessary to detach forces greater than those which would be required in case of a war in the West to defend the shores and land frontier of Russia against a live Turkey; so that, in reality, the seizure of Constantinople from seaward, while such a seizure was yet possible, would have increased but very little the material probabilities of the final success of Russia. In questions of the character of the last Greek question a fleet in the Black Sea might have exercised a weighty influence it might have been used as a strong diplomatic expedient, but it would have been no very important military weapon in view of the objects that appertain to Russia. It is naturally impossible to estimate speculatively the moral effect of such a stupendous event as the entry of the Russian troops into Constantinople, even if it were unexpected, but such an event would in any case be a double-edged weapon.

OPINION OF LORD PALMERSTON.

The following extracts from Lord Palmerston's letters and opinions on the Eastern Question appeared in the Morning Post' of December 30, 1876. As they appear peculiarly appropriate at the present time, they are here reproduced.

It is nearly forty years since Lord Palmerston wrote to the Secretary of the Embassy at Constantinople in these words :People go on talking of the inevitable and progressive decay of the Turkish empire, which they say is crumbling to pieces. In the first place, no empire is likely to fall to pieces if left to itself, and if no kind neighbours tear it to pieces. In the next place, I much question that there is any process of decay going on in the Turkish empire; and I am inclined to suspect that those who say that the Turkish empire is rapidly going from bad to worse, ought rather to say that the other countries of Europe are year by year becoming better acquainted with the manifest and manifold defects of the organisation of Turkey. . . . Half the conclusions at which mankind arrive are reached by the abuse of metaphors, and by mistaking general resemblance or imaginary similarity for real identity. Thus people compare an ancient monarchy with an old building, an old tree, or an old man, and because the building, tree, or man must, from the nature of things, crumble, or decay, or die, they imagine that the same thing holds good with a community, and that the same laws which govern inanimate matter, or vegetable and animal life, govern also nations and states; than which there cannot be a greater or more utterly unphilosophical mistake. For, besides all other points of difference, it is to be remembered that the component parts of the building, tree, or man remain the same, or are either decomposed by external causes or are altered in their

internal structure by the process of life, so as ultimately to be unfit for their original functions; while, on the contrary, the component parts of a community are undergoing daily the process of physical renovation and of moral improvement. Therefore all that we hear every day of the week about the decay of the Turkish empire, and its being a dead body or a sapless trunk, and so forth, is pure and unadulterated nonsense.' Still, as he says elsewhere, you can't expect much energy of a people

6

with no heels to their shoes.'

In a letter to Lord Clarendon of May 22, 1853, Lord Palmerston writes as follows :—

'The policy and practice of the Russian Government have always been to push forward its encroachments as fast and as far as the apathy or want of firmness of other Governments would allow it to go, but always to stop and retire when it was met with decided resistance, and then to wait for the next favourable opportunity to make another spring on its intended victim. In furtherance of this policy, the Russian Government has always had two strings to its bow-moderate language and disinterested professions at Petersburg and at London; active aggression by its agents on the scene of operations. If the aggression succeed locally, the Petersburg Government adopts them as a fait accompli which it did not intend, but cannot, in honour, recede from. If the local agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held is appealed to as a proof that the agents have overstepped their instructions. This was exemplified in the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi and in the exploits of Simonivitch and Vikovitch in Persia. Orloff succeeded in extorting the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi from the Turks, and it was represented as a sudden thought, suggested by the circumstances of the time and place, and not the result of any previous instructions; but having

been done it could not be undone. On the other hand, Simonivitch and Vikovitch failed in getting possession of Herat in consequence of our vigorous measures of resistance; and as they failed, and when they failed, they were disavowed and recalled, and the language previously held at St. Petersburg was appealed to as a proof of the sincerity of the disavowal, although no human being with two ideas in his head could for a moment doubt that they had acted under specific instructions.'

Again, on September 21, 1853, he says in a letter to Mr. Sidney Herbert :

'I am coming reluctantly to the conclusion that war between the Emperor of Russia and Turkey is becoming inevitable. If such war should happen, upon his head be the responsibility of the consequences. I by no means think with you that he will have an easy victory over the Turks. On the contrary, if the betting is not even, I would lay odds on the Turks. All that the Turkish army wants is directing officers, and it would be strange indeed if England, France, Poland and Hungary could not amply supply that deficiency. I do not believe in the disaffection of the Turkish provinces-this is an oft-repeated tale got up by the Russians. The best refutation is that for many months past the Russian agents have been trying per fas et nefas to provoke insurrection in Turkey, and have failed. The fact is that the Christian subjects in Turkey know too well what Russian régime is not to be aware that it is of all things the most to be dreaded.'

Here is a striking passage on the 'bag-and-baggage' policy : 'I have no partiality for the Turks as Mohammedans, and should be very glad if they could be turned into Christians; but as to the character of the Turkish Government in regard to its treatment of Christians, I am well convinced that there are a vast number of Christians under the Governments of Russia, Austria, Rome, and Naples, who would be rejoiced to be as well

treated and to enjoy as much security for person and property as the Christian subjects of the Sultan. To expel from Europe the Sultan and his two million of Mussulman subjects, including the army and the bulk of the landowners, might not be an easy task; still the five Powers might effect it, and play the Polish drama over again. But they would find the building up still more difficult than the pulling down. There are no sufficient Christian elements as yet for a Christian State in European Turkey capable of performing its functions as a component part of the European system. The Greeks are a small minority, and could not be the governing race. The Sclavonians, who are the majority, do not possess the conditions necessary for becoming the bones and sinews of a new State. A reconstruction of Turkey means neither more nor less than its subjection to Russia, direct or indirect, immediate or for a time delayed.'

In the following letter to Lord Clarendon, which is dated May 14, 1855, he summarises the most necessary reforms for Turkey, and anticipates part of the Constitution just promulgated :

'What remains to be done for the nonconformists in Turkey would be, I apprehend, speaking generally :-(a.) Capacity for military service by voluntary enlistment, and eligibility to rise to any rank in the army. (b.) Admission of non-Mussulman evidence in civil as well as criminal cases. (c.) Establishment of mixed courts of justice (with an equal number of Christian and Mussulman judges) for all cases in which Mohammedans and non-Mohammedans are parties. (d.) Appointment of a Christian officer as assessor to every governor of a province, when that governor is a Mussulman; such assessor to be of suitable rank, and to have full liberty to appeal to Constantinople against any act of the governor unjust, oppressive, or corrupt. (e.) Eligibility of Christians to all places in the Adminis