OPENING ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF DEPARTMENT IV., "ECONOMY AND TRADE," OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE PRO- WHEN your general secretary, on behalf of the association, did me the honour to ask me some weeks ago to preside here to-day, my first impulse was to decline, because I felt it would not be in my power to prepare such an address as I should have liked to have delivered to so distinguished a company as that which I see before me, without neglecting other work to which I had committed myself. Before, however, I sent an answer, the thought occurred to me that there was one subject highly appropriate to be brought before this section, on which it was very desirable that someone should utter a word of warning; that I might be able to do so as well as another; and that anything I might say would go forth to some degree recommended by its having been said to you. The subject to which I allude is the present condition and immediate prospects of our commercial treaties. When, in the year 1846, free exchange achieved so great a triumph by the repeal of the Corn Laws, those who had been most anxious for that measure were so con fident that the experiment would be greatly successful, that they expected that other nations would rapidly follow upon the same path. These sanguine expectations were not justified by events. Europe saw, indeed, with astonishment the great improvement in English trade, as well as the happy political results which ensued from the victory of Cobden and his allies; but false theory, evil custom, and, above all, sinister interests, were sufficient to prevent our example being followed to any considerable extent. It might be imagined by persons to whom the subject was new, that our diplomatists had not done enough to call the attention of other nations to the great success of the English experiment, but there could not be a greater mistake. The Foreign Office, under various chiefs, and the commercial department of the Board of Trade always, were instant and urgent, no one pressing the moral more home than Lord Clarendon, who was so much liked and respected on the Continent. At length, after having waited very long and very patiently, Mr. Cobden, M. Chevalier, and some other friends of the good cause, determined to change their tactics. There was at that moment on the throne of France a prince who had become a convert to free trade, and who possessed, in the year 1859, almost absolute power. That prince knew that he and his dynasty were not beloved by the great majority of the men of high intellect in France. He believed at that time that it was impossible for him to conciliate the safety of his throne with anything like a real parliamentary government. He felt, accordingly, that the best chance for him, and his, was to confer great material benefits upon his people; and he knew that the likeliest way to do this was to give to trade and industry that great development which could, he was well aware, only be given by doing something in the direction of freedom of exchange. It would be most unfair, too, not to add that he had a genuine feeling for the masses. You recollect, I daresay, Henry Heine's phrase "It is all in vain; the future belongs to our enemies, the Communists, and Louis Napoleon is only their John the Baptist." Again, he had learnt from the story of his uncle, and from his own early experience, that England was a tremendously great and formidable power. Timor Angliæ initium sapientiæ, as M. de Laveleye said the other day, in speaking of him. But he also knew that, in the years 1858-59, the pressure put upon his Government to pick a quarrel with England had been a great deal stronger than was pleasant, and there were moments when he himself believed that England wanted to pick a quarrel with him. Most of us remember how intensely anti-French was the feeling of London society, during the war which ended with the peace of Villafranca. Well, a little before that event, he himself said to one who was much with him, then, in Northern Italy, and who repeated the statement to me, that "he expected every day, when he got up in the morning, to hear that the Government of Lord Derby had declared against him." I spent the winter of 1859-60 in Paris, and know, of my own knowledge, that the feeling against England in many circles was one of great irritation. Victor Cousin, for example, said to me, "You English are thwarting our policy in Italy-you are insulting us, but we insult nobody." Napoleon, however, was well aware that all this international discomfort did not arise from any real divergence of national interests, and that the best way to get rid of it would be to bring the two nations closer together through the bonds of personal and mutually beneficent intercourse. All these causes united to make him extremely disposed to listen to the suggestions that reached him from the side of Mr. Cobden and M. Chevalier, and you all know that these good dispositions on his part, and the suggestions on their part, bore fruit in the French Commercial Treaty of 1860. That treaty was severely criticised by many, from many different points of view. Some criticised it from the good old protectionist point of view. "The invasion of this or that English product will injure our English manufacturers," said the English protectionist. "The invasion of this or that French product will injure our French manufacturers," said the French protectionist. Others criticised it from the purely political point of view. "What "What you have done," said some English politicians who thought more of politics proper than of commerce, "is no doubt excellent, but you buy gold too dear; you strengthen a dynasty which is hostile to parliamentary institutions and is opposed by the best intellect of France." "What you do is desirable in itself," said some French politicians, "but it is a sad mistake to have done it in the way you have done it. No reform of this kind. will be durable in France, unless the protectionists are fairly warred down in parliamentary strife. You are building your house upon the sand of imperial will, not on the rock of national will, and in doing so you are putting a slight upon us, the representatives of free political institutions in France, and England's truest friends." A third party criticised it from the point of view of free trade gone mad. "The only way," said they, "to spread the true faith of Adam Smith, is by example and H precept. There have been a great many bad commercial treaties in the world, therefore all commercial treaties are bad. There have been commercial treaties which have bound the contracting parties not to give advantages to other nations. It follows, therefore, that commercial treaties which must have the result of giving great and immediate advantages to other nations are a delusion and a snare. Accursed, therefore, be he who proposes, concludes, or defends a commercial treaty! May the doom of the rebuilder of Jericho be upon him!" In spite, however, of all these objections, the French Commercial Treaty of 1860 came into force, and began to spread its influence far and wide. France knew, when she concluded the treaty, that England, having quite given up charging one duty on the same product if it came from one nation, and a different duty if it came from another nation, would, by the mere fact of concluding a treaty with her to allow certain French goods to come in without duty, be ipso facto and at once allowing similar goods to come in without duty from whatever nation they came; and England knew, when she concluded the treaty, that France intended to give the same advantages as she gave to England to all states which were willing to treat with her on the basis of the treaty she had just concluded with England. The new good commercial treaty, accordingly, was an absolute disclaimer and repudiation of all that desire for exclusive advantages which was of the essence of the old bad commercial treaty. Previously, however, to the conclusion of the French Commercial Treaty of 1860, England had a great many treaties with other nations, by which those nations bound themselves to give to England as good treatment as they gave to the most favoured nations. When, then, France had concluded with any of these nations a com |