The fact that I have asked you to go to China is the clearest evidence of my very real concern with regard to the situation there. Secretary Byrnes and I are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible. It is my desire that you, as my Special Representative, bring to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States to this end.

Specifically, I desire that you endeavor to persuade the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, to effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in north China.

It is my understanding that there is now in session in Chungking a Peoples' Consultative Council made up of representatives of the various political elements, including the Chinese Communists. The meeting of this Council should furnish you with a convenient opportunity for discussions with the various political leaders.

Upon the success of your efforts, as outlined above, will depend largely, of course, the success of our plans for evacuating Japanese troops from China, particularly north China, and for the subsequent withdrawal of our own armed forces from China. I am particularly desirous that both be accomplished as soon as possible.

In your conversations with Chiang Kai-shek and other Chinese leaders you are authorized to speak with the utmost frankness. Particularly, you may state, in connection with the Chinese desire for credits, technical assistance in the economic field, and military assistance (I have in mind the proposed U. S. military advisory group which I have approved in principle), that a China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a proper place for American assistance along the lines enumerated.

I am anxious that you keep Secretary Byrnes and me currently informed of the progress of your negotiations and of obstacles you may encounter. You will have our full support and we shall endeavor at all times to be as helpful to you as possible.

The President and the Secretary of State are both anxious that the unification of China by peaceful democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible.

At a public hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on December 7, the Secretary of State said:

"During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to promote a military union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined power to bear upon our common enemy, Japan. Our longerrange goal, when as now, and a goal of at least equal importance, is the development of a strong, united, and democratic China.

"To achieve this longer-range goal, it is essential that the Central Government of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise. We believe, as we have long believed and consistently demonstrated, that the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek affords the most satisfactory base for a developing democracy. But we also believe that it must be broadened to include the representatives of those large and well organized groups who are now without any voice in the government of China.

This problem is not an easy one. It requires tact and discretion, patience and restraint. It will not be solved by the Chinese leaders themselves. To the extent that our influence is a factor, success will depend upon our capacity to exercise that influence in the light of shifting conditions in such a way as to encourage concessions by the Central Government, by the so-called Communists, and by the other faction."

The President has asked General Marshall to go to China as his Special Representative for the purpose of bringing to bear in an appropriate and practicable manner the influence of the United States for the achievement of the ends set forth above. Specifically, General Marshall will endeavor to influence the Chinese Government to call a national conference of representatives of the major political elements to bring about the unification of China and, concurrently, effect a cessation of hostilities, particularly in North China.

In response to General Wedemeyer's recent messages, the State Department requests the War Department to arrange for directions to him stipulating that: (1) He may put into effect the arrangements to assist the Chinese National Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports, including the logistical support of such troops;

(2) He may also proceed to put into effect the stepped-up arrangements for the evacuation of Japanese troops from the China theater;

(3) Pending the outcome of General Marshall's discussions with Chinese leaders in Chungking for the purpose of arranging a national conference of representatives of the major political elements and for a cessation of hostilities, further transportation of Chinese troops to north China, except as north China ports may be necessary for the movement of troops and supplies into Manchuria, will be held in abeyance;

(4) Arrangements for transportation of Chinese troops into north China may be immediately perfected, but not communicated to the Chinese Government. Such arrangements will be executed when General Marshall determines either (a) that the movement of Chinese troops to north China can be carried out consistently with his negotiations, or (b) that the negotiations between the Chinese groups have failed or show no prospect of success and that the circumstances are such as to make the movement necessary to effectuate the surrender terms and to secure the long-term interests of the United States in the maintenance of international peace.

APPENDIX F

(Referred to on p. 655)

[Editorial, the New York Times, Saturday, May 12, 1951]

CHINA AND THE UN

In his testimony before the Senate committees inquiring into the dismissal of General MacArthur, Secretary Marshall declared that it was his "very decided impression at the present time" that the United States should use its veto power to kill any attempt to admit the Chinese Communist regime into the United Nations. He emphasized again that, while the United States would exclude that issue from any Korean armistice negotiations to bar appeasement or reward for aggression, we could not prevent some other country from raising the question, or avoid discussion of it. He refused to go into the "technical part" of the problem of administration. But he made it plain that in his view "we should never yield" on it.

This raises the question whether the Administration is changing its views on that issue, as it has been changing them on certain others, or whether there is, in fact, some differences, at least in emphasis, between the Pentagon and the State Department. For it has been the State Department view, expressed by Secretary Acheson before Senate and House Members as long ago as March 31, 1950, and maintained over since, that while the United States would oppose the seating of Red China under coercion, we would not veto that action, and that if the majority should vote against us we would accept the judgment of the majority. In taking that stand the State Department held that the right to veto membership in the United Nations applies only to the admission of countries, and that since China is already a member of the United Nations, the issue of which regime should represent it is only a procedural question, which is not subject to the veto.

It is worth noting, we believe, that the Charter provides for the admission, not of countries, but of states, and that the Chinese state which was made an original member of the United Nations was the "Republic of China." That state still exists; its Government resides in Formosa; and we as well as the majority of the United Nations members still recognize it and have rejected all attempts to oust it from any United Nations organ. The British contend that it is "China" which is a United Nations member and that therefore there can be no question of admitting the Peiping regime, which is supposedly in control of most of China. But the Peiping regime represents a new state, calling itself the "People's Republic of China." That state is at least as different from the other as were some of Hitler's puppet states from the conquered states which we and the British continued to recognize though their Governments were in

exile. And the admission of new states to the United Nations is subject to the veto.

As to whether the new state is actually in control of China is at least a moot question in view of the rising terror in that country and the continued guerrilla warfare, which suggest that the civil war born of Communist aggression is by no means over. Certainly there is no reason for indecent haste to bury the old and hail the new.

But the decisive factor, morally, if not legally, is that the "Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China" has been condemned by the United Nations as an aggressor in Korea, that it is waging actual war against the United Nations, and that the United Nations has undertaken enforcement action against it. The Charter specifically provides that membership in the United Nations is open only to "peace loving" states which accept the obligations of the Charter and are willing and able to carry them out, and that any member against whom enforcement action is under way may be suspended, and even expelled, if it persists in violating the principles of the Charter. To admit the "People's Republic of China" while it is in fact waging war against the United Nations, and until it has given proof of the qualifications demanded by the Charter, would therefore be a stultifying repudiation of fact and logic.

The final answer to this question must still be given by Secretary Acheson. We trust that when he does appear before the Senate committees he will be able to revive his previous stand and subscribe to the views advanced by Mr. Marshall, which are certainly in keeping with those of the overwhelming majority of the American people.

APPENDIX G

(Referred to on p. 660)

[Extracted from the Washington Post, Friday, May 11, 1951]

MACARTHUR VIEWS ON MESSAGE GIVEN

NEW YORK, May 10 (UP).-General MacArthur's spokesman said today that until January 13 this year MacArthur believed Washington officials wanted "our forces" evacuated from Korea and made a "scapegoat" for "some political advantage."

Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's aide, said a January 13 message from President Truman was the Government's first clear statement to MacArthur to "hold" in Korea.

Whitney charged that the message, as paraphrased in testimony yesterday by Secretary of Defense Marshall, had been "misunderstood," and made to read as an order limiting MacArthur's freedom to fight the war.

Before receiving the message, said Whitney, MacArthur and his command had been led to believe the Administration wanted to evacuate the Eighth Army from Korea, pretending the enemy forced an evacuation which would be used as an international political weapon.

MacArthur "wasn't going to use the Eighth Army as a scapegoat," Whitney

said.

"You must understand that prior to the receipt of this message it appeared to be the prevailing view in Washington that our forces should be evacuated from Korea as soon as diplomatic discussions then under way in the United Nations had been concluded," Whitney said.

"It seemed to be the prevailing view of the authorities in Washington that if the evacuation was conducted as the result of enemy pressure some political advantage would be served."

Just what this political purpose might have been was not indicated, but Whitney made it clear he was talking about a basis for future political moves against the Communist aggressor.

In his testimony yesterday Marshall said the January 13 message "mainly covered foreign policy aspects," and that it cautioned MacArthur to use "great prudence" in fighting the Chinese Communists to avoid spreading the Korean

war.

MacArthur believed, Whitney said, that the message differed from previous directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff because it directed him to "hold" indefinitely in Korea.

He said MacArthur construed it as the President's implication that he "desired our position in Korea be held indefinitely and that this was a reversal of the views he (MacArthur) had previously received from Washington."

Whitney said the purport of the message "seems to have been misunderstood" following Marshall's testimony.

"The press handling of this message suggests its purpose was the imposition of the existing restrictions upon the command's freedom of military action," Whitney declared.

"The purpose of the message was to outline to General MacArthur the benefits which would accrue if a successful resistance in Korea was sustained. The message stated it was not to be taken in any sense as a directive."

APPENDIX H

(Referred to on p. 678)

[Extracts from Congressional Record, Senate, May 3, 1951, pp. 5484, 5485]

DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Commander in Chief of the Military Forces of the Republic of China, performed distinguished services from May 1943 to September 1945 by leading his beleagured nation's fight against the onslaught of the Japanese invader. Beset by seemingly insuperable handicaps imposed by shortages of aircraft, modern weapons, and other vital material, he stood firm, inspiring the Chinese armies to contain and inflict heavy casualties upon more than a million hostile troops in the vast reaches and forbidding terrain of China. His determined attempts to drive the enemy from his native land culminated in a powerful campaign which was forcing the Japanese back when hostilities were terminated by the enemy's surrender. Through his courage, resourcefulness, statesmanship, and unassailable conviction that eventual victory would reward his suffering fellow countrymen, Generalissimo Chiang made a contribution of major proportion to the success of the United Nations.

LEGION OF MERIT, DEGREE OF CHIEF COMMANDER

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Commander in Chief of Chinese Military Forces. For extraordinary fidelity and exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services while in a position of the highest responsibility as Generalissimo and Supreme Commander in Chief of the valiant military forces of the Republic of China, while engaged in a great war, as the champion of liberty and freedom against one of the common enemies of the United Nations. His noble and inspiring achievements as the miiltary leader of his country have culminated in the unification of the Chinese people, thereby making possible their successful resistance of the enemy's onslaught and contributing in a high degree to the ultimate freedom of the world from the shackles of Japanese domination and the fear of aggression.

APPENDIX I

(Referred to on p. 935)

MESSAGE OF GENERAL MACARTHUR TO VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS

[From New York Times, August 29, 1950]

Your inspiring message of the 17th has moved me deeply and I trust that you will convey to all of my comrades-in-arms of the Veterans of Foreign Wars assembled on the occasion of our Fifty-first Annual National Encampment my assurance that their confidence and support will give this command much added strength to meet the tests of battle which lie immediately ahead.

Tell them that I am happy to report that their successors in arms now engaging the enemy along our battle lines in South Korea are exemplifying that same high standard of devotion, fortitude, and valor which characterized their own march to victory when they themselves engaged in combat in the field.

From senior commanders down through all ranks, their tactical skill, their invincible determination, and their fighting qualities against a fanatical foe, well trained, expertly directed, and heavily armed have upheld our country's finest traditions.

Toward victory, however difficult the road, they are giving an account of themselves which should make every American heart beat with pride and infinite satisfaction.

A New Battle Line

In view of misconceptions currently being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific, I believe it in the public interest to avail myself of this opportunity to state my views thereon to you, all of whom, having fought overseas, understand broad strategic concepts.

To begin with, any appraisal of that strategic potential requires an appreciation of the changes wrought in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines.

That salient was not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack us. The Pacific was a potential area of advancement for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas.

All of this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which has become a vast moat to protect us as long as we hold it.

Indeed, it acts as a protective shield to all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area we control to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas held by us and our free Allies. From this island chain we can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostock to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.

Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort. No amphibious force can be successful with our control of the sea lanes and the air over these lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modern ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends of the Pacific would come to failure.

A Peaceful Lake

Under such conditions the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader-it assumes instead the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense.

It envisions no attack against anyone nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained would be an invincible defense against aggression. If we hold this line we may have peace-lose it and war is inevitable.

The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center of this defensive perimeter, 100 to 150 miles closer to the adjacent friendly segments-Okinawa and the Philippines-than any point in continental Asia. At the present time there is on Formosa a concentration of operational air and naval bases which is potentially greater than any similar concentration of the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Additional bases can be developed in a relatively short time by an aggressive exploitation of all World War II Japanese facilities.

An enemy force utilizing those installations currently available could increase by 100 percent the air effort which could be directed against Okinawa as compared to operations based on the mainland and at the same time could direct damaging air attacks with fighter-type aircraft against friendly installations in the Philippines, which are currently beyond the range of fighters based on the mainland. Our air supremacy at once would become doubtful.

As a result of its geographic location and base potential, utilization of Formosa by a military power hostile to the United States may either counterbalance or overshadow the strategic importance of the central and southern flank of the United States front-line position.