Formosa in the hands of such a hostile power could be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish offensive strategy and at the same time checkmate defensive or counteroffensive operations by friendly forces based on Okinawa and the Philippines.

This unsinkable carrier-tender has the capacity to operate from ten to twenty air groups of types ranging from jet fighters to B-29-type bombers as well as to provide forward operating facilities for short-range coastal submarines.

In acquiring this forward submarine base, the efficacy of the short-range submarine would be so enormously increased by the additional radius of activity as to threaten completely sea traffic from the south and interdict all set lanes in the Western Pacific. Submarine blockade by the enemy, with all its destructive ramifications, would thereby become a virtual certainty.

Should Formosa fall and bases thereafter come into the hands of a potential enemy of the United States, the latter will have acquired an additional "fleet" which will have been obtained and can be maintained at an incomparably lower cost than could its equivalent in aircraft carriers and submarine tenders.

Current estimates of air and submarine resources in the Far East indicate the capability of such a potential enemy to extend his forces southward and still maintain an imposing degree of military strength for employment elsewhere in the Pacific area.

A Historical Function

Historically, Formosa has been used as a springboard for just such military aggression directed against areas to the south. The most notable and recent example was the utilization of it by the Japanese in World War II. At the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 it played an important part as a staging area and supporting base for the various Japanese invasion convoys. The supporting air forces of Japan's Army and Navy were based on fields situated along southern Formosa.

From 1942 through 1944 Formosa was a vital link in the transportation and communication chain which stretched from Japan through Okinawa and the Philippines to Southeast Asia. As the United States carrier forces advanced into the Western Pacific, the bases on Formosa assumed an increasingly greater role in the Japanese defense scheme.

Should Formosa fall into the hands of a hostile power, history would repeat itself. Its military potential would again be fully exploited as the means to breach and neutralize our Western Pacific defense system and mount a war of conquest against the free nations of the Pacific basin.

Nothing could be more fallacious than the threadbare argument by those who advocate appeasement and defeatism in the Pacific that if we defend Formosa we alienate continental Asia.

Those who speak thus do not understand the Orient. They do not grant that it is in the pattern of the Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute, and dynamic leadership-to quickly turn on a leadership characterized by timidity or vacillation—and they underestimate the Oriental mentality. Nothing in the last five years has so inspired the Far East as the American determination to preserve the bulwarks of our Pacific Ocean strategic position from future encroachment, for few of its people fail accurately to appraise the safeguard such determination brings to their free institutions.

To pursue any other course would be to turn over the fruits of our Pacific victory to a potential enemy. It would shift any future battle area 5,000 miles eastward to the coasts of the American continents, our own home coast; it would completely expose our friends in the Philippines, our friends in Australia and New Zealand, our friends in Indonesia, our friends in Japan, and other areas, to the lustful thrusts of those who stand for slavery against liberty, for atheism as against God.

The decision of President Truman on June 27 lighted into flame a lamp of hope throughout Asia that was burning dimly toward extinction. It marked for the Far East the focal and turning point in this area's struggle for freedom. It swept aside in one great monumental stroke all of the hypocrisy and the sophistry which has confused and deluded so many people distant from the actual scene.

APPENDIX J

(Referred to on p. 1001)

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE DEAN RUSK, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FAB EASTERN AFFAIRS, AT THE CHINA INSTITUTE DINNER, WALDORF-ASTORIA HOTEL, NEW YORK CITY, AT 8 P. M., E. D. T., FRIDAY, MAY 18, 1951

CHINESE-AMERICAN FRIENDSHIP

For release at 8:00 p. m., E. D. T., Friday, May 18, 1951. Not to be previously published, quoted from or used in any way

I should like, first of all, to congratulate the China Institute on its quarter century of splendid public service and to compliment you who are responsible for this timely chance to recall the warm friendship which has marked the relations between the Chinese and American people throughout the last two centuries.

Something of what we have in mind this evening is contained in a Concurrent Resolution which passed the Senate on May 4 and which is now before the House of Representatives, which reads in part:

"Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the Congress of the United States reaffirm the historic and abiding friendship of the American people for all other peoples, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, and declares

"That the American people deeply regret the artificial barriers which separate them from the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and which keep the Soviet peoples from learning of the desire of the American people to live in friendship with all other peoples and to work with them in advancing the ideal of human brotherhood; and

"That the American people and their Government desire neither war with the Soviet Union nor the terrible consequences of such a war.”

Despite the artificial barriers which now separate us from most of the peoples of China, we meet to reaffirm the historic and abiding friendship of the American people for the people of China.

Most of you here this evening are better qualified than I to explore the origins and elements of Chinese-American friendship. Over the centuries this friendship has come to be taken for granted; cordial sentiments between a free China and a free America became strong and durable because they were constantly nourished by common purposes and common practical interests.

We and the Chinese, for example, have had a vital interest in the peace of the Pacific. Each of us wants security on our Pacific flank and wants to be able to look across those vast waters to find strength, independence and good will in its great neighbor on the other side. It was inevitable that the driving force of Japanese militarism would sooner or later bring China and America together to oppose it, just as we had moved forty years earlier to support China's independence and integrity against threats from Europe. The same issues are now posed again-and are made more difficult to deal with because foreign encroachment is now being arranged by Chinese who seem to love China less than they do their foreign masters.

We meet here this evening to reaffirm our friendship with the Chinese people— but not merely as a routine and elegant expression of good will. For the friendship we have taken for granted for so long is now being attacked with every available weapon by those who have come to power on the mainland of China. Their sustained and violent effort to erase all evidence of this friendship bears powerful witness to the validity and strength of the bonds between our two peoples. American influence among the Chinese people is intolerable to those in power in Peiping and Moscow because they know, and quite rightly, that the idea of national and individual freedom which is at the heart of American political thought is the greatest threat to their own evil purposes.

Is the message of this meeting this evening to our friends in China prompted solely by narrowly conceived American interests? That important American interests are involved, there can be no doubt. But our historical relations with China have always reflected a high regard on our part for Chinese interests and it is these we ask our friends in China now to consider.

The independence of China is gravely threatened. In the Communist world there is room for only one master-a jealous and implacable master, whose price of friendship is complete submission. How many Chinese, in one community

after another, are now being destroyed because they love China more than the Soviet Union? How many Chinese will remember in time the fates of Rajk, Kostov, Petkov, Clementis and all those in other satellites who discovered that being Communist is not enough for the conspirators of the Kremlin?

The freedoms of the Chinese people are disappearing. Trial by mob, mass slaughter, banishment as forced labor to Manchuria, Siberia, or Sinkiang, the arbitrary seizure of property, the destruction of loyalties within the family, the suppression of free speech-these are the facts behind the parades and celebrations and the empty promises.

The territorial integrity of China is now an ironic phrase. The movement of Soviet forces into Sinkiang, the realities of "joint exploitation" of that great province by Moscow and Peiping, the separation of Inner Mongolia from the body politic of China, and the continued inroads of Soviet power into Manchuria under the cloak of the Korean aggression mean in fact that China is losing its great northern areas to the European empire which has stretched out its greedy hands for them for at least a century.

Are our Chinese friends reflecting upon the maps of China now being published on the mainland which show Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria and areas in the west and southwest as something distinct from China? Are our friends in China impressed by trade-union buttons appearing on the streets of Peiping which no longer show Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia on the map of China? Have the authorities in Peiping themselves fully considered what it means for them to have Soviet troops on Chinese soil, in the light of the experience of the miserable satellites of eastern Europe?

The peace and security of China are being sacrificed to the ambitions of the Communist conspiracy. China has been driven by foreign masters into an adventure of foreign aggression which cuts across the most fundamental national interests of the Chinese people. This action stands condemned by the great world community in which the Chinese people have always aspired to play a worthy role.

Hundreds of thousands of Chinese youth are being sacrifieced in a fiery furnace, pitting their waves of human flesh against the fire power of modern weapons and without heavy equipment, adequate supply or the most elementary medical attention. Apart from Korea, the Chinese are being pressed to aggressive action in other areas-all calculated to divert the attention and energies of China away from the encroachments of Soviet imperialism upon China itself.

I find it hard to believe that the Chinese people will acquiesce in the kind of future which their masters are now preparing for them. I find it impossible to believe that our friends in China have given up their desire to live at peace with their neighbors, to play a major role as a peaceful member of the international community of nations, to trade freely with all the world, to improve their own conditions in accordance with their own needs, aspirations and traditions, to maintain their independence as a nation, to preserve their territorial integrity and to live out their lives in dignity and with respect of their fellow

men.

Events in China must surely challenge the concern of Chinese everywhere— in Formosa, on the mainland and in overseas communities. There is a job to be done for China which only the Chinese can do-a job which will require sustained energy, continued sacrifice and an abundance of the high courage with which so many Chinese have fought for so long during the struggles of the past decades. The rest of us cannot tell them exactly what is to be done or how. We cannot provide a formula to engage the unity of effort among all Chinese who love their country. But one thing we can say-as the Chinese people move to assert their freedom and to work out their destiny in accordance with their own historical purposes, they can count upon tremendous support from free peoples in other parts of the world.

It is not my purpose, in these few moments this evening, to go into specific elements of our own national policy in the present situation. But we can tell our friends in China that the United States will not acquiesce in the degradation which is being forced upon them. We do not recognize the authorities in Pieping for what they pretend to be. The Peiping regime may be a colonial Russian government-a Slavic Manchukuo on a larger scale. It is not the Government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese.

It is not entitled to speak for China in the community of nations. It is entitled only to the fruits of its own conduct-the fruits of aggression upon which it is now willfully, openly, and senselessly embarked.

We recognize the National Government of the Republic of China, even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. We believe it more authentically represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their historic demand for independence from foreign control. That government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States. Under the circumstances, however, such aid in itself cannot be decisive to the future of China. The decision and the effort are for the Chinese people, pooling their efforts, wherever they are, in behalf of China.

If the Chinese people decide for freedom, they shall find friends among all the peoples of the earth who have known and love freedom. They shall find added strength from those who refuse to believe that China is fated to become a land of tyranny and aggression and who expect China to fulfill the promise of its great past.

APPENDIX K
(Referred to on p. 1086)

DIRECTIVES, ORDERS, AND MEMORANDA SENT TO GENERAL MACARTHUR BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTAINING RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON HIM IN THE CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,

Washington, May 23, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,

United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On Tuesday, May 8, 1951, you asked me the following question:

"General, can you supply for the record the directives and orders and memoranda sent to General MacArthur by the Department of Defense containing these restrictions or any restrictions that were imposed on him in the conduct of the campaign?" (p. 911 of the testimony).

I have had the Joint Chiefs of Staff examine their records and I have been supplied with the following paraphrased excerpts of all military directives and orders sent to General MacArthur containing restrictions, either direct or indirect, on the conduct of the campaign in Korea. These excerpts are arranged in chronological order and have been paraphrased in such a way that they may be printed in the record of the hearings.

As you know, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a large number of messages to General MacArthur on a wide variety of problems incident to the campaign in Korea. In response to your question, however, the following excerpts relate only to directives and orders containing restrictions:

"(a) On 25 June 1950 General MacArthur was informed that, to assist in evacuating United States dependents and noncombatants (names to be furnished by the United States Ambassador in Korea), he could take action by Air and Navy to prevent the Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul area from falling into unfriendly hands,

“(b) On 26 June 1950, at the direction of the President, the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) was authorized to utilize Navy and Air Force elements of the Far East Command to attack all North Korean military targets (troop columns, guns, tanks) south of the 38th parallel in order to clear South Korea of North Korean military forces. In the same dispatch he was authorized to use naval forces of the Far East Command in the coastal waters and sea approaches of Korea without restriction.

"(c) On 29 June 1950 CINCFE was authorized to extend his operations into North Korea against air bases, depots, tank formations, troop columns, and other purely military targets. He was cautioned that special care would be taken to insure that operations in North Korea stay well clear of the Manchurian and Soviet borders. Utilization of Army forces was limited to communications and other essential service units, except that the employment of Army combat and service forces, as might be required to insure the retention of a port and air base in the general area of Pusan, was authorized.

"(d) On 30 June 1950 the limitation on the employment of Army forces imposed on 29 June 1950 was rescinded.

"(e) On 1 July 1950 instructions were issued to CINCFE stating that he should be careful that in establishing a naval blockade of Korea his forces stay well clear of the coastal waters of Manchuria and the U. S. S. R.

“(ƒ) On 28 August 1950 instructions were issued to CINCFE that particular care should be taken that United States aircraft not violate Soviet or Chinese territory or territorial waters.

"(g) On 8 September 1950 a message was dispatched to CINCFE stating that, for the present, no further attacks should be made against Rashin.

"(h) On 26 September 1950 CINCFE was directed that his Air Force units would be employed only against objectives which had bearing on the tactical situation.

"(i) On 27 September 1950 a directive was sent to CINCFE which stated that his forces would not cross the Soviet or Manchurian borders under any circumstances, that only Korean ground force units would be used in the northeast province bordering the Soviet Union and the area along the Manchurian border, and that support of U. N. operations north or south of the 38th parallel would not include air or naval action against Manchurian or Soviet territory. "(j) On 6 November 1950 CINCFE was directed to postpone until further orders bombing of targets within five miles of the Manchurian border. Later the same day he was authorized to go ahead with planned bombing near the frontier but was cautioned that his forces must be extremely careful to avoid violating Manchurian territory and air space.

"(k) On 29 December 1950 CINCFE was directed to conduct a ground defense from successive positions generally as outlined in a message from CINCFE to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was told that, subject to the primary consideration of safety to the forces under his command, he would inflict on the enemy such damage as was possible.

"(7) On 9 January 1951 his instructions of 29 December 1950 were confirmed with an additional reference to his basic mission of protecting Japan. He was told further that favorable action would not be taken at that time on certain of his proposals as follows:

"(1) Strengthening of our effort in Korea.

"(2) Blockade of China coast.

"(3) Naval and air attacks on objectives in Communist China.

"(4) Obtaining Korean reinforcements from the Chinese Nationalist garrison in Formosa.

"(m) On 21 February 1951 CINCFE was told that the restriction regarding Rashin, which had been imposed on 8 September 1950, must remain in effect for the present.

66

'(n) On 1 March 1951 the request of the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, transmitted by CINCFE, to destroy the North Korean electrical power complex, including plants on the Yalu River, was disapproved."

Faithfully yours,

APPENDIX L

(S) G. C. MARSHALL.

(Referred to on p. 1086)

[The Observer, 22, Tudor Street, London, E. C. 4, Sunday, April 8, 1951]

BRITAIN ASKS UNITED STATES TO EXPLAIN

STRONG EXCEPTION TO MAC ARTHUR LETTER-FEAR OF CHANGES IN POLICY

(By Our Diplomatic Correspondent)

The British Government has taken the strongest possible exception to General MacArthur's letter to Mr. Joseph Martin, the Republican Party leader, favouring the use of Nationalist Chinese troops from Formosa and interpreted as foreshadowing an extension of the war to the mainland of Asia.

Our Embassy in Washington has been asked to get a full explanation of how it is possible for such a statement, in complete variance with agreed policy, to be made by a serving officer.

The British had understood that the American Administration fully agreed with the policy of not extending the war far beyond the 38th Parallel unless