military conditions made it essential. Now there is some doubt in Whitehall whether, in spite of the White House statement that there is no change in policy towards Formosa and the use of Nationalist troops, Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson will be able to resist pressure for changes in policy from General MacArthur and his Republican Party adherents.

The reference by the Minister of State, Mr. Kenneth Younger, in a speech yesterday, to "such irresponsible statements as seem to come out at frequent intervals from highly placed quarters, without the authority of the United Nations, or indeed of any member Government," is regarded as a mild version of what the Cabinet really thinks about General MacArthur's statements.

It is also expected that Mr. Morrison will take the opportunity provided by numerous Parliamentary questions this week to make it clear how strongly the Government deprecates the intrusion of General MacArthur into politics.

AVOIDING CHECK TO OPERATIONS

The General's action is all the more galling because agreement between the British and American Governments over the question of crossing the 38th Parallel and over the importance of limiting the war in Korea had been virtually reached before General MacArthur sent his letter.

The consultations now going on in Washington on a declaration of United Nations aims in Korea have revealed differences between Britain and America, but only on questions of form and timing, not on any point of substance in future policy.

The main disagreement has been over the timing of any announcement. The British view is that a moderate statement now, during the lull, would seize the "psychological moment" of which the Foreign Secretary has spoken. The American view appears to be that it might hamper military operations to issue any statement at this moment when there are indications of a strong Chinese cffensive. It is known that General MacArthur, who gave a warning of. this offensive recently, strongly opposes issuing any such joint statement.

"IRRESPONSIBLE STATEMENTS" ON KOREA

Mr. Kenneth Younger, Minister of State, referred at a Labour conference in Cardiff yesterday to "natural differences of policy" between Britain and the United States.

He added: "Our biggest difference with the Americans is, of course, in our attitude towards China, and here I am bound to say that the Peking government have not done much to help us convince our American friends that we are right and they are wrong.

"We shall, however, persist in our efforts to give Communist China every chance to take her place in the world and in the United Nations.

"NOTHING HARMFUL

"People say that the door has been closed by our condemnation of the Chinese as aggressors. I doubt it. Their attitude depends much more on the military situation, otherwise why did they refuse the Indian cease-fire proposals before Christmas when no one had called them aggressors?

"United Nations aims in Korea have been made clear and there is nothing in them which the Chinese can regard as harmful to themselves.

"Neither we nor they should, therefore, be misled by such irresponsible statements as seem to come out at frequent intervals from highly placed quarters, without the authority of the United Nations, or indeed of any member Government."

On our "extremely bad" relations with Russia, Mr. Younger said: "I doubt whether the Soviet Government wants war, and I am certain the Soviet people do not. Many of the factors which drove previous dictators to war are lacking. Nor shall we exaggerate the strength of the Soviet bloc."

[The Sunday Times, an independent journal, Kemsley House, London, W. C. 1, Sunday, March 25, 1951]

UN DRAFTING TRUCE INVITATION TO CHINESE FORCES IN KOREA

ACCEPTANCE WOULD OPEN WAY TO FAR EASTERN SETTLEMENT

(From O. H. Brandon, representative of the Sunday Times)

WASHINGTON, Saturday.

An implied invitation to Communist China to seek a negotiated settlement of the Korean conflict will be issued here within the next few days. It will be in the form of a public statement on United Nations intentions.

Although this policy statement, now being drafted, will, in effect, be a reiteration of the aims already enunciated by the United Nations, it will be designed also to reassure Peking that, while unification of Korea remains a basic political objective, it is not the object of the present military campaign. The declaration will also remind Peking that agreement for a cease-fire based on stabilization of the present front lines could not only lead to a settlement of the Korean conflict, but would open the door to negotiations for a general settlement of Far Eastern problems.

Officials here hope that the difference between the present military situation and that existing when the Good Offices Committee of the General Assembly made its first offer may help to modify the Chinese attitude.

HALT NEAR PARALLEL

There can be little doubt that the United Nations ground forces will seek to disengage themselves from the enemy as soon as they have attained defensible positions on or about the 38th Parallel. Should the Chinese then refrain from further aggressive action, ground fighting would cease and a de facto cease-fire on the ground would operate.

The nations concerned are fully agreed, however, that in the absence of a ceasefire agreement the United Nations air forces would continue to pound and harass the enemy in North Korea.

There is much evidence that the American public is now taking a more balanced view than it did a few weeks ago, and that, if a cease-fire could be agreed, there would be little objection to the United States entering into negotiations with the Chinese Communists.

MACARTHUR ORDER ON CROSSING PARALLEL

(From Richard Hughes, Representative of the Sunday Times)

TOKYO, Saturday.

On his return from a flying visit to Korea today General MacArthur said that he had directed the American Eighth Army to cross the 38th Parallel again “if and when its security makes it tactically advisable."

"The Parallel has never had any military significance,” he added. “Our naval and air forces cross it at will, and ground forces have done so in the past.

"Our troops maintain the initiative and the enemy continues to withdraw. Enemy supply lines are taking terrible punishment from naval and air bombardment. There is no heavy fighting, and the United Nations army is in fine spirit and fettle."

With South Korea almost all back in United Nations hands, he concluded, signs of reconstruction were quickening and Seoul, the Southern Capital, was "beginning to resume some evidence of life."

Asked whether there had been any developments after his earlier statement, in which he expressed readiness to meet the Chinese Commander in Chief to try to arrange a truce, he replied: "There was no contact."

Latest reports from Korea show that, in the centre of the front, United Nations armoured forces are within two miles of the 38th Parallel, and that the link-up between ground forces and the American paratroops dropped at Munsan, 20 miles northwest of Seoul, had virtually broken organized Communist resistance.

83797-51-pt. 5-5

CRITICAL ATTITUDE OF U. N. DELEGATIONS

(From Rodney Campbell, Representative of the Sunday Times)

NEW YORK, Saturday. Western delegations to the United Nations, particularly that of the United States, expressed considerable resentment here today that General MacArthur should express himself so freely on matters that both the United States administration and the United Nations feel lie outside his jurisdiction as Allied Commander.

General MacArthur's statements that the United Nations' action against the Chinese mainland would bring about the collapse of Communist China caused most of the criticism heard here today. Most diplomats approached praised his attempt to make contact with the Communist field commander in Korea. This reflects the view of most key members of the world organisation that a ceasefire and peaceful settlement are more advisable and more feasible objectives in the present phase of the campaign than the merest suggestion of a major war against the Chinese.

The United States delegation handles the MacArthur statement with kid gloves, declining direct comment on it, but assuring other delegations that Washington had no intention of asking the United Nations to authorize expansion of the war to China.

APPENDIX M
(Referred to on p. 1286)

CASUALTY FIGURES

Battle casualties are defined as all casualties directly due to combat or which are sustained as a result of going to or returning from a combat mission. They are grouped into 14 categories.

The World War I and II casualty figures are battle casualties only. They were for the Army and Air Corps.

World I and II figures on what we have called nonbattle casualties were:

APPENDIX N

(Referred to on p. 1320)

TWELFTH REPORT, FEBRUARY 23, 1951

I herewith submit Report No. 12 of the United Nations Command operations in Korea for period 16 through 31 December, inclusive. Korean releases Nos. 732 through 775 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Combined operations: Apart from the continuation of our Naval blockade and unremitting air interdiction of enemy troops and supply concentrations in North Korea, the period from 16 to 31 December was consumed by the United Nations Command with the readjustment of our ground positions along the Kaesong-Yongyong-Hwachon-puypyongni defense line made necessary by the entry of Communist China into the war and by the enemy in build-up operations preparatory to offensive action aimed at the conquest of all of Korea. These tactical readjustments have been conducted with great skill by local commanders and unparalleled coordination among the several areas. My communiqué No. 15 of 26 December publicly reporting on these operations is repeated here for the record of the United Nations Command:

"This amphibious movement of the 10 Corps from the Hungnam sector to a juncture with the 8th Army has been successfully completed with but light casualties and no matériel loss. This operation has been conducted with great skill and coordination by Army, Navy, and Air Commanders concerned and exemplary courage and marked efficiency have characterized the conduct of all personnel. It has completed the readjustment of our positions made necessary by the entry of Communist China into the war. The real text [test] of the United Nations Command was when it was suddenly and without the customary notice of belligerency confronted by this new power in overwhelming force and yet survived without marked diminution of its strength and resources or loss of its fluidity of movement and maneuver. This it has done and has come through well.

"With the successful close of this phase of our operations, I believe it pertinent to review briefly the military events of the recent past. In the latter days of October our forces were advancing from the south and northeast in columns of pursuit to destroy the North Korea remnants and complete the prescribed mission of restoring order and unification to all of Korea. The end of the campaign was clearly in sight, when some of our units met with surprise assault by Chinese Communist elements of unknown organization and strength. In the face of this new force the Eighth Army was withdrawn to a closely integrated front, to there await the logistical build-up which would permit resumption of our advance in attack formation. Meanwhile, every effort was made to assess enemy strength and intentions in light of this new reinforcement repeatedly and publicly declared by Chinese Communist authorities to be only on an individual volunteer basis. Political intelligence failed to penetrate the iron curtain and provide no substantial information of intent. Field intelligence was handicapped by the severest limitations. Aerial reconnaissance beyond the border, which was the normal source of field intelligence, was forbidden. Avenues of advance from border sanctuary to battle area, only a night's march, provided maximum natural concealment. No intelligence service in the world could have surmounted such handicaps to determine to any substantial degree enemy strength, movements, and intentions. This left ground reconnaissance in force as the proper, indeed the sole, expedient. Not until 24 November did our logistical position permit resumption of forward operations. We hoped that the Army would be opposed by no more than token Chinese force to support previous commitments but short of a full Chinese commitment to major operations.

"Political reassurances that the United Nations Command would not violate the international border were universally believed to have failed to convince the Chinese authorities. The free world wanted the integrity of our purpose fully understood and accordingly renewed assurances were publicly given by me as military commander upon the resumption of our advance that the Eighth Army would be returned to its home station in Japan just as soon as the Korean border area had been cleared of hostile elements. This but expressed our hopes— indeed the hopes of all men of good will-through reemphasis of our military objectives. Unfortunately in some quarters it has been otherwise interpreted and my intent misrepresented. Our advance was the final test of Chinese intentions. Events subsequently have disclosed that neither political nor military

reassurances could have had the slightest influence upon the momentous decision underlying Red China's commitment of her forces to war.

"The Eighth Army and affiliated United Nations units met powerful enemy resistance along the entire line-resistance which unmasked the fiction of 'volunteer' participation and disclosed the massive deployment of the Fourth Chinese Field Army, an important segment of the entire Chinese Communist military strength, in a formation of 9 corps abreast in columns of divisions to an aggregate of 27 divisions, with elements of the Third Field Army discovered in initial deployment immediately to the rear. Despite their initial valiant resistance, some of the ROK (Republic of Korea) forces were overwhelmed by this massive array. This exposed the Eighth Army's right flank and required its withdrawal. These withdrawal operations, made in accordance with plans previously prepared against any such eventuality, were skillfully conducted without loss of cohesion and with all units remaining intact. The gallant Second Infantry Division and the equally gallant Turkish brigade being directly exposed by the gap torn through ROK forces took the heaviest attendant pressure, but the enemy, caught off balance in the midst of build-up operations, had not yet developed the strength to enable exploitation of the break-through which would have imperiled the Eighth Army. Fortunate presence of the 10 Corps on the enemy's flank forced him to divide his forces and thus further weaken his offensive capabilities achieved at that time of his build-up operations against the Eighth Army.

"In its broad implications I consider that these operations, initiated on 24 November and carried through to this redeployment, have served a very significant purpose-possibly in general result the most significant and fortunate of any conducted during the course of the Korean campaign. The might of a major military nation was suddenly and without warning thrown against this relatively small United Nations Command but without attaining a decision. Due to intervening circumstances beyond our power to control or even to detect we did not achieve the United Nations objective. But at a casualty cost less than that experienced in a comparable period of defensive fighting on the Pusan perimeter, we exposed before too late secret political and military decisions of enormous scope and threw off balance enemy military preparations aimed at surreptitiously massing the power capable of destroying our forces with one mighty extended blow.

"No command ever fought more gallantly or efficiently under unparalleled conditions of restraint and handicap, and no command could have acquitted itself to better advantage under prescribed missions and delimitations involving unprecedented risk and jeopardy."

Possibly of greatest political significance throughout these tactical displacement operations has been the avidity with which North Korean citizens have sought sanctuary behind the United Nations lines. There is little doubt but that given the opportunity practically the entire North Korean population would have migrated south in search of such sanctuary. Without the slightest hesitancy they have made clear their complete aversion to Communist rule and their fervent desire at whatever hazard for refuge within the protection of the United Nations. They welcomed our forces as liberators when we went in and sought to withdraw with us when we withdrew. Historically, this exemplifies the popular dread of Communist tyranny-the reason such rule may only survive in a totalitarian police state.

APPENDIX O

(Referred to on pp. 1767, 1936)

[Extract from Appendixes contained in Union Calendar No. 22 (Background Information on the use of United States Armed Forces in Foreign Countries), appearing therein at page 49, entitled "I. Memorandum of July 3, 1950, prepared by the Department of State on the authority of the President to repel the attack in Korea"]

AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO REPEL THE ATTACK IN KOREA

This memorandum is directed to the authority of the President to order the armed forces of the United States to repel the aggressive attack on the Republic of Korea.

As explained by Secretary Acheson to the press on June 28, as soon as word of the attack on Korea was received in Washington, it was the view of the President and of all of his advisers, that the first responsibility of the Government of the United States was to report the attack to the United Nations.