SPECIALIZED AGENCIES International Labor Organization, 33rd Annual Conference June 7, 1950: Chairman ruled that a Polish proposal to unseat the Chinese National Representative must be referred to the Credentials Committee, Credentials Committee reported favorably on Chinese National credentials. International Telecommunications Union—International High Frequency Broadcasting Conference April 4, 1950: Soviet proposal to invite a Chinese Communist to participate as the sole representative of China rejected, 14 states voting in favor, 24 against (U. S.), 12 abstentions. Administrative Council September 4, 1950: Yugoslav proposal to seat a Chinese Communist rejected, 2 states voting in favor, 9 against (US), 2 abstentions. April 16, 1951: Soviet proposal to exclude the Chinese National Representatives and seat a Chinese Communist rejected, 5 states voting in favor. 9 against (US), 3 abstentions. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Conference May 30, 1950: General (a) Report of the Credentials Committee recommending provisional seating of Chinese National Representative pending final decision by the Conference adopted, 32 states voting in favor (US), 1 against, 1 abstention. (b) Czech proposal recommending exclusion of Chinese National Representatives rejected, 4 states voting in favor, 30 against (US), 14 absten(c) Yugoslav proposal recommending exclusion of Chinese National Representatives rejected, 4 states voting in favor, 29 against (US), 13 abstentions. Universal Postal Union-Executive and Liaison Committee tions. May 15, 1950: Swiss resolution to admit a Chinese Communist for that session adopted, 6 states voting in favor, 5 against (US), 4 abstentions. Committee also decided that prior to its next session (May 1951) it would consult all UPU Member States on the Chinese representation issue via a referendum. April 30, 1951: Result referendum announced as follows: 33 states voted for the seating of representatives of the Chinese National Government; 23 states voted for the seating of the representatives of the Chinese Communist regime: 13 states abstained; 17 states failed to vote. May 21, 1951: US proposal to seat Chinese National representatives adopted. 10 states voting in favor (US), 6 against, 3 abstentions. Joint Meeting of Universal Postal Union and International Air Transport Association 2 January. 25, 1951: (a) US resolution to postpone consideration of the Chinese representation question until the General Assembly had taken action and to seat a Chinese Nationalist, pending such consideration, rejected, 3 states voting in favor (US), 5 against, 3 abstentions, 1 unmarked ballot. (b) Soviet proposal to seat a Chinese Communist adopted, 5 states voting in favor, 3 against (US), 3 abstentions, 1 unmarked ballot. February 5, 1951: Czech resolution opposing US proposal to reopen discussion of the Chinese representation issue adopted, 6 states voting in favor, 3 against (US), 3 abstentions. World Meteorological Organization-1st Congress March 19, 1951: Accepted credentials of Chinese National Representatives, 23 states voting in favor (US), 9 against, 2 abstentions. Annual Joint Meeting of the Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development September 7, 1950: Czech resolution to exclude the Chinese National and seat a Chinese Communist rejected, US voting against. 2 Special ad hoc conference and not a permanent body of the UPU. Action on the Chinese Representation Question in United Nations and Specialized Agency Bodies, (Addendum, May 22-June 12, 1951) Trusteeship Council June 5, 1951: U. S. motion to postpone indefinitely dicussion of Soviet proposal to seat a Chinese Communist adopted, 11 states voting in favor (U. S.), 1 against, no abstentions. Universal Postal Union-Technical Transit Committee June 6, 1951: U. S. proposal to seat a Chinese Nationalist adopted, 8 states voting in favor (U. S.), 3 against, 5 abstentions. International Telecommunications Union-Consultative Committee for International Radio June 6, 1951: Decided not to include in agenda Soviet proposal to exclude Chinese Nationalist and seat Chinese Communist; 24 states voting in favor (U. S.), 5 against, 1 abstention. APPENDIX Q THE KOREAN CRISIS CAUSED BY WAVERING FOREIGN POLICIES OF ADMINISTRATION Speech of Hon. Robert A. Taft, of Ohio, in the Senate of the United States, June 28, 1950 AN OUTRAGEOUS ACT OF AGGRESSION Early on Sunday morning, June 25, the Communist-dominated Republic of North Korea launched an unprovoked aggressive military attack on the Republic of Korea, recognized as an independent nation by the United Nations. On the same day the Security Council of the United Nations adopted a resolution noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea from forces from North Korea, and determining that this action constituted a breach of the peace. The resolution called for the immediate cessation of hostilities, for the withdrawal of the armed forces of North Korea to the thirty-eighth parallel, and for the United Nations Commission on Korea to make informational reports; and called "upon all members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." This resolution was adopted by a vote of nine members, Russia being absent, and Yugoslavia abstaining. The attack did not cease, and on Tuesday, June 27, the President issued a statement announcing that he had "ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support." He also announced that he had ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, and that he had directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened, and that military assistance to the Philippine Government and the forces of France and the associated states in Indochina be accelerated. On the same day, last night, the United Nations adopted another resolution definitely recommending "that the members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security in the area." This vote was adopted by seven members of the Security Council; Yugoslavia voting "no," and India and Egypt refraining from voting, Russia still being absent. American air and sea forces have moved into Korea and are partaking in the war against the northern Korea Communists. No one can deny that a serious crisis exists. The attack was as much a surprise to the public as the attack at Pearl Harbor, although, apparently, the possibility was foreseen by all our intelligence forces, and should have been foreseen by the administration. We are now actually engaged in a de facto war with the northern Korean Communists. That in itself is serious, but nothing compared to the possibility that it might lead to war with Soviet Russia. It is entirely possible that Soviet Russia might move in to help the North Koreans and that the present limited field of conflict might cover the entire civilized world. Without question, the attack of the North Koreans is an outrageous act of aggression against a friendly independent nation, recognized by the United Nations, and which we were instrumental in setting up. The attack in all probability was instigated by Soviet Russia. We can only hope that the leaders of that country have sufficient judgment to know that a world war will result in their own destruction, and will therefore refrain from such acts as might bring about such a tragic conflict. A FORTUNATE CHANGE OF POLICY Mr. President, Korea itself is not vitally important to the United States. It is hard to defend. We have another instance of communism picking out a soft spot where the Communists feel that they can make a substantial advance and can obtain a moral victory without risking war. From the past philosophy and declarations of our leaders, it was not unreasonable for the North Koreans to suppose that they could get away with it and that we would do nothing about it. The President's statement of policy represents a complete change in the programs and policies heretofore proclaimed by the administration. I have heretofore urged a much more determined attitude against communism in the Far East, and the President's new policy moves in that direction. It seems to me that the time had to come, sooner or later, when we would give definite notice to the Communists that a move beyond a declared line would result in war. That has been the policy which we have adopted in Europe. Whether the President has chosen the right time or the right place to declare this policy may be open to question. He has information which I do not have. It ssems to me that the new policy is adopted at an unfortunate time, and involves a very difficult military operation indeed-the defense of Korea. I sincerely hope that our Armed Forces may be successful in Korea. I sincerely hope that the policy thus adopted will not lead to war with Russia. In any event, I believe the general principle of the policy is right, and I see no choice except to back up wholeheartedly and with every available resource the men in our Armed Forces who have been moved into Korea. If we are going to defend Korea, it seems to me that we should have retained our Armed Forces there and should have given, a year ago, the notice which the President has given today. With such a policy, there never would have been such an attack by the North Koreans. In short, this entirely unfortunate crisis has been produced first, by the outrageous, aggressive attitude of Soviet Russia, and second, by the bungling and inconsistent foreign policy of the administration. NOT A BIPARTISAN POLICY I think it is important to point out, Mr. President, that there has been no pretense of any bipartisan foreign policy about this action. The leaders of the Republican Party in Congress have never been consulted on the Chinese policy or Formosa or Korea or Indochina. Republican members of the Foreign Relations Committee and of the Armed Forces Committee were called to the White House at 10:30 a. m. on June 27, and were informed with regard to the President's statement, but, of course, they had no opportunity to change it or to consult Republican policy committees in either the House of Representatives or the Senate. I hope at a later time to put into the RECORD a historical statement of the position of various Republican leaders on the general question of China policy, showing that it is very different indeed, from what the President has heretofore advocated, and that, in general, it is more in accord with what he is now proposing. CONGRESS NOT CONSULTED Furthermore, it should be noted that there has been no pretense of consulting the Congress. No resolution has ever been introduced asking for the approval of Congress for the use of American forces in Korea. I shall discuss later the question of whether the President is usurping his powers as Commander in Chief. My own opinion is that he is doing so; that there is no legal authority for what he has done. But I may say that if a joint resolution were introduced asking for approval of the use of our Armed Forces already sent to Korea and full support of them in their present venture, I would vote in favor of it. 83797-51-pt. 5-6 THE ATTACK INVITED BY PAST ADMINISTRATION POLICY I have said that the present crisis is produced by the bungling and inconsistent policies of the administration. First, we agreed to the division of Korea along the thirty-eighth parallel giving the Russians the northern half of the country, with most of the power and a good deal of the industry, and leaving a southern half which could not support itself, except on an agricultural basis. This was in line with a very foolish policy which paid for Russian assistance against Japan, which we did not need, by presenting Russia with the Kurile Islands, half of Sakhalin Island, and the control of Manchuria. The agreement was a part of the sympathetic acceptance of communism as a peace-loving philosophy, which has made Russia a threat to the very existence of the world. Second, the Chinese policy of the administration gave basic encouragement to the North Korean aggression. If the United States was not prepared to use its troops and give military assistance to Nationalist China against Chinese Communists, why should it use its troops to defend Nationalist Korea against Korean Communists? That certainly must have seemed a fairly logical conclusion to those who have inaugurated this aggression. The Communists undoubtedly considered that Korea was very much less important than China to the United States, and that they could get away with their grab of Korea, as the Chinese Communists got away with theirs in China. The general policy of doing nothing in China was reaffirmed by Secretary Acheson in a speech before the National Press Club as recently as January 12 of this year. I read from the New York Herald Tribune's account of that speech: "Secretary of State Dean Acheson accused the Soviet Union today of planning dismemberment of China. He said the United States could exploit the eventual resentment of Asian peoples over this aggression only by avoiding foolish adventures such as intervention on Formosa." I might suggest that intervention in Korea from a military standpoint is a good deal more foolish an adventure than intervention on Formosa. According to the New York Herald Tribune: "Soviet Russia, using new methods, new skills, and new concepts to cloak imperialist aggression, already had swallowed Outer Mongolia and has nearly completed the absorption of Manchuria, Secretary Acheson said. He charged Moscow with similar designs on the areas of Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang. "In a major policy speech before the National Press Club, Secretary Acheson said the United States was helpless to prevent this dismemberment. He made it clear that the State Department's future plans for checking the spread of Soviet influence through Asia would depend mainly on the righteous wrath and anger of Chinese and other Asiatics over Russian encroachments." No doubt the North Korean Communists were quite prepared to take a chance on that "righteous wrath and anger" of the Chinese and perhaps of other Koreans, which might perhaps develop some 10 years from today. According to the account in the New York Herald Tribune, Secretary Acheson also said: "For its own security the United States must and shall maintain armed forces in Japan, the Ryukyu Islands (Okinawa) and the Philippines. But no such line of containment could be drawn in southern and southeast Asia, where the United States had no direct responsibilities and only limited opportunities for action. "He said we would fight if Japan, Okinawa, or the Philippines were attacked. "But we could give no such guaranty to southern and southeast Asia." In other places he made it equally clear that neither Formosa nor Korea was included behind the line upon which the United States would stand. Just for my own satisfaction, I read: "He jabbed sarcastically at Senator Robert A. Taft, Republican, of Ohio, who charged in the Senate yesterday that President Truman and Secretary Acheson had forsaken the policy of containing communism by their refusal to save Formosa." This is quoting Secretary Acheson. "To say that the main motive of American foreign policy was to halt the spread of communism was putting the cart before the horse. The United States was interested in stopping communism chiefly because it had become a subtle instrument of Soviet imperialism." There is nothing, apparently, against communism. At his "American intervention on Formosa would obscure the issue White House press conference, President Truman also took a slap at Senator Taft. Observing that Senator Taft was entitled to his opinion, President Truman added: 'I didn't know he was a military expert, though'." Secretary Acheson made a statement to the Foreign Relations Committee at about the same time. To the Foreign Relations Committee he said the United States would have an impregnable defense line in the Far East, without For mosa. "Secretary Acheson was quoted as making the suggestion to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations yesterday. According to the Senator from Texas [Mr. Connally], the Secretary said Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines were the American line of security in the western Pacific, and that with bases on this line the position would be impregnable. He said he would not speak for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, although he gave the impression that he knew something of their views. He strongly reaffirmed President Truman's stand against sending military forces or military advice to the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa, and he said that he alone was responsible for the State Department's confidential guidance message of December 23, telling its officials abroad to prepare for the loss of Formosa to the Communists. "Acheson said that several important problems had come to a head since Congress adjourned 3 months ago. One of them was possible American recognition of Communist China. On this point he reminded Senators that the Communists now control all of China except a few isolated areas, which the Administration saw no need for haste in recognizing. He said American recognition would depend on future events, including assurances that Chinese Communists would protect the safety of American citizens and obey international law. He distinctly stated that beyond the line laid down the United States could not assure the rest of the Far East against attack." With such a reaffirmation of our Far Eastern policy, is it any wonder that the Korean Communists took us at the word given by the Secretary of State? If we were contemplating the recognition of Communist China, as the Secretary clearly indicated, then ccertainly they could well think that if they could once occupy Korea, they could look forward to recognition by the United States of a Communist Korea. Third, Mr. President, our action in Korea itself invited attack. We withdrew our troops from Korea, because it was said that it was impossible to defend Korea on a military basis. We did, however, declare that we would give armed assistance to Korea. The Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 authorized the President "to furnish military assistance to the Republic of Korea," and, in the second supplemental appropriation act passed October 28, 1949, $10,500,000 was set aside to carry out the provisions of the authorization. Assistant Secretary Webb testified specifically, both before the House and Senate, that the appropriation was sought for the purpose of helping Koreans to deter external aggression. As a matter of fact, however, apparently no part of this appropriation, other than $200, has ever been spent to give military assistance to the Republic of Korea. I talked today with an American Army officer who has been in an important position in Korea for 3 years. He told me that we had never kept our promises to the Koreans, either as to economic assistance or as to military assistance, and that, as a matter of fact, except for the arms left behind, we have sent no military assistance to the Koreans. Furthermore, that has been the official policy of the Administration, contrary to the grounds on which they sought the money, through Secretary Webb's testimony and the request for appropriation. They have actually adopted the policy of only giving aid for internal security. The President's own statement makes that clear. The President's statement says, as will be noted: "In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security-" He did not follow the policy which was authorized by Congress. He did not use the money which was given him for the purpose of opposing external aggression. The policy has been-and it was so testified yesterday before one of the Senate committees by the generals in charge-simply to give them the money to maintain internal security. Certainly the fact of our policy toward the arming of South Korea was well known to the North Koreans, and certainly it was a policy which invited the attack which has occurred. |