"I have also directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

"I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the Associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

"I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance. of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

"I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council."

Since then, the President of the United States on July 19 made the following declaration in a message to the Congress:

"In addition to the direct military effort we and other members of the United Nations are making in Korea, the outbreak of aggression there requires us to consider its implications for peace throughout the world. The attack upon the Republic of Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that the international Communist movement is prepared to use armed invasion to conquer independent nations. We must, therefore, recognize the possibility that armed aggression may take place in other areas.

"In view of this, I have already directed that United States forces in support of the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance be speeded up to the Philippine Government and to the Associated States of Indochina, and to the forces of France in Indochina. I have also ordered the United States Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack upon Formosa, and I have requested the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. These steps were at once reported to the United Nations Security Council.

"Our action in regard to Formosa was a matter of elementary security. The peace and stability of the Pacific area had been violently disturbed by the attack on Korea. Attacks elsewhere in the Pacific area would have enlarged the Korean crisis, thereby rendering much more difficult the carrying out of our obligations to the United Nations in Korea.

"In order that there may be no doubt in any quarter about our intentions regarding Formosa, I wish to state that the United States has no territorial ambitions whatever concerning that island, nor do we seek for ourselves any special position or privilege on Formosa. The present military neutralization of Formosa is without prejudice to political questions affecting that island. Our desire is that Formosa not become embroiled in hostilities disturbing to the peace of the Pacific and that all questions affecting Formosa be settled by peaceful means as envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations. With peace reestablished, even the most complex political questions are susceptible of solution. In the presence of brutal and unprovoked aggression, however, some of these questions may have to be held in abeyance in the interest of the essential security of all.”

These statements and the facts to which they related make perfectly clear certain fundamental points which the people of the world will have clearly in mind:

1. The United States has not encroached on the territory of China, nor has the United States taken aggressive action against China.

2. The action of the United States in regard to Formosa was taken at a time when that island was the scene of conflict with the mainland. More serious conflict was threatened by the public declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities. Such conflict would have threatened the security of the United Nations Forces operating in Korea under the mandate of the Security Council to repel the aggression on the Republic of Korea. They threatened to extend the conflict through the Pacific area.

3. The action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing action addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the mainland. It was an action designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. As President Truman has solemnly declared, we have no designs on Formosa, and our action was not inspired by any desire to acquire a special position for the United States.

4. The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied Forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now.

5. The United States has a record through history of friendship for the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions of Chinese reciprocate it. We took the lead with others in the last United Nations General Assembly to secure approval of a resolution on the integrity of China. Only the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites did not approve that resolution.

6. The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa. We would approve full United Nations investigation here or on the spot. We believe that United Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful, rather than a forceable solution of that problem.

7. We do not believe that the Security Council need be or will be diverted from its consideration of the aggression against the Republic of Korea. There was a breach of the peace in Korea. The aggressor attacked, has been condemned, and the combined forces of the United Nations are now in battle to repel the aggression. Formosa is now at peace and will remain so unless someone resorts to force. If the Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa we shall support and assist that study. Meanwhile, the President of the Security Council should discharge the duties of his office and get on with the item on the agenda which is the Complaint of Aggression Against the Republic of Korea, and, specifically, the recognition of the right of the Korean Ambassador to take his seat and vote on the United States resolution for the localization of the Korean conflict.

I request that this letter be circulated to members of the Security Council.

C. Letter of the President to Ambassador Austin, August 28, 1950

[From New York Times, August 29, 1950]

As I told you on the telephone this morning I want to congratulate you on your able presentation of the views of the United States Government in the Security Council of the United Nations from the first onset of the aggression against the Republic of Korea Throughout the entire course of the proceedings you have represented this Government with great effectiveness and in full accordance with my directions. The letter which you addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations on August 25 on the subject of Formosa admirably sums up the fundamental position of this Government as it had been stated by me on June 27 and in my Message to the Congress on July 19. You have clearly set forth in that letter the heart and essence of the problem. You have faithfully set down my views as they were then and as they are now.

To the end that there be no misunderstanding concerning the position of the Government of the United States with respect to Formosa, it may be useful to repeat here the seven fundamental points which you so clearly stated in your letter to Mr. Lie.

"1. The United States has not encroached on the territory of China, nor has the United States taken aggressive action against China.

"2. The action of the United States in regard to Formosa was taken at a time when that island was the scene of conflict with the mainland. More serious conflict was threatened by the public declaration of the Chinese Communist authorities. Such conflict would have threatened the security of the United Nations forces operating in Korea under the mandate of the Security Council to repel the aggression of the Republic of Korea. They threatened to extend the conflict through the Pacific area.

"3. The action of the United States was an impartial neutralizing action addressed both to the forces on Formosa and to those on the mainland. It was an action designed to keep the peace and was, therefore, in full accord with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. As President Truman has solemnly declared, we have no designs on Formosa, and our action was not inspired by any desire to acquire a special position for the United States.

"4. The action of the United States was expressly stated to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the Allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the Allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now.

"5. The United States has a record through history of friendship for the Chinese people. We still feel the friendship and know that millions of Chinese reciprocate it. We took the lead with others in the last United Nations General Assembly to secure approval of a resolution on the integrity of China. Only the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites did not approve that resolution.

"6. The United States would welcome United Nations consideration of the case of Formosa. We would approve full United Nations investigation here, or on the spot. We believe that United Nations consideration would contribute to a peaceful, rather than a forceable solution of that problem.

"7. We do not believe that the Security Council need be, or will be, diverted from its consideration of the aggression against the Republic of Korea. There was a breach of the peace in Korea. The aggressor attacked, has been condemned, and the combined forces of the United Nations are now in battle to repel the aggression.

"Formosa is now at peace and will remain so unless someone resorts to force.

"If the Security Council wishes to study the question of Formosa we shall support and assist that study. Meanwhile, the president of the Security Council should discharge the duties of his office and get on with the item on the agenda, which is the complaint of aggression against the Republic of Korea, and, specifically, the recognition of the right of the Korean Ambassador to take his seat and the vote on the United States resolution for the localization of the Korean conflict."

These seven points accurately record the position of the United States.

In the forthcoming discussion of the problem in the Security Council you will continue to have my complete support.

Sincerely yours,

AUGUST 27, 1950.

HARRY S. TRUMAN.

D. Message of General MacArthur to Veterans of Foreign Wars

[From New York Times, August 29, 1950]

Your inspiring message of the 17th has moved me deeply and I trust that you will convey to all of my comrades-in-arms of the Veterans of Foreign Wars assembled on the occasion of our Fifty-first Annual National Encampment my assurance that their confidence and support will give this command much added strength to meet the tests of battle which lie immediately ahead.

Tell them that I am happy to report that their successors in arms now engaging the enemy along our battle lines in South Korea are exemplifying that same high standard of devotion, fortitude, and valor which characterized their own march to victory when they themselves engaged in combat in the field.

From senior commanders down through all ranks, their tactical skill, their invincible determination, and their fighting qualities against a fanatical foe, well trained, expertly directed and heavily armed, have upheld our country's finest traditions.

Toward victory, however difficult the road, they are giving an account of themselves which should make every American heart beat with pride and infinite satisfaction.

A New Battle Line

In view of misconceptions currently being voiced concerning the relationship of Formosa to our strategic potential in the Pacific, I believe it in the public interest to avail myself of this opportunity to

state my views thereon to you, all of whom, having fought overseas, understand broad strategic concepts.

To begin with, any appraisal of that strategic potential requires an appreciation of the changes wrought in the course of the past war. Prior thereto the western strategic frontier of the United States lay on the littoral line of the Americas with an exposed island salient extending out through Hawaii, Midway, and Guam to the Philippines.

That salient was not an outpost of strength but an avenue of weakness along which the enemy could and did attack us. The Pacific was a potential area of advancement for any predatory force intent upon striking at the bordering land areas.

All of this was changed by our Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire Pacific Ocean, which has become a vast moat to protect us as long as we hold it.

Indeed, it acts as a protective shield to all of the Americas and all free lands of the Pacific Ocean area we control to the shores of Asia by a chain of islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas held by us and our free Allies. From this island chain we can dominate with air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostock to Singapore and prevent any hostile movement into the Pacific.

Any predatory attack from Asia must be an amphibious effort. No amphibious force can be successful with our control of the sea lanes and the air over these lanes in its avenue of advance. With naval and air supremacy and modern ground elements to defend bases, any major attack from continental Asia toward us or our friends of the Pacific would come to failure.

A Peaceful Lake

Under such conditions the Pacific no longer represents menacing avenues of approach for a prospective invader-it assumes instead the friendly aspect of a peaceful lake. Our line of defense is a natural one and can be maintained with a minimum of military effort and expense.

It envisions no attack against anyone nor does it provide the bastions essential for offensive operations, but properly maintained would be an invincible defense against aggression. If we hold this line we may have peace-lose it and war is inevitable.

The geographic location of Formosa is such that in the hand of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center of this defensive perimeter, 100 to 150 miles closer to the adjacent friendly segments-Okinawa and the Philippines— than any point in continental Asia.

At the present time there is on Formosa a concentration of operational air and naval bases which is potentially greater than any similar concentration of the Asiatic mainland between the Yellow Sea and the Strait of Malacca. Additional bases can be developed in a relatively short time by an aggressive exploitation of all World War II Japanese facilities.

An enemy force utilizing those installations currently available could increase by 100 per cent the air effort which could be directed against Okinawa as compared to operations based on the mainland and at the same time could direct damaging air attacks with fightertype aircraft against friendly installations in the Philippines, which are currently beyond the range of fighters based on the mainland. Our air supremacy at once would become doubtful.