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of only 6 of our 13 allies in Korea. All six, according to the Secretary of State, felt the application of the doctrine of "hot pursuit" was not wise. As a consequence, the decision of the United States military was disregarded.

The action of American officials in connection with the "hot pursuit" question is most difficult to understand. Witnesses agree that the Defense Establishment, after the decision to invoke "hot pursuit" had been approved by all responsible agencies of the American Government, requested the State Department to notify our allies in Korea of our intention to apply this doctrine.

Of course the command function delegated to the United States did not require us to notify our allies.

Testimony indicates that our diplomatic representatives were requested to contact the governments of 6 of our 13 allies in Korea in order to "get the attitude." " It will be noted that this instruction was at variance with the request made by the Defense Department in that (1) Defense requested that our allies be notified and (2) Defense requested all allies be notified.

Secretary of State Acheson testified that our diplomatic representatives were not instructed to urge our allies to concur in acceptance of the "hot pursuit" doctrine.

In spite of numerous questions directed to this point, the committee never did publicly obtain the names of the six nations contacted nor the reason for the failure to contact other participating nations.

The consequence of this informal veto of our command authority is apparent. Enemy aircraft can fly from their Manchurian sanctuary in ever-increasing numbers to attack, not only our Air Forces, but also our Ground Forces in Korea. Failure to apply the "hot pursuit" technique places a life-and-death handicap on our airmen and has cost planes and personnel. While engaged in combat, in high-speed jet planes, our men have the additional obligation of keeping one eye on the Yalu River boundary.

14. The parallel has no military significance

73

The division of Korea was accepted as a devise to effect Japanese surrender." The Soviets, under this arrangement, accepted the surrender of all Japanese troops located north of the thirty-eighth parallel, while the United States forces accepted the surrender of Japanese military units south of the parallel. Although this division was originally accepted as a matter of temporary convenience, it was soon discovered that the Soviet Union regarded it as a definite boundary.

Failing in all efforts to gain Soviet cooperation in the consolidation of Korea, the United States presented the problem to the United Nations.

In November 1947 the General Assembly of the United Nations called for an election in Korea under the observation of a United Nations commission so that the people of Korea could choose a representative national assembly, draft a constitution, and establish a national government.

Soviet-controlled North Korea refused to allow the United Nations commission north of the parallel. As a result the free elections were confined to South Korea and the Republic was established on August 15, 1948.

A month later the Soviets announced the creation of a Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea, claiming jurisdiction over the entire country.

On June 25, 1950, the Communist forces of North Korea began crossing the thirty-eighth parallel in force in a full-scale assault on the Republic of Korea. The lightly armed South Korean constabulary fell back under the weight of the initial thrust.

The President of the United States, with concurrence from his advisers, authorized the use of naval and air units to bolster the defense of South Korea. After an on-the-spot survey, General MacArthur, supreme commander, Allied Powers, advised the President that the situation required the use of ground troops. The President accepted the advice of General MacArthur and ordered the use of United States military units on duty in Japan.

Since that time Korea has become a seesaw battleground. Seoul, the capital, has changed hands four times. UN troops reached the Yalu River last fall and the conflict in Korea seemed near a close. Then the Chinese Communists entered the conflict with four field armies. This enormously expanded the scope of the war.

72 Hearings, p. 2078.

73 See Acheson's address before the American Newspaper Guild, Washington, D. C., June 29, 1950.

The thirty-eighth parallel has been crossed and recrossed as the armies fought up and down the narrow Korean peninsula. Several times the allied forces lost the initiative while waiting for a UN decision as to whether or not the thirtyeighth parallel could be crossed.

The problem of the parallel came up for discussion during the committee hearings. Witnesses appearing before the committee agree that the parallel has no military significance. General Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave his views on the matter as follows:

"From a military point of view, as I have said, the thirty-eighth parallel means nothing, but we must realize politically it may have a lot of significance and that is why we would have liked to have some guidance along that area, which has not been given to us as yet by the United Nations."

99 74

15. The political significance of the thirty-eighth parallel has never been satisfactorily explained

* * *

It would be expected, of all the witnesses, that Secretary of State Acheson could best explain the political significance of the thirty-eighth parallel. Nevertheless no clear exposition was forthcoming. He did say that "I think there was understanding about the policy, but some of the nations associated with us did not think that there should be military decisions to advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel until the policy decision to do so had been taken by the United Nations, particularly by the nations contributing forces." 75 On the same subject Secretary of Defense Marshall said:

"We regarded that there was no, you might say, legal prohibition against passing the thirty-eighth parallel; for that purpose, he would go ahead and do it; but a major advance beyond the thirty-eighth parallel at this particular time when the situation had been restored was not to be undertaken without the approval, specific approval, of the Government." 76

16. Limited war is impossible to define

The committee has heard much about "limited war." This is a new concept in warfare. Efforts to define limited war, to discover what the phrase means, have met with evasion.

Some historical examples of limited war were cited but it turned out that in each case the limitation was imposed by the inability of the commander to bring maximum power to bear. No illustration was given of a commander conducting a limited war when he had the opportunity for offensive effort and the resources to back it up.

The enemy in Korea fought with no holds barred. They had no Navy or they would have used it. They had a small air force, which was steadily expanded as the war went on and the full strength of this air force was thrown into battle.

We did have inescapable handicaps; witnesses testified to our limitations. But the idea of not exploiting the resources available in the face of an enemy exerting all his power is to us indefensible.

17. The identity of our real enemy has been established

Some witnesses-but not all-showed hesitation in identifying the real enemy with whom we have been engaged. That the outbreak in Korea was no local operation was manifest from the start. Subsequently, as the Chinese Communists poured in and planes and weapons of Russian manufacture appeared upon the scene, we had a practical demonstration of what Americans had already surmised that the Korean aggression was an international Communist action. General MacArthur so identified it as did Secretary Acheson, indirectly when he said that there was "Russian dominance in that (Chinese) regime." 18. The Russian domination of Communist China was already known

77

99 78

The fact that Russia had an overwhelming influence in Communist China has been long known. For instance, Army Intelligence in 1945 drew up a documented report which demonstrated this influence and domination. A persistent and disturbing factor has been the reluctance of some State Department officials to

74 Op. cit., p. 1072.

75 Ibid., p. 2031.

76 Ibid., p. 340.

77 Ibid., p. 142.

78 Ibid., p. 2109.

accept this authoritative evidence. For instance, at the very time (1945) that Army Intelligence drafted its report, a trusted Foreign Service officer of the State Department, upon his return from an extended trip into the Red-controlled portions of China, told an American journalist that "the so-called Communists are agrarian reformers of a mild, democratic stripe more than anything else." During these hearings Secretary Marshall himself, reflecting on his experiences in China in 1947, said:

99 79

"When I got out to China and looked the ground over, from the very start, and there was no doubt that the leadership of this group were Marxist Communists, and so stated in my presence, and insisted, in my presence, that they were.

"And, when I visited Yenan, in that mountain fastness of theirs, in their little theater building which they used for all sorts of purposes, and they had some kind of entertainment prepared for me-over the proscenium arch, was a large picture of Stalin; and I recall Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist Prime Minister, came to me protestign, in Chungking, in the late winter or early spring of 1946, against the dragging of Stalin's portrait through the streets, in the mud.

"I have heard him assert not once but a number of times that he was a Marxist Communist. His story always was that they would approach the desired end, which was a Communist form of government, through, first the democratic processes, as they called them, until there was enough stability and industrial strength and development to permit them to go the whole way to a Marxist Communist state.

"The only phase of the agrarian belief would have been, I should suppose, the fact that most of the members of the party were of the agrarian type, as there were almost no industries within the Communist bounds in the early days of China.

"There was never any doubt in my mind, and never any though there was any misunderstanding about it.'

99 80

19. There has been a lack of adequate military support from United Nations allies The Korean War was supposed to be a United Nations action. Forty-seven members of the international organization formally supported the operation but few contributed much practical assistance. (Turkey, considering her resources, was a notable exception.) The plain truth is that the United States has footed most of the bill in money and has furnished most of the men and equipment. Ninety percent of the casualties were American. Contributions of our UN allies total:

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1 The 10,000 listed as manning ships from United Kingdom include personnel aboard ships of British Commonwealth countries.

2 Exact number of New Zealanders unavailable.

NOTE. In addition to the forces listed above, which are actually in the Korean area, a few other small contingents have been promised.

Source: Hanson Baldwin, the New York Times, July 9, 1951.

We are unable to comprehend why the administration persisted in its attitude of refusing the offer of 33,000 fighting men advanced by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. At first administration spokesmen stated that any acceptance would result in an open invitation to extend the war to Red China. After the Chinese

79 Congressional Record, June 5, 1951, p. 6298 (Raymond Ludden, Foreign Service officer). 80 Hearing, p. 377.

Communists entered the war the excuse for still refusing the Nationalistic troops was that this might provoke Russia into interfering in the Korean War.

The experience of our fighting men on the battlefields of Korea raise serious questions about the strength of the theory of collective security as it has been implemented thus far.

20. Some of our allies have displayed an unfortunate attitude with respect to economic sanctions against Red China

The attitude of some of our allies on the issue of applying economic sanctions against Communist China has been most discouraging. The lack of prompt, strong, positive American leadership on this question no doubt contributed to the confused manner in which sanctions have been applied, 6 months after Chinese Communist aggression took place. It is most difficult to understand the willingness of nations to trade with a common enemy and take increased profits from the bloody conflict in Korea.

82

The technical definition of "goods which contribute to the war potential of the enemy" is not the real issue. It is the moral question which must be faced in a positive manner or it will undermine the United Nations and the world's latest effort to achieve peace through collective security.

World War II resulted from the failure to apply economic sanctions against the Fascist aggressors in the 1930's. This recent lesson should still be in sharp focus. The economy of China is at best precarious. Almost any commodity which Red China wants is of vital necessity to that nation's ability to wage war. The United Nations waited precious months before taking a hesitant step in applying economic sanctions. Strict adherence to these sanctions by all nations would be a realistic way in which to support the cause of collective security. Economic sanctions are only as effective as is the will to resist the desire for profit of any member of the UN. One nation, failing to cooperate, will render useless the efforts of all others.

21. The Secretary of State has assumed military functions

A flagrant example of political interference in military decisions occurred in relation to the bombing of Rachin.

Rachin is an important supply depot located in northeast Korea close to the Siberian boundary near Vladivostok.

83

General MacArthur testified that as a military decision he recommended the bombing of this town. This recommendation was approved by the JCS 84 and on one occasion an air strike was made on this target. On another occasion, the bombers returned because of poor visibility.

Gen. Emmet O'Donnell, commander of the Far East Bomber Command, testified that Rachin could be "bombarded and destroyed without any damage to or encroachment on Soviet territory."

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Yet under interrogation by Senator Cain, Secretary Acheson admitted that though he had no qualifications to evaluate military problems, nevertheless he objected to the bombing of Rachin holding that it was an "unimportant military supply center" the bombing of which "might cause involvement with the Soviet Union and the extension of hostilities." Accordingly the authority of our Air Force to attack this enemy base was withdrawn.

9 86

State Department meddling in military matters is not new. Former Secretary of Defense Johnson testified "there had been trouble in Mr. Forrestal's time, and there was trouble in my time, and we tried to correct it. The Military Department is supposed to be concerned with military power; the State Department with political objectives, and when it comes up to the top we have to reconcile or else the Security Council and the President have to reconcile." 87 22. The Communist objective is to take over "lock, stock, and barrel" any government of which communists become a part

The American people have long been puzzled as to how and why a coalition government of the Nationalists and the Communists was contemplated in China. The testimony of our State Department has been to the effect that the idea of a Communist coalition government originated with the Chinese Nationalists.8

82 See appendix III for the responses received thus far from United Nations members regarding sanctions.

83 Hearings, p. 17.

84 Ibid., p. 2276.

Ibid., p. 3068.

86 Ibid., p. 2276.

87 Ibid., p. 2577.

88 An allegation which is denied by officials of the Chinese Republic who claim the idea originated with the Chinese Communists.

882

The testimony of General Hurley, however, was to the effect that a group within the State Department, attached to the American Embassy in China, worked toward that end. The testimony of General Marshall corroborates the conclusion that an arms embargo and the threat of ending American military assistance was used to force Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to admit Communist elements into the government.

88b

In the light of our previous experience in Poland, where communistic elements soon absorbed the whole government, and in other Balkan and central European countries, it should have been clear, and it was clear to all realistic Americans, that oil and water could not mix. Yet, on June 6, 1951, the Secretary of State was asked by Senator Wiley:

"Was there ever any chance in your opinion of actually bringing the two Chinese groups together to work in harmony?"

To which the Secretary replied:

“Yes, sir. This was the constant effort carried out through General Stilwell, Wedemeyer, Mr. Hurley, as the President's personal representative, and General Marshall after the war. It was the official policy of both the Nationalists and the Communists, and it was the view of all our military people that it was possible and it was the only way to get real Chinese fighting against the Japanese.”

89

On June 7, however, Senator Wiley asked the Secretary of State whether or not it was the objective of the Communists to take over every government in which they were a component part.

When Mr. Acheson evaded the question, Senator Wiley asked:

“That is the objective everywhere, isn't it?”

To which President Truman's Secretary of State replied:

"Yes, sir. That is their objective.” “

A A comparison of the conflicting testimony of the Secretary of State on June 6 and June 7 cannot help but convince an unprejudiced, objective analyst that we urged the Generalissimo to take into his government Communist components with the full knowledge that we were requesting him to embrace the elements of his destruction.

23. The United States will support the Government of the Republic of China All witnesses have agreed that it is and has been the firm and continuing policy of the Government of the United States to support the Government of the Republic of China. The United States recognized the Nationalist Government as the legal Government of China, as a faithful war ally, as the Government which was one of the founders of the United Nations and as a charter member of the Security Council.

90

All witnesses agreed it would be unthinkable that any government could “shoot its way into the United Nations.” Secretary Acheson stated that the Truman administration will strongly oppose the entry of Communist China into the United Nations as our representatives have done on 76 occasions when this issue was raised in the past. The Secretary of State reiterated previous statements to the effect that the United States would not exercise a veto on this issue, but he added that our Government would take the question to the Court of International Justice at The Hague if the United States ever found itself in the minority on a vote on this question.

No single individual at any time advocated, before this committee, the unseating of the Nationalist Government or the seating of the Communist government in the United Nations. Time will tell whether the administration will hold to this admirable determination or whether they will again yield to pressure. 24. Mismanagement and corruption in government is not confined to the Orient We acknowledge that, in some instances, the National Government of Chiang Kai-shek is alleged to have been corrupt and decadent. It is equally true that this allegation is not unique in the twentieth-century world. Certainly there can be no greater corruption than that found in the Communist world wherein whole nations are forcibly brought to slavery by an organized minority which maintains itself by the force of sheer brutality.

It ill behooves the Government of the United States to level charges of corruption or decadence against any friendly nation. "People who live in glass bouses should not throw stones." "1

88a Ibid., p. 2905.

88b Ibid., p. 555, supra.

89 Ibid., p. 1986.

90 Ibid., p. 1728.

91 Deep freeze, pastel mink, RFC, and organized crime and dope would furnish ample material for a Chinese writer to discuss corruption in some other quarter.

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