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in China. I have asked that the name of the city not be used because I am advised that we are not sure that the people involved in this are all in a safe place."

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The Secretary clearly states: "This is from the chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce.' ."" and then read the long telegram into the record. It was a bitter indictment of the Nationalist regime, containing such statements as: "Through our support of a decadent and ineffectual Nationalist Government, we have, not without a measure of truth, been accused of being party to the rape and eventual abandonment of the large part of China, and the people therein, to communism.” 28

Senator Knowland immediately raised objection to the reading of an anonymous telegram into the record and requested that the signatures be presented." Senator Wiley asked whether the signatures were Englishmen, Americans, or Chinese, to which Secretary Acheson replied, "This was sent from the American Chamber of Commerce in a city," but continued to say, "I do not know whether individuals' names were on it." Yet, when Senator Knowland pursued by asking, "Then it is an anonymous telegram?" the Secretary replied, "Well, no, this is a telegram from the consul saying that the American Chamber of Commerce asked him. * ** *" To this, Senator Brewster replied, "You mean there is no name at all?" and the Secretary responded, "I do not know." 30

Senator Knowland pointed out that the telegram might have been sent by a fellow traveler or even a Communist, and it was later disclosed that the city from which the telegram originated was, at the time the telegram was sent, in Communist hands.30

When asked by Chairman Russell the present location of the consul, the Secretary responded, "I will have to find that out, sir." "1

Senator Smith of New Jersey inquired if the source of the telegram was investigated by the State Department in order to establish the reliability of the individuals or the group, and Secretary Acheson replied: "Well, I cannot tell you whether the investigation was made in China."

These rather embarrassing developments led Senator Russell to again explain that the State Department had presented the telegram in executive session of the Armed Services Committee a year or a year and a half ago; that it had "quite an impact on me at the time *** and it made a very vivid impression on me." 32

Now, we have here the State Department of the United States submitting a telegram which they claim came from the chairman of an American chamber of commerce in an undisclosed city which bitterly attacks our ally, Chiang Kai-shek.

Without knowing whether the communication is signed or whether indeed it had originated from any chamber of commerce and without conducting any investigation to determine the reliability of the informant, the Secretary of State of his own volition, at the time when our ally needed our support introduced this anonymous communication into the executive testimony, creating such an impact that, as Chairman Russell stated:

"The thing that discouraged me more in that position [support of Chiang Kaishek] than any other single thing was a telegram from the United States Chamber of Commerce in one of the largest cities of China."

The only conclusion that we can draw from this story is that the Secretary of State abandoned the use of his critical faculties and judgment when it came to evaluating any evidence which supported the Communist viewpoint. 16. The problem of Communist infiltration in our Government is still unresolved It is common knowledge that efforts toward Communist infiltration of the State Department have been persistent over the years. This is no idle charge. After long continued congressional pressure, some few convictions have been secured. Today Carl Marzani is serving a penitentiary sentence for concealing the fact that he had been a Communist organizer. The confessions of Julian Wadleigh were made under oath. Alger Hiss, one of President Roosevelt's confidential advisers, was convicted of perjury, involving his contacts with a Communist espionage ring operating within the Federal Government, and is now in prison.

20 Ibid., p. 1971. 27 Ibid., p. 1972. 28 Ibid., p. 1973. 29 Ibid., p. 1973. 30 Ibid., p. 1974. 31 Ibid., p. 1974. 32 Ibid., p. 1975.

This Communist infiltration has been a critical problem since 1933. At some stage, not yet clear to this committee, Communist influence began to affect our Far East policy. We have had the policy under review during these hearings. Witnesses discussed the activities of the State Department group who favored the Chinese Communists. We are satisfied that the truth about the pro-Communist State Department group has not yet been revealed. It should be noted that since the conclusion of these hearings the State Department has reluctantly admitted that it has numerous major loyalty cases under review.

The Executive has done nothing to assist Congress in its efforts to get at the truth about this infiltration. His consistent tactic is to refuse access to the full records when Congress asks for it. His consistent rejoinder to charges is the phrase "red herring."

There can be no confidence, no unity of purpose until this administration makes available to the public the facts; until the Executive demonstrates the desire to remove from our national institutions those who seek to destroy America. In the light of the continuous disclosures as to the substantial number of security risks discharged by the State Department, it is obvious that a serious situation of Communist infiltration has existed and still endangers our national security.

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17. The advice and information of our ablest and most experienced officials has been ignored

The inquiry revealed that it has become the habitual practice of the Executive to make decisions without thorough consultation with the ablest and most competent officials on the scene of action.

The testimony is replete with examples of this practice. A few are cited: (a) The failure to consult MacArthur relative to the Yalta Conference.* (b) The failure to inform Ambassador Hurley about the Yalta agreement at the time when he was actively representing this Government in China. (c) The granting of the Polish loan to the Communist satellite government over the vigorous protests of Arthur Bliss Lane, our Ambassador to Poland at the time.

(d) Failure to consult MacArthur before decision to fight in Korea. (e) Failure of Marshall, on his way to China, to consult MacArthur on the Far East situation.

(f) Failure to adopt General Wedemeyer's recommendations on China and Korea as well as the suppression of his report.

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(g) Failure to follow Admiral Leahy's advice regarding the necessity for Russian entry into the Pacific War.

(h) Failure to follow the recommendations of Angus Ward and his subsequent exile to an obscure post in Africa.

(i) Failure to accept the advice of Admiral Badger relative to military assistance to the Republic of China.

This method of operation by our State Department has had devastating effects upon our Foreign Service officers. It has apparently resulted in a frustration

and inertia, which has reacted unfavorably to our national security. The confidence and harmonious operation of our foreign relations demands that this tendency be reversed and that those who are entrusted with the responsibility of representing our Government abroad be kept informed and allowed to exercise their authority in conformance with our democratic traditions.

18. The Constitution of the United States provides that the Congress has the sole power to declare war

Although these hearings commenced as an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the recall of the General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, it was soon apparent that there was an underlying question of great constitutional significance; namely, the right of the Executive to involve this Nation in a war without consent of the Congress of the United States. In buttressing the position of the administration, citations have been made in the public record of over

33 To support this contention, it must be noted that on July 9, 1951, Senator McCarran (Democrat, Nevada), chairman of the recently created Senate Committee on Internal Security, announced after an executive session that "Facts have been developed which show definite Communist slanting of the Voice of America broadcasts, publications, and moving pictures sent abroad which are supposed to give the American viewpoint in the fight against communism."

34 Op. cit., p. 128.

35 Ibid., p. 2836.

36 Ibid., p. 2293, supra.

150 instances where the Executive, utilizing his authority as Commander in Chief, has used the Armed Forces of the United States without the consent of Congress."

House Document No. 127 shows that whenever the President has used the Armed Forces without the consent of Congress he has done it "as a result of direct aggression upon those forces or in protection of American lives or property."

In the Korean case, the Executive authorized large-scale military operations without the consent of the Congress. Since the President could make a personal decision of this character again, the constitutional question must be resolved. The use of military forces to the extent of the Korean conflict falls squarely within the constitutional provisions of the war-making power of Congress, therefore, the action on the part of the Executive to intervene without the prior consent of Congress or immediate subsequent approval was ill-advised and should not be allowed to remain as a precedent in our constitutional history.

PART VI. CONCLUSIONS

An inquiry of the type of the MacArthur hearings would accomplish little for the public good unless those who participated arrived at some firm conclusions the implementation of which will strengthen our country.

We have examined all of the facts and in good faith submit to the public the following conclusions:

1. The inquiry was in the public interest

The inquiry into the military situation in the Far East and the facts surrounding the relief of General MacArthur has been very productive. As a result of the extensive testimony the public and the Members of Congress have for the first time in a decade been informed as to our policies in the Far East.

The hearings have revealed glaring mistakes, evasions, contradictions, and significant admissions which will enable the American people to more properly evaluate our future course of action.

We are satisfied that this investigation was in the public interest.

2. The removal of General MacArthur was within the constitutional power of the President, but the circumstances were a shock to the national pride Without debating the right of the President to remove any military leader it must be pointed out that the reasons assigned for the removal of General MacArthur were utterly inadequate to justify the act.

The "justification" for removal seems to have been built up after the removal rather than before.

The removal came 8 months after the victorious landing at Inchon, a military operation of an extremely hazardous character so brilliantly carried out as to rouse the outspoken admiration of all professional soldiers and our people generally.

Far more serious were the effects in the Far East of his curt and precipitate dismissal. There, perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, prestige is associated with dignity and a due regard for decorum. General MacArthur was our senior general, a former Chief of Staff, and a distinguished commander in two World Wars.

His position in the Far East was unparalleled. He not only held the highest United States command, but he was also the general of the United States forces in Korea and supreme commander of the combined forces of the United Nations. He held these positions while still in command of and responsible for occupied Japan. As the executive, in carrying out the reconstruction of that defeated empire, he acted with extraordinary success. His energetic, intrepid, and vigorous prosecution of the conflict in Korea had deepened the regard in which he was justly held. That such an officer should be discarded overnight, as though he was merely a disgruntled subordinate, is deplorable. The unseeming haste of the dismissal further compromised the position of the United States, a position already badly shaken as a result of the unhappy events of the past 6 years.

Furthermore, there were still other serious repercussions. General MacArthur, testifying before the joint committee, said that "I have never known it in the American Army, and I know of no precedents any place. Being summarily relieved in that way made it impossible to carry out directives that I was working

Op. cit., H. Rept. No. 127, as quoted in detail under item 12, Agreements.

on at that moment. I had to turn them over to my successor, an admirable officer in every respect, General Ridgway, who was 350 miles away on the Korean front. I don't think there is any question that the interest of the United States was jeopardized in such a summary mode of turning over great responsibilities which involve the security of the country."

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3. There was no serious disagreement between General MacArthur and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to military strategy in Korea

The military played no part in initiating or recommending the recall of General MacArthur. The record reveals direct testimony from Secretary Marshall, General Bradley, General Collins, General Vandenberg, and Admiral Sherman on this question. These witnesses testified clearly and unequivocally that the military no more than concurred in a previously made decision to recall General MacArthur.

At the outset, General Bradley refused to divulge conversations with the President, or to enumerate persons whom the President consulted relative to General MacArthur's recall. Under examination by Senator Wiley, General Bradley indicated that President Truman had not, however, requested General Bradley to maintain such matters confidential. Thus, General Bradley on his own initiative refused to give the details and would only give the conclusions of the talks.

When Senator Wiley made a motion to require General Bradley to divulge the actual conversations the chairman ruled against him and the committee upheld General Bradley's refusal to talk. Subsequent witnesses also refused to give the details of what went on in the White House conferences.

In any event, no evidence was presented to prove that any of the military had been responsible for initiating the action for General MacArthur's dismissal. Lastly, it should be noted that the committee still remains in the dark as to precisely what civilian influences were instrumental in the ouster of General MacArthur.39

4. Our Armed Forces have acquitted themselves with gallantry

In the midst of the sober reflections provoked by much that the inquiry has brought forth, we do not forget that in one respect the national honor has been nobly upheld: Our Armed Forces-land, sea, and air-have acquitted themselves with a gallantry unsurpassed in our history. If the recent conduct of our foreign affairs has been disheartening, the same cannot be said of the behavior of the heroic men and women who were given all but impossible tasks to carry out. The forces first ordered into Korea were largely green troops. Assigned to stem as best they could the advance of an enemy overwhelming in numbers and battle experience, these sholdiers distinguished themselves by their fortitude. They were stubborn in retreat, suffering, as they had to do, reverses most punishing to morale.

Later, in the landings at Inchon, the superb coordination in action of all branches of the services roused universal admiration.

Above all, as the fighting has ebbed and flowed with no clear goal of victory to hearten and sustain them our forces have faithfully performed as the command directed.

The traditions of Lexington, Gettysburg, the Argonne, the Bulge, and Coral Sea, and Iwo Jima, have been upheld. In a world and time when stamina is being challenged on every hand, we may recall a surgeon's statement of the conditions under which the First Marine Division conducted their retreat from Hungham in December 1950:

*

"Thirty degrees below zero weather with no fires or warming tents, frozen C rations for food, snow for water, and the hills lined with screaming Chinese for 16 bloody miles * *. Men arrived in Hajarn with a shell of ice around their feet inside their boots. Fifteen hundred were evacuated * * * by air, the remaining either being minor or the men refused to turn in, despite the pain and danger of permanent injury, in their desire to fight their way out with their comrades."

Such valor in the battle line deserves something better than indecision, irresolution, and equivocation in the ultimate center of command.

5. The administration's Far East policy has been a catastrophic failure

A candid survey of the position which the United States now occupies in the Orient leads to the conclusion that the adminstraton's management of affairs in

38 Hearings, p. 26.

39 Ibid., p. 763, supra.

the Far East represents the most desolate failure in the history of our foreign policy. This management has been heedless in its neglect of our interests; the upshot has been catastrophe. The single exception in the record is provided by Japan, where the reputation of the United States for firmness, generosity, and fair dealing has been nobly upheld. The irony provided by this exception lies in the fact that the person most responsible for our success in Japan-Gen. Douglas MacArthur-is the man whose dimissal provoked the investigation in which we have been engaged.

Let us briefly recall the historical background against which this catastrophe was played out:

For many years the Far East was a region of ancient and enfeebled kingdoms, intermittently subjected to the impositions and rapacity of predatory colonial powers. In these long-continued aggressions the United States had never participated. On the contrary, the United States had been scrupulous in carrying out agreements freely negotiated and had attained an enviable position in the esteem of oriental peoples.

Toward the close of the nineteenth century, the rivalry of the colonial powers in China had become so intense, the encroachments of Russia on the southern boundary of Siberia so threatening, that an international war seemed unavoidable. In this situation the United States stated in the most categorical terms the position it had assumed in respect to China; it insisted upon the integrity of that country. Thereafter, over a period of years, this position was reaffirmed.

(Examples: The Open Door Note, 1899; the Boxer Rebellion Circular, 1900; the Nine Power Treaty, 1922; Secretary Hull's demands on the Japanese Ambassadors, 1941.)

In effect, the United States in its relations with China had adopted a selfdenying ordinance, and so swift was the growth of American domestic wealth and strength that the power of its example was a persuasive argument against aggression by others.

In 1941, Japan directly challenged the position of the United States, and war followed. War in Europe, for other reasons, was an immediate concomitant and the preoccupation with European war meant that minimum resources of men and matériel could be devoted to the Pacific conflict. With this minimum, the Armed Forces of the United States-land, sea, and air-raised the far-eastern prestige of America to a height never before attained. Forswearing all idea of conquest, with the promise of Philippine independence fulfilled, Americans could justly say that the reputation of their country in the Far East was at its zenith.

Then, with an appalling swiftness, the position of the United States was undermined, compromised, and finally shattered. For this ruinous collapse, the administration in general and the State Department in particular has a direct and dreadful responsibility.

For years, the Russian Communists had plainly stated that international revolution was their aim. An international conspiratorial apparatus was under their control and in this apparatus the Chinese Communists had important places. Their hope of capturing the whole of China was freely acknowledged, their umbilical connection with Moscow well understood. The most intransigent enemy of the Chinese Communists was Chiang Kai-shek, and, for years before Pearl Harbor, he had carried on a war both against the invading Japanese and the Chinese Communists.

In 1913, at Cairo, the United States had made the most solemn undertaking that Korea should be set free and that territories previously wrested from the Chinese Republic should be restored. At the time of President Roosevelt's death on April 12, 1945, these commitments were presumably still in force. The secret agreements at Yalta were then unknown, not a single Russian soldier was engaged in the Far East, and the forces of the United States were within striking distance of the very heart of Japan.

On August 8, 1945, the Russians entered Manchuria, and after a few days of skirmishing, the Japanese resistance on the Asiatic mainland was over. There followed the movement of the Chinese Communists into the vacuum which the Russians conveniently provided. Later in the year (December 15, 1945), a formal demand by President Truman was served upon the Chinese calling for a cessation of hostilities between the Nationalists and the Communists and insisting that a "national conference of representatives of major political elements in the country agree upon arrangements which would give those elements a fair and effective representation in the Chinese National Government." In this manner the fatal coalition policy was imposed upon our ally.

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