the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the one hand, and MacArthur, on the other hand, could have been reconciled. The transcript of record of the hearings satisfied me that in all probability it would have been impossible at such a conference to find any acceptable basis of reconciliation. MacArthur's proposal to expand the war to the mainland of China at a time when the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were satisfied that our offensive power was not yet strong enough to run the risk of an all-out war with Russia, was opposed strongly as a matter of policy not only by the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but also by our allies within the United Nations.

However, I think that MacArthur's brilliant past service in his various military positions throughout his long career entitled him to an opportunity to be heard at such a White House conference, before a final decision was made relative to his dismissal. If at such a conference a basis of reconciliation between MacArthur and his superiors could not have been found, then I think the President and General MacArthur, keeping in mind the best interests of national unity, should have attempted to set forth their differences of viewpoint in a dignified joint public statement, closing with the announcement that in view of those differences it had been agreed between them that MacArthur should submit his resignation as commander in the field, and that the President had accepted the resignation.

Nevertheless, the fact cannot be escaped that although one may differ with the procedure which was followed in removing MacArthur from his command, the controlling issue still remains, Was the President justified in removing him?

My Republican colleagues either in the joint statement by eight of them or in the separate statements by two of them, avoid a consideration of that basic issue by discussing matters irrelevant and immaterial to it.

Where do we find the answer to that issue? We find it in the transcript of record taken throughout the hearings. It is a record which was made by witnesses testifying under oath, and it contains not only their testimony but a large number of exhibits which tell the story of the frictions and differences which developed between MacArthur and his superiors, including both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President of the United States. It is a record which satisfied me completely that the President was not only justified in recalling MacArthur, but in view of MacArthur's conduct over the months since the outbreak of the Korean War, it became the President's duty to recall him. In fact, I think he should have recalled him many months before he did. The record of the hearings makes perfectly clear that MacArthur, in both his speech before the Congress and his testimony before the committee, sought to leave the false impression that the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with his proposals to carry the war to the mainland of China, when the contrary was the fact. The record of the hearings shows that MacArthur was so out of sympathy with the military and foreign policy of his Government in Asia that he and his superiors came to deal at arm's length with each other at a time when complete mutual confidence and teamwork cooperation were essential in the interest of national security.

MacArthur's ultimatum to the Chinese Communist leaders to meet with him on the field of battle and negotiate a truce or be threatened with extension of the war to the mainland of China, which he knew at the time was contrary to the military and foreign policy of his Government and of the United Nations, was inexcusable and indefensible. It alone would have been adequate grounds for his recall because the record of the hearings shows that beyond doubt his ultimatum greatly embarrassed the President, who at that time was seeking to carry out negotiation within the United Nations for an agreement among our allies on terms and conditions which should be offered as a basis of a truce in Korea. It is highly probable that MacArthur's ultimatum to the Chinese Communist leaders in regard to a truce, including his threat to expand the war to the mainland of China, if they did not comply with the ultimatum, destroyed the best chance that the United Nations have had for negotiating an honorable peace in Korea. The dissension within the United Nations which the MacArthur ultimatum created played into the Russian Communist propaganda tactics. For days thereafter, the Russian propaganda line followed the big lie technique of misrepresenting the actual facts and sought to give an exaggerated impression that most of the members of the United Nations were out of sympathy with the policies of the United States in Asia, when the fact is they only opposed the policies as enunciated by MacArthur.

Be that as it may, the official record of the hearings shows that MacArthur's ultimatum did cause a discontinuance of further discussions between our Government and the foreign ministers of our allies in the United Nations, until such a

time as the policy of the United States in respect to MacArthur's proposal of expanding the war to the mainland of China was clarified.

In his speeches in this country since his recall, MacArthur has clearly convicted himself of having been so out of sympathy with the military and foreign policy of his Government that any President of the United States, be he Democrat or Republican, would have been derelict in his duty had he not removed such a commander from the field.

My Republican colleagues cannot escape the fact that the supremacy of a basic constitutional doctrine of vital importance to the freedom and liberty of every American was threatened by MacArthur's conduct; namely, the supremacy of civilian government over military cliques. Whenever a military commander wishes to conduct himself as MacArthur did and seeks to set himself up as a competing voice with that of the President on American military and foreign policy, he should first resign his command, put on civilian clothes, and carry the issue as a civilian to the people of the United States. That MacArthur did not do. Therefore, his recall was necessitated by his own misconduct.

The American people owe a great deal of gratitude for the courage and devotion to duty of the Secretary of Defense and the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who unanimously testified that MacArthur's course of action justified his recall. It is of course very regrettable that in such a critical period of our history at a time when unity of purpose among our people is essential to our national security, such an incident as the MacArthur case should have arisen to divide our people. However, one of the great strengths of our system of self-government is the devotion of our people to constitutional principles. History has taught us that we will remain strong in our individual liberties only to the extent that we hold fast to the checks and balances of our Constitution.

As the MacArthur case passes into history, it will have left another indelible lesson for future generations of Americans to profit by, namely, the preservation of a system of government by law requires that officials of government, both those in military and civilian posts, must not attempt to exceed their line of command or authority.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,

WAYNE MORSE.

APPENDIX TT

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Washington, August 17, 1951.

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,

United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your request, made during the course of my testimony before the combined Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, that the following be submitted for the record of the hearings:

(a) The text of all of General MacArthur's statements which are regarded as having significance in connection with his dismissal.

(b) A full explanation as to why it is contended that of each of these statements was considered to be in violation of directives or in conflict with known policies of the United States.

In fulfilling this request, I must point out initially that the President has stated that while the culminating factor in his decision was the publicly announced offer by General MacArthur on March 24, 1951, to negotiate a settlement of the Korean conflict with the commander of the enemy forces, he had considered the necessity of relieving him on several previous occasions, because of public statements by General MacArthur voicing disagreement or discontent with the policies of his Government. President Truman cited specifically the occasion of General MacArthur's proposed message to the VFW which the President directed him to withdraw on August 26, 1950. At that time, you may recall, the reason for the President's action was stated to be that he felt there could be but one voice expressing the foreign policy of the United States.

I should also point out that there was no attempt to draw up a bill of particulars at the time of the discussions between the President and his advisers preceding General MacArthur's relief. Notwithstanding this, I am listing below some statements by General MacArthur which I regard as having significance in connection with his relief, together with my views as to why it was considered that each of these statements was in violation of directives or in conflict with known policies of the United States. In view of the fact that some of the state

ments or messages are rather long, and because the full text of each of them has already been printed in the document Compilation of Certain Published Information on the Military Situation in the Far East, I shall not repeat their text as you have requested. A page reference in the document mentioned is indicated for each statement.

(a) General MacArthur's proposed message to the VFW (p. 115)

In the message directing General MacArthur to withdraw this message, it was stated that various features of it with respect to Formosa were in conflict with the policy of the United States and its position in the United Nations. Specifically, it was considered that the policy advocated by General MacArthur with regard to Formosa did not agree in all respects with the statement of policy expressed by President Truman in his message to Congress on July 19, 1950, which was reiterated by Ambassador Austin in a letter to Secretary General Trygve Lie, dated August 25, 1950.

(b) The exchange of messages with Arthur Krock, dated November 29 and 30 1950 (p. 137); General MacArthur's answers to question put to him by a reporter from the United States News and World Report, first published in the New York Times on December 2, 1950 (p. 174); General MacArthur's message to Mr. Hugh Baillie, president of the United Press, dated December 1, 1950 (p. 176).

These three statements, made almost simultaneously, did not violate any specific directive. Each of them did, however, include comments relating to military-political decisions which had been made with regard to the conduct of the Korean conflict, and to matters affecting our relations with our United Nations allies. Traditionally, such comments by a military commander are submitted for clearance beforehand.

The Presidential directive of December 5, 1950, requiring prior clearance of statements concerning military or foreign policy, was in large measure generated because of these statements.

(c) General MacArthur's statement of February 13, 1951 (p. 181)

The fourth and fifth paragraphs of this statement were considered to be comments on established military policies. Meticulous compliance with the directive of December 5 1950, would have required that this statement be submitted for prior clearance.

(d) General MacArthur's statement of March 7, 1951 (p. 182)

The last paragraph of this statement was considered to be a comment affecting both foreign and military policies. It should therefore have been submitted for prior clearance in accordance with the December 5, 1950, directive. (e) General MacArthur's announcement of March 24, 1951 (p. 23)

This statement was considered to be a direct and complete violation of the directive of December 5, 1950. Apart from this violation, the statement was particularly ill-advised and ill-timed in view of the fact that General MacArthur had been informed on March 20 that the President was planning an announcement relative to a possible settlement in Korea. The effect of this statement, with its implied threat of the expansion of military operations to Red China if General MacArthur's invitation were not accepted, and because of its impact on the negotiations then being conducted with our United Nations allies as to the terms of the possible settlement, was to cause the President's proposal to be abandoned.

(f) General MacArthur's letter to Representative Martin, dated March 20, 1951 (p. 185)

This letter indicated once more General MacArthur's inability to give his wholehearted support to the foreign and military policies of his Government. Both directly and implicitly it took issue with the political and military decisions to delimit the area of the Korean conflict, if possible, and therefore to avoid the risk of using Chinese Nationalist troops. Still further, the next to last paragraph, emphasizing the importance of the Asian area over Europe, was a direct foreign-policy statement involving the reactions of all our allies in Western Europe and complicating our dealings with them. Once again the question was raised of whose voice spoke for the United States on foreign-policy matters.

(g) General MacArthur's message to the editor of the Freeman magazine dated April 5, 1951 (p. 186)

This statement became public during the time the President was considering with his advisers the relief of General MacArthur. Its significance was not somuch that it violated a directive or conflicted with policy, but that the final sentence gave a misleading impression, in view of the fact that the decision not. to arm additional South Korean units had been made largely because of General MacArthur's recommendation against it.

In furnishing the above, I wish to restate what I think is apparent from the testimony in the course of the hearings: that there was no single incident or statement which was the efficient cause of General MacArthur's relief, and that the fact that many of his statements were considered to be in violation of policies. or directives was not the essential reason for his relief. In my testimony I stated at length my own reasons for supporting the President's decision to relieve General MacArthur. I stressed that it was not merely because General MacArthur had publicly expressed his disagreement with the foreign and military policies of the United States, but because by doing so it became doubtful whether, due to his open lack of sympathy with the established policies of the United States, he could any longer be permitted to exercise the authority of making the decisions required of a theater commander.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff each gave their separate reasons why they concurred, from a military point of view, in the President's decision to relieve General MacArthur. Their reasons were summarized by General Bradley in his testimony along the following lines:

"That by his public statements and by his official communications to us, he had indicated that he was not in sympathy with the decision to try to limit the conflict to Korea. This would make it difficult for him to carry out Joint Chiefs of Staff directives. Since we had decided to try to confine the conflict to Korea and avoid a third world war, it was necessary to have a commander more responsive to control from Washington.

"That General MacArthur had failed to comply with the Presidential directive to clear statements on policy before making such statements public. He had also taken independent action in proposing to negotiate directly with the enemy field commander for an armistice and had made that statement public despite the fact that he knew the President had such a proposal under consideration from a governmental level.

"That the Joint Chiefs of Staff have felt and feel now that the military must be controlled by civilian authority in this country."

It is plain, therefore, that the reasons behind the President's decision to relieve General MacArthur, and those of his advisers in concurring with the decision, were not merely that he violated directives or disagreed with military and foreign policy decisions. It was General MacArthur's course of conduct, pursued over a period of months, in publicizing his disagreement, thereby creating doubt and confusion in the minds of the American people and our United Nations allies as to whose voice expressed the foreign policy of the United States, and indicating that he could not give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States Government and the United Nations, which led to the President's action, and the unanimous concurrence of his advisers. Faithfully yours,

Hon. STYLES BRIDGES,

APPENDIX UU

G. MARSHALL.

AUGUST 18, 1951.

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATER BRIDGES: There is enclosed a copy of a letter from the Acting Secretary of Defense with further reference to your request of June 12 for an intelligence study concerning the effect of Russian entry into the war against Japan.

This letter was received yesterday but was not brought to my attention in time to be taken up at the meeting of the committees. Unless you object, I shall instruct the staff to have the letter insered in the appendix of the record.

Sincerely,

RICHARD B. RUSSELL.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, August 16, 1951.

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,

United States Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is with further regard to a request by Senator Bridges dated June 12, 1951, which you forwarded, that a copy of an intelligence study concerning the effect of Russian entry into the war against Japan be furnished for the use of the combined Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. Senator Bridges believes that such a study was prepared by a group of senior officers in G-2 of the War Department in the early spring of 1945.

In a letter dated June 20, 1951, I informed you that up to that time the Department of the Army had been unable to locate any document fitting the description given, but would continue to search for it. On June 21 Senator Bridges read into the record of the hearings a document bearing the date of April 21, 1945, which he believed to be a copy of the study in question. Senator Bridges also gave the names of 10 officers who he had been informed had shared in the preparation of the study.

The Department of the Army has continued to search for the document requested by Senator Bridges, but has not been able to locate it. In addition, the relevant portion of the June 21 record of the hearings was sent to 9 of the 10 officers named by Senator Bridges, and they were asked to furnish any information they could recollect concerning a study of the nature of the one read into the record. The tenth officer named by Senator Bridges, Col. Joseph A. Michela, is now deceased.

The replies received from the nine officers are similar in stating that the subject of Soviet participation in the war against Japan was discussed by the area specialists in G-2 early in 1945 and that their views on the subject were in general agreement with those expressed in the document quoted by Senator Bridges. However, only three of the officers concerned, Colonels Black, Truman Smith, and Yeaton, recalled participating in the preparation of such a study. One other officer, Colonel Kenyon, thought that the document quoted by Senator Bridges was familiar in thought and phraseology but could not identify it otherwise. The remaining five officers, Colonels Booth, Delaney, Jadwin, Mayer, and Harvey Smith, had no specific recollection of having participated in the preparation of such a study or having seen one like it.

Four of the nine officers concerned, Colonels Booth, Mayer, Truman Smith, and Harvey Smith, also commented that some of the language or thoughts expressed in the document quoted by Senator Bridges appear to be inappropriate or unlike those normally used in a G-2 study. Paragraphs 11 and 12 and the recommendation were mentioned specifically in this connection.

Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell, who was Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, at the time concerned, was also contacted in connection with the search for the study requested by Senator Bridges. He could not identify the document read into the record as being familiar to him.

The Department of the Army, in furtherance of its efforts to locate the study in question, communicated with the officers named as I outlined above, with the thought that they would be assisted in their search. Unfortunately, it cannot be found.

Faithfully yours,

ROBERT W. LOVETT, Acting Secretary.

APPENDIX VV 1

Hon. RICHARD B. RUSSELL,

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, Washington 25, D. C., August 31. 1951.

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I refer to your letter of July 19, 1951, to the Secretary of State requesting the full text of the report of General Hurley, and to the letter from the Department of State to you dated August 2, 1951, enclosing the majority of the material requested and stating that the release of the remainder, composed of cables, was under consideration for cryptographic reasons.

1 See also Appendix LL.