warfare. In its report submitted to the Commission on 31 May, the Special Committee considered the problem in the light of the resolution on qualitative disarmament adopted by the General Commission on 22 April 1932. The principle of qualitative disarmament was based on the idea of the selection of certain categories of weapons, the possession of which should be "absolutely prohibited to all States or internationalized by means of a general convention." The Special Committee considered whether chemical weapons and methods of warfare came under the three criteria laid down in the above resolution, namely, (1) whether they are most specifically offensive in character; (2) whether they are the most efficacious against national defence; and (3) whether they are the most threatening to civilians. The Committee agreed unanimously that chemical weapons and appliances constructed for their utilization should undoubtedly be included under the third of these criteria.

69. There was some difference of opinion in the Committee as regards the two other criteria, but the majority of members agreed that chemical weapons and methods of warfare could also come under these criteria.

70. As for bacteriological warfare, the Special Committee considered this method of warfare "so particularly odious that it revolted the conscience of humanity more than any other form of warfare." Accordingly it was of the opinion that it should be included in a system of qualitative disarmament irrespective of whether it could be included under any of the three criteria laid down by the General Commission.

(c) Resolution on the prohibition of chemical, bacteriological and incendiary warfare

71. In a resolution adopted on 23 July 1932 by the General Commission relating to the future work of the Conference, sections provided that "chemical, bacteriological and incendiary warfare should be prohibited under the conditions unanimously recommended by the Special Committee." The resolution also provided that "rules of international law should be formulated in connection with the provisions relating to the prohibition of the use of chemical, bacterial and incendiary weapons and bombing from the air, and should be supplemented by special measures dealing with the infringement of these provisions."

72. The Soviet Union delegation, while having no objection to section 3 of the above resolution, voted against it on the grounds that its Government had already signed the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which contained the same elements. The delegation formally moved that States represented at the Conference, "insofar as they had not done so hitherto, undertake to sign within three months, and to take steps for the speediest possible ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 concerning the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare."

(d) Principal conclusions adopted regarding chemical and bacteriological warfare

5

73. In connexion with the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological warfare, the question of its preparation

Some other provisions were also adopted concerning incendiary warfare.

in peacetime, and of possible violation of provisions adopted, was raised during the discussion in the General Commission and the Bureau of the Conference.

74. On 20 September 1932 the Bureau, having considered the relation between the preparation of chemical warfare and the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, requested the Special Committee to submit a report on the advisability of extending its prohibition to cover the preparation of chemical warfare in peacetime, and on the problem raised by possible violation of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological warfare.

75. The conclusions of the Special Committee, which framed the principles on which were based the provisions finally included under Part IV (Chemical Warfare) in the draft Convention adopted in first reading, were submitted to the Bureau of the Conference in two major reports, the first on 25 October 1932 and the second on 13 December 1932. The following were the most important items considered in these reports:

1. Absolute and relative character of the prohibition;

2. The prohibition of preparation for chemical and bacterial warfare;

3. Supervision of the prohibition of the preparation of chemical warfare;

4. Establishment of the fact of the use of chemical and bacterial warfare:

5. Penalties for the use of chemical and bacterial warfare.

(i) Absolute or relative character of prohibition

76. The Protocol of 17 June 1925 did not formally exclude the condition of reciprocity; Article 39 of the draft Convention drawn up by the Preparatory Commission prohibited chemical warfare on condition of reciprocity, while bacterial warfare was absolutely prohibited. The Special Committee considered that prohibition of chemical warfare must also be absolute. If not, any attempt to prohibit preparation for chemical warfare in peacetime would be illusory.

77. The principle of absolute prohibition involved the exclusion of the right of resorting to the prohibited means of warfare by a State victim of an unlawful war. Accordingly an undertaking not to use chemical warfare could not be given on condition of reciprocity. In the view of the Rapporteur of the Committee the absolute character of the prohibition made necessary an effective system of control and sanctions.

(ii) Prohibition of the preparation of chemical and bacterial warfare 78. The Special Committee was of the opinion that the prohibition which might apply to the preparation, importation, exportation and possession of substances exclusively suitable for chemical warfare would be only of limited value because their manufacture could be improvised by any State possessing a chemical industry.

79. The Special Committee was also of the opinion that the prohibition of preparation for chemical warfare must not apply to research work. The prohibition must also not apply to the manufacture, importation, exportation or possession of implements and substances suitable for legitimate use, and capable of employment in chemical warfare, "lest such prohibition should place insuperable obstacles in the way of chemical industry and hence of the progress of humanity.'

80. As for bacterial warfare the Special Committee was of the opinion that in practice it was not possible to prevent such warfare. The supervision of preparation for bacterial warfare "would, in the opinion of the Committee, never be complete, and therefore always ineffectual": virulent bacteria, such as might cause epidemics, are to be found in all bacteriological laboratories and hospitals treating contagious diseases.

(iii) Supervision of the prohibition of preparation for chemical warfare

81. The Special Committee considered that the supervision would not be effective if based only on consultations by some supervisory body on national statistics concerning production, exportation and importation of various chemical products. Information would also have to be obtained with regard to their transformation and final use. The Special Committee considered also the question of inspection of chemical factories. In its opinion, such supervision by a national authority was not inconceivable, provided that the existing national systems of supervision of certain chemical products for fiscal reasons could be made general. Such supervision, however, involved difficulties especially regarding the final destination of the chemical products. The Committee emphasized that such supervision would completely destroy secrecy in commercial affairs.

82. As for entrusting supervision to an international body, in the Committee's opinion "the difficulties would be considerable." It considered as doubtful the effectiveness of preventing all preparations for chemical warfare by means of international inspection, which in addition, "would be a source of numerous disputes and suspicions," and "in any case, nothing that might have been done in peacetime could prevent the rapid conversion of chemical industries into war industries as soon as hostilities broke out."

83. Finally the Committee considered the methods of supervision based on the existence of regulations concerning production. Considering that the inequality of the distribution of raw materials among States also created an inequality of strength, the Committee was of opinion that to endeavour to redress this inequality by limiting the output capacity of countries rich in raw materials "is a difficult undertaking, and it is doubtful whether it is economically desirable." Moreover, the Committee thought that States would hesitate to give up industries which, even if not very remunerative, were of vital importance to them. On the contrary the Committee considered that, while it was possible to envisage a limitation of stocks of chemical products where these were exclusively suitable for chemical warfare, the determination of limits would always be difficult for the other chemical products.

(iv) Establishment of the fact of the use of chemical and bacterial warfare

84. The Committee considered that a commission should be created to undertake urgent initial investigations for collecting available evidence of use of the forbidden weapon. Such a commission might be constituted in peacetime or might be composed of representatives of the Permanent Disarmament Commission accredited to the belligerent States. As an alternative, the Committee also considered the possibility of the complainant State applying to the doyen of the

Diplomatic Corps who would appoint as members of the commission military attachés and technical experts of foreign nationality selected from a list drawn up in advance by the Permanent Disarmament Commission. The result of the investigations should be reported to the Permanent Disarmament Commission.

(v) Penalties for the use of chemical or bacterial warfare

85. The Committee was of the opinion that sanctions were primarily political in character. In considering the purely technical features of sanctions the Committee was faced with the difficulty of differentiating clearly between the political and technical phases of the matter.

86. In connexion with the question of sanctions the Committee considered the following measures:

(1) Assistance to the State attacked

In the view of the Committee the most effective sanction against the violation of the prohibition of chemical and bacterial warfare would be to place the resources of the chemical industry of the world at the disposition of the State attacked. These measures could be organized on a universal, continental or regional basis, the first being, in the opinion of the Committee, the most effective.

(2) Measures of pressure against the guilty State

The measures contemplated by the Special Committee varied from mere diplomatic representations to military measures. The Committee examined in particular the question of the stoppage of supplies to the guilty State of raw materials, products and appliances necessary for chemical and bacterial warfare, which, in certain cases, would hamper the continuance of that warfare. But it was considered that no rapid or even practical effect could be expected from this action if the guilty State possessed a highly developed chemical industry, and considerable stocks of raw material. As regards bacteriological warfare the Committee considered that these measures would be quite ineffectual. (3) Reprisals

The Committee considered only the technical aspect of this question. If the final Convention should permit the right of individual reprisals of a chemical nature, the preparation of those reprisals could never begin until a breach of the prohibition had been officially established; the technical assistance of other States would be necessary from the moment that preparation by them had become lawful. In the case of collective repricals the Committee considered that the transgressor State would necessarily be in a state of technical inferiority.

(e) Views of certain delegations regarding sanctions and retaliation

87. During the discussion in the Bureau on the question of sanctions and retaliation on 10, 11 and 12 November 1932, the Chairman summarized the position by stating that nearly all the members of the Bureau were opposed to the recognition of the right to retaliate by the use of chemical weapons against the State which initially had used them. As for sanctions against the State which violated the prohibition, opinions varied considerably. On the one hand, it was

suggested that the Conference should make detailed provisions for collective measures of repression, while on the other hand, certain delegations and particularly that of the United Kingdom, were of the opinion that their governments might have some difficulty in arriving at a decision with regard to sanctions which they were prepared to accept.

88. In the opinion of the representative of France the question of retaliation might be solved only by a collective measure. "It would not be" he declared, "the attacked State that would have the right to take justice into its own hands, but, as in civilized societies it would be the community of States, which would act on its behalf."

89. The representative of the USSR declared that the question of sanctions should not be settled only in connexion with the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, but that account should also be taken of the use of other weapons which might appear incompatible with the objects of the Conference. In that connexion the representative of the USSR proposed on 13 January 1933 the postponement of the discussion on sanctions until the General Commission had dealt with this question in general.

90. The representative of the United States was also of the opinion that the problem of violations must be studied as a whole and not in application to a single phase of the Convention in course of preparation. 91. On the same date the Bureau submitted the following draft, which was adopted:

"The Bureau agrees to the principle of special measures being taken in case of a violation of the prohibition of the use of chemical, incendiary and bacterial weapons.

"It decides to elaborate the relevant articles with regard to such special measures after the general penalties for the case of the violation of the Convention have been examined by the Conference."

(f) Embodiment of provisions relating to chemical and bacteriological warfare in the United Kingdom draft Disarmament Convention 92. In accordance with the decision taken by the Bureau on 30 January 1933 the drafting Committee prepared a certain number of articles which were embodied in Part IV (Chemical Warfare ) of the draft Disarmament Convention submitted by the United Kingdom delegation to the General Commission on 16 March 1933. 93. This part included four sections:

Section 1 dealing with the prohibition of chemical, incendiary and bacteriological warfare;

Section 2 including provisions for the prohibition of the preparations for chemical, incendiary and bacteriological warfare; Section 3 dealing with the supervision of the observance of the prohibition of the preparation for chemical, incendiary and bacteriological warfare;

Section 4 dealing with the question of the establishment of the fact of the use of chemical, incendiary and bacteriological warfare. 94. During the first reading of Part IV of the Convention by the General Commission on 30 May 1933, on which date the draft Convention as a whole was adopted in first reading, certain delegations

See annex II for the complete text of Part IV (Chemical Warfare) of the draft Convention adopted in first reading.