(c) By special consent of the national or lawful consent of the responsible official concerned, on request of, or as otherwise arranged with, the agency.

X. Granting of special consent. In order to promote confidence and to facilitate the functioning of the international agency by reducing the number of instances in which the agency would need to obtain warrants or other special authorization, the participating nations shall undertake to comply, and to encourage their nationals to comply, with reasonable requests of the agency to consent to particular inspections, surveys, and explorations. The agency, in turn, shall collaborate with the nations and their authorities.

XI. Resort to domestic or international court, body, or official.Where warrants or similar authorization are required in accordance with specific proposal IX, they normally, but not necessarily, shall be sought in the first instance from the appropriate domestic court, body, or official. But in no case shall a denial or undue delay by a domestic court, body, or official prejudice the right of the agency to apply to an international court or body.

XII. Domestic courts, bodies, or officials required to issue warrants upon showing of probable or reasonable cause. The participating nations shall take such legislative or other action as may be necessary:

(a) To establish and maintain in the various regions of their territory local courts, bodies, or officers having jurisdiction to issue warrants or other authorization to the international agency for inspections and surveys in accordance with specific proposal IX: and

(b) To require that such warrants or other authorization shall be issued whenever the agency or its accredited representative shows probable or reasonable cause to suspect or believe that any of the following activities are occurring, or that any of the following are located upon or within the property which is sought to be entered and inspected or surveyed and which is described: (i) Any activity which is required to be reported, licensed, or regulated, or which is prohibited, by the treaty or convention;

(ii) Any facility or material which is required to be reported or controlled, or the possession of which is prohibited to nations or persons, under the treaty or convention;

(iii) Any material which should be discovered pursuant to the treaty or convention; and

(iv) Any evidence that a violation of the treaty or convention has occurred, is occurring, or is threatened.

XIII. International court, body, or official required, to issue warrants upon showing of probable or reasonable cause.-Upon proper application and the same showing of probable or reasonable cause as is described in specific proposal XII, an international court or body shall issue warrants or other special authorization for inspections and surveys by the agency in accordance with specific proposal IX.

XIV. Scope of warrants. The warrants or equivalent authorizations which are referred to in specific proposals IX, XI, XII, and XIII shall describe the premises or areas authorized to be entered and the facilities or other property authorized to be inspected or the areas authorized to be surveyed. They may specify the manner in which the inspections or surveys shall be conducted consistently with

the treaty or convention. In the case of inspections, they may authorize the agency to take custody of property which is used or possessed by nations or persons in violation of the treaty or convention.

AERIAL SURVEYS

XV. Spot aerial surveys.-The treaty or convention shall provide that the agency shall conduct spot aerial surveys in each period of two years over areas not exceeding five per cent of the territory under the control of each nation or areas not to exceed 2,000 square miles, whichever is the larger. (These area limitations apply to spot aerial surveys only.) The location of the areas to be surveyed shall be determined by the agency. Aerial surveys made under these provisions shall be subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c), as follows:

(a) The nation concerned shall have notice of every aerial survey and shall be afforded opportunity to present objections or to suggest modifications.

(b) The nation concerned shall have the right to examine the aircraft used by the agency and to send at least one observer on each survey flight.

(c) Copies of aerial photographs taken by the agency and reports of information obtained by it in the course of its aerial surveys shall be furnished to the nation concerned upon its request. Only information relating to atomic energy shall be made public as required by the treaty or convention.

XVI. Routine aerial surveys in areas known to contain source material. The treaty or convention shall grant the agency the right to conduct routine aerial surveys over areas which are known to contain source material, subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of specific proposal XV.

XVII. Other aerial surveys relating to source material. The treaty or convention shall grant the agency the right to conduct such aerial surveys as the agency deems desirable in conjunction with the surveys and explorations conducted by the agency in areas known, or likely, to contain source material or as the agency deems necessary for the purpose of verifying information furnished, as specified in specific proposal III of chapter 3. These surveys shall be subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed in sub-paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of specific proposal XV.

XVIII. Aerial surveys upon suspicion of clandestine activities.-On the consent of the nation concerned, or when authorized by warrant or other special authorization issued to the agency upon a showing of probable or reasonable cause similar to that prescribed in specific proposals XII and XIII, the agency may conduct aerial surveys over territories of participating nations to verify reports of clandestine activities or to clear up other suspicion. These surveys shall be subject to the limitations and procedures prescribed in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of specific proposal XV.

FORMAL INQUIRIES

XIX. The agency may set up formal inquiries whenever, through reports made to it or through information acquired in the course of its operations, inspections, surveys, or explorations, it ascertains facts

War and the Use of Nuclear Weapons

Western Policies

37. STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (DEAN), OCTOBER 5, 1951 (EXCERPT)

But what of the future? Today the United States stands before the world with the lamp of liberty raised high in one hand and the atomic bomb in the other. To many people both at home and abroad-this is a spectacle that is more fearsome than comforting. It is not surprising that this is so, for the peoples of the world have seen the power of the atomic bomb demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They have seen the devastation that lay below the towering mushroom clouds and they have no difficulty in imaging the suffering and desolation among innocent civilians that would follow in the wake of an all-out, global atomic war. So vivid is this picture that, even in the face of persistent Communist acquisitiveness and aggression, many sincere, thinking people have asked themselves the question: "Is the United States really pursuing the right course?" I believe that we are. In essence, we have taken the positoin as a nation that war is bad, and aggression is bad, and any weapon that serves to prevent war and aggression, or to stop aggression once it has been undertaken, is good. This is not an unreasonable position, particularly when one considers that to take any other position would in all likelihood mean the end, not only of our freedom and our way of life, but of all of the noble ideals to which man has aspired through the ages.

I said that I believe we are following the right course. I would like to qualify this to the extent that I believe we are following the right course insofar as moral considerations influence the actions we take. Up to the present, in our period of atomic world leadership, we have undoubtedly taken the moral factor into account. We have been mindful of the heavy responsibilities that go with our position, and we have handled ourselves accordingly. For evidence of this, I think one needs to look no further than the obvious embarrassemnt we experienced when, at the conclusion of World War II, we found ourselves to be the only nation in the world with the atomic bomb. I think it will forever redound to our credit that our awareness of the moral ramifications of exclusive possession of such a powerful new weapon resulted in our unprecedented offer to place the facilities. for its manufacture under international control-an offer that, as you know, was subsequently turned down by the Communists, who meanwhile were busy developing a bomb of their own. I think it is also pertinent to note that during the post-war period when we had exclusive possession of the atomic bomb-we never once resorted to its use to settle our international differences, even in the face of great provocation.

Unfortunately, I believe, the Communists have been aware of the important role played by the moral factor in our deliberations and they have counted on it and taken advantage of it in such instances. as the Czechoslovakian coup d'etat, the North Korean aggression, the Chinese revolution, the Berlin blockade and their flagrant viola

United States Atomic Energy Commission Press Release, October 15, 1951.

the mass destruction of human beings corresponds in still greater measure to the aspirations and the conscience of the peoples of the whole world;

being firmly resolved to avert the danger of these scientific discoveries being used to the detriment and against the interests of mankind;

resolved to conclude a convention to prohibit the production and the employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and for this purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries * [here follows the list of plenipotentiaries], who, after presenting their credentials found to be in good and due form, agreed as follows:

Article 1. The high contracting parties solemnly declare that they are unanimously resolved to prohibit the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy, and for this purpose assume the following obligations:

(a) not to use atomic weapons in any circumstances whatsoever; (b) to prohibit the production and storing of weapons based on the use of atomic energy;

(c) to destroy, within a period of three months from the day of the entry into force of the present convention, all stocks of atomic energy weapons whether in a finished or unfinished condition.

Article 2. The high contracting parties declare that any violation of article 1 of the present convention is a most serious international crime against humanity.

Article 3. The high contracting parties shall, within a period of six months from the day of the entry into force of the present convention, pass legislation providing severe penalties for violators of the statutes of the present convention.

Article 4. The present convention shall be of indefinite duration. Article 5. The present convention shall be open for the adhesion of any State whether a Member or non-member of the United Nations. Article 6. The present convention shall come into force after its approval by the Security Council and after the ratification and delivery of ratification documents to the Secretary-General for safe keeping by one half of the signatory States, including all the Member States of the United Nations named in Article 23 of the Charter of the Organization.

Article 7. After the entry into force of the present convention it shall be binding on all States whether Members or non-members of the United Nations.

Article 8. The present convention, of which the Russian, Chinese, French, English and Spanish texts shall be authentic, is drawn up in one copy and shall be kept in the archives of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Secretary-General shall communicate certified copies to all the parties to the convention.

War and the Use of Nuclear Weapons

Western Policies

37. STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (DEAN), OCTOBER 5, 1951 (EXCERPT)

But what of the future? Today the United States stands before the world with the lamp of liberty raised high in one hand and the atomic bomb in the other. To many people-both at home and abroad this is a spectacle that is more fearsome than comforting. It is not surprising that this is so, for the peoples of the world have seen the power of the atomic bomb demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They have seen the devastation that lay below the towering mushroom clouds and they have no difficulty in imaging the suffering and desolation among innocent civilians that would follow in the wake of an all-out, global atomic war. So vivid is this picture that, even in the face of persistent Communist acquisitiveness and aggression, many sincere, thinking people have asked themselves the question: "Is the United States really pursuing the right course?" I believe that we are. In essence, we have taken the positoin as a nation that war is bad, and aggression is bad, and any weapon that serves to prevent war and aggression, or to stop aggression once it has been undertaken, is good. This is not an unreasonable position, particularly when one considers that to take any other position would in all likelihood mean the end, not only of our freedom and our way of life, but of all of the noble ideals to which man has aspired through the ages.

I said that I believe we are following the right course. I would like to qualify this to the extent that I believe we are following the right course insofar as moral considerations influence the actions we take. Up to the present, in our period of atomic world leadership, we have undoubtedly taken the moral factor into account. We have been mindful of the heavy responsibilities that go with our position, and we have handled ourselves accordingly. For evidence of this, Í think one needs to look no further than the obvious embarrassemnt we experienced when, at the conclusion of World War II, we found ourselves to be the only nation in the world with the atomic bomb. I think it will forever redound to our credit that our awareness of the moral ramifications of exclusive possession of such a powerful new weapon resulted in our unprecedented offer to place the facilities for its manufacture under international control-an offer that, as you know, was subsequently turned down by the Communists, who meanwhile were busy developing a bomb of their own. I think it is also pertinent to note that during the post-war period when we had exclusive possession of the atomic bomb- we never once resorted to its use to settle our international differences, even in the face of great provocation.

Unfortunately, I believe, the Communists have been aware of the important role played by the moral factor in our deliberations and they have counted on it and taken advantage of it in such instances as the Czechoslovakian coup d'etat, the North Korean aggression, the Chinese revolution, the Berlin blockade and their flagrant viola

United States Atomic Energy Commission Press Release, October 15, 1951.