This would confront many who escaped the direct effects of the explosion with poisoning or starvation, or both. Imagination stands appalled. There are of course the palliatives and precautions of a courageous civil defense, and about that the Home Secretary will be speaking later on tonight. But our best protection lies, as I am sure the House will be convinced, in successful deterrents operating from a foundation of sober, calm and tireless vigilance.

However, a curious paradox has emerged. Let me put it simply. After a certain point has been passed, it may be said, the worse things get the better. The broad effect of the latest developments is to spread almost indefinitely and at least to a vast extent the area of mortal danger. This should certainly increase the deterrent upon Soviet Russia by putting her enormous spaces and scattered population on an equality, or near equality, of vulnerability with our small, densely populated island and with Western Europe.

I cannot regard this development as adding to our dangers. We have reached the maximum already. On the contrary, to this form of attack continents are vulnerable as well as islands. Hitherto crowded countries, as I have said, like the United Kingdom and Western Europe, have had this outstanding vulnerability to carry. But the hydrogen bomb with its vast range of destruction and the even wider area of contamination would be effective also against nations whose population hitherto has been so widely dispersed over large land areas as to make them feel that they were not in any danger at all.

They too become highly vulnerable; not yet equally perhaps, but still highly and increasingly vulnerable. Here again we see the value of deterrents, immune against surprise and well understood by all persons on both sides I repeat on both sides-who have the power to control events. That is why I have hoped for a long time for a top level conference where these matters could be put plainly and bluntly from one friendly visitor to the conference to another.

Then it may well be that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached a stage in this story where safety will be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation. *

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Thus, they [the Soviet Government] should be convinced that a surprise attack could not exclude immediate retaliation. might say to them: Although you might kill millions of our peoples, and cause widespread havoc by a surprise attack, we could, within a few hours of this outrage, certainly deliver several, indeed many times the weight of nuclear material which you have used, and continue retaliation on the same scale. We have, we could say, already hundreds of bases for attack from all angles and have made an intricate study of suitable targets. Thus, it seems to me, with some experience of wartime talks, you might go to dinner and have a friendly evening. I should not be afraid to talk things over as far as they can be. This, and the hard facts, would make the deterrent effective.

I must make one admission, and any admission is formidable. The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics or dictators in the mood of Hitler when he found himself in his final dug-out. That is a blank. Happily, we may find methods of protecting ourselves, if we were all agreed, against that.

39. THE NEW PHASE OF THE STRUGGLE WITH INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM: ADDRESS BY THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF

STATE (DULLES), DECEMBER 8, 1955 (EXCERPT) 1

We are, it seems, in a new phase of the struggle between international communism and freedom.

The first postwar decade was a phase of violence and threat of violence. There was the continued Soviet military occupation of northern Iran, the Communist guerilla war in Greece, the Soviet blockade of Berlin, the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia under the menace of armed invasion, the war against Korea, the war against Indochina, the warfare in the Formosa Straits, and the hostile threats against Western Europe when the German Federal Republic acted to join the West.

Since last spring, this phase of violence seems to have undergone an eclipse. But we should remember that one of the doctrines taught by Lenin and constantly emphasized by Stalin was the need for "zigzag." Repeatedly Stalin drove home the idea that it is as important to know when to retreat as when to attack, and that when blocked in one course it is necessary to find another.

Stalin is dead. But for 30 years his writings have been the Communist creed, and Stalinism in fact, though not in name, is still a potent influence in Russia. In prudence, therefore, we must act on the assumption that the present Soviet policies do not mark a change of purpose but a change of tactics.

We do not, however, want policies of violence to reappear. Therefore, it is useful to have clearly in mind what are the free-world policies which have caused the Soviet Union to shift from tactics of violence and intimidation as being unproductive.

The free nations have adopted and implemented two interrelated policies for collective security. The first policy is to give clear warning that armed aggression will be met by collective action. The second policy is to be prepared to implement this political warning with deterrent power.

THE POLITICAL WARNING SYSTEM

The first major political warning to the Soviet Union was expressed in the North Atlantic Treaty, a product of the Democrat-Republican cooperation of 1948 and 1949. By the North Atlantic Treaty, the parties told the Soviet rulers that, if they attacked any one, they would have to fight them all. If the Kaiser and Hitler had known in advance that their aggressions would surely bring against them the full power of the United States, they might never have begun their armed aggression. As it was, they did what despots readily do they miscalculated. The North Atlantic Treaty left no room for such miscalculation. That, said Sanator Vandenberg, was "the most practical deterrent to war which the wit of man has yet devised."

But the North Atlantic Treaty was not enough. With that alone, it might be inferred that we were relatively indifferent to what occurred elsewhere, notably in Asia. And, indeed, less than a year after the North Atlantic Treaty came into force, the Communists attacked the Republic of Korea.

1 Department of State Bulletin, December 19, 1955. Made before the Illinois Manufacturers' Association at Chicago, Ill., on Dec. 8 (press release 683).

But now, except for countries of South Asia which choose "neutralism," the gaps in the political warning system have been closed. The United States with bipartism cooperation has made mutual security treaties with the Philippines, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and with the Republic of China on Taiwan. We have entered into the ANZUS [Australia-New Zealand-U. S.] Pact. We have joined with seven other nations to make the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty. There is the Balkan alliance of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey and the Baghdad Pact, which includes the "northern tier" of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan.

All of these treaties are made pursuant to what the United Nations Charter calls the "inherent right of collective self-defense." Together they constitute a worldwide political warning system. They prevent the despots from miscalculating that they can use Red armies to conquer weaker nations, one by one.

THE DETERRENT OF RETALIATORY POWER

It is, however, not enough to have a political warning system. It must have backing if it is effectively to deter. That poses a difficult problem.

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With more than 20 nations strung along the 20,000 miles of iron curtain, it is not possible to build up static defensive forces which could make each nation impregnable to such a major and unpredictable assault as Russia could launch. attempt this would be to have strength nowhere and bankruptcy everywhere. That, however, does not mean that we should abandon the whole idea of collective security and merely build our own defense area. *Fortunately, we do not have to choose between two disastrous alternatives. It is not necessary either to spread our strength all around the world in futile attempts to create everywhere a static defense, nor need we crawl back into our own hole in the vain hope of defending ourselves against all of the rest of the world. * ** As against the possibility of full-scale attack by the Soviet Union itself, there is only one effective defense, for us and for others. That is the capacity to counterattack. That is the ultimate deterrent. * * * The arsenal of retaliation should include all forms of counterattack with a maximum flexibility. ** In such ways, the idea of collective security can be given sensible and effective content.

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What I have just been saying is what I said 5 years ago.

That program has now become a reality. We have developed, with our allies, a collective system of great power which can be flexibly used on whatever scale may be requisite to make aggression costly. Our capacity to retaliate must be, and is, massive in order to deter all forms of aggression. But if we have to use that capacity, such use would be selective and adapted to the occasion.

To deter aggression, it is important to have the flexibility and the facilities which make various responses available. In many cases, any open assault by Communist forces could only result in starting a general war. But the free world must have the means for responding effectively on a selective basis when it chooses. It must not put itself in the position where the only response open to it is general war. The essential thing is that a potential aggressor should know in advance that he can and will be made to suffer for his aggression more than he can possibly gain by it. This calls for a system in which local defensive strength is reinforced by more mobile deterrent power. The method of doing so will vary according to the character of the various areas.

What I have been saying is from an article I wrote about 2 years

ago.

Our mutual security arrangements help provide the local defensive strength needed to preserve internal order against subversive tactics

and to offer a resistance to aggression which would give counterattacking, highly mobile forces time to arrive.

Thus we have collective defense policies which, on the one hand, are calculated to deter armed aggression and which, on the other hand, we can, if need be, live with indefinitely.

The two elements I have described-on the one hand, a political warning system and, on the other hand, selective retaliatory powerconstitute in combination a firm foundation for peace. If we want peace to continue, we must preserve that foundation intact.

We earnestly strive for some dependable system of limitation of armament. Until we succeed in such efforts, however, we and our allies must constantly maintain forces, weapons, and facilities necessary to deter armed aggression, large or small. That is an indispensable price of peace.

40. PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS: STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS (LODGE), DECEMBER 9, 1955 (EXCERPT) 1

The United States has repeatedly said that it would never use any weapons, be they rifles or H-bombs, except in defense against aggression and in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. Khrushchev is not satisfied with that pledge. Mr. Bulganin calls on all States to commit themselves not to be the first to use the nuclear weapons in war and in any case to use them only if approved by the Security Council. This has a fine self-denying ring about it. Let us see what it really means.

The Soviet Union's own proposal of May 10, which has so often been quoted here, shows why atomic weapons cannot be totally eliminated in the near future.

If an international agreement makes it impossible for a law-abiding power to use them first, even in dire extremity of self-defense against s massive aggression, then that power which is strongest in conventional means of warfare would be immediately established as the strongest military power on earth. And it would still have a reserve of its own nuclear weapons sufficient to strike devastating blows.

The true democracies of the world, by their very way of life, have traditionally been forced to accept the first blows in war. Thus they generally concede a great strategic initiative. Should they also agree not to use their most powerful weapons in their own defense after taking that first blow, they would be committing suicide.

But this is not all. The Soviet Union has dredged up the idea of subjecting the use of these weapons, even in self-defense, to protracted Security Council approval-another way of saying "veto".

The pledge against the use of atomic weapons except in defense against aggression as provided in the Charter is actually wider reaching than the fallacious proposal put forward by the Soviet Union. What then would be the value of additional pledges? My Belgian colleague answered this question in conclusive terms in this powerful statement the other day.

United States delegation to the General Assembly. Press release No. 2314, December 9, 1955.

"Such undertakings would have the effect, if there were some potential aggressor in the world, of reassuring such an aggressor as to the consequences of the act which he is contemplating, and consequently of encouraging the aggressor to commit an aggression. How can we rely on the undertaking that this aggressor would have assumed not to use the atomic weapons if that same aggressor was capable of violating the fundamental undertaking of the United Nations Charter not to resort to aggression by any weapon whatsoever?"

I fully subscribe to this analysis. The United States would, therefore, oppose any amendment to the draft resolution which would substitute a so-called prohibition against first use for the general undertaking not to use atomic weapons except in defense against aggression.

Mr. Kuznetsov tries to reinforce his proposed ban on atomic weapons by citing the supposed effectiveness of international conventions prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. It is true that these weapons were not used in World War II. But this was certainly not only because of such international agreements. These undertakings were observed because of the controlling force of strategic and political considerations.

If chemical warfare could have been employed with the versatility of the atomic weapons on any battlefield in a manner so decisive as to prevent retaliation on the aggressor, does anyone believe that the Nazi war machine would not have used it in World War II?

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UNITED

41. JOINT DECLARATION BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE STATES (EISENHOWER) AND THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM (EDEN), FEBRUARY 1, 1956.1

We are conscious that in this year 1956, there still rages the age-old struggle between those who believe that man has his origin and his destiny in God and those who treat man as if he were designed merely to serve a state machine.

Hence, we deem it useful to declare again certain truths and aims upon which we are united and which we are persuaded are supported by all free nations.

[1]

Because of our belief that the state should exist for the benefit of the individual and not the individual for the benefit of the state, we uphold the basic right of peoples to governments of their own choice.

[2]

These beliefs of ours are far more than theory or doctrine. They have been translated into the actual conduct of our policy, both domestic and foreign. We are parties to the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Charter, the Potomac Charter and the Pacific Charter. In them, we have, with other friends, dedicated ourselves to the goal

New York Times, February 2, 1956.