atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.'

2. Paragraph 6 of the resolution

"Directs the Commission, in working out plans for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments;

(a) to determine how over-all limits and restrictions on all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and fixed;

(b) to consider methods according to which States can agree by negotiation among themselves, under the auspices of the Commission, concerning the determination of the overall limits and restrictions referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above and the allocation within their respective national military establishments of the permitted national armed forces and armaments."

3. The present working paper presents a plan for the determination of over-all numerical limitations on the size of the armed forces of States. Obviously some over-all limitations on the size of the armed forces of States are an essential part of any comprehensive plan for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments. The working paper is not intended to exclude, but to facilitate the development of other essential components which must be included in what the preamble of the General Assembly resolution refers to as "comprehensive and co-ordinated plans, under international control, for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes" including "safeguards that will ensure the compliance of all *** nations [whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system]." Proposals have already been submitted on certain other essential components, i. e., the control of atomic energy and disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments. By submitting this working paper and focusing attention on another component we hope to facilitate progress toward an agreed comprehensive programme.

B. STANDARDS FOR DETERMINING NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS OF ALL ARMED FORCES

4. In fixing numerical limitations on the armed forces of States a number of factors, demographic, geographic, political and economic, have to be considered. The Charter responsibilities of States and the need of balanced power-relationships among States must also be taken into account. There is no one automatic formula which can inflexibly be applied in all cases. The objective must be to reduce the possibility and the fear of successful aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security. 5. The following working formula is suggested as a basis of discussion:

(a) There should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom,

and the United States of America which should be worked out with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security among themselves or with other States and thus reducing the danger of war. It is tentatively suggested that the maximum ceilings for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and China should be the same and fixed at, say, between 1 million and 1.5 million, and the maximum ceilings for the United Kingdom and France should be the same and fixed at, say, between 700,000 and 800,000.

(b) For all other States having substantial armed forces there should be agreed maximum ceilings fixed in relation to the ceilings agreed upon for the Five Powers. Such ceilings should be fixed with a view to avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security in any area of the world and thus reducing the danger of war. The ceilings would normally be less than one per cent of the population. Moreover, they should be less than current levels except in very special circum

stances.

C. SIGNIFICANCE OF OVER-ALL NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS

6. While a nation's armed forces are not the only measure of its armed strength, and other elements of armed strength will have to be considered in any comprehensive programme for the balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, nevertheless a numerical limitation on armed forces is a major element in any such programme for the following reasons:

(a) All armaments programmes depend upon manpower and therefore must to a greater or less degree be affected by limitations on permitted armed forces.

(b) A substantial reduction of armed forces as here suggested in itself would tend to reduce the likelihood of successful aggression.

(c) Agreement on a substantial and balanced reduction of armed forces, minimizing the likelihood and fear of successful aggression, should greatly facilitate agreement reducing and restricting the armaments supporting these armed forces.

D. IMPLEMENTATION OF PROPOSALS FOR NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS OF ALL ARMED FORCES

7. In determining the numbers in the armed forces, all kinds of armed forces, including para-military and security forces, must be included.

8. Adequate provision must be made to ensure that the maximum limitation on armed forces is not circumvented through building up large forces of trained reserves or militarily trained police.

9. This system must be accepted by all States, whether or not Members of the United Nations, whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system.

10. There should be adequate safeguards throughout the process of reduction to ensure that limitations are put into effect and observed as agreed and that violations can be promptly detected.

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11. The implementation of the reductions should be closely related to progress in connexion with other phases of the programme for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, such as the control of atomic energy and the system of progressive and continuing disclosure and verification.

12. The reduction should be carried through in a manner and in accordance with a time schedule prescribed by the international control organ and should be completed within the shortest feasible time after its commencement.

13. In the future, further numerical limitation of permitted armed forces would be contemplated as substantial progress is achieved toward the easing of international tensions, and the agreed ceilings would be subject to review at stated intervals.

14. The proposed limitations including their relationship to other components of the programme for regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments and the elimination of weapons adaptable to mass destruction should be comprehended within the treaty or treaties required under paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952.

57. SUPPLEMENT TO TRIPARTITE PROPOSALS (FRANCE, UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATES) FOR FIXING NUMERICAL LIMITATION OF ALL ARMED FORCES, AUGUST 12, 19521

I. It is contemplated that any agreement for the numerical limitation of armed forces would necessarily comprehend:

(a) provisions to ensure that production of armaments and quantities of armaments bear a direct relation to the amounts needed for permitted armed forces;

(b) provisions for composition of permitted armed forces and armaments in order to prevent undue concentration of total permitted armed forces in a manner which might prejudice a balanced reduction;

(c) procedures in conformity with the directive contained in paragraph 6 (b) of the General Assembly Resolution of 11 January 1952, for the negotiation within over-all limitations of mutually agreed programmes of armed forces and armaments with a view to obtaining early agreement on these matters among states with substantial military resources.

Procedures should be worked out to facilitate the development under the auspices of the Disarmament Commission of mutually agreed programmes of armed forces and armaments to be comprehended within the treaty or treaties referred to in the General Assembly Resolution of 11 January 1952.

II. One possible procedure, advanced for the purpose of initiating discussions, might be:

(a) Upon acceptance of the proposals set forth in Working Paper DC/10 with respect to fixing numerical limitation of all armed forces, arrangements might be made for a conference between China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America with a view to reaching tentative agreement among themselves, by negotiation, on:

1 United Nations Document DC/20, pp. 162–164.

1. the distribution by principal categories of the armed forces that they would consider necessary and appropriate to maintain within the agreed numerical ceilings proposed for their armed forces;

2. the types and quantities of armaments which they would consider necessary and appropriate to support permitted armed forces within the proposed numerical ceilings;

3. the elimination of all armed forces and armaments other than those expressly permitted, it being understood that provision will be made for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

The distribution of armed forces within stated categories and the types and volumes of armaments would not necessarily be identic, even for states with substantially equal aggregate military strength, inasmuch as their needs and responsibilities may be different. The objective of the agreements would be to reduce the possibility and fear of aggression and to avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security. Such agreements would necessarily be tentative, as they would have to be reviewed in the light of further tentative agreements to be reached, as indicated in the following paragraph.

(b) When tentative agreement is attained at the conference referred to in paragraph II (a), regional conferences might be held, to be attended by all governments and authorities having substantial military forces in the respective regions, for the purpose of reaching similar tentative agreement on

(1) the over-all numerical ceilings for the armed forces of all such governments and authorities, as proposed in paragraph 5 (b) of the Tripartite Working Paper on numerical limitations,

(2) the distribution of the permitted armed forces within stated categories,

(3) the type and volume of armaments necessary and appropriate to support the permitted armed forces, and

(4) the elimination of all armed forces and armaments other than those expressly permitted, it being understood that provision will be made for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction, and for the effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes only.

(c) Thereafter a draft treaty might be worked out, as contemplated in operative paragraph 3 of the General Assembly Resolution of 11 January 1952, comprehending and bringing into a balanced relationship all essential components of the programme.

III. The timing and co-ordination of the reductions, prohibitions. and eliminations should ensure the balanced reduction of over-all armed strength and should avoid creating or continuing any disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security during the period that the reductions, prohibitions and eliminations

are being put into effect. In particular, the initial limitations or re ductions in armed forces and permitted armaments and the initial steps toward elimination of prohibited armaments should commerce at the same time. Subsequent limitations and reductions should be synchronized with subsequent progress in elimination of prohibited armaments. An international control authority should be estab lished at the commencement of the programme and it should be in a position to assume progressively its functions in order to ensure the carrying out of such limitations, reductions, curtailments and prohibitions. Thus, when the limitations and reductions in armed forces and permitted armaments provided by the treaty or treaties are com pleted, production of prohibited armaments will have ceased, existing stockpiles of prohibited armaments and facilities for their production will have been disposed of, atomic energy will be utilized for peaceful purposes only, and the international control authority will have assumed its full functions.

58. CANADA, FRANCE, UNITED KINGDOM, AND UNITED STATES: JOINT DRAFT RESOLUTION, MARCH 12, 19551

The General Assembly (The Security Council)

Recalling its unanimous resolution of 4 November 1954 referring to the need for a draft international disarmament convention to provide inter alia for major reduction of all armed forces and all conventional armaments;

Recalling that the Anglo-French proposals of 11 June 1954 on the phasing of a disarmament programme (DC/SC.1/10) have been accepted as a basis for a draft international disarmament convention as stated in the draft resolution of the USSR of 8 October 1954 (A/C.1/750);

Noting that the Anglo-French proposals provide for major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments;

Considers that the provisions in a draft disarmament convention relating to reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments should be based on the following principles:

(a) There shall be major reductions in the armed forces of the United States, the USSR, France, China and the United Kingdom.

(b) There shall be an agreed level of armed forces to which all States in excess of it shall reduce, so that no State shall have armed forces strong enough to be a serious threat to international peace.

(c) The levels of all States' armed forces shall be established at fixed agreed limits or shall be calculated on the basis of simple agreed criteria, including demographic, geographic, economic and political factors, with the objective of reducing the possibility of aggression and avoiding a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security.

(d) No State shall be entitled to increase its armed forces above the levels existing at the entry into force of the disarmsment convention, except that special arrangements will have to be made for certain specified States which will provide for levels of armed forces and armaments in accordance with the principles set out in paragraph (c) above.

UN Document, DC/SC.1/17, 12 March 1955, pp. 1-2.