(e) The agreed levels of armed forces shall apply not only to armies, navies and air forces, but also to all para-military forces and all internal security forces of a military type.

(f) No State shall retain or acquire any armaments and equipment in excess of those quantities agreed upon for the maintenance of the armed forces permitted under the Convention. The levels and types of such armaments and equipment shall be such as to prevent undue concentration of total permitted armed forces in a manner which might threaten international peace and security. Requests the Disarmament Commission in its preparation of a draft international disarmament convention, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, to take full account of these principles.

59. MEMORANDUM BY THE DELEGATIONS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FRANCE: REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES, MARCH 29, 1955 1 The United Kingdom and France consider that there should be major reductions in the armed forces of the five permanent members of the Security Council. To this end they are each prepared to reduce their overall armed forces to a total of 650,000 men, as part of a general scheme of reductions which would provide that:

(1) There shall be a uniform ceiling for the three other permanent members of the Security Council which shall be fixed at a figure between one and one and a half million men.

(2) The forces permitted to other States shall in all cases be considerably lower than the levels established for the five permanent members of the Security Council.

(3) No State shall be entitled to increase its armed forces above the levels existing at the entry into force of the disarmanent convention, except that special arrangements will have to be made for certain specified States which will provide for levels of armed forces and armaments such as will reduce the possibility of aggression and avoid a disequilibrium of power dangerous to international peace and security.

Atomic Energy

60. SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED TO ENSURE THE USE OF ATOMIC ENERGY ONLY FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES: FIRST REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, 1946 (EXCERPT) 1

CHAPTER 1-GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The major task before the Atomic Energy Commission is to make specific proposals for the control of atomic energy in order to foster its use only for peaceful purposes and to prevent its use for destructive ends. This task has led us to an analysis of the types of safeguard necessary to afford protection against the hazards of violations and evasions. The report contains the first findings of Committee 2, limited to this aspect of the general problem. These findings have led to the conclusion that a single international control agency must be responsible for the system of safeguards and control. The Com

JUN Document, DC/SC.1/20, 29 March, 1955.

UN Atomic Energy Commission Official Records. Special Supplement. Report to the Security Council, New York, 1946, pp. 43-65.

mittee has not discussed the general characteristics of such an agency or its exact powers in the way, for example, of development, research. or the international planning of atomic energy production. Nor has it considered how the various safeguards would be administered in practice as part of an overall system.

The report has been prepared in accordance with the following resolution adopted by Committee 2 on 8 October 1946:

"That Committee 2 proceed to examine and report on the safeguards required at each stage in the production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to prevent the possibilities of misuse indicated in the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee; that the Committee may hold informal meetings as it may decide, at which scientific representatives may take part in the discussions."

The programme of work adopted by Committee 2 on 21 October 1946 called for the consideration of three distinct kinds of possible misuse: diversion of materials, clandestine operations, and seizures of material or facilities. It was proposed that measures to prevent these possibilities of misuse be considered for each of the following stages in the production and use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes: uranium and thorium mines, concentration plants, refineries, chemical and metallurgical plants, primary reactors and associated chemical separation plants, isotope separation plants, and secondary reactors. In the course of its deliberations, the Committee heard statements from a number of technical experts who furnished information on all the important stages from the raw material to the production of concentrated nuclear fuel and on other matters. The Committee desires to express its thanks to the Canadian, the United Kingdom, and the United States delegations which arranged for these experts to attend meetings of the Committee. A list of these experts and the topics on which they tendered information is given in Annex 8.

In the course of the Committee's work, definitions of certain types of safeguard have been formulated and have been used throughout this report. "Control" as used in this report is a general term which includes any or all types of safeguards. The types of safeguards which have been specifically defined are as follows:

1. Accounting for materials means the systematic measurement and reporting in prescribed form of quantities of key materials entering and leaving an establishment or installation, in process, and in storage. It includes prescription of the points at which measurements must be taken, the methods of measurement, and the manner in which the data are summarized into accounts. Accounting is normally accompanied by measures of analysis and auditing to ensure conformity between the accounts and the facts. Analysis may be limited to an indirect check of the accounts to test them for consistency. In order to be thoroughly effective, however, accounting for materials must also be extended to direct and simultaneous auditing checks of the accuracy with which individual measurements are incorporated into summary accounts and the validity of the measurements themselves. This necessitates adequate independent observation of the measurements, tests of the accuracy of scales and other measuring instruments, and possibly independent duplicate measurements either on a sampling basis or as a whole. It also implies the right to obtain explanations of discrepancies. When auditing is extended to independent direct checks, it becomes one element in inspection.

2. Inspection means close and careful independent scrutiny of operations to detect possible evasions or violations of prescribed methods of operation. In addition to direct auditing measures as described above, inspection may include observation of points of ingress to and egress from an establishment or installation to ensure that materials and supplies are flowing in the prescribed manner, observation of the activities within the establishment or installation, and measures in the form of aerial or ground survey and otherwise to guard against clandestine activities. To be fully effective, the power of inspection may require that the operations be carried on in a specified manner in order to facilitate the inspection. In this event, inspection verges on supervision.

3. Supervision means continuous association and co-operation in day-to-day operations with the management, together with authority to require that the management comply with certain conditions so as to facilitate the execution of measures of control. For example, it may include the right to require that plants be designed and constructed in such a manner as to hinder diversion of materials, the right to require that the processes be conducted in a specified manner, or the right to order cessation of operations to take a complete inventory of materials in process. The more extensive the intervention of the supervisors into such matters, the closer supervision approaches management itself.

4. Management means direct power and authority over day-by-day decisions governing the operations themselves, as well as advisory responsibility for planning. Managerial control means internal control of a plant by a director or manager. Management by the international control agency means that the management is established by and is responsible to such an agency. Management is normally a prerogative of ownership, but need not imply ownership.

5. Licensing is a type of safeguard in which the degree of control is determined by the licensing agreement. It means the granting of permission to conduct certain activities under specified conditions. The conditions may include accounting and reporting requirements, rights of inspection or supervision, conformity with approved plant design or processes, etc. Similar results may be obtained through the leasing of establishments or installations from the international control agency or through a management contract, where the conditions are specified in the lease or contract, but leasing is not a prerequisite of licensing.

As explained above, Committee 2 has stressed the specific types of safeguard which should be applied at the several stages in the production and utilization of atomic energy. By this method, the Committee has sought to reach conclusions concerning individual elements of control. While this method is a logical one and enables a study to be made of the separate parts of the problem, the findings thereby arrived at must be viewed in the light of the general objective of securing an effective and enforceable system of control. The detailed findings contained in Chapters 2 to 8, inclusive, are interrelated. The co-ordination of safeguards is discussed to some extent in Chapter 8, but further measures of co-ordination must be considered before formulating a comprehensive system of control.

The specific control measures mentioned in the findings are not meant to be definitive, but rather to be indicative of the various types

of safeguards applicable at each stage. In devising a definite system of control, provision must be made for flexibility in adapting safe guards to a rapidly developing technology. The findings are, more over, of a technical nature. It has been assumed in the preparation of the report that the staff of the international control agency would be technically competent and loyal to the agency and that it would exercise its functions thoroughly, but without encroaching on matters beyond the requirements of the implementation of its mission. It has been assumed, furthermore, that the agency would treat with the necessary discretion information which it acquires.

In considering the types of safeguards to be applied at particular points, the objective has been to provide effective control with the least interference in normal activities. An ineffective system of control would be worse than none. The interference in a country's normal activities introduced by an effective system of control would be small compared with the disturbances which would result from the defence measures necessary for protection against atomic weapons.

In the preparation of this report there has been no discussion of the type or character of the international control agency in which control authority is to be vested. The overall powers required by an authority depend upon the functions entrusted to it. Only the functions of providing safeguards against diversion from declared establishments and of discovering clandestine operations have been considered. The question of seizure of atomic energy establishments or materials by a nation intending aggression has only been recognized as a problem for future consideration. The findings, therefore, do not represent a plan for atomic energy control, but only some of the elements which should be incorporated in any complete and effective plan.

CHAPTER 2-SAFEGUARDS NECESSARY TO DETECT AND PREVENT THE DIVERSION OF URANIUM AND THORIUM FROM DECLARED MINES AND MILLS

Introduction

In the general problem of safeguards, the mines and ore deposits occupy a special position. A complete control at this stage could give a starting point from which it might be possible to keep track of potentially dangerous material through all its later stages. In this connexion, the report of the Scientific and Technical Committee states: "A special significance must be attached to the devising of adequate safeguards against the diversion of raw materials, since none of the subsequent operations can proceed without uranium, or uranium and thorium."

FINDINGS FOR MINING AND MILLING OF URANIUM

1. In considering the diversion of uranium at the mining and milling stage, one need only be concerned with substantial quantities of material. Occasional petty theft by miners or mill operatives would not be a matter of consequence.

The diversion of many tons of ore would be required to make a few pounds of the finished nuclear fuel.

2. Safeguards to prevent diversion should be determined, to some extent, by the richness of the ore mined. They should be stringent at rich mines and might be less strict for low-grade deposits.

The uranium content of ores varies considerably, ranging from very rich uranium ore to deposits containing small fractions of one per cent of uranium. When considering the latter, the following points should be kept in mind: Ores with a low uranium content are sometimes found in deposits which can be worked by open pit methods. This means that operations may be scattered over a wide area, and such controls as could be set up at points of egress (e.g. from a mine shaft) would not be possible, unless the whole area were under guard and, if feasible, enclosed. It is probable that in the future substantial amounts of uranium will be derived from very low-grade ores containing other valuable elements. Clearly, more rigorous safeguards would become necessary as the uranium becomes concentrated. One must also not overlook dumps of tailings from various mines and mills, and even from certain chemical plants, because these, too poor to have been worked so far for uranium, might contain a very appreciable total amount of this metal.

Knowledge of ore reserves in certain known mines would be a further safeguard against diversion. However, in most mines, sampling methods to prove ore reserves would be inaccurate and difficult to apply as a control measure.

3. The system of accounting, guarding, and inspection of uranium mines and mills could follow the normal patterns ordinarily used in the control of mining and milling operations.

Assuming that egress from the mines or mills is under control by guards checking the contents and destination of shipments, it would appear that substantial or systematic theft of ores or concentrates would probably be detected.

In addition to the physical guarding of its property, the management normally has a system of control in its plants to ensure efficient operation. The controls used by the management are designed primarily with a view to detecting technical inefficiencies and ensuring and maintaining maximum recovery. They give a very close check on the flow of material over a long period of time, though they may be inaccurate over short periods.

Adequate facilities for weighing, assay, and analysis are required by the inspectorate. In the simplest case of inspection, the operating controls used by the mine and mill management could be examined and verified with comparative ease by the inspectorate. In other circumstances, it might be necessary to duplicate controls by having a complete independent and reliable assaying and sampling laboratory. One such laboratory could service a number of mines and mills.

4. An adequate system of inspection could be so organized as not to interfere seriously with normal mining and milling operations.

Inspection of mines and mills is not a new problem, but one that has been solved satisfactorily by government authorities inspecting managements to prevent the diversion of the raw materials under government control. It has been proved possible for an independent inspectorate to review the accounting procedures used by the management, check the weighing and assaying equipment, make independent