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"Recognizing that a genuine system for disarmament * * must be accepted by all nations whose military resources are such that their failure to accept would endanger the system "3***

"(e) The treaty (or treaties) shall specifically be open to all States for signature and ratification or adherence. The treaty (or treaties) shall provide what States must become parties thereto before the treaty (or treaties) shall enter into force."

ANNEX I

PROPOSED STAGES OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION OF ARMED FORCES AND NON-ATOMIC ARMAMENTS

Disclose

STAGE I

(a) Over-all manpower strength of regular and reserve military forces and paramilitary organizations, including training establishments and security and police forces, broken down into each category.

b Location of all operational military installations.

Verify

a) By examination and cross-checks of central records to include personnel, disbursement, medical and procurement supplemented by access to and spot checks of records at selected installations.

b) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installations.

(a) and (b): Inspectors will have access to entire national territory to extent necessary to determine that all facilities and installations have been declared. Aerial surveys will be permitted for same purpose and to same extent.

Disclose

STAGE II

a) Organization, composition and disposition of units making up over-all strengths disclosed in stage I.

b) Over-all annual capacity of heavy industry relating to armaments to include coal, steel, aluminum and electricity.

Verify

(a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to personnel, movement of units and administrative support supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.

b) By cross checks of pertinent statistics and employment records, access to plants, and analysis of operation with respect to materials used.

(a) and (b): By aerial survey as stated in stage I.

Disclose

STAGE III

(a) Equipment (including reserve equipment of units making up over-all strengths disclosed in stages I and II except units equipped with novel weapons). (b) Production facilities for manufacture of weapons and heavy equipment for units making up over-all strengths disclosed in stages I and II (excluding novel weapons), giving location, type and capacity.

Verify

a) By quantitative analysis of records pertaining to table of organization and equipment, and repair and overhaul of equipment supplemented by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.

(b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labour force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.

(a) and (b): By aerial survey as stated in stage I.

STAGE IV

Disclose

(a) Information as to equipment of units equipped with novel weapons to include biological warfare, chemical warfare, radiological warfare and atomic weapons. (b) Installations and facilities devoted to manufacture of novel weapons.

Verify

(a) By cross checks with stages I and II and quantitative inspection of units disclosed. (b) By inspection of physical dimensions of plants and examination of records pertaining to consumption of power and raw materials, available labour force, and finances, and by access to and spot checks of selected units and installations.

(a) and (b): By aerial survey as set forth in stage I.

Disclose

STAGE V

(a) Quantities of novel weapons on hand by types.

Verify

(a) By physical count of stock piles of finished novel weapons cross checked with information disclosed in stages I, II, III and IV.

ANNEX II

PROPOSED STAGES OF DISCLOSURE AND VERIFICATION OF ATOMIC ARMAMENTS

Disclose

STAGE I

(a) Location of all installations directly concerned with production of atomic energy, or the product of which is primarily useful in the production of atomic energy. Also manpower employed, physical dimensions, and power input of each installation. (Excluding weapon storage sites.)

(b) Uses or functions of these installations. This should be confined to a statement giving the input material, the produce material and the process used in each instance.

Verify

(a) By direct examination, location, manpower used, power input and physical dimensions of installation. (Inspectors will have access to entire national territory to the extent necessary to determine through such means as aerial survey, inspection of water and railways and power lines, that all atomic energy installations have been declared).

(b) Uses and functions in so far as revealed by external examination of all structures and unhoused equipment. Detailed interior inspection shall take place in subsequent stages, the particular stage in which it will take place depending upon the function of the plant. (Verification of (a) above will be of value as partial verification of plant use or function).

(a) and (b): By aerial survey in all stages for same purposes and to same extent as permitted with armed forces and nonatomic armaments. (See annex I.)

Disclose

STAGE II

(a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output, of all those installations or parts of installations concerned with preparation of atomic energy raw or feed materials (and such auxiliary materials as graphite, heavy water and beryllium), from mines up to but not including reactors, isotope separation plants, and similar nuclear conversion devices used to produce fissionable or fusionable material.

Verify

(a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with stage I.

STAGE III

Disclose

(a) Details of design and operation, including present and past output of all those atomic energy installations or parts of installations, concerned with the conversion of feed materials to fissionable or fusionable materials or with the preparation or radioactive materials in large quantities.

(b) Amounts and types of fissionable or fusionable material on hand or in process; amounts and types of radioisotopes on hand or in process.

(c) General design and operational characteristics of research laboratories involving reactors operating at a power level of 1 MW or more, including amounts of radioactive, or fissionable or fusionable materials produced.

Verify

(a) By direct and detailed inspection of all aspects the installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with stages I and II.

(b) By direct and detailed inspection of fissionable or fusionable material, or radioactive materials, installations, for production thereof, and appropriate records. (c) By survey of facilities associated with reported reactors, by detailed inspection of reactors themselves.

Disclose

STAGE IV

(a) Details of design and operation, including past and present output of all those atomic energy establishments and installations concerned with the fabrication of atomic or radioactive weapons from fissionable or other materials.

Verify

(a) By direct and detailed inspection of installations and appropriate records. Cross checks with stages I, II, and III.

Disclose

STAGE V

(a) Location, numbers and types of atomic and radioactive weapons on hand. Weapon storage sites.

Verify

(a) By direct inspection. Cross checks with stages I, II and III and (a) above.

63. UNITED STATES: WORKING PAPER ON METHODS OF IMPLEMENTING AND ENFORCING DISARMAMENT PROGRAMMES: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CONTROL ORGANS WITH APPROPRIATE RIGHTS, POWERS, AND FUNCTIONS, MAY 25, 19541

INTRODUCTION

1. The General Assembly resolution of 11 January 1952, directs the Disarmament Commission to formulate plans for the establishment within the framework of the Security Council of an international control organ (or organs) to ensure the implementation of the treaty (or treaties). Such major aspects of the disarmament programmes as disclosure and verification, limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, and the control of atomic energy cannot be implemented until an international control organization with appropriate rights, powers and functions has been established.

2. The broad objectives in establishing control organs are: (i) to provide international control of atomic energy so as to enforce observance of prohibition and elimination of atomic and hydrogen weapons and to ensure use of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, (ii) to supervise programmes for limitation and balanced reduction of armed forces and armaments, and prohibition and elimination of major mass

1 UN Document, DC/SC.1/5, 25 May 1954.

destruction weapons; (iii) to supervise the various safeguards necessary for enforcement of the programme, including disclosure and verification, and (iv) to help develop an open world by assuring each participating State that other States are observing the various agreements and by providing knowledge upon which States can take rapid action to provide for their security in the event of serious violations of the disarmament agreement.

UNITED STATES SUGGESTIONS

8. The United States suggests the establishment of a United Nations Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority (hereafter referred to as the Authority).

4. Under the Authority there would be a Disarmament Division to carry out the responsibilities of the Authority with respect to the safeguards to ensure enforcement of the programme and the reduction and limitation of all armed forces and non-atomic armaments. Article 42)

(See

5. Also under the Authority there would be an Atomic Development Division to carry out the responsibilities of the Authority with respect to the international development and control of atomic energy.

I. Organization and Composition

6. The Authority should be composed in the same manner as the Disarmament Commission. While it is necessary to keep the Authority to a reasonably small size for the sake of overall efficiency, it may prove desirable also to include as members a limited number of additional States.

7. Any State not a member of the Authority would have an automatic right to participate, without vote, in Authority discussions of charges of violations by that State of provisions of the disarmament programme treaty. Any State not a member of the Authority would have the right to participate, without vote, in Authority discussions of any question brought before the Authority whenever the latter considers that the interests of that State are specially affected.

Director-General

A. DISARMAMENT DIVISION

8. The Disarmament Division would be under the supervision and control of a Director-General, who might be appointed for a fixed term, by the Authority.

9. While the Director-General would be subject to control by the Authority, he should be allowed sufficient discretion in carrying out the terms of the disarmament programme treaty and the instructions of the Authority to ensure effective operation of the Disarmament Division. The Director-General would be required to refer to the Authority charges of violations and other important developments but not routine day-to-day decisions concerning the operations of the Disarmament Division.

10. The Director-General would be assisted in the performance of his duties by Assistant Directors-General in charge of the principal departments of the Disarmament Division.

Secretariat

11. The Secretariat of the Disarmament Division would be organized into departments, each charged with responsibility for administering a principal function of the Division. The Secretariat would also furnish the personnel to perform the necessary staff functions for the Authority.

12. The Secretariat would furnish the staffs of the inspection groups in each country.

13. The Secretariat should be staffed with international civil servants appointed by the Director-General. The principles governing appointment and the international obligation of the persons appointed should be similar to those contained in the United Nations Charter.

Corps of Inspectors

14. The Disarmament Division would include among its personnel, but separate from the Secretariat, a Corps of Inspectors. The Corps would be composed of persons technically qualified for various types of inspections and nominated by the States that are signatories of the disarmament programme treaty.

15. Individuals would be selected by the Director-General from the Corps of Inspectors to form the necessary inspection groups, both resident and transient. The inspection groups would be responsible to the Director-General in their work, and would be given authority to take specified emergency action upon discovery of violations or infractions of the Treaty, such action to be subject to review by the Authority.

16. Each inspection group would include a national of each of the permanent members of the Authority except where the member itself is being inspected, plus nationals of other signatory States. In general the latter would be selected, subject to their possessing the requisite technical qualifications, on a basis of rotation.

17. Each State being inspected should appoint a liaison officer to accompany each inspection team.

18. In conducting individual inspections, each inspection group would be permitted to divide into such subgroups as might be necessary and to assign responsibilities to members of its staff in order to best complete the functions assigned to it.

B. ATOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

Board of Governors

19. The Atomic Development Division would be under the supervision and control of a Board of Governors.

20. Each permanent Member of the Authority would appoint a Member of the Board.

21. Not less than six nor more than eight additional Members of the Board would be appointed by the Authority.

22. Appointees would be expected to possess outstanding technical qualifications and would be appointed for a term of five years.

23. While the Board of Governors would be subject to control by the Authority, it should be allowed sufficient discretion in carrying out the terms of the disarmament programme treaty and the instructions of the Authority to ensure effective operation of the Atomic Development Division.

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