inspection which would give a basis for confidence that disarmament agreements would be observed, and have all stressed the primary importance of inspection and control of agreements to reduce and limit armaments.

DIFFICULTIES OF ASSURING BY EFFECTIVE INSPECTION AND CONTROL THAT ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE ELIMINATED

Together with this recognition of the absolute need for a control system adequate to support every portion of a disarmament agreement, the Governments represented in the Disarmament Sub-Committee have recognized the problems caused by the vast technological developments in an expansion of nuclear energy materials. The Soviet Union, in its proposals of 10 May 1955, noted that "there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation, the security of the States signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed, since the possibilities would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for surprise attack on peace-loving States."

In President Eisenhower's statement on disarmament at Geneva on 21 July this year, he said, "We have not as yet been able to discover any scientific or other inspection method which would make certain of the elimination of the nuclear weapons. So far as we are aware no other nation has made such a discovery. Our study of this problem is continuing. The representative of Canada, Mr. Martin, the representative of France, M. Moch, and the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Nutting, have all many times during the discussions of the Sub-Committee noted the danger of inadequate control of fissionable material, that all our previous concepts have been rendered obsolete by new scientific developments, and that it was necessary to consider facts as they are today and not as they were yesterday or the day before.

Mr. Nutting at the Sub-Committee meeting of 5 October 1955 summed up the views of all the delegations when he referred to the "barrier of science which prevents us at this moment, on the admission of the Soviet Union, the United States and every other delegation represented at this table, from making nuclear disarmament the safe hope for the world that we would wish it to be."

The present impossibility of establishing an effective inspection and control method that would completely account for nuclear weapons material is of exceptional importance. It means that no nation has as yet been able to find any scientific or other inspection method that would account for all nuclear weapons material. It means that the amount of unaccountability is of such magnitude as to be an unacceptable unknown quantity of vast destructive capacity.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?

In the light of these circumstances, the United States believes that two steps should be taken to meet the issues posed by these facts. The first is to continue the search for the method by which complete accountability of nuclear materials and reliable inspection and control

might be attained. The United States is already engaged in this search. The United States has placed a number of its ablest scientists in continuing work on this problem. The United States Government welcomes efforts by any other nation in this regard and invites the scientists and officials of any nation in the world, if they believe they have a method which can completely account for past and present production of fissionable materials and to insure against improper diversion of nuclear weapons, to come forward and advance for consideration such method.

Second, in addition to such continuing study and research there must be a joint effort to reach agreements which can reduce the possibility of war, and in particular, and as a first priority provide against the possibility of a great surprise attack.

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S PROPOSAL

It is against this background that President Eisenhower on 21 July proposed at Geneva that steps be taken now, which would have an immediate effect, which would be practical, and which would strike at the very core of the disarmament problem-the suspicion and fear which are the great causes of international tensions. The Eisenhower proposal called for an exchange of blueprints of their military establishments between the Soviet Union and the United States and the provision of facilities for reciprocal aerial reconnaissance from one end to the other of these two countries. The purpose of this. exchange is to provide against the possibility of a great surprise attack, particularly with nuclear weapons, the importance of this having been previously recognized by the Soviet Union as well as by the United States.

In expounding these proposals made by the President, in the Outline Plan presented by the United States in the Disarmament Sub-Committee on 30 August 1955, in order to take into account the views of the Soviet Union expressed in its 10 May 1955 proposals. and at Geneva, as well as certain views of the other members of the Disarmament Sub-Committee, the United States noted, "Each nation has recognized the need for ground observers, and these will be stationed at key locations within the other country for the purpose of allowing them to certify the accuracy of the foregoing information and to give warning of evidence of surprise attack or of mobilization." In introducing this 30 August Outline Plan, the United States also recognized that the danger of great surprise attack is a matter of concern to each of the Governments represented in the Sub-Committee and to all nations of the world. It is further realized that the carrying out of the President's proposal will involve the co-operation of each of the Governments represented in the Disarmament SubCommittee, and the question arises whether this exchange of military blueprints and aerial reconnaissance should be confined to the territorial limits of the United States and the Soviet Union. It is the belief of the United States that it is most essential that a beginning should be made on the President's proposal by agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States, but that this agreement between these two countries putting the President's plan into effect without delay might also provide for the adherence and participation, as agreed, of designated countries on an equitable basis, once the plan is in operation between the Soviet Union and the United States..

Furthermore, it should be clear that the President's proposal is directed toward providing against the possibility of a great surprise attack of any kind with any weapon. So far as the information to be exchanged is concerned, it will consist of the identification, strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, including organized reserves and para-military; and a complete list of military plants, facilities, and installations with their locations. It is not contemplated that the blueprints of military establishments would include every specific detail. Similar information would be simultaneously exchanged by each Government, as mutually agreed upon by the two Governments, within the framework of the United Nations. This exchange of information would be directed toward safeguarding the possibility of a great surprise attack, and the details of information to be exchanged are subject to negotiation.

So far as aerial reconnaissance is concerned, however, the United States would not consider that there are prohibited areas. In the words of President Eisenhower, the United States "would allow these planes, properly inspected, peaceful planes, to fly over any particular area of the country that they wanted to, because in this-only in this-way could you convince them there wasn't something over there that maybe was by surprise ready to attack them."

REDUCTION OF THE BURDEN OF ARMAMENTS

The United States believes that the taking of this practical step to provide against the possibility of surprise attack, as suggested in the President's proposals, will lessen danger and relax international

tensions.

By this very fact, a system guarding against surprise attack as proposed by the United States should make more easily attainable a broader disarmament agreement. The lessons learned through the mutual exchange of military blueprints and through reciprocal aerial reconnaissance will help measurably in the joint efforts of the Disarmament Sub-Committee to find an effective inspection and control system which will fully support agreements to reduce, limit and regulate armaments and armed forces.

It is the firm policy of the United States Government that the relaxation of international tensions through concrete deeds should proceed concurrently with efforts to find a solution to the problem of armaments. As President Eisenhower said at the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government, "The United States Government is prepared to enter into a sound and reliable agreement making possible the reduction of armament."

The United States earnestly seeks an agreement for the reduction. of all armaments and armed forces, concurrent with the relief of international tensions and when a reliable system of inspection and control is devised. The problems of disarmament have become increasingly complicated because of the changed technical circumstances which have been previously described. These technical circumstances must be taken into account, not only in devising a system of inspection and control, but also in relation to the scale. timing and ratio of any reductions which might be agreed upon.

While these considerations are being studied, and while our scientists are trying to find methods by which complete accountability for uclear material and reliable inspection and control might be attained, it is imperative that we find the means to provide against surprise attack and to attain that degree of international trust indispensable to a broad disarmament programme supported by effective inspection and reporting. The United States believes that the Eisenhower plan is the gateway to agreement in these further fields and in itself provides a great assurance against war.

It is the hope of the United States that, upon further consideration of the proposal of the President of the United States at Geneva on 21 July, the Outline Plan in implementation of the Presidential proposal submitted to the Disarmament Sub-Committee on 30 August, and the further explanations made during the course of the SubCommittee discussions and summed up in this memorandum, that the members of the Sub-Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the United Nations General Assembly may decide that the early execution of this plan would contribute to the reduction of present international tensions, would provide safeguards against major surprise attack, would lessen the fear of war, would assist in the development of a comprehensive international agreement for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, and would advance the cause of peace. It is the further hope of the United States that agreement could be reached to place the proposal of the United States into effect at the earliest opportunity, and that the members of this Sub-Committee would continue their efforts to reach agreement on an effective system of international inspection and control and upon a general programme for reduction and limitation of armament.

74. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (EISENHOWER) TO THE PREMIER OF THE USSR (BULGANIN), OCTOBER 11, 19551

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank you for your letter of September 19, 1955 about my Geneva proposal of July 21 that we exchange information about military establishments and permit reciprocal aerial inspection over our two countries.

You raise a good many questions, and I shall not be able to reply to them until the doctors let me do more than at present. In any event, a full reply calls for preliminary work by my advisers and this is actively under way.

Let me now say, however, that I am encouraged that you are giving such full consideration to my Geneva proposal. I hope that we can agree on it, not as a cure-all, but, as I said at Geneva, to show a spirit of non-aggressiveness on both sides and so to create a fresh atmosphere which would dispel much of the present fear and suspicion. This, of itself, would be worthwhile. It would, I believe, make it more possible to make progress in terms of comprehensive plans for inspection, controls and reductions of armament, which will satisfy the high hopes of our peoples, and indeed of all the world.

I have not forgotten your proposal having to do with stationing inspection teams at key points in our countries, and if you feel this

White House press release, October 12, 1955.

would help to create the better spirit I refer to, we could accept that

too.

With best wishes,
Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

75. LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (EISENHOWER) TO THE PREMIER OF THE USSR (BULGANIN), MARCH 1, 19561

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

In accordance with my message to you of October 11, I have now thoroughly reviewed your letter of September 19, regarding the objective of an acceptable system of disarmament which we discussed at Geneva.

I have noted with satisfaction that you have expressed agreement with the importance of providing mutual safeguards against surprise attack and with the desirability of reciprocal reductions in armaments. You have credited me with a sincere desire to find a way to settle the important problem of international control and inspection.

It would appear, however, that you raise the following questions with regard to my Geneva proposal. You ask whether the adoption of my offer would lead to the reduction of armaments, and express doubt. You suggest the need of extending the inspection to other countries. You raise other points regarding nuclear weapons.

I am confident that the adoption of my Geneva proposal, combined with ground inspection teams which you proposed, thus reducing the danger of surprise attack, will in fact lead to a reduction of armaments, the lessening of tensions, and the brightening of the prospects of a durable peace.

UNITED STATES PEACE AIMS AFFIRMED

Certainly the United States is fully resolved to achieve those ends. My representative on the subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission will be prepared to help develop a program to carry out that resolve, through appropriate action by our Governments.

In my judgment our efforts must be directed especially to bringing under control the nuclear threat. As an important step for this purpose and assuming the satisfactory operation of our air-and-groundinspection system, the United States would be prepared to work out, with other nations, suitable and safeguarded arrangements so that future production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world. would no longer be used to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons. With this could be combined my proposal of Dec. 8, 1953, "to begin now and continue to make joint contributions" from existing stockpiles of normal uranium and fissionable materials to an international atomic agency. These measures, if carried out adequately, would reverse the present trend toward a constant increase in nuclear weapons overhanging the world. My ultimate hope is that all production of fissionable materials anywhere in the world will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

1 The New York Times, March 7, 1956.