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under-developed countries. Such assistance shall not be made conditional upon any demands of a political or military nature. States shall endeavour to devote a part of the savings resulting from world-wide disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons to the extensive use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes.

4. Measures for the liquidation of all foreign military, naval and air bases on the territories of other States shall be completed. On the completion of all the measures enumerated above, it would be desirable that the Powers should further reduce their armaments and armed forces to the levels strictly necessary for the maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations of signatory States under the terms of the United Nations Charter.

The question of the obligations of China, as one of the permanent members of the Security Council, under the convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen, and other weapons of mass destruction shall be examined with the participation of the People's Republic of China.

CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OVER THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the great importance and the necessity of instituting effective international control over the fulfillment by States of their obligations under the convention on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons.

Notes that the necessary conditions for the institution of a control system which would enjoy the trust of all States and would fully meet the requirements of international security do not at present exist.

It is impossible to disregard the fact that there exists at present considerable international tension and mistrust in relations between States. It is this that accounts for the fact that, in the conditions of mistrust among States which have come into being, barriers of every sort are being erected even in regard to the interchange of industrial, agricultural, scientific, cultural and other delegations. Such a situation makes difficult the attainment of agreement regarding the admission by States to their enterprises, particularly those engaged in military production, of foreign control officials who might carry out the inspection of such enterprises.

In the existing situation, when many States are displaying legitimate anxiety for their security, it is difficult to expect that these States would trustingly provide other States with facilities for access to industrial and other resources of theirs which are vital to their security.

In so far as the necessary trust does not at the present time exist between States, a situation may arise in which the adoption of decisions on international control will in reality be reduced to a mere formality which does not achieve the objective. This is all the more inadmissible because, in present conditions, the greatest apprehensions exist among peace-loving peoples in connexion with the existence of atomic and hydrogen weapons, in regard to which the institution of international control is particularly difficult.

This danger is inherent in the very nature of atomic production. It is well known that the production of atomic energy for peaceful purposes can be used for the accumulation of stocks of explosive atomic materials, and moreover, in ever greater quantities. This means that States having establishments for the production of atomic energy can accumulate, in violation of the relevant agreements, large quantities of explosive materials for the production of atomic weapons. The danger of this state of affairs becomes still more understandable if account is taken of the fact that where the corresponding quantities of explosive atomic materials exist production of actual atomic and hydrogen bombs is technically fully feasible and can be effected on a large scale.

Thus, there are possibilities beyond the reach of international control for evading this control and for organizing the clandestine manufacture of atomic and hydrogen weapons, even if there is a formal agreement on international control. In such a situation, the security of the States signatories to the international convention cannot be guaranteed, since the possibility would be open to a potential aggressor to accumulate stocks of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a surprise atomic attack on peace-loving States.

Until an atmosphere of trust has been created in relations between States, any agreement on the institution of international control can only serve to lull the vigilance of the peoples. It will create a false sense of security, while in reality there will be a danger of the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and, hence the threat of surprise attack and the unleashing of an atomic war with all its appalling consequences for the peoples.

It must also be borne in mind that preparations for a new war, the danger of which has been greatly increased by the development of atomic and hydrogen weapons, inevitably necessitate the concentration of large military formations at certain points together with large quantities of conventional armaments-aircraft, artillery, tanks, warships and so forth. Such concentration and the movement of large formations of land, sea and air forces cannot be effected except through important communication centres, ports and airfields. Under conditions of modern military technique, the importance of such points in the preparation of an aggressive war has not diminished, but is on the contrary increasing.

In addition to atomic and hydrogen weapons, for all their destructive capacity, armies of many millions and vast quantities of conventional armaments, which are of decisive importance to the outcome of any major war, would inevitably be involved in military operations in the event of the outbreak of war.

All this must be taken into account in resolving the problem of nstituting international control over the fulfilment by States of their obligations under the convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

The problem of instituting International Control and of the rights and powers of the international control organ must therefore be considered in close connexion with the execution of the above-mentioned measures for the lessening of international tension, the strengthening of trust between States and the carrying out of other measures relating to the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

In view of the foregoing,

the General Assembly institutes an International Control Organ having the following rights and powers:

1. DURING THE FIRST STAGE of execution of the measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons

(a) In order to prevent a surprise attack by one State upon another, the International Control Organ shall establish on the territory of all the States concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in aerodromes. The task of these posts shall be to see to it that there is no dangerous concentration of military land forces or of air or naval forces.

(b) The International Control Organ shall have the right to require from States any necessary information on the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

(c) The Control Organ shall have unimpeded access to records relating to the budgetary appropriations of States for military needs, including all decisions of their legislative and executive organs on the subject. States shall periodically, within specified time-limits, furnish the control organ with information on the execution of the measures provided for in the convention (treaty).

2. DURING THE SECOND STAGE of execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons

The carrying out of the measures provided for in the Declaration set forth above and of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons envisaged for the first stage will create the necessary atmosphere of trust between States, thereby ensuring the appropriate conditions for the extension of the functions of the International Control Organ.

In these conditions, the International Control Organ shall have the following rights and powers:

(a) To exercise control, including inspection on a continuing basis, to the extent necessary to ensure implementation of the abovementioned convention by all States. The International Control Organ shall exercise these functions, while also enjoying the right to require from States the necessary information on the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Staff recruited to carry out the work of inspection shall be selected on an international basis.

(b) To have permanently in all States signatories to the convention its own staff of inspectors having, within the bounds of the control functions they exercise, unimpeded access at all times to all objects of control.

In order to prevent a surprise attack by one State upon another, the International Control Organ shall in particular have on the territory of all the States concerned, on a basis of reciprocity, control posts at large ports, at railway junctions, on main motor highways and in

aerodromes.

(c) The Control Organ shall have unimpeded access to records relating to the budgetary appropriations of States for military needs, including all decisions of their legislative and executive organs on the subject. States shall periodically, within specified time-limits, furnish the control organ with information on the execution of the measures provided for in the convention (treaty).

3. The Control Organ shall make recommendations to the Security Council on measures of prevention and suppression with regard to violators of the convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

4. The functions and powers of the permanent international control organ shall be defined on the basis of the foregoing principles, and appropriate instructions shall be prepared for this purpose.

92. PROPOSAL ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS SUBMITTED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR (BULGANIN) AT THE MEETING OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE FOUR POWERS, GENEVA, JULY 21, 1955 1

DECISION OF THE MEETING OF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE FOUR POWERS ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND THE PROHIBITION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

I

With a view to the reduction of tension in the relations between States, the strengthening of mutual confidence among them and the removal of the threat of a new war, the heads of government of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France consider it necessary to endeavour to secure as soon as possible the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Following an exchange of views on the question of the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, they have agreed on the following:

1. The levels of the armed forces of the United States of America, the USSR and China shall be fixed at 1 to 1.5 million men for each of these Powers; the levels for the United Kingdom and France shall be 650 thousand men each, and the question of the level to be fixed for China, with other related questions concerning the armed forces of China, shall be examined with the participation of the Government of the People's Republic of China.

The levels of armed forces for all other States shall not exceed 150200 thousand men, and shall be subject to agreement at the appropriate international conference.

2. The complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall enter into force when conventional armaments and armed forces have been reduced to the extent of 75 per cent of the agreed reductions. The elimination of these weapons from the armaments of States and their destruction shall be completed during the process of the reduction of armaments by the final 25 per cent of the agreed reductions. All atomic materials shall thereafter be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

3. Simultaneously with the initiation of measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the four Powers, before the entry into force of the agreement on the complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons, shall assume a solemn obligation not to use

1 UN Document, DC/SC.1/29/Rev.1, pp. 1-3.

nuclear weapons, which they shall regard as prohibited to them. Exceptions to this rule may be permitted for purposes of defence against aggression, when a decision to that effect is taken by the Security Council.

4. As one of the first measures for the execution of the programme for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, States possessing atomic and hydrogen weapons shall undertake to discontinue tests of these weapons.

5. Effective international control shall be instituted over the execution of measures for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

6. The heads of government of the four Powers have instructed their Ministers of Foreign Affairs to make every effort to achieve the necessary agreement on any yet unsettled points of the convention referred to above, which shall be subject to examination in the United Nations.

II

At the same time, the heads of government of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France, determined to prevent the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons, which are weapons of mass destruction of human beings, and to liberate the peoples from the threat of devastating atomic war, solemnly declare:

Pending the conclusion of the international convention for the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and France assume the obligation not to be the first to use atomic or hydrogen weapons against any country, and call on all other States to associate themselves with this declaration.

Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly

93. ARMS CENSUS: RESOLUTION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, DECEMBER 5, 1949 1

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

RECALLING its resolution 192 (III) of 19 November 1948, and in particular its recommendation that the Commission for Conventional Armaments, in carrying out its plan of work, devote its first attention to the formulation of proposals for the receipt, checking and publication, by international organ of control within the framework of the Security Council, of full information to be supplied by Member States with regard to their effectives and their conventional armaments,

Having examined the records of the discussions in the Security Council and in the Commission for Conventional Armaments regarding the implementation of the above-mentioned recommendation

1. APPROVES the proposals formulated by the Commission for Conventional Armaments for the submission by Member States of full information on their conventional armaments and armed forces and the verification thereof, as constituting the necessary basis for the implementation of the above-mentioned recommendation;

1 General Assembly Roundup, Fourth Regular Session, Press Release GA/600, Part II, pp. 15–16.

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