Congress certain amendments to the basic law as circumstances have demanded.

In the summer of 1952, the committee decided to begin an intensive study of the problems of atomic power development, and requested the Commission to prepare a statement of its views on this matter. Pending completion of the Commission statement, the committee prepared and issued in December 1952, a 415-page print entitled "Atomic Power and Private Enterprise." This print, the first compilation on the subject, sought to illuminate the problems associated with increased peacetime atomic energy developments.

In the spring of 1953 the Commission submitted its policy statement on atomic power, and the committee held extensive hearings on the subject. During the course of these hearings, the Atomic Energy Commission emphasized that maximum progress in this area required greater contributions in manpower, dollars, and resources from private enterprise, and that legislative revisions would be needed to make this possible. Witnesses from the Department of Defense and the Department of State reported that our nation could invigorate its atomic power development effort without subtracting from our atomic military strength, and that such a broadened attack on peacetime power would advantage our country in its international relations.

The testimony of executive branch representatives and of spokesmen for science, industry, labor, and management heard by the joint committee in the course of the 1953 hearings on atomic power development appears in the 649-page Joint Committee publication on the subject of Atomic Power Development and Private Enterprise, published in the fall of 1953.

The committee has, in addition, maintained a continuing and active interest in all other phases of the atomic program affected by the proposed legislation. Last spring, its Security Subcommittee inquired into the procedures of the Atomic Energy Commission for safeguarding classified information. Its Research and Development Subcommittee held extended hearings on the Commission's 5-year reactor development program and on other related scientific and engineering activities. The weapons program has demanded a large portion of the committee's intense attention.

Thus, through studies, inspections, meetings, hearings, and continuing day-to-day contact with the atomic energy program the committee has amassed a body of information and experience which forms the base underlying the legislation now recommended.

On February 17 of this year, the President of the United States submitted to the Congress a series of recommendations incorporating the proposals of the executive branch for amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. These amendments, aimed at "strengthening the defense and economy of the United States and of the free world," sought to accomplish the following:

First, widened cooperation with our allies in certain atomic energy matters; Second, improved procedures for the control and dissemination of atomic energy information; and

Third, encouragement of broadened participation in the development of peacetime uses of atomic energy in the United States.

Following submission of the President's message to the Congress, the Joint Committee, sitting as a subcommittee of the whole, drafted

a series of amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. On April 15 and 19, the chairman and vice chairman of the Joint Committee introduced into the House and Senate H. R. 8862 and S. 3323, the resulting companion bills. At the time these bills were introduced, attention was drawn to the fact that they would undoubtedly be subject to revision by the Joint Committee during the course of public and executive hearings on the proposed legislation. The committee met almost daily in its consideration of these bills and held many public hearings, at which witnesses representing Government and industry were heard.

Throughout, our deliberations were marked with the spirit of nonpartisanship which has characterized the work of the Joint Committee from its inception. Virtually all differences of opinion originally existing between committee members concerning specific provisions of the legislation were resolved in the course of our discussions, and through a more complete understanding of the problems and the provisions of the measure, and our hearings ended with essential unanimity having been reached on the general provisions of the bills.

On June 30, new bills incorporating the revisions made during the executive meetings on H. R. 8862 and S. 3323, were introduced. It is these bills, H. R. 9757 and S. 3690, which we now unanimously report favorably.

We are aware of the heavy responsibility we now assume in commending this legislation to the Congress, and thereby to the American people. Many imponderables are still involved in trying to chart the future course of atomic progress, and we presume that the legislative changes we now recommend will themselves undoubtedly require revision from time to time.

It is our deep conviction, however, that this legislation will speed atomic progress and will promote the security and well-being of the Nation. It accomplishes the purposes set forth in the President's February 17 message to the Congress. It addresses itself to a needed, across-the-board modernization of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. It proposes changes wherever 8 years of testing the organic law in the hard crucible of actual experience has led the committee to conclude that revisions would make for greater security, efficiency, and economy in the operation of our national atomic energy program.

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE AND THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS

Widened cooperation with our allies in certain atomic energy matters

H. R. 9757 and S. 3690 authorize the negotiation of bilateral agreements for cooperation with foreign nations in the area of peace time uses of atomic energy under carefully stipulated safeguards. The Commission may transfer and exchange restricted data dealing with industrial, nonmilitary uses of atomic energy. Also, under explicitly stated safeguards, the Commission may transfer to another nation, party to an "agreement for cooperation," atomic materials in quantities needed for the development or utilization of atomic energy for nonmilitary and research purposes. Besides allowing bilateral agreements in this field, the legislation also authorizes the President to enter into an international arrangement with a group of nations for the purpose of international cooperation in nonmilitary applications

of atomic energy and thereafter to cooperate with that group of nations, pursuant to agreements for cooperation. The legislation provides a mechanism to implement the President's peacetime International Atomic Pool Plan, outlined in his speech before the United Nations on December 8, 1953.

On the miltary side, the legislation permits the Department of Defense, under comprehensive security safeguards, to transfer to another nation, or to a regional defense organization of which we are a member, restricted data concerning the tactical employment of atomic weapons. Such information includes data necessary to the development of defense plans, the training of personnel in the employment of, and defense against, atomic weapons, and the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons. The types of information that may be communicated to others to achieve these objectives are carefully delineated, and it is made clear that no information which would reveal important or significant data on the design or fabrication of the nuclear portions of atomic weapons, or on the detailed engineering of other important parts of atomic weapons, can be revealed.

We believe that peacetime international atomic energy cooperation on the basis of the terms set forth in this legislation will redound to the mutual benefit of all concerned in such common undertakings. We believe also that the degree of military atomic cooperation envisaged in these amendments will increase the effectiveness of our joint defense planning with other nations in our mutual defense. further believe that the attendant gains to our own security will more than offset the risks taken when any classified military information, irrespective of its sensitivity or quantity, passes beyond our exclusvie control.

We

In making our recommendations for international cooperation, we have proceeded under the policy that security restrictions which prove to be onerous or unnecessary can always be relaxed, whereas the act of abandoning exclusive control over any item of information is irrevocable. Accordingly, we have approached these sections of legislation with great circumspection-preferring to resolve any doubts on the side of caution.

Improvement of procedures for the control and dissemination of atomic energy information

The information control provisions of the organic law and of these bills are built around the concept of restricted data, which the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 defines as "all data concerning the manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or the use of fissionable material in the production of power, but shall not include any data which the Commission from time to time determines may be published without adversely affecting the common defense and security."

Clearance for access to restricted data has been contingent upon an investigation as to character, associations, and loyalty of the individual. The same investigative requirements have applied to all personnel employed by the Atomic Energy Commission or its contractors, whether such employees would in fact have subsequent access to only small amounts of classified information of little security significance, or whether their positions required broad and continuing access to the

most sensitive data in the atomic program. The amended legislation would permit the Atomic Energy Commission, on the basis of established criteria, to relate the scope of background investigation required to the extent and sensitivity of the classified information to which an employee would have access while on the project. We believe that such a practice will make for greater overall security and greater protection of atomic secrets, by permitting the resources of our investigative agencies to be concentrated on those areas where painstaking and scrupulous background checks are most urgently required. As atomic weapons have more and more assumed the status of conventional armaments in our military services, an increasing number of Department of Defense personnel have required access to restricted data. The Atomic Energy Commission is now permitted to disclose restricted data to military personnel qualifying for such information on a need-to-know basis and possessing the appropriate service clearance. At the same time, Commission contractors are prohibited from revealing or disclosing restricted data to military personnel on the basis of their military clearance, requiring instead that potential recipients first secure an Atomic Energy Commission clearance based on investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or by the Civil Service Commission. The amendments would remedy this administrative anomaly by permitting contractors and licensees of the Commission to give Department of Defense personnel access to restricted data under conditions which would assure safeguarding of the information.

Much restricted data concerns the military utilization of atomic weapons. Responsibility for the control of all restricted data, however, is vested in the Atomic Energy Commission. In certain instances, the Department of Defense has desired to remove military utilization information from the restricted data category, and without putting it in the public domain, to handle it under the safeguards used to protect other classified military information. Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, however, information can be removed from the restricted data category only through declassification, following a Commission determination that the publication of this data would not adversely affect the common defense and security. To meet this problem, the bill would permit information relating primarily to the utilization of atomic weapons to be removed from the restricted data category after a joint determination by the Commission and the Department of Defense that the data related primarily to military utilization, and that it should and could be safeguarded under the Espionage Act and other applicable statutes. The Department of Defense would also be given a voice with the Atomic Energy Commission in declassification actions involving restricted data which relates primarily to military utilization of atomic weapons.

The joint committee has been keenly aware of the critical role of information control in helping assure this Nation's continued atomic supremacy. We have recommended legislative changes in this area only after exhaustive consideration of all the factors involved, and on the basis of our carefully considered judgment that these changes will promote our common defense and security.

The domestic development of peacetime uses of atomic energy

The organic law makes the production and use of fissionable material a Government monopoly. Private industry is permitted

neither to own nor possess such material, nor to own or operate atomic reactors or other facilities capable of producing or utilizing these same materials. The basic law stipulates that "All right, title, and interest within or under the jurisdiction of the United States, in or to any fissionable material, now or hereafter produced, shall be the property of the Commission, and shall be deemed to be vested in the Commission by virtue of this act." It defines "fissionable material" as "plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope-235, or any other material which the Commission deems to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy through nuclear chain reactions of the material, or any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing.

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The phrase "fissionable material" is stricken from the proposed legislation, and the new words "special nuclear material" are substituted in its stead. This change is intended to clarify the original provision of the act to give to the Commission, in addition to the power to determine and regulate the use of materials utilizable in the fission process, the power to perform the same functions in respect to materials which can be utilized in fusion processes.

This report has already summarized the considerations underlying the stringent prohibitions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 against private participation in atomic energy. It has also made clear that changing conditions now not only permit but require a relaxation of these prohibitions if atomic energy is to contribute in the fullest possible measure to our national security and progress.

The recommended legislation therefore permits the Commission to license private industry, to possess and use special nuclear materials. The United States Government, however, would retain title to such materials. The legislation also permits private persons, under license of the Commission, to own reactors intended to produce and utilize such materials.

It is our firmly held conviction that increased private participation in atomic power development, under the terms stipulated in this proposed legislation, will measurably accelerate our progress toward the day when economic atomic power will be a fact. It is likewise our conviction that the safeguards written into this legislation will prevent special interests from winning undue advantages at the expense of the national interest.

We do not believe that the efforts of free enterprise, using its own resources and moneys, are by themselves adequate to achieve the speediest possible attack on the goal of peacetime power. Neither do we believe that maximum progress toward this objective will be afforded by an effort relying exclusively on governmental research and development, using the public's moneys. We believe, rather, that teamwork between Government and industry-teamwork of the type encouraged by these amendments is the key to optimum progress, efficiency, and economy in this area of atomic endeavor. In other words, our legislative proposals aim at encouraging flourishing research and development programs under both Government and private auspices.

We are mindful of the fact that in the immedia te future, relatively few firms may be involved in this effort. We acknowledge that dangers of restrictive patent practices are present, though not inherent, in such a situation. Accordingly, we recommend to the Congress that holders of patents on inventions of primary importance to the