Given the ratification of the Atlantic Pact, the committee does not believe it desirable to encourage the extension of assistance to countries of Western Europe on a bilateral basis at this time. It is believed that the committee amendments outlined above should greatly encourage the formation of common defense plans on a multilateral basis in accordance with the terms of the pact.

10. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MAP AND ERP

The military assistance program has been developed with constant attention to the primary need for economic recovery in Europe. The committee approves this approach on the ground that no nation or group of nations can hope to achieve a genuine peace unless they first provide a way of life for their people based upon sound economic conditions.

It is also recognized, however, that no program for economic recovery today can proceed on the assumption that there is a guaranty of world peace without the accomplishment of mutual defense measures adequate to deter potential aggressors. Many, if not all, of the ERP nations are living in a state of insecurity brought about by a knowledge of the serious limitations on their ability to resist aggression. It is the conviction of the committee that as long as this feeling of insecurity exists, it will be extremely difficult to bring about any permanent measure of economic well-being. It is therefore felt that the European recovery program will receive an added stimulus from the atmosphere of security that a successful joint defense effort will engender.

Recognizing the fundamental interrelationship between the two programs ECA has participated actively in the formulation of the military assistance program. It has expressed its conviction that the program as presented to Congress will not have an adverse effect on the economic recovery program, but will, in fact, contribute to the recovery effort by achieving a greater degree of mutual cooperation among European nations and by stimulating within those nations a confidence in their ability to resist external and internal aggression. The military-assistance program could possibly have an adverse effect on economic recovery in two ways. First, if the supplies of military equipment from the United States were furnished on too large a scale they might strain the fiscal ability of the receiving countries to put them to effective use, might call for the diversion of too much labor from productive occupations to service in armed forces, and might tax facilities for handling and caring for the equipment provided. The committee believes however that the program presented to the Senate, which will emphasize balancing and modernizing the equipment of forces already planned for, rather than any increase in these forces, will have little or no effect on the receiving countries' total economies.

A second possible effect would be an undue strain on the economies of recipient nations by virtue of too large an increase in indigenous military production. Additional military production on the scale presently contemplated, however, should have no significant adverse effect. The amounts of increased military production that various European countries are expected to undertake have been carefully measured against their budgetary ability to finance the costs involved.

Both ECA and the OEEC have stressed that fiscal year 1950 must be the year of general financial stabilization. The added productive burdens which the North Atlantic Pact countries have agreed to shoulder were weighed with this objective in mind. Facilities already in existence in those countries, which can be readily put into production, are ample to make the agreed amounts of new equipment. [III. Aid to Other Countries, omitted.]

IV. THE UNITED NATIONS AND MAP

13. PROVISIONS IN THE LEGISLATION RELATING TO THE UN

The present program is a measure for collective defense and mutual assistance designed to enable free nations which are acting in support of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter to preserve their independence and freedom and to fulfill effectively their obligations under the Charter. To the extent that it is successful it will strengthen the United Nations and assist in the fulfillment of the purposes of that organization.

There are numerous provisions in the bill which the committee believes underscore categorically the continuation of this country's support of the United Nations and our obligations under the Charter. That policy, as recently restated in Senate Resolution 239, is reaffirmed, and specific direction is also given so that maximum efforts are to be made to obtain agreements (1) on providing the UN with armed forces and (2) on universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation. Clearly, this country will be subject to any future obligations which may arise with respect to action under article 26, which deals with the regulation of armaments.

Further, the agreements required before aid is furnished must include provisions that make certain the furnishing of equipment and materials, services, or other assistance is consistent with the Charter. Assistance is to be terminated if such aid contravenes any decision of the Security Council or if the President determines that such aid would be helping any nation against which the UN is taking preventive or enforcement action (sec. 404c).

In conclusion, there is no doubt that the program is consistent with the peaceful objectives of the UN and the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter. [V. Cost of the Program, omitted]

[VI. Administration of Program, omitted]

24. TERMINATION OF THE PROGRAM

Notwithstanding the fact that it is impossible specifically to answer the broad question of how long world conditions will be such as to require some degree of military assistance and mutual support, the committee is of the opinion that the operation of the specific program proposed by this legislation should be definitely capable of prompt termination in case such action is necessary. Not only must it be possible for the President to effect such termination under certain conditions, but the Congress must also have specific recourse in this field.

With the foregoing in mind, the committee has provided in section 405 the several circumstances which would require the breaking off of all or a part of the program: (1) If a recipient requests that aid to it shall cease; (2) if the aid is no longer consistent with our national interest or the purpose and policies of this act; (3) if such aid contravenes a decision of the Security Council; (4) if the President determines such aid would violate our Charter obligation to desist from helping a nation against which the United States is taking preventive or enforcement action; (5) if there is a concurrent resolution by the two Houses of Congress requiring termination. In addition, subsection 408 (f) represents an important requirement regarding termination by providing that any equipment or materials procured for signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty under title I may be retained for our use, and shall not be disposed of to any foreign signatory, if the President determines such disposal will not promote the self-help, mutual aid, and collective capacity to resist armed attack as contemplated by the treaty, or if Congress calls for such retention by concurrent resolution.

The committee believes that these specific provisions for the termination of the program amply protect the interests of the United States.

25. THIS PROGRAM IS NOT AN ARMAMENT RACE

The committee is aware of the contention that this program marks the beginning of our participation in a global armament race.

The committee wishes to emphasize that it is not the purpose or the intent either of the United States or the other countries to whom assistance is proposed, to build up military manpower forces comparable in size to those of the Soviet Union. That nation has consistently maintained the largest military force in the postwar world, with over 5,000,000 men under arms. It has increased its military budget for 1949 by 19 percent over that of 1948; there has been progress in the training of its troops-the ground forces are estimated to be in better condition than at any time since the war; it has increased the security measures along its borders and the borders of its satellites. The Soviet force in Germany was recently increased from 70 to 100 thousand men. All of this activity demonstrated that in the face of the complete demoblization of the forces of the United States and the European nations, and without a competing program of military improvement, the Soviet policy has been and is to increase its military strength. This policy is apparently a deliberate one on the part of the Soviet Government and would exist whether or not a program of aid to free nations is undertaken by the United States.

Nevertheless, the committee holds to the view that the program of aid proposed seeks only to improve the effectiveness of forces supported by the budgets of the European nations, and cannot possibly provide the strength required to undertake aggression; the program is wholly defensive in nature. The United States remains committed to the purposes and principles of the United Nations and is fully ready to cooperate in any program of armament regulation worked out by the United Nations, as again stated in the present bill, if such program will provide adequate safeguards to assure the observance by all parties of any resolution or convention restricting armaments.

It has been Soviet intransigence, not a reluctance on the part of the United States, which has so far prevented the accomplishment of such a program.

VIII. CONCLUSION

26. EFFECT ON THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES

Throughout its consideration of this bill the committee has scrutinized the effect which the proposals herein recommended might have. upon the security of the United States. The impact of a program such as this one upon our own military position might conceivably manifest itself directly, through a weakening of the United States military forces, or less directly, by contravening parts of our foreign policy.

In examining the effects of the program on our own military forces, the combined knowledge and experience of the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations has been applied. The detailed break-down of the aid program, showing types and amounts of matériel, has been available. It has been examined against the requirements of our own Military Establishment, both as they exist today and as they might exist in case of a mobilization. The committee feels that the equipment, matériel, and services to be provided by this bill are fully within the capabilities of the Nation, are geared to present inventories and strategic plans, and will in no way weaken the combat effectiveness of our own military units or forces.

As to the effects of the program on our foreign policy, the committee is confident that this legislation is sound. The declaration contained in the preamble to the bill clearly points out that the giving of this military assistance has been found necessary to further our national policy of fostering peace and security. The detailed provisions of the legislation are designed to assist free nations to achieve a greater degree of security without impeding their efforts toward economic recovery. The concept of developing collectively the capacity of the free nations of the world to resist aggression is basic both to the North Atlantic Treaty and to this bill, and the committee is firmly of the opinion that our own national security will be well served by the enactment of the legislation.

[Appendix omitted.]

219. MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1949, OCTOBER 6, 1949

(EXCERPT) 1
AN ACT

To promote the foreign policy and provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States by furnishing military assistance to foreign nations.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949".

1 Public Law 329, 81st Congress, 1st session.

FINDINGS AND DECLARATION OF POLICY

The Congress of the United States reaffirms the policy of the United States to achieve international peace and security through the United Nations so that armed force shall not be used except in the common interest. The Congress hereby finds that the efforts of the United States and other countries to promote peace and security in furtherance of the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations require additional measures of support based upon the principle of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid. These measures include the furnishing of military assistance essential to enable the United States and other nations dedicated to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter to participate effectively in arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in support of those purposes and principles. In furnishing such military assistance, it remains the policy of the United States to continue to exert maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as contemplated in the Charter and agreements to achieve universal control of weapons of mass destruction and universal regulation and reduction of armaments, including armed forces, under adequate safeguards to protect complying nations against violation and evasion.

The Congress hereby expresses itself as favoring the creation by the free countries and the free peoples of the Far East of a joint organization, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to establish a program of self-help and mutual cooperation designed to develop their economic and social well-being, to safeguard basic rights and liberties and to protect their security and independence.

The Congress recognizes that economic recovery is essential to international peace and security and must be given clear priority. The Congress also recognizes that the increased confidence of free peoples in their ability to resist direct or indirect aggression and to maintain internal security will advance such recovery and support political stability.

*

TITLE IV

GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 401. Military assistance may be furnished under this Act, without payment to the United States except as provided in the agreements concluded pursuant to section 402, by the provision of any service, or by the procurement from any source and the transfer to eligible nations of equipment, materials, and services: Provided, That no equipment or materials may be transferred out of military stocks if the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, determines that such transfer would be detrimental to the national security of the United States or is needed by the reserve components of the armed forces to meet their training requirements. SEC. 402. The President shall, prior to the furnishing of assistance to any eligible nation, conclude agreements with such nation or group of such nations, which agreements, in addition to such other provisions as the President deems necessary to effectuate the policies and pur