The four treaties further contain obligations to grant the full exercise of human rights and the enjoyment of the fundamental freedoms to the people in the territories affected. Maintenance by the ex-enemy states of military, naval, and air forces, armaments, and fortifications is limited in harmony with the principles of the Atlantic Charter to the strengths necessary for local defense and internal order.

The extent of reparations which had been claimed against these states is finally settled by the treaties. The problem itself presented marked difficulties between the claims of those states which were devastated by the forces of the ex-enemy states and therefore felt entitled to require that reparation be made to the greatest degree possible, and those countries which felt that the important thing was to build a sound basis of economic rehabilitation for the future. Agreements as finally reached were determined by the prior armistice commitments or by agreement on the amount which could be paid without depriving the states in question of the essential resources necessary to enable them to live without external assistance and without placing additional burdens upon the Allied and Associated Powers. The provisions relating to Italian colonies, while not providing a final settlement, lifted this issue from the controversial aspects of conflicting claims. By affording opportunity for consultation, not only among the interested governments but with the peoples of the areas in question, the treaties give promise that any final solution will be in harmony with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The settlement involving Trieste and the establishment of the Italo-Yugoslav frontier gave rise to the greatest difficulties throughout the entire negotiations. Without a settlement of this problem it seemed likely that no over-all agreement could be secured. When agreement upon the ethnic solution proposed by the United States proved impossible, and no agreement could be reached on alternative frontiers proposed by different delegations, internationalization of this area was suggested as the only means possible of achieving agreement. The United States then took the lead in making certain that the security and independence of any such area should be assured by the Security Council, the body which has been entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining peace. Guaranties have been inserted so that the population of this area may be free to enjoy the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed to all peoples by the United Nations Charter and may develop their own institutions under the protection of international authority. The frontier line between Italy and Yugoslavia establishes furthermore a certain balance between the two ethnic groups. The statute for the free port of Trieste was drawn with the aim of making it possible for Trieste to resume its traditional place as a port for the hinterland of Central Europe without the conflicting rivalries of national sovereignties impeding its development.

It is important to note that the treaties established the obligation that none of the states in question should for a period of 18 months be permitted to discriminate among the nations in matters pertaining to commerce and industry. Thus the principle of the open door in commerce and economic relations has been established for a period sufficient to permit the subsequent incorporation of this principle in bilateral commercial treaties which will in any case have to be nego

tiated, and to give to the United Nations time to agree in a more general way upon future commercial practices to govern international trade.

The treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary each contain a provision to insure that navigation upon the Danube is to be free and open to the nationals, vessels of commerce, and goods of all states on a footing of equality, thus establishing the principle that artificial barriers and discriminatory practices at least as regards this important international waterway should be eliminated. Although provision is not contained in the treaties themselves, the Council of Foreign Ministers further agreed that a conference would be held within 6 months for the purpose of establishing an international regime in respects of the Danube.

The treaties likewise provide that the property of the United Nations removed as a consequence of occupation of their territories by enemy forces should be returned, and that the property of these nations and their nationals in the territories of the ex-enemy states themselves must either be restored to their owners or if loss or damage prevents restoration, the owner should receive compensation in local currency. This was set at the rate of two-thirds of the loss suffered, sufficient to compensate the owner in part and at the same time to avoid placing too heavy a burden upon the economic reconstruction of the countries in question.

229. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, JUNE 6, 19491

PART I. BACKGROUND

1. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE TREATY

The basic objective of the treaty is to assist in achieving the primary purpose of the United Nations-the maintenance of peace and security. It is designed to do so by making clear the determination of the members of the North Atlantic community to safeguard their common heritage of freedom by exercising collectively their inherent right of self-defense in the event of an armed attack upon any of them, while making clear at the same time their determination to live in peace with all governments and all peoples.

2. TEXT OF NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

[For text of the North Atlantic Treaty see document 129.]

3. BACKGROUND OF TREATY

The paramount desire of the American people is and always has been for peace and freedom. Since 1776 they have constantly striven, and sometimes fought, to maintain their own freedom and to further the development of freedom elsewhere. They have always sought to live in peace with all men.

18. Ex. Rept. No. 8, 81st Cong., 1st sess.

Since 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated, this Government has contributed to the peace and freedom of the Americas by making clear that it would regard an armed attack upon any part of the Americas as an attack upon the United States. No other doctrine has become more deeply imbedded in American foreign policy. In 1947 all the American Republics joined in signing the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, which provided that each would regard an attack on any one of them as an attack upon all.

Since World War II

In 1945 the United States Government and the American people wholeheartedly accepted the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations. In doing so they undertook the obligation not to use force except in conformity with the Charter and the responsibility, not only of living up to that obligation but of using their influence to see that other powers live up to it. No government has labored harder or more unceasingly to reach international understanding through the United Nations and to make the United Nations a more effective instrument.

Unfortunately one great power and a small group of nations under its domination have not only refused to cooperate in the establishment of a just and lasting peace, but have sought to prevent it, both within and without the United Nations. That power and its fifth columns in other countries have sought to prevent the establishment of such a peace. It has sought to obstruct efforts for the promotion of human welfare and stability in order to profit from human misery and hunger in propagating its own system and advancing its own imperialistic ends.

This threat to free institutions everywhere has caused free nations to draw together in increased cooperation for both defense and economic recovery, as reflected in the Brussels Treaty and the Convention for European Economic Cooperation. The United States Government, in giving effect to the desire of the American people to assist in promoting peace and freedom, has taken far-reaching steps to this end in the act to provide for assistance to Greece and Turkey and in the European recovery program of 1948 and 1949.

Senate Resolution 239.-The concern of the American people at the unfavorable trend of postwar developments led to the introduction into the Senate during the Eightieth Congress of a large number of resolutions which aspired to change the United Nations Charter or to chart a more effective course for United States foreign policy through the United Nations. The committee thoroughly canvassed the issues involved, in close cooperation with the Department of State, and, on May 19, 1948, unanimously approved Senate Resolution 239, which sought to focus these aspirations on the most constructive measures it considered practicable.

That resolution was adopted by the Senate on June 11, 1948, by a vote of 64-4. It advised the President

of the sense of the Senate that this Government, by constitutional process, should particularly pursue the following objectives within the United Nations Charter: (1) Voluntary agreement to remove the veto from all questions involving pacific settlements of international disputes and situations, and from the admission of new members.

(2) Progressive development of regional and other collective arrangements for individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the purposes, principles, and provisions of the Charter.

(3) Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security.

(4) Contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its deter mination to exercise the right of individual or coller tive self-defense under article 51 should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.

(5) Maximum efforts to obtain agreements to provide the United Nations with armed forces as provided by the Charter, and to obtain agreement among member nations upon universal regulation and reduction of armaments under adequate and dependable guaranty against violation.

(6) If necessary, after adequate effort toward strengthening the United Nations, review of the Charter at an appropriate time by a General Confer ence called under article 109 or by the General Assembly.

Pursuant to this advice the President in July authorized the Secre tary of State to enter into exploratory conversations on the security of the North Atlantic area with representatives of the Governments of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. These conversations resulted in October in agree ment that the establishment by treaty of a collective defense arrangement for the North Atlantic area within the framework of the United Nations Charter was desirable and necessary. The North Atlantic Treaty was accordingly negotiated and signed on April 4, 1949, by representatives of the seven governments which had participated in the initial conversations and of the Governments of Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, and Portugal.

Executive-legislative cooperation.-The committee commends the close cooperation between the executive branch and the Senate, which has characterized the development of this treaty from inception to conclusion as an example of how important matters in the field of foreign relations should be handled. First the committee and the De partment of State considered together the problems facing the United States in this field and the courses of action best suited to deal with them. The Senate then gave the President its advice as to particula objectives to be sought. The executive branch faithfully followed the advice of the Senate and, during the negotiations with the other gor ernments, consulted fully with the committee, which played an effec tive part in formulating the terms of the treaty. From the beginning the deliberations of both the committee and the Senate on Senate Res olution 239 and the treaty have been conducted on a wholly nonpar tisan basis. Finally, in order to give the American and other people the earliest possible opportunity to consider the treaty, its terms were made public considerably in advance of signature, as soon as they had been agreed upon by the negotiating governments.

4. COMMITTEE HEARINGS AND ACTION

The committee discussed with the Secretary of State the draft the North Atlantic Treaty in two informal executive meetings of February 18 and March 8. The treaty, made public on March was signed in Washington on April 4, and was transmitted to k Senate on April 12. Before commencing public hearings the comittee met again on April 21 to consider the relationship of the tre to the proposed military-assistance program. Public hearings."ginning on April 27, were held on 16 days-April 27-29, May 29-13, and 16-18. Besides the committee members, various Sen attended or participated in the cross-examination of the witnes

The very extensive and thorough hearings comprise three printed volumes.

The first administration witness was Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson on April 27, 1949. The Hon. Warren R. Austin, Chief, United States Mission to the United Nations; Hon. Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense: Hon. W. A. Harriman, United States special representative in Europe of the Economic Cooperation Administration; Hon. Robert A. Lovett, former Under Secretary of State, and Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff of the United States Army and representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, completed the testimony presented for the administration by May 3.

In the succeeding weeks the committee heard all witnesses who requested to be heard. Among the 90 nongovernmental witnesses were representatives from a number of our important business, labor, agricultural, church, veterans, and service groups. In addition, the committee also received communications from organizations, such as the American Federation of Labor, the United States Chamber of Commerce, and the Junior Chamber of Commerce, placing them on record as favoring the treaty.

Following the conclusion of public hearings, the committee met in executive session on June 2 and 6 to evaluate the evidence gained in committee hearings and to consider the committee report. On June 6 the committee voted unanimously (13-0) to report the treaty favorably to the Senate with the recommendation that it be approved for ratification.

PART II. GENERAL NATURE OF THE TREATY

The treaty establishes a collective defense arrangement for the North Atlantic area within the framework of the United Nations Charter and based upon the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter. In many respects it is similar to and patterned upon the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro.

The 12 signatories of the treaty are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The treaty is subject to review at any time after 10 years and any party may cease to be a party after 20 years; otherwise it is of indefinite duration.

General objectives of the treaty

The primary objective of the treaty is to contribute to the maintenance of peace by making clear the determination of the parties collectively to resist armed attack upon any of them.

It is designed to strengthen the system of law based upon the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It should go far to remove any uncertainty which might mislead potential aggressors as to the determination of the parties fully to carry out their obligations under the Charter and collectively to resist an armed attack.

The security of the North Atlantic area is vital to the national security of the United States and of key importance to world peace and security. The peoples of the North Atlantic area are linked together not only by the interdependence of their security but by a common heritage and civilization and devotion to their free institutions, based upon the principles of democracy, individual liberty and