I think it would be very fortunate if [a Pacific security system could be developed] and it certainly is a possibility which we have very much in mind, but it does not seem as though that could be achieved at any early predictable date.

The committee, while concurring in the Secretary's evaluation of the prospects for a Pacific Pact, wishes nonetheless to express its belief that such a pact is a desirable ultimate objective of United States policy in the Pacific and hopes that the Department of State will continue to encourage such a development. The security of the Pacific area would be measurably enhanced if the nations of that region would join and work together for their regional and collective self-defense.

12. NEED FOR RATIFICATION NOW

The terms of the Korean armistice agreement state that after January 22, 1954, all prisoners in the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission shall be released. At the same time, the prospects for a political conference on Korea are not encouraging, preliminary negotiations having been broken off in December. These two facts combine to make the Korean situation uncertain.

The committee, in view of this circumstance, explored with administration witnesses the timing of the United States ratification of this treaty. It was their consensus that prompt action by the Senate would be helpful. Secretary Dulles testified:

It is my judgment that it is wise to act now, and promptly, because this treaty will be, itself, one of the stabilizing factors. ***

A postponement of action on the treaty could not but raise doubt in the minds of enemies of the Republic of Korea as to what our intentions were.

And General Ridgway added:

I would think the sooner the treaty were in effect, the better, in our interests. The committee concurs in these opinions, in the conviction that the entry into effect of this treaty, which the Republic of Korea has already ratified, will be a stabilizing factor in the Korean situation.

13. CONCLUSIONS

The committee believes that the objectives of this treaty are important to the security of the United States in the Far East. The treaty constitutes an essential link in the system of collective security thus far developed. Because it gives clear and formal notice to would-be aggressors that we will react with prompt measures to defend the peace in the event of an attack upon an area vital to our safety, it eliminates a factor which may have played a major role in the outbreak of the major wars of this century-that of miscalculation by the enemy as to what our conduct would be.

While there are risks in any course of action of this kind in the Pacific, there are greater risks in not advising a potential enemy just what he can expect us to do, and in not recognizing the advantages to the United States in having a powerful and loyal ally whose subjects fought valiantly at our side during a 3-year campaign in the interests of peace and justice.

For these reasons the Committee on Foreign Relations urges the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of this treaty, subject to the understanding noted above.

[Appendix omitted.]

236. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENSE TREATY, JANUARY 25, 19551

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to whom was referred the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Ex. K, 83d Cong., 2d sess.) and the protocol thereto signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, reports both instruments to the Senate, and recommends that its advice and consent to ratification be given at an early date.

1. MAIN PURPOSE OF THE TREATY AND PROTOCOL

This treaty constitutes an important step in the evolution of United States policy to create a system of collective security in the Western Pacific area. It is the latest addition to the protective network of mutual defense treaties which have been concluded by the United States with Japan, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, and Korea.

Designed to promote security and to strengthen the fabric of peace in southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, the treaty is intended to deter aggression in that area by warning potential aggressors that an open armed attack upon the territory of any of the parties will be regarded by each of them as dangerous to its own peace and safety (art. IV, par. 1). In such circumstances the parties agree to meet the common danger in accordance with their constitutional processes. They also agree to consult on measures to be taken for the common defense, whenever the territorial integrity or political independence of any of the parties is threatened in any way other than by armed attack, or by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace the area (art. IV, par. 2). Internal subversion directed from with would be an example of one such fact or situation calling for cons tation.

The treaty is thus a mechanism for collective defense against b open armed attack and internal subversion, and it is in this la respect primarily that it differs from the previous bilateral and ir lateral security treaties in the Pacific. As with the Korean Muta Defense Treaty (Ex. A, 83d Cong., 2d sess.) and similar defene treaties, the parties to the treaty reaffirm their solemn obliga under the Charter of the United Nations to settle their disputes ** peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force in th international relations (art. I). The treaty pledges them to main's " and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist art attack, and, further, to prevent and counter subversive activities rected from without against their territorial integrity and po stability (art. II). It provides for cooperation in developing measte including technical assistance designed to promote the econ progress and social well-being of the parties (art. III, for imme consultation whenever their territorial integrity or political indepen ence is threatened by other than armed attack or any fact endange the peace (art. IV, par. 2), and for the creation of a council to cous matters pertaining to the implementation of the treaty ar Other articles define the area to which the treaty shall apply VIII) and the circumstances under which other states may be ma

1 U. S. Congress. Senate. Executive Report No. 1, 84th Congress, 2d session..

to accede to its terms (art. VII). Finally, an understanding is incorporated in the text of the instrument itself by which the United States declares that the armed aggression referred to in article IV as dangerous to its peace and security would be Communist aggression.

The protocol designates the States of Laos and Cambodia and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam as states or territories for the purposes of article IV, thus bringing into play the obligations of the parties with respect to armed attack and indirect aggression against this addition to the "treaty area". At the same time those countries are made eligible for the kind of economic measures and technical assistance contemplated in article III of the treaty.

2. BACKGROUND OF THE TREATY

At the time that negotiations were begun in 1950 leading to the Japanese security treaty and to the series of separate security pacts in the Pacific area, it was hoped that a rather broad type of collective security arrangement might be worked out. It was not then possible to realize this goal, and further action on a multipartite protective umbrella over Southeast Asia had to be deferred as long as active hostilities continued in Indochina. The defense treaties with Japan, the Philippines and Australia and New Zealand, which were approved by the Senate on March 20, 1952, were not regarded as ultimate ends in themselves, but were expressly conceived as measures taken "pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security" in the Pacific area. Following an address by President Eisenhower on April 16, 1953, in which he advocated "united action for Southeast Asia", Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sought during the next year to complete a pact covering this area. Until after the Geneva armistice agreements were concluded, however, circumstances made that impracticable.

In the course of hearings on the Korean Defense Treaty (Ex. A, 83d Cong., 2d sess.) the committee had stated its conviction that a multilateral agreement for the Pacific, comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty, would be desirable. Secretary Dulles, however, pointed out that substantial cultural, political, and geographical differences existed among the Pacific countries which distinguished this area from Europe and constituted serious obstacles to achieving the desired development at an early date. The committee acknowledged these difficulties but nevertheless expressed the hope that the Department of State would continue its efforts to encourage the nations of the Pacific to work together for their regional and collective selfdefense.

After 4 months of negotiations between the United States and other governments, it was announced on August 14, 1954 that upon the invitation of the Government of the Philippines, the Foreign Ministers of the Governments concerned had agreed to meet on September 6 to consider measures to further their common objectives. At the request of the President, two members of the committee, Senator H. Alexander Smith and Senator Michael J. Mansfield, accompanied Secretary Dulles to Manila as plenipotentiary delegates and, together with him, signed the treaty, the protocol and a "Pacific Charter" which was also adopted at the conference. The charter, a declaration

of principles dedicating the signatory governments to the ideals of self-determination and independence, does not require ratification. The treaty and protocol were signed on September 8, 1954, and transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent on November 10, 1954.

3. COMMITTEE ACTION

Because the administration was particularly concerned that the last session of Congress should not close without some preliminary consideration being given to the treaty, the committee decided to act with unusual dispatch. Accordingly, the first public hearing was held on November 11, 1954, the morning after the President had transmitted the pertinent documents to the Senate. There was no intention to press for further action on the treaty at that time; but it was hoped that such a demonstration of the Government's continued interest in the pact would provide additional impetus to other signatories to proceed promptly with their own ratification. At the hearing of November 11, extended testimony was heard from Secretary Dulles on the various legal and political implications of the treaty, and, more briefly, from Adm. Arthur C. Davis, Director of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs speaking on behalf of the Department of Defense.

After the 84th Congress had convened, the committee considered the treaty in executive session on January 13, 1955, when additionsi testimony was received from the Secretary of State. This second appearance of Mr. Dulles was useful in bringing the committee up to date on events bearing upon the treaty since its transmittal to the Senate, and in reviewing for the committee and its two new members (Senators Barkley and Morse) the underlying conditions deemed by the Secretary of State to justify expeditious action.

A second public hearing was held on January 19. Hon. Hamilto Fish, former Congressman from New York, representing the American Political Action Committee, Miss Freda Utley, on behalf of the American China Policy Association, and Mrs. Agnes Waters appeared and were heard.

On January 21, the committee agreed, by a vote of 14 to 1, to report both the treaty and the protocol to the Senate for final action.

The committee desires to commend the executive branch for 13 efforts to keep the committee thoroughly informed during the course of the negotiations. In the preliminary discussions as well as at the conference itself a spirit of cooperation was exhibited between the legislative and executive branches which contributed greatly to the satisfactory outcome of the proceedings.

4. SUMMARY OF TREATY PROVISIONS

The basic design of the treaty is similar to that of defense treaties previously concluded with Korea, the Philippines, and the ANZUS countries, but with several important differences.

In the preamble, the parties reaffirm their sovereign equality, the faith in the United Nations Charter, their desire to live in peace wi all peoples and all governments and the intentions expressed in the Manila Charter to uphold the principles of equal rights and se determination of peoples. The reaffirmation of these principles

accompanied by a declaration that the parties will strive to promote self-government and to secure independence for all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities. The preamble further sets forth as the fundamental purposes of the treaty, coordination of the parties' efforts for collective defense and the preservation of security, warning potential aggressors that the signatories stand together. Thus the character of the instrument as a peaceful arrangement for defense against aggression is plainly marked.

Article I reproduces the undertaking found in other security treaties to settle any international disputes in which the parties may be involved, by peaceful means, and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. This article takes cognizance of the status of all signatories as members of the United Nations.

Article II embodies the principle of the Vandenberg resolution (S. Res. 239, 80th Cong.) characteristic of the other mutual security treaties. It pledges the parties, separately and jointly, through self-help and mutual aid to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity not only to resist armed attack; but also

to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

This recognition of the dangers of subversion and indirect aggression introduces an element not found in the system of defense agreements which preceded the Southeast Asian Treaty; in none of the prior pacts is there a provision for countering subversion, although the Japanese Security Treaty does contemplate the use of United States forces to put down large-scale riots and disturbances instigated by an outside power (art. I). Article II, therefore, seeks to stimulate positive action to defeat the erosive devices which international communism has utilized to destroy the freedom and independence of nations. Under article III the parties agree to cooperate in developing economic measures, including technical assistance, designed to promote their economic progress and social well-being. This is accompanied by an undertaking to strengthen the parties' free institutions. No comparable provision appears in any of the previous defense treaties. It is founded upon the conviction that if the free nations can develop their internal stability through economic cooperation, the ground for Communist penetration will be rendered less fertile. However, the article does not commit the United States to a specific aid program, nor does it preclude continued economic cooperation with any country whose economic welfare is important to our own well-being and the stability of the treaty area.

5. OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE IV

Article IV contains the activating, operative core of the treaty. Paragraph 1 corresponds generally to article III of the Korean Treaty and article V of the Philippine and Australia-New Zealand Treaties in the recognition by each party that—

aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety.